AES CTR-DRGB: performance improvement

[oweals/openssl.git] / CHANGES

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 2d1d13f7fb507e0e2f6353a48e726b0330bedca9..228408d9f053a7d6e84cc3b5a1a2c779168d4d98 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -7,10 +7,49 @@
  https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
  release branch.
 
- Changes between 1.1.1e and 1.1.1f [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.1.1g and 1.1.1h [xx XXX xxxx]
 
   *)
 
+ Changes between 1.1.1f and 1.1.1g [21 Apr 2020]
+
+  *) Fixed segmentation fault in SSL_check_chain()
+     Server or client applications that call the SSL_check_chain() function
+     during or after a TLS 1.3 handshake may crash due to a NULL pointer
+     dereference as a result of incorrect handling of the
+     "signature_algorithms_cert" TLS extension. The crash occurs if an invalid
+     or unrecognised signature algorithm is received from the peer. This could
+     be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial of Service attack.
+     (CVE-2020-1967)
+     [Benjamin Kaduk]
+
+  *) Added AES consttime code for no-asm configurations
+     an optional constant time support for AES was added
+     when building openssl for no-asm.
+     Enable with: ./config no-asm -DOPENSSL_AES_CONST_TIME
+     Disable with: ./config no-asm -DOPENSSL_NO_AES_CONST_TIME
+     At this time this feature is by default disabled.
+     It will be enabled by default in 3.0.
+     [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+ Changes between 1.1.1e and 1.1.1f [31 Mar 2020]
+
+  *) Revert the change of EOF detection while reading in libssl to avoid
+     regressions in applications depending on the current way of reporting
+     the EOF. As the existing method is not fully accurate the change to
+     reporting the EOF via SSL_ERROR_SSL is kept on the current development
+     branch and will be present in the 3.0 release.
+     [Tomas Mraz]
+
+  *) Revised BN_generate_prime_ex to not avoid factors 3..17863 in p-1
+     when primes for RSA keys are computed.
+     Since we previously always generated primes == 2 (mod 3) for RSA keys,
+     the 2-prime and 3-prime RSA modules were easy to distinguish, since
+     N = p*q = 1 (mod 3), but N = p*q*r = 2 (mod 3). Therefore fingerprinting
+     2-prime vs. 3-prime RSA keys was possible by computing N mod 3.
+     This avoids possible fingerprinting of newly generated RSA modules.
+     [Bernd Edlinger]
+
  Changes between 1.1.1d and 1.1.1e [17 Mar 2020]
   *) Properly detect EOF while reading in libssl. Previously if we hit an EOF
      while reading in libssl then we would report an error back to the