OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
- Changes between 1.0.2d and 1.0.2e [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.2h and 1.0.2i [xx XXX xxxx]
- *) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
- return an error
- [Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen <ismo.puustinen@intel.com>]
+ *)
- *) Rewrite PSK to support ECDHE_PSK, DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK. Add ciphersuites
- from RFC4279, RFC4785, RFC5487, RFC5489.
+ Changes between 1.0.2g and 1.0.2h [3 May 2016]
- Thanks to Christian J. Dietrich and Giuseppe D'Angelo for the
- original RSA_PSK patch.
- [Steve Henson]
+ *) Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check
- *) Dropped support for the SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED flag. This SSLeay
- era flag was never set throughout the codebase (only read). Also removed
- SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER which was only used if
- SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED was also set.
- [Matt Caswell]
+ A MITM attacker can use a padding oracle attack to decrypt traffic
+ when the connection uses an AES CBC cipher and the server support
+ AES-NI.
- *) Changed the default name options in the "ca", "crl", "req" and "x509"
- to be "oneline" instead of "compat".
- [Richard Levitte]
+ This issue was introduced as part of the fix for Lucky 13 padding
+ attack (CVE-2013-0169). The padding check was rewritten to be in
+ constant time by making sure that always the same bytes are read and
+ compared against either the MAC or padding bytes. But it no longer
+ checked that there was enough data to have both the MAC and padding
+ bytes.
- *) Remove SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG. This is SSLeay legacy, we're
- not aware of clients that still exhibit this bug, and the workaround
- hasn't been working properly for a while.
- [Emilia Käsper]
+ This issue was reported by Juraj Somorovsky using TLS-Attacker.
+ (CVE-2016-2107)
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
- *) The return type of BIO_number_read() and BIO_number_written() as well as
- the corresponding num_read and num_write members in the BIO structure has
- changed from unsigned long to uint64_t. On platforms where an unsigned
- long is 32 bits (e.g. Windows) these counters could overflow if >4Gb is
- transferred.
- [Matt Caswell]
+ *) Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow
- *) Given the pervasive nature of TLS extensions it is inadvisable to run
- OpenSSL without support for them. It also means that maintaining
- the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT option within the code is very invasive (and probably
- not well tested). Therefore the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT option has been removed.
- [Matt Caswell]
+ An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function which is used for
+ Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
+ amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
+ corruption.
- *) Removed support for the two export grade static DH ciphersuites
- EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA and EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA. These two ciphersuites
- were newly added (along with a number of other static DH ciphersuites) to
- 1.0.2. However the two export ones have *never* worked since they were
- introduced. It seems strange in any case to be adding new export
- ciphersuites, and given "logjam" it also does not seem correct to fix them.
- [Matt Caswell]
+ Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function is primarly used by
+ the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the
+ OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data
+ from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered
+ vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly
+ with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable.
- *) Version negotiation has been rewritten. In particular SSLv23_method(),
- SSLv23_client_method() and SSLv23_server_method() have been deprecated,
- and turned into macros which simply call the new preferred function names
- TLS_method(), TLS_client_method() and TLS_server_method(). All new code
- should use the new names instead. Also as part of this change the ssl23.h
- header file has been removed.
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-2105)
[Matt Caswell]
- *) Support for Kerberos ciphersuites in TLS (RFC2712) has been removed. This
- code and the associated standard is no longer considered fit-for-purpose.
+ *) Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow
+
+ An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function. If an attacker
+ is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check can overflow
+ resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL
+ internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function all usage is one of two
+ forms. The first form is where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be
+ the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that
+ specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and
+ therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are
+ one of these two forms, it is believed that there can be no overflows in
+ internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths.
+ Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). All instances
+ of these calls have also been analysed too and it is believed there are no
+ instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur.
+
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-2106)
[Matt Caswell]
- *) RT2547 was closed. When generating a private key, try to make the
- output file readable only by the owner. This behavior change might
- be noticeable when interacting with other software.
+ *) Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation
- *) Added HTTP GET support to the ocsp command.
- [Rich Salz]
+ When ASN.1 data is read from a BIO using functions such as d2i_CMS_bio()
+ a short invalid encoding can casuse allocation of large amounts of memory
+ potentially consuming excessive resources or exhausting memory.
- *) RAND_pseudo_bytes has been deprecated. Users should use RAND_bytes instead.
- [Matt Caswell]
+ Any application parsing untrusted data through d2i BIO functions is
+ affected. The memory based functions such as d2i_X509() are *not* affected.
+ Since the memory based functions are used by the TLS library, TLS
+ applications are not affected.
- *) Added support for TLS extended master secret from
- draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-03.txt. Thanks for Alfredo Pironti for an
- initial patch which was a great help during development.
- [Steve Henson]
+ This issue was reported by Brian Carpenter.
+ (CVE-2016-2109)
+ [Stephen Henson]
- *) All libssl internal structures have been removed from the public header
- files, and the OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN option has been removed (since it is
- now redundant). Users should not attempt to access internal structures
- directly. Instead they should use the provided API functions.
- [Matt Caswell]
+ *) EBCDIC overread
- *) config has been changed so that by default OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is used.
- Access to deprecated functions can be re-enabled by running config with
- "enable-deprecated". In addition applications wishing to use deprecated
- functions must define OPENSSL_USE_DEPRECATED. Note that this new behaviour
- will, by default, disable some transitive includes that previously existed
- in the header files (e.g. ec.h will no longer, by default, include bn.h)
- [Matt Caswell]
+ ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications
+ using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result
+ in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.
- *) Added support for OCB mode. OpenSSL has been granted a patent license
- compatible with the OpenSSL license for use of OCB. Details are available
- at https://www.openssl.org/docs/misc/OCB-patent-grant-OpenSSL.pdf. Support
- for OCB can be removed by calling config with no-ocb.
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-2176)
[Matt Caswell]
- *) SSLv2 support has been removed. It still supports receiving a SSLv2
- compatible client hello.
- [Kurt Roeckx]
-
- *) Increased the minimal RSA keysize from 256 to 512 bits [Rich Salz],
- done while fixing the error code for the key-too-small case.
- [Annie Yousar <a.yousar@informatik.hu-berlin.de>]
-
- *) CA.sh has been removmed; use CA.pl instead.
- [Rich Salz]
-
- *) Removed old DES API.
- [Rich Salz]
-
- *) Remove various unsupported platforms:
- Sony NEWS4
- BEOS and BEOS_R5
- NeXT
- SUNOS
- MPE/iX
- Sinix/ReliantUNIX RM400
- DGUX
- NCR
- Tandem
- Cray
- 16-bit platforms such as WIN16
- [Rich Salz]
-
- *) Clean up OPENSSL_NO_xxx #define's
- Use setbuf() and remove OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF
- Rename OPENSSL_SYSNAME_xxx to OPENSSL_SYS_xxx
- OPENSSL_NO_EC{DH,DSA} merged into OPENSSL_NO_EC
- OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160, OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD merged into OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
- OPENSSL_NO_FP_API merged into OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
- Remove OPENSSL_NO_BIO OPENSSL_NO_BUFFER OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
- OPENSSL_NO_EVP OPENSSL_NO_FIPS_ERR OPENSSL_NO_HASH_COMP
- OPENSSL_NO_LHASH OPENSSL_NO_OBJECT OPENSSL_NO_SPEED OPENSSL_NO_STACK
- OPENSSL_NO_X509 OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY
- Remove MS_STATIC; it's a relic from platforms <32 bits.
- [Rich Salz]
-
- *) Cleaned up dead code
- Remove all but one '#ifdef undef' which is to be looked at.
- [Rich Salz]
-
- *) Clean up calling of xxx_free routines.
- Just like free(), fix most of the xxx_free routines to accept
- NULL. Remove the non-null checks from callers. Save much code.
- [Rich Salz]
-
- *) Add secure heap for storage of private keys (when possible).
- Add BIO_s_secmem(), CBIGNUM, etc.
- Contributed by Akamai Technologies under our Corporate CLA.
- [Rich Salz]
-
- *) Experimental support for a new, fast, unbiased prime candidate generator,
- bn_probable_prime_dh_coprime(). Not currently used by any prime generator.
- [Felix Laurie von Massenbach <felix@erbridge.co.uk>]
-
- *) New output format NSS in the sess_id command line tool. This allows
- exporting the session id and the master key in NSS keylog format.
- [Martin Kaiser <martin@kaiser.cx>]
-
- *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
- compilation flags.
- [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
-
- *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
- in i2d_ECPrivateKey. Thanks to Ted Unangst for feedback on this issue.
- [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
-
- *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
- [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
-
- *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
- can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
- server.
-
- Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
- Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
- preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
- [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
-
- *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
- ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
- by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
- http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
-
- Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
- flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
- [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
-
- *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file():
- this fixes a limitation in previous versions of OpenSSL.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Experimental encrypt-then-mac support.
-
- Experimental support for encrypt then mac from
- draft-gutmann-tls-encrypt-then-mac-02.txt
-
- To enable it set the appropriate extension number (0x42 for the test
- server) using e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac=0x42
-
- For non-compliant peers (i.e. just about everything) this should have no
- effect.
-
- WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, SUBJECT TO CHANGE.
-
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with
- existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in
- the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap
- algorithms and include tests cases.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Extend CMS code to support RSA-PSS signatures and RSA-OAEP for
- enveloped data.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest,
- MGF1 digest and OAEP label.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make openssl verify return errors.
- [Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> and Ben Laurie]
-
- *) New function ASN1_TIME_diff to calculate the difference between two
- ASN1_TIME structures or one structure and the current time.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Update fips_test_suite to support multiple command line options. New
- test to induce all self test errors in sequence and check expected
- failures.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add FIPS_{rsa,dsa,ecdsa}_{sign,verify} functions which digest and
- sign or verify all in one operation.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add fips_algvs: a multicall fips utility incorporating all the algorithm
- test programs and fips_test_suite. Includes functionality to parse
- the minimal script output of fipsalgest.pl directly.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add authorisation parameter to FIPS_module_mode_set().
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add FIPS selftest for ECDH algorithm using P-224 and B-233 curves.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Use separate DRBG fields for internal and external flags. New function
- FIPS_drbg_health_check() to perform on demand health checking. Add
- generation tests to fips_test_suite with reduced health check interval to
- demonstrate periodic health checking. Add "nodh" option to
- fips_test_suite to skip very slow DH test.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New function FIPS_get_cipherbynid() to lookup FIPS supported ciphers
- based on NID.
- [Steve Henson]
+ *) Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername
+ callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN.
+ [Todd Short]
- *) More extensive health check for DRBG checking many more failure modes.
- New function FIPS_selftest_drbg_all() to handle every possible DRBG
- combination: call this in fips_test_suite.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add support for Dual EC DRBG from SP800-90. Update DRBG algorithm test
- and POST to handle Dual EC cases.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add support for canonical generation of DSA parameter 'g'. See
- FIPS 186-3 A.2.3.
-
- *) Add support for HMAC DRBG from SP800-90. Update DRBG algorithm test and
- POST to handle HMAC cases.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add functions FIPS_module_version() and FIPS_module_version_text()
- to return numerical and string versions of the FIPS module number.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Rename FIPS_mode_set and FIPS_mode to FIPS_module_mode_set and
- FIPS_module_mode. FIPS_mode and FIPS_mode_set will be implemented
- outside the validated module in the FIPS capable OpenSSL.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Minor change to DRBG entropy callback semantics. In some cases
- there is no multiple of the block length between min_len and
- max_len. Allow the callback to return more than max_len bytes
- of entropy but discard any extra: it is the callback's responsibility
- to ensure that the extra data discarded does not impact the
- requested amount of entropy.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add PRNG security strength checks to RSA, DSA and ECDSA using
- information in FIPS186-3, SP800-57 and SP800-131A.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) CCM support via EVP. Interface is very similar to GCM case except we
- must supply all data in one chunk (i.e. no update, final) and the
- message length must be supplied if AAD is used. Add algorithm test
- support.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial version of POST overhaul. Add POST callback to allow the status
- of POST to be monitored and/or failures induced. Modify fips_test_suite
- to use callback. Always run all selftests even if one fails.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) XTS support including algorithm test driver in the fips_gcmtest program.
- Note: this does increase the maximum key length from 32 to 64 bytes but
- there should be no binary compatibility issues as existing applications
- will never use XTS mode.
- [Steve Henson]
+ *) Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from the
+ default.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
- *) Extensive reorganisation of FIPS PRNG behaviour. Remove all dependencies
- to OpenSSL RAND code and replace with a tiny FIPS RAND API which also
- performs algorithm blocking for unapproved PRNG types. Also do not
- set PRNG type in FIPS_mode_set(): leave this to the application.
- Add default OpenSSL DRBG handling: sets up FIPS PRNG and seeds with
- the standard OpenSSL PRNG: set additional data to a date time vector.
- [Steve Henson]
+ *) Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. When the
+ methods are enabled and ssl2 is disabled the methods return NULL.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
- *) Rename old X9.31 PRNG functions of the form FIPS_rand* to FIPS_x931*.
- This shouldn't present any incompatibility problems because applications
- shouldn't be using these directly and any that are will need to rethink
- anyway as the X9.31 PRNG is now deprecated by FIPS 140-2
- [Steve Henson]
+ Changes between 1.0.2f and 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016]
+
+ * Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
+ Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not
+ provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers.
+ [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+ * Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers. SSLv2
+ is by default disabled at build-time. Builds that are not configured with
+ "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2. Even if "enable-ssl2" is used,
+ users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method()
+ will need to explicitly call either of:
+
+ SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+ or
+ SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+
+ as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the application
+ explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client and
+ server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key
+ recovery have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT
+ ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available.
+ (CVE-2016-0800)
+ [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+ *) Fix a double-free in DSA code
+
+ A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private
+ keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications
+ that receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is
+ considered rare.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley(Google/BoringSSL) using
+ libFuzzer.
+ (CVE-2016-0705)
+ [Stephen Henson]
- *) Extensive self tests and health checking required by SP800-90 DRBG.
- Remove strength parameter from FIPS_drbg_instantiate and always
- instantiate at maximum supported strength.
- [Steve Henson]
+ *) Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak.
- *) Add ECDH code to fips module and fips_ecdhvs for primitives only testing.
- [Steve Henson]
+ Add a new method SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user that handles the seed properly.
- *) New algorithm test program fips_dhvs to handle DH primitives only testing.
- [Steve Henson]
+ SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour.
+ In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak, SRP_VBASE_get_by_user
+ was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed
+ is configured.
- *) New function DH_compute_key_padded() to compute a DH key and pad with
- leading zeroes if needed: this complies with SP800-56A et al.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial implementation of SP800-90 DRBGs for Hash and CTR. Not used by
- anything, incomplete, subject to change and largely untested at present.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Modify fipscanisteronly build option to only build the necessary object
- files by filtering FIPS_EX_OBJ through a perl script in crypto/Makefile.
- [Steve Henson]
+ Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in
+ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note
+ also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide
+ invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake
+ credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong
+ guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from
+ that of a valid user.
+ (CVE-2016-0798)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
- *) Add experimental option FIPSSYMS to give all symbols in
- fipscanister.o and FIPS or fips prefix. This will avoid
- conflicts with future versions of OpenSSL. Add perl script
- util/fipsas.pl to preprocess assembly language source files
- and rename any affected symbols.
- [Steve Henson]
+ *) Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption
+
+ In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an
+ int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For
+ large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any
+ memory because |i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data
+ field as NULL leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values
+ of |i|, the calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|.
+ In this case memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it
+ is insufficiently sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists
+ in BN_dec2bn. This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn
+ is ever called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data.
+ This is anticipated to be a rare occurrence.
+
+ All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that is not expected
+ to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line
+ arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
+ on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
+ consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-0797)
+ [Matt Caswell]
- *) Add selftest checks and algorithm block of non-fips algorithms in
- FIPS mode. Remove DES2 from selftests.
- [Steve Henson]
+ *) Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions
+
+ The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in
+ the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a
+ string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings.
+
+ Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an
+ OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a
+ memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where
+ the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this
+ could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can
+ also occur.
+
+ The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour.
+ These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data
+ is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions
+ in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these
+ functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore
+ applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from
+ untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be
+ vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed
+ as command line arguments.
+
+ Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc
+ received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to
+ trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-0799)
+ [Matt Caswell]
- *) Add ECDSA code to fips module. Add tiny fips_ecdsa_check to just
- return internal method without any ENGINE dependencies. Add new
- tiny fips sign and verify functions.
- [Steve Henson]
+ *) Side channel attack on modular exponentiation
- *) New build option no-ec2m to disable characteristic 2 code.
- [Steve Henson]
+ A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on
+ the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery
+ of RSA keys. The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on
+ an attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same
+ hyper-threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions.
- *) New build option "fipscanisteronly". This only builds fipscanister.o
- and (currently) associated fips utilities. Uses the file Makefile.fips
- instead of Makefile.org as the prototype.
- [Steve Henson]
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Yuval Yarom, The University of
+ Adelaide and NICTA, Daniel Genkin, Technion and Tel Aviv University, and
+ Nadia Heninger, University of Pennsylvania with more information at
+ http://cachebleed.info.
+ (CVE-2016-0702)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
- *) Add some FIPS mode restrictions to GCM. Add internal IV generator.
- Update fips_gcmtest to use IV generator.
- [Steve Henson]
+ *) Change the req app to generate a 2048-bit RSA/DSA key by default,
+ if no keysize is specified with default_bits. This fixes an
+ omission in an earlier change that changed all RSA/DSA key generation
+ apps to use 2048 bits by default.
+ [Emilia Käsper]
- *) Initial, experimental EVP support for AES-GCM. AAD can be input by
- setting output buffer to NULL. The *Final function must be
- called although it will not retrieve any additional data. The tag
- can be set or retrieved with a ctrl. The IV length is by default 12
- bytes (96 bits) but can be set to an alternative value. If the IV
- length exceeds the maximum IV length (currently 16 bytes) it cannot be
- set before the key.
- [Steve Henson]
+ Changes between 1.0.2e and 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016]
+
+ *) DH small subgroups
+
+ Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe"
+ primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for
+ generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC 5114
+ support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an
+ application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are
+ not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's private
+ DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete multiple
+ handshakes in which the peer uses the same private DH exponent. For example
+ this could be used to discover a TLS server's private DH exponent if it's
+ reusing the private DH exponent or it's using a static DH ciphersuite.
+
+ OpenSSL provides the option SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE for ephemeral DH (DHE) in
+ TLS. It is not on by default. If the option is not set then the server
+ reuses the same private DH exponent for the life of the server process and
+ would be vulnerable to this attack. It is believed that many popular
+ applications do set this option and would therefore not be at risk.
+
+ The fix for this issue adds an additional check where a "q" parameter is
+ available (as is the case in X9.42 based parameters). This detects the
+ only known attack, and is the only possible defense for static DH
+ ciphersuites. This could have some performance impact.
+
+ Additionally the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been switched on by
+ default and cannot be disabled. This could have some performance impact.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Antonio Sanso (Adobe).
+ (CVE-2016-0701)
+ [Matt Caswell]
- *) New flag in ciphers: EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER. This means the
- underlying do_cipher function handles all cipher semantics itself
- including padding and finalisation. This is useful if (for example)
- an ENGINE cipher handles block padding itself. The behaviour of
- do_cipher is subtly changed if this flag is set: the return value
- is the number of characters written to the output buffer (zero is
- no longer an error code) or a negative error code. Also if the
- input buffer is NULL and length 0 finalisation should be performed.
- [Steve Henson]
+ *) SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers
- *) If a candidate issuer certificate is already part of the constructed
- path ignore it: new debug notification X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP for this case.
- [Steve Henson]
+ A malicious client can negotiate SSLv2 ciphers that have been disabled on
+ the server and complete SSLv2 handshakes even if all SSLv2 ciphers have
+ been disabled, provided that the SSLv2 protocol was not also disabled via
+ SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.
- *) Improve forward-security support: add functions
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th December 2015 by Nimrod Aviram
+ and Sebastian Schinzel.
+ (CVE-2015-3197)
+ [Viktor Dukhovni]
- void SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure))
- void SSL_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL *ssl, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure))
+ *) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 1024 bits.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
- for use by SSL/TLS servers; the callback function will be called whenever a
- new session is created, and gets to decide whether the session may be
- cached to make it resumable (return 0) or not (return 1). (As by the
- SSL/TLS protocol specifications, the session_id sent by the server will be
- empty to indicate that the session is not resumable; also, the server will
- not generate RFC 4507 (RFC 5077) session tickets.)
+ Changes between 1.0.2d and 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015]
+
+ *) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64
+
+ There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring
+ procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks
+ against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to
+ perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just
+ feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to
+ deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount
+ of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and
+ likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
+ additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
+ private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
+ key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by
+ default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Hanno Böck.
+ (CVE-2015-3193)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
- A simple reasonable callback implementation is to return is_forward_secure.
- This parameter will be set to 1 or 0 depending on the ciphersuite selected
- by the SSL/TLS server library, indicating whether it can provide forward
- security.
- [Emilia Käsper <emilia.kasper@esat.kuleuven.be> (Google)]
+ *) Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter
- *) New -verify_name option in command line utilities to set verification
- parameters by name.
- [Steve Henson]
+ The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer
+ dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS
+ algorithm and absent mask generation function parameter. Since these
+ routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be
+ used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a
+ DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is
+ vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client
+ authentication.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG).
+ (CVE-2015-3194)
+ [Stephen Henson]
- *) Initial CMAC implementation. WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, API MAY CHANGE.
- Add CMAC pkey methods.
- [Steve Henson]
+ *) X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak
- *) Experimental renegotiation in s_server -www mode. If the client
- browses /reneg connection is renegotiated. If /renegcert it is
- renegotiated requesting a certificate.
- [Steve Henson]
+ When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak
+ memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any
+ application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is
+ affected. SSL/TLS is not affected.
- *) Add an "external" session cache for debugging purposes to s_server. This
- should help trace issues which normally are only apparent in deployed
- multi-process servers.
- [Steve Henson]
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) using
+ libFuzzer.
+ (CVE-2015-3195)
+ [Stephen Henson]
- *) Extensive audit of libcrypto with DEBUG_UNUSED. Fix many cases where
- return value is ignored. NB. The functions RAND_add(), RAND_seed(),
- BIO_set_cipher() and some obscure PEM functions were changed so they
- can now return an error. The RAND changes required a change to the
- RAND_METHOD structure.
- [Steve Henson]
+ *) Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs.
+ This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages,
+ though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and
+ legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible.
+ [Emilia Käsper]
- *) New macro __owur for "OpenSSL Warn Unused Result". This makes use of
- a gcc attribute to warn if the result of a function is ignored. This
- is enable if DEBUG_UNUSED is set. Add to several functions in evp.h
- whose return value is often ignored.
- [Steve Henson]
->>>>>>> f00a10b... GH367: Fix dsa keygen for too-short seed
+ *) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
+ use a random seed, as already documented.
+ [Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen <ismo.puustinen@intel.com>]
Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015]
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin
(Google/BoringSSL).
+ (CVE-2015-1793)
[Matt Caswell]
+ *) Race condition handling PSK identify hint
+
+ If PSK identity hints are received by a multi-threaded client then
+ the values are wrongly updated in the parent SSL_CTX structure. This can
+ result in a race condition potentially leading to a double free of the
+ identify hint data.
+ (CVE-2015-3196)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
Changes between 1.0.2b and 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015]
*) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI
Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015]
+ *) Change RSA and DH/DSA key generation apps to generate 2048-bit
+ keys by default.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
*) Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g.
ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one.
So far those who have to target multiple plaforms would compromise
projects / oweals / openssl.git / blobdiff