OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
- Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.0i [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.0k and 1.0.0l [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
+ avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
+ Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
+ several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug
+ is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
+ 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
+ [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0j and 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+ This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
+ Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+ at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
+
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+ (CVE-2013-0169)
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+ This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+ the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+ so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+ (This is a backport)
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+ *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0i and 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]
+
+ *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+ to fix DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+ fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+ (CVE-2012-2333)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+ Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]
*) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer