Various parts of the RSA documentation were inaccurate and out of date and

[oweals/openssl.git] / CHANGES

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 3ea4aa3a6d224c63e3887e069d2869a086d9b283..75b88b66f7411a3ba99c79b368cbc94438878a4a 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,40 @@
 
  Changes between 0.9.6e and 0.9.7  [XX xxx 2002]
 
+  *) Make sure tests can be performed even if the corresponding algorithms
+     have been removed entirely.  This was also the last step to make
+     OpenSSL compilable with DJGPP under all reasonable conditions.
+     [Richard Levitte, Doug Kaufman <dkaufman@rahul.net>]
+
+  *) Add cipher selection rules COMPLEMENTOFALL and COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT
+     to allow version independent disabling of normally unselected ciphers,
+     which may be activated as a side-effect of selecting a single cipher.
+
+     (E.g., cipher list string "RSA" enables ciphersuites that are left
+     out of "ALL" because they do not provide symmetric encryption.
+     "RSA:!COMPLEMEMENTOFALL" avoids these unsafe ciphersuites.)
+     [Lutz Jaenicke, Bodo Moeller]
+
+  *) Add appropriate support for separate platform-dependent build
+     directories.  The recommended way to make a platform-dependent
+     build directory is the following (tested on Linux), maybe with
+     some local tweaks:
+
+       # Place yourself outside of the OpenSSL source tree.  In
+       # this example, the environment variable OPENSSL_SOURCE
+       # is assumed to contain the absolute OpenSSL source directory.
+       mkdir -p objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`"
+       cd objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`"
+       (cd $OPENSSL_SOURCE; find . -type f -o -type l) | while read F; do
+               mkdir -p `dirname $F`
+               ln -s $OPENSSL_SOURCE/$F $F
+       done
+
+     To be absolutely sure not to disturb the source tree, a "make clean"
+     is a good thing.  If it isn't successfull, don't worry about it,
+     it probably means the source directory is very clean.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
   *) Make sure any ENGINE control commands make local copies of string
      pointers passed to them whenever necessary. Otherwise it is possible
      the caller may have overwritten (or deallocated) the original string
@@ -1633,7 +1667,26 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
   *) Clean old EAY MD5 hack from e_os.h.
      [Richard Levitte]
 
- Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e  [XX xxx XXXX]
+ Changes between 0.9.6e and 0.9.6f  [XX xxx XXXX]
+
+  *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX
+     and get fix the header length calculation.
+     [Florian Weimer <Weimer@CERT.Uni-Stuttgart.DE>,
+       Alon Kantor <alonk@checkpoint.com> (and others),
+       Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Use proper error handling instead of 'assertions' in buffer
+     overflow checks added in 0.9.6e.  This prevents DoS (the
+     assertions could call abort()).
+     [Arne Ansper <arne@ats.cyber.ee>, Bodo Moeller]
+  
+ Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e  [30 Jul 2002]
+
+  *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject
+     the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear
+     negative or the content length exceeds the length of the
+     supplied buffer.
+     [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>]
 
   *) Fix cipher selection routines: ciphers without encryption had no flags
      for the cipher strength set and where therefore not handled correctly
@@ -1656,6 +1709,41 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      applications.
      [Bodo Moeller]
 
+  *) Changes in security patch:
+
+     Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced
+     Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory,
+     Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number
+     F30602-01-2-0537.
+
+  *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject
+     the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear
+     negative or the content length exceeds the length of the
+     supplied buffer. (CAN-2002-0659)
+     [Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>]
+
+  *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to
+     happen in practice.
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were
+     too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655)
+     [Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)>
+
+  *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
+     supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions.
+     (CAN-2002-0657)
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
+     supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656)
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+  *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could
+     supply an oversized client master key. (CAN-2002-0656)
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
+
+
  Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d  [9 May 2002]
 
   *) Fix crypto/asn1/a_sign.c so that 'parameters' is omitted (not