Remove hard coded ecdsaWithSHA1 hack in ssl routines and check for RSA

[oweals/openssl.git] / CHANGES

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index bd97fedda929d7c1980e23c846348d851c3761f8..68e7bc4a82825d8c50b3f8689cec8a45fd405005 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,17 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.1  [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Add GCM support to TLS library. Some custom code is needed to split
+     the IV between the fixed (from PRF) and explicit (from TLS record)
+     portions. This adds all GCM ciphersuites supported by RFC5288 and 
+     RFC5289. Generalise some AES* cipherstrings to inlclude GCM and
+     add a special AESGCM string for GCM only.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Expand range of ctrls for AES GCM. Permit setting invocation
+     field on decrypt and retrieval of invocation field only on encrypt.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
   *) Add HMAC ECC ciphersuites from RFC5289. Include SHA384 PRF support.
      As required by RFC5289 these ciphersuites cannot be used if for
      versions of TLS earlier than 1.2.
@@ -148,6 +159,11 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.0d and 1.0.0e [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Remove hard coded ecdsaWithSHA1 signature tests in ssl code and check
+     signature public key algorithm by using OID xref utilities instead.
+     Before this you could only use some ECC ciphersuites with SHA1 only.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
   *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
      by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see: