+
+int MS_CALLBACK generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int length, resultlength;
+ union {
+ struct sockaddr sa;
+ struct sockaddr_in s4;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+ struct sockaddr_in6 s6;
+#endif
+ } peer;
+
+ /* Initialize a random secret */
+ if (!cookie_initialized)
+ {
+ if (!RAND_bytes(cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH))
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting random cookie secret\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ cookie_initialized = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Read peer information */
+ (void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer);
+
+ /* Create buffer with peer's address and port */
+ length = 0;
+ switch (peer.sa.sa_family)
+ {
+ case AF_INET:
+ length += sizeof(struct in_addr);
+ length += sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port);
+ break;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+ case AF_INET6:
+ length += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+ length += sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port);
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ OPENSSL_assert(0);
+ break;
+ }
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+
+ if (buffer == NULL)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"out of memory\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (peer.sa.sa_family)
+ {
+ case AF_INET:
+ memcpy(buffer,
+ &peer.s4.sin_port,
+ sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port));
+ memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port),
+ &peer.s4.sin_addr,
+ sizeof(struct in_addr));
+ break;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+ case AF_INET6:
+ memcpy(buffer,
+ &peer.s6.sin6_port,
+ sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port));
+ memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port),
+ &peer.s6.sin6_addr,
+ sizeof(struct in6_addr));
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ OPENSSL_assert(0);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */
+ HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH,
+ buffer, length, result, &resultlength);
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+
+ memcpy(cookie, result, resultlength);
+ *cookie_len = resultlength;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int MS_CALLBACK verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int length, resultlength;
+ union {
+ struct sockaddr sa;
+ struct sockaddr_in s4;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+ struct sockaddr_in6 s6;
+#endif
+ } peer;
+
+ /* If secret isn't initialized yet, the cookie can't be valid */
+ if (!cookie_initialized)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Read peer information */
+ (void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer);
+
+ /* Create buffer with peer's address and port */
+ length = 0;
+ switch (peer.sa.sa_family)
+ {
+ case AF_INET:
+ length += sizeof(struct in_addr);
+ length += sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port);
+ break;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+ case AF_INET6:
+ length += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+ length += sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port);
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ OPENSSL_assert(0);
+ break;
+ }
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+
+ if (buffer == NULL)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"out of memory\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (peer.sa.sa_family)
+ {
+ case AF_INET:
+ memcpy(buffer,
+ &peer.s4.sin_port,
+ sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port));
+ memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port),
+ &peer.s4.sin_addr,
+ sizeof(struct in_addr));
+ break;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+ case AF_INET6:
+ memcpy(buffer,
+ &peer.s6.sin6_port,
+ sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port));
+ memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port),
+ &peer.s6.sin6_addr,
+ sizeof(struct in6_addr));
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ OPENSSL_assert(0);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */
+ HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH,
+ buffer, length, result, &resultlength);
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+
+ if (cookie_len == resultlength && memcmp(result, cookie, resultlength) == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+/* Example of extended certificate handling. Where the standard support
+ * of one certificate per algorithm is not sufficient an application
+ * can decide which certificate(s) to use at runtime based on whatever
+ * criteria it deems appropriate.
+ */
+
+/* Linked list of certificates, keys and chains */
+struct ssl_excert_st
+ {
+ int certform;
+ const char *certfile;
+ int keyform;
+ const char *keyfile;
+ const char *chainfile;
+ X509 *cert;
+ EVP_PKEY *key;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
+ int build_chain;
+ struct ssl_excert_st *next, *prev;
+ };
+
+struct chain_flags
+ {
+ int flag;
+ const char *name;
+ };
+
+struct chain_flags chain_flags_list[] =
+ {
+ {CERT_PKEY_VALID, "Overall Validity"},
+ {CERT_PKEY_SIGN, "Sign with EE key"},
+ {CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE, "EE signature"},
+ {CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE, "CA signature"},
+ {CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM, "EE key parameters"},
+ {CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM, "CA key parameters"},
+ {CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN, "Explicity sign with EE key"},
+ {CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME, "Issuer Name"},
+ {CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE, "Certificate Type"},
+ {0, NULL}
+ };
+
+
+static void print_chain_flags(BIO *out, int flags)
+ {
+ struct chain_flags *ctmp = chain_flags_list;
+ while(ctmp->name)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(out, "\t%s: %s\n", ctmp->name,
+ flags & ctmp->flag ? "OK" : "NOT OK");
+ ctmp++;
+ }
+ }
+
+/* Very basic selection callback: just use any certificate chain
+ * reported as valid. More sophisticated could prioritise according
+ * to local policy.
+ */
+static int set_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, void *arg)
+ {
+ int i, rv;
+ SSL_EXCERT *exc = arg;
+#ifdef CERT_CB_TEST_RETRY
+ static int retry_cnt;
+ if (retry_cnt < 5)
+ {
+ retry_cnt++;
+ fprintf(stderr, "Certificate callback retry test: count %d\n",
+ retry_cnt);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+ SSL_certs_clear(ssl);
+
+ if (!exc)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Go to end of list and traverse backwards since we prepend
+ * newer entries this retains the original order.
+ */
+ while (exc->next)
+ exc = exc->next;
+
+ i = 0;
+
+ while(exc)
+ {
+ i++;
+ rv = SSL_check_chain(ssl, exc->cert, exc->key, exc->chain);
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Checking cert chain %d:\nSubject: ", i);
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(exc->cert), 0,
+ XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+ BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
+
+ print_chain_flags(bio_err, rv);
+ if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
+ {
+ SSL_use_certificate(ssl, exc->cert);
+ SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, exc->key);
+ /* NB: we wouldn't normally do this as it is
+ * not efficient building chains on each connection
+ * better to cache the chain in advance.
+ */
+ if (exc->build_chain)
+ {
+ if (!SSL_build_cert_chain(ssl, 0))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else if (exc->chain)
+ SSL_set1_chain(ssl, exc->chain);
+ }
+ exc = exc->prev;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+void ssl_ctx_set_excert(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_EXCERT *exc)
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(ctx, set_cert_cb, exc);
+ }
+
+static int ssl_excert_prepend(SSL_EXCERT **pexc)
+ {
+ SSL_EXCERT *exc;
+ exc = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_EXCERT));
+ if (!exc)
+ return 0;
+ exc->certfile = NULL;
+ exc->keyfile = NULL;
+ exc->chainfile = NULL;
+ exc->cert = NULL;
+ exc->key = NULL;
+ exc->chain = NULL;
+ exc->prev = NULL;
+ exc->build_chain = 0;
+
+ exc->next = *pexc;
+ *pexc = exc;
+
+ if (exc->next)
+ {
+ exc->certform = exc->next->certform;
+ exc->keyform = exc->next->keyform;
+ exc->next->prev = exc;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ exc->certform = FORMAT_PEM;
+ exc->keyform = FORMAT_PEM;
+ }
+ return 1;
+
+ }
+
+void ssl_excert_free(SSL_EXCERT *exc)
+ {
+ SSL_EXCERT *curr;
+ while (exc)
+ {
+ if (exc->cert)
+ X509_free(exc->cert);
+ if (exc->key)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(exc->key);
+ if (exc->chain)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(exc->chain, X509_free);
+ curr = exc;
+ exc = exc->next;
+ OPENSSL_free(curr);
+ }
+ }
+
+int load_excert(SSL_EXCERT **pexc, BIO *err)
+ {
+ SSL_EXCERT *exc = *pexc;
+ if (!exc)
+ return 1;
+ /* If nothing in list, free and set to NULL */
+ if (!exc->certfile && !exc->next)
+ {
+ ssl_excert_free(exc);
+ *pexc = NULL;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ for(; exc; exc=exc->next)
+ {
+ if (!exc->certfile)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Missing filename\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ exc->cert = load_cert(err, exc->certfile, exc->certform,
+ NULL, NULL, "Server Certificate");
+ if (!exc->cert)
+ return 0;
+ if (exc->keyfile)
+ exc->keyfile = exc->certfile;
+ exc->key = load_key(err, exc->certfile, exc->certform, 0,
+ NULL, NULL, "Server Certificate");
+ if (!exc->key)
+ return 0;
+ if (exc->chainfile)
+ {
+ exc->chain = load_certs(err,
+ exc->chainfile, FORMAT_PEM,
+ NULL, NULL,
+ "Server Chain");
+ if (!exc->chainfile)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+
+int args_excert(char ***pargs, int *pargc,
+ int *badarg, BIO *err, SSL_EXCERT **pexc)
+ {
+ char *arg = **pargs, *argn = (*pargs)[1];
+ SSL_EXCERT *exc = *pexc;
+ int narg = 2;
+ if (!exc)
+ {
+ if (ssl_excert_prepend(&exc))
+ *pexc = exc;
+ else
+ {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Error initialising xcert\n");
+ *badarg = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (strcmp(arg, "-xcert") == 0)
+ {
+ if (!argn)
+ {
+ *badarg = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (exc->certfile && !ssl_excert_prepend(&exc))
+ {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Error adding xcert\n");
+ *badarg = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ exc->certfile = argn;
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(arg,"-xkey") == 0)
+ {
+ if (!argn)
+ {
+ *badarg = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (exc->keyfile)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Key already specified\n");
+ *badarg = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ exc->keyfile = argn;
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(arg,"-xchain") == 0)
+ {
+ if (!argn)
+ {
+ *badarg = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (exc->chainfile)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Chain already specified\n");
+ *badarg = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ exc->chainfile = argn;
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(arg,"-xchain_build") == 0)
+ {
+ narg = 1;
+ exc->build_chain = 1;
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(arg,"-xcertform") == 0)
+ {
+ if (!argn)
+ {
+ *badarg = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ exc->certform = str2fmt(argn);
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(arg,"-xkeyform") == 0)
+ {
+ if (!argn)
+ {
+ *badarg = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ exc->keyform = str2fmt(argn);
+ }
+ else
+ return 0;
+
+ (*pargs) += narg;
+
+ if (pargc)
+ *pargc -= narg;
+
+ *pexc = exc;
+
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ ssl_excert_free(exc);
+ *pexc = NULL;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+static void print_raw_cipherlist(BIO *bio, SSL *s)
+ {
+ const unsigned char *rlist;
+ static const unsigned char scsv_id[] = {0, 0, 0xFF};
+ size_t i, rlistlen, num;
+ if (!SSL_is_server(s))
+ return;
+ num = SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist(s, NULL);
+ rlistlen = SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist(s, &rlist);
+ BIO_puts(bio, "Client cipher list: ");
+ for (i = 0; i < rlistlen; i += num, rlist += num)
+ {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, rlist);
+ if (i)
+ BIO_puts(bio, ":");
+ if (c)
+ BIO_puts(bio, SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+ else if (!memcmp(rlist, scsv_id - num + 3, num))
+ BIO_puts(bio, "SCSV");
+ else
+ {
+ size_t j;
+ BIO_puts(bio, "0x");
+ for (j = 0; j < num; j++)
+ BIO_printf(bio, "%02X", rlist[j]);
+ }
+ }
+ BIO_puts(bio, "\n");
+ }
+
+
+void print_ssl_summary(BIO *bio, SSL *s)
+ {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ X509 *peer;
+ /*const char *pnam = SSL_is_server(s) ? "client" : "server";*/
+ BIO_printf(bio, "Protocol version: %s\n", SSL_get_version(s));
+ print_raw_cipherlist(bio, s);
+ c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s);
+ BIO_printf(bio,"Ciphersuite: %s\n", SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+ do_print_sigalgs(bio, s, 0);
+ peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(s);
+ if (peer)
+ {
+ int nid;
+ BIO_puts(bio, "Peer certificate: ");
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(bio, X509_get_subject_name(peer),
+ 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+ BIO_puts(bio, "\n");
+ if (SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(s, &nid))
+ BIO_printf(bio, "Hash used: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid));
+ }
+ else
+ BIO_puts(bio, "No peer certificate\n");
+ if (peer)
+ X509_free(peer);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ ssl_print_point_formats(bio, s);
+ if (SSL_is_server(s))
+ ssl_print_curves(bio, s, 1);
+ else
+ ssl_print_tmp_key(bio, s);
+#else
+ if (!SSL_is_server(s))
+ ssl_print_tmp_key(bio, s);
+#endif
+ }
+
+int args_ssl(char ***pargs, int *pargc, SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx,
+ int *badarg, BIO *err, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) **pstr)
+ {
+ char *arg = **pargs, *argn = (*pargs)[1];
+ int rv;
+
+ /* Attempt to run SSL configuration command */
+ rv = SSL_CONF_cmd_argv(cctx, pargc, pargs);
+ /* If parameter not recognised just return */
+ if (rv == 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* see if missing argument error */
+ if (rv == -3)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(err, "%s needs an argument\n", arg);
+ *badarg = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ /* Check for some other error */
+ if (rv < 0)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Error with command: \"%s %s\"\n",
+ arg, argn ? argn : "");
+ *badarg = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ /* Store command and argument */
+ /* If only one argument processed store value as NULL */
+ if (rv == 1)
+ argn = NULL;
+ if (!*pstr)
+ *pstr = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null();
+ if (!*pstr || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(*pstr, arg) ||
+ !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(*pstr, argn))
+ {
+ BIO_puts(err, "Memory allocation failure\n");
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ end:
+ if (*badarg)
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int args_ssl_call(SSL_CTX *ctx, BIO *err, SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx,
+ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *str, int no_ecdhe, int no_jpake)
+ {
+ int i;
+ SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(cctx, ctx);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(str); i+= 2)
+ {
+ const char *param = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(str, i);
+ const char *value = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(str, i + 1);
+ /* If no_ecdhe or named curve already specified don't need
+ * a default.
+ */
+ if (!no_ecdhe && !strcmp(param, "-named_curve"))
+ no_ecdhe = 1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+ if (!no_jpake && !strcmp(param, "-cipher"))
+ {
+ BIO_puts(err, "JPAKE sets cipher to PSK\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, param, value) <= 0)
+ {
+ BIO_printf(err, "Error with command: \"%s %s\"\n",
+ param, value ? value : "");
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ /* This is a special case to keep existing s_server functionality:
+ * if we don't have any curve specified *and* we haven't disabled
+ * ECDHE then use P-256.
+ */
+ if (!no_ecdhe)
+ {
+ if (SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, "-named_curve", "P-256") <= 0)
+ {
+ BIO_puts(err, "Error setting EC curve\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+ if (!no_jpake)
+ {
+ if (SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, "-cipher", "PSK") <= 0)
+ {
+ BIO_puts(err, "Error setting cipher to PSK\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx))
+ {
+ BIO_puts(err, "Error finishing context\n");
+ ERR_print_errors(err);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+static int add_crls_store(X509_STORE *st, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+ {
+ X509_CRL *crl;
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
+ {
+ crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+ X509_STORE_add_crl(st, crl);
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int ssl_ctx_add_crls(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int crl_download)
+ {
+ X509_STORE *st;
+ st = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx);
+ add_crls_store(st, crls);
+ if (crl_download)
+ store_setup_crl_download(st);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int ssl_load_stores(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ const char *vfyCApath, const char *vfyCAfile,
+ const char *chCApath, const char *chCAfile,
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int crl_download)
+ {
+ X509_STORE *vfy = NULL, *ch = NULL;
+ int rv = 0;
+ if (vfyCApath || vfyCAfile)
+ {
+ vfy = X509_STORE_new();
+ if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(vfy, vfyCAfile, vfyCApath))
+ goto err;
+ add_crls_store(vfy, crls);
+ SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store(ctx, vfy);
+ if (crl_download)
+ store_setup_crl_download(vfy);
+ }
+ if (chCApath || chCAfile)
+ {
+ ch = X509_STORE_new();
+ if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(ch, chCAfile, chCApath))
+ goto err;
+ SSL_CTX_set1_chain_cert_store(ctx, ch);
+ }
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ if (vfy)
+ X509_STORE_free(vfy);
+ if (ch)
+ X509_STORE_free(ch);
+ return rv;
+ }