+ Changes between 0.9.8y and 0.9.8za [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *)
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+ This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
+ Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+ at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
+
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+ (CVE-2013-0169)
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+ This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+ the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+ so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+ (This is a backport)
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+ *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]
+
+ *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+ to fix DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+ fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+ (CVE-2012-2333)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+ Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the
+ 'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an
+ int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by
+ rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131)
+ [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+ BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+ in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+ Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+ issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+ (CVE-2012-2110)
+ [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]
+
+ *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+ in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+ content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+ needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+ old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+ CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+ an MMA defence is not necessary.
+ Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+ this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a
+ client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
+ Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
+
+ *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
+ Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
+ Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
+ preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
+ [Antonio Martin]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
+
+ *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
+ of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption
+ which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against
+ the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing
+ differences arising during decryption processing. A research
+ paper describing this attack can be found at:
+ http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
+ <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
+ for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
+ [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen]
+
+ *) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109)
+ [Ben Laurie, Kasper <ekasper@google.com>]
+
+ *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
+ (CVE-2011-4576)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
+ Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
+ Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
+ Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
+ and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
+ [Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>]
+
+ *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race.
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
+ [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
+ interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than
+ BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent
+ threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients.
+
+ This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
+ lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
+ BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
+ the last update always remained unused).
+ [Emilia Käsper (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular
+ for multi-threaded use of ECDH.
+ [Adam Langley (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper
+ by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see:
+
+ http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf
+
+ [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8q and 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]
+
+ *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014
+ [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
+
+ *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must
+ escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is
+ ambiguous.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8p and 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]
+
+ *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers
+ and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack.
+ Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by
+ Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan
+ Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252
+ [Ben Laurie]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8o and 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]
+
+ *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer
+ overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can
+ be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix for double free bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c CVE-2010-2939
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Don't reencode certificate when calculating signature: cache and use
+ the original encoding instead. This makes signature verification of
+ some broken encodings work correctly.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) ec2_GF2m_simple_mul bugfix: compute correct result if the output EC_POINT
+ is also one of the inputs.
+ [Emilia Käsper <emilia.kasper@esat.kuleuven.be> (Google)]
+
+ *) Don't repeatedly append PBE algorithms to table if they already exist.
+ Sort table on each new add. This effectively makes the table read only
+ after all algorithms are added and subsequent calls to PKCS12_pbe_add
+ etc are non-op.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8n and 0.9.8o [01 Jun 2010]
+
+ [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.8o and later 0.9.8 patch levels were released after
+ OpenSSL 1.0.0.]
+
+ *) Correct a typo in the CMS ASN1 module which can result in invalid memory
+ access or freeing data twice (CVE-2010-0742)
+ [Steve Henson, Ronald Moesbergen <intercommit@gmail.com>]
+
+ *) Add SHA2 algorithms to SSL_library_init(). SHA2 is becoming far more
+ common in certificates and some applications which only call
+ SSL_library_init and not OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() will fail.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) VMS fixes:
+ Reduce copying into .apps and .test in makevms.com
+ Don't try to use blank CA certificate in CA.com
+ Allow use of C files from original directories in maketests.com
+ [Steven M. Schweda" <sms@antinode.info>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]
+
+ *) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never
+ update s->server with a new major version number. As of
+ - OpenSSL 0.9.8m if 'short' is a 16-bit type,
+ - OpenSSL 0.9.8f if 'short' is longer than 16 bits,
+ the previous behavior could result in a read attempt at NULL when
+ receiving specific incorrect SSL/TLS records once record payload
+ protection is active. (CVE-2010-0740)
+ [Bodo Moeller, Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>]
+
+ *) Fix for CVE-2010-0433 where some kerberos enabled versions of OpenSSL
+ could be crashed if the relevant tables were not present (e.g. chrooted).
+ [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8l and 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]
+
+ *) Always check bn_wexpend() return values for failure. (CVE-2009-3245)
+ [Martin Olsson, Neel Mehta]
+
+ *) Fix X509_STORE locking: Every 'objs' access requires a lock (to
+ accommodate for stack sorting, always a write lock!).
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) On some versions of WIN32 Heap32Next is very slow. This can cause
+ excessive delays in the RAND_poll(): over a minute. As a workaround
+ include a time check in the inner Heap32Next loop too.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) The code that handled flushing of data in SSL/TLS originally used the
+ BIO_CTRL_INFO ctrl to see if any data was pending first. This caused
+ the problem outlined in PR#1949. The fix suggested there however can
+ trigger problems with buggy BIO_CTRL_WPENDING (e.g. some versions
+ of Apache). So instead simplify the code to flush unconditionally.
+ This should be fine since flushing with no data to flush is a no op.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Handle TLS versions 2.0 and later properly and correctly use the
+ highest version of TLS/SSL supported. Although TLS >= 2.0 is some way
+ off ancient servers have a habit of sticking around for a while...
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Modify compression code so it frees up structures without using the
+ ex_data callbacks. This works around a problem where some applications
+ call CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data() before application exit (e.g. when
+ restarting) then use compression (e.g. SSL with compression) later.
+ This results in significant per-connection memory leaks and
+ has caused some security issues including CVE-2008-1678 and
+ CVE-2009-4355.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Constify crypto/cast (i.e., <openssl/cast.h>): a CAST_KEY doesn't
+ change when encrypting or decrypting.
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT which will allow clients to
+ connect and renegotiate with servers which do not support RI.
+ Until RI is more widely deployed this option is enabled by default.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add "missing" ssl ctrls to clear options and mode.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with
+ a no_renegotiation alert as required by RFC5746. Some renegotiating
+ TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully when they receive
+ the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled this alert and would hang
+ waiting for a server hello which it will never receive. Now we treat a
+ received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal error. This is because
+ applications requesting a renegotiation might well expect it to succeed
+ and would have no code in place to handle the server denying it so the
+ only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if
+ peer supports secure renegotiation and 0 otherwise. Print out peer
+ renegotiation support in s_client/s_server.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Replace the highly broken and deprecated SPKAC certification method with
+ the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Implement RFC5746. Re-enable renegotiation but require the extension
+ as needed. Unfortunately, SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+ turns out to be a bad idea. It has been replaced by
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you
+ know what you are doing.
+ [Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>, Ben Laurie, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixes to stateless session resumption handling. Use initial_ctx when
+ issuing and attempting to decrypt tickets in case it has changed during
+ servername handling. Use a non-zero length session ID when attempting
+ stateless session resumption: this makes it possible to determine if
+ a resumption has occurred immediately after receiving server hello
+ (several places in OpenSSL subtly assume this) instead of later in
+ the handshake.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) The functions ENGINE_ctrl(), OPENSSL_isservice(),
+ CMS_get1_RecipientRequest() and RAND_bytes() can return <=0 on error
+ fixes for a few places where the return code is not checked
+ correctly.
+ [Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>]
+
+ *) Add --strict-warnings option to Configure script to include devteam
+ warnings in other configurations.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for --libdir option and LIBDIR variable in makefiles. This
+ makes it possible to install openssl libraries in locations which
+ have names other than "lib", for example "/usr/lib64" which some
+ systems need.
+ [Steve Henson, based on patch from Jeremy Utley]