- if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
- {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
- krb5_data enc_ticket;
- krb5_data authenticator;
- krb5_data enc_pms;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
- + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
- int padl, outl;
- krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
- krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-
- if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
-
- n2s(p,i);
- enc_ticket.length = i;
-
- if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
- p+=enc_ticket.length;
-
- n2s(p,i);
- authenticator.length = i;
-
- if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- authenticator.data = (char *)p;
- p+=authenticator.length;
-
- n2s(p,i);
- enc_pms.length = i;
- enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
- p+=enc_pms.length;
-
- /* Note that the length is checked again below,
- ** after decryption
- */
- if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
- enc_pms.length + 6))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
- &kssl_err)) != 0)
- {
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr,"kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
- krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
- if (kssl_err.text)
- fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
- ** but will return authtime == 0.
- */
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
- &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
- {
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr,"kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
- krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
- if (kssl_err.text)
- fprintf(stderr,"kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
- goto err;
- }
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
- if (enc == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
-
- if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
- (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
- outl += padl;
- if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
- {
- /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
- * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
- * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
- * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
- * the protocol version.
- * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
- * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
- */
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
- s->session->master_key_length=
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
-
- if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
- {
- size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
- if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
- {
- s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
- memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
- }
- }
-
-
- /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
- * but it caused problems for apache.
- * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
- * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
- */
- }
- else
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
- {
- int ret = 1;
- int field_size = 0;
- const EC_KEY *tkey;
- const EC_GROUP *group;
- const BIGNUM *priv_key;
-
- /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
- if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Let's get server private key and group information */
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
- {
- /* use the certificate */
- tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
- }
- else
- {
- /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
- * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
- */
- tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
- }
-
- group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
- priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
-
- if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
- !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Let's get client's public key */
- if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (n == 0L)
- {
- /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
-
- if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
- == NULL) ||
- (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
- {
- /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
- * authentication using ECDH certificates
- * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
- * never executed. When that support is
- * added, we ought to ensure the key
- * received in the certificate is
- * authorized for key agreement.
- * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
- * the two ECDH shares are for the same
- * group.
- */
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
- }
- else
- {
- /* Get client's public key from encoded point
- * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
- */
- if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Get encoded point length */
- i = *p;
- p += 1;
- if (n != 1 + i)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
- clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
- * currently, so set it to the start
- */
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- }
-
- /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
- field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
- if (field_size <= 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
- if (i <= 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
- EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
- EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
- s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
-
- /* Compute the master secret */
- s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
- generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
- return (ret);
- }
- else
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+ krb5_data enc_ticket;
+ krb5_data authenticator;
+ krb5_data enc_pms;
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+ int padl, outl;
+ krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
+ krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ if (!kssl_ctx)
+ kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+ enc_ticket.length = i;
+
+ if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
+ p += enc_ticket.length;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+ authenticator.length = i;
+
+ if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ authenticator.data = (char *)p;
+ p += authenticator.length;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+ enc_pms.length = i;
+ enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
+ p += enc_pms.length;
+
+ /*
+ * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
+ */
+ if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
+ enc_pms.length + 6)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
+ &kssl_err)) != 0) {
+# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+ if (kssl_err.text)
+ fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
+ * return authtime == 0.
+ */
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
+ &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
+# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+ if (kssl_err.text)
+ fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
+ goto err;
+ }
+# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
+# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
+
+ if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
+ (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ outl += padl;
+ if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
+ && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
+ /*
+ * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
+ * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
+ * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
+ * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
+ * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
+ * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
+ * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
+ * cipher)
+ */
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ pms, outl);
+ if(s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
+ al = SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
+ size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
+ if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
+ s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
+ memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
+ len);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
+ * but it caused problems for apache.
+ * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
+ * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
+ */
+ } else
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
+ int ret = 1;
+ int field_size = 0;
+ const EC_KEY *tkey;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+
+ /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
+ if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Let's get server private key and group information */
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
+ /* use the certificate */
+ tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
+ * ServerKeyExchange msg.
+ */
+ tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
+ }
+
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+ priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
+ !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Let's get client's public key */
+ if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (n == 0L) {
+ /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
+
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
+ == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
+ * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
+ * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
+ * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
+ * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
+ * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
+ */
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
+ pkey.ec)) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
+ * ClientKeyExchange message.
+ */
+ if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Get encoded point length */
+ i = *p;
+ p += 1;
+ if (n != 1 + i) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
+ * to the start
+ */
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
+ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
+ if (field_size <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
+ NULL);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+ EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+ EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
+
+ /* Compute the master secret */
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ p, i);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
+ if(s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ return (ret);
+ } else