2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
37 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 tls1_export_keying_material,
42 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
43 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
57 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
58 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
60 tls1_export_keying_material,
61 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
62 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
63 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
64 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
65 tls_close_construct_packet,
69 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
73 tls1_generate_master_secret,
74 tls1_change_cipher_state,
75 tls1_final_finish_mac,
76 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
77 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
78 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
80 tls1_export_keying_material,
81 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
82 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
83 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
84 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
85 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
86 tls_close_construct_packet,
90 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
93 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
94 * http, the cache would over fill
103 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
107 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
109 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
113 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
116 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
117 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
119 s->version = s->method->version;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
125 int nid; /* Curve NID */
126 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
127 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
131 * Table of curve information.
132 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
133 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
135 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
136 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
137 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
138 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
139 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
140 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
141 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
142 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
143 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
144 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
145 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
146 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
147 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
148 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
149 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
150 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
151 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
152 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
153 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
154 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
155 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
156 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
157 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
158 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
159 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
160 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
161 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
162 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
164 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
167 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
168 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
169 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
170 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
173 /* The default curves */
174 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
175 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
176 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
177 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
178 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
181 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
182 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
183 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
184 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
185 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
186 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
187 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
188 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
191 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
192 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
194 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
195 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
196 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
197 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
198 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
199 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
200 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
201 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
202 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
203 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
204 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
205 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
206 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
207 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
208 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
209 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
210 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
211 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
212 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
213 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
214 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
215 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
218 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
219 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
220 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
223 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
225 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
226 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
227 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
229 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
231 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
235 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
238 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
239 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
246 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
248 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
249 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
250 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
251 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
252 * lists in the first place.
253 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
254 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
255 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
257 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
258 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
260 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
262 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
263 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
265 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
266 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
267 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
268 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
269 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
272 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
273 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
277 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
278 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
282 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
283 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
286 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
287 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
291 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
292 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
297 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
302 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
303 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
305 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
308 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
310 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
311 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
312 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
315 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
318 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
319 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
321 const unsigned char *curves;
322 size_t num_curves, i;
323 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
324 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
326 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
328 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
331 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
332 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
334 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
335 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
337 } else /* Should never happen */
340 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
342 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
343 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
344 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
350 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
351 * if there is no match.
352 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
353 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
354 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
356 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
358 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
359 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
361 /* Can't do anything on client side */
365 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
367 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
368 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
370 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
371 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
372 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
373 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
374 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
375 /* Should never happen */
378 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
382 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
383 * but s->options is a long...
385 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
386 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
388 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
389 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
390 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
391 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
392 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
395 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
398 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
400 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
401 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
402 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
404 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
408 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
409 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
410 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
411 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
412 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
415 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
416 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
424 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
428 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
429 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
431 unsigned char *clist, *p;
434 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
437 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
438 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
441 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
442 unsigned long idmask;
444 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
446 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
455 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
459 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
463 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
466 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
468 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
474 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
476 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
478 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
480 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
481 if (nid == NID_undef)
482 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
483 if (nid == NID_undef)
484 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
485 if (nid == NID_undef)
487 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
488 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
490 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
494 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
495 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
499 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
503 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
506 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
507 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
514 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
515 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
518 /* Determine curve ID */
519 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
520 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
521 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
525 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
527 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
529 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
530 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
532 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
533 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
535 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
541 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
542 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
543 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
545 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
546 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
549 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
550 * supported (see RFC4492).
552 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
553 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
554 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
555 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
556 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
559 if (i == num_formats)
564 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
565 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
566 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
568 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
570 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
571 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
572 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
573 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
574 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
578 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
579 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
584 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
591 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
595 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
597 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
598 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
599 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
601 *pformats = ecformats_default;
602 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
604 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
606 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
611 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
612 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
614 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
616 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
619 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
622 /* If not EC nothing to do */
623 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
625 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
629 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
632 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
636 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
637 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
639 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
645 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
646 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
647 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
648 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
649 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
651 return 0; /* Should never happen */
652 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
653 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
655 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
657 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
658 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
659 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
661 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
667 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
669 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
671 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
673 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
674 * is compatible with the client extensions.
676 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
678 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
681 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
684 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
685 unsigned char curve_id[2];
686 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
687 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
688 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
689 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
690 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
694 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
695 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
699 /* Need a shared curve */
700 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
704 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
708 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
713 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
716 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
717 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
720 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
721 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
723 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
726 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
727 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
729 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
735 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
738 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
739 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
740 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
741 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
743 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
744 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
745 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
746 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
747 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
748 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
750 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
751 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
752 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
757 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
758 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
759 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
762 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
765 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
768 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
769 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
770 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
771 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
772 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
774 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
775 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
778 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
779 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
783 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
784 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
785 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
786 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
787 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
788 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
789 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
791 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
792 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
797 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
798 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
800 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
801 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
803 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
804 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
805 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
806 /* Should never happen */
809 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
810 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
815 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
816 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
817 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
818 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
820 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
824 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
825 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
828 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
829 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
831 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
834 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
835 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
837 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
843 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
847 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
848 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
849 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
850 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
853 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
854 if (i == sent_sigslen
855 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
856 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
860 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
865 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
866 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
867 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
872 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
874 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
879 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
880 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
881 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
883 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
886 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
888 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
890 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
891 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
892 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
893 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
895 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
896 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
897 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
898 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
900 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
902 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
903 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
904 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
910 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
911 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
912 * @c: cipher to check
913 * @op: Security check that you want to do
915 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
917 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
919 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
920 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
922 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
924 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
925 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
927 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
928 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
931 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
934 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
936 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
938 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
941 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
943 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
944 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
954 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
955 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
956 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
957 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
958 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
961 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
963 PACKET extensions = *packet;
964 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
965 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
968 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
969 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
972 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
973 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
979 if (num_extensions <= 1)
982 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
983 if (extension_types == NULL) {
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
988 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
989 extensions = *packet;
990 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
992 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
993 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
994 /* This should not happen. */
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1000 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1004 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1005 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1006 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1007 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1012 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1016 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1019 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1021 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1023 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1024 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1026 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1027 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1029 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1030 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1031 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1032 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1040 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1041 if (s->renegotiate) {
1042 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, 2)
1043 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1044 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len, 2)) {
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1049 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1050 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1053 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1054 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1055 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, 2)
1056 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1057 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1058 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1059 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1060 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name, 1)
1061 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1062 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname), 2)
1063 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1064 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1069 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1070 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1071 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1072 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, 2)
1073 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1074 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1075 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 1)
1076 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1077 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt,
1078 OPENSSL_WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1079 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1080 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1081 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1082 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1092 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1094 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1095 size_t num_curves, num_formats;
1098 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1100 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, 2)
1101 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1102 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1103 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy(pkt, pformats, num_formats, 1)
1104 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1110 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1112 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1113 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1118 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, 2)
1119 /* Sub-packet for curves extension */
1120 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1121 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)) {
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1125 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1126 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1127 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1128 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, pcurves[0], 1)
1129 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, pcurves[1], 1)) {
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1131 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1136 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1141 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1143 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1145 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1146 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1147 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1148 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1149 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1150 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1151 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1155 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1156 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1157 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1160 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1161 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1164 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, 2)
1165 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1173 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1175 const unsigned char *salg;
1177 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1179 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, 2)
1180 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1181 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1182 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1183 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1184 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1185 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1186 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1192 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1195 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, 2)
1196 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1197 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1198 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp, 1)
1199 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1200 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)) {
1201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1204 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1205 unsigned char *idbytes;
1209 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1210 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1212 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1213 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 1)
1214 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1215 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen
1216 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1221 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1222 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)) {
1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1226 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1227 unsigned char *extbytes;
1228 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1234 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1235 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1241 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1248 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1253 * 1: peer may send requests
1254 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1256 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1257 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1259 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1261 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, 2)
1262 /* Sub-packet for Hearbeat extension */
1263 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1264 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, mode, 1)
1265 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1273 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1275 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1276 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1278 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, 2)
1279 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1287 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1288 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1289 * (see longer comment below)
1291 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1292 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt,
1293 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, 2)
1294 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1295 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1296 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1297 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, 2)
1298 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1302 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1305 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1306 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = 0;
1307 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1310 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, 2)
1311 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1312 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1313 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1314 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)) {
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1318 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1319 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1320 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1321 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, prof->id, 2)) {
1322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1326 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1332 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1333 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1334 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1339 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, 2)
1340 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1346 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1347 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, 2)
1348 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1355 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, 2)
1356 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1362 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1363 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1364 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1367 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1368 unsigned char *padbytes;
1371 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1376 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1377 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1383 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, 2)
1384 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(pkt, 2)
1385 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1389 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1390 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1401 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1402 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1405 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1406 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1408 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1411 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1412 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1413 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1414 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1419 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1421 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1424 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1429 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1432 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1435 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1443 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1444 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1447 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1448 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1449 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1452 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1457 const unsigned char *plist;
1460 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1464 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1466 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1468 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1470 if (plistlen > 255) {
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1475 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1476 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1477 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1478 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1483 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1486 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1488 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1489 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1491 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1495 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1498 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1501 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1502 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1504 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1507 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1508 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1511 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1512 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1516 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1519 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1522 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1530 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1531 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1532 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1533 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1534 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1535 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1536 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1537 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1538 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1539 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1541 if (limit - ret < 36)
1543 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1548 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1549 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1550 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1552 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1556 * 1: peer may send requests
1557 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1559 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1560 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1562 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1568 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1569 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1570 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1571 const unsigned char *npa;
1572 unsigned int npalen;
1575 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1577 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1578 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1579 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1581 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1583 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1585 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1589 if (!custom_ext_add_old(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1591 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1593 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1594 * for other cases too.
1596 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1597 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1598 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1599 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1600 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1602 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1606 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1607 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1611 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1612 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1613 unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1615 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1617 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1621 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1627 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1630 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1635 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1636 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1637 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1638 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1640 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1642 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1644 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1646 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1647 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1651 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1653 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1654 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1655 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1658 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1660 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1661 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1662 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1670 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1671 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1672 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1674 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1676 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1677 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1679 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1680 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1681 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1682 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1683 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1685 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1686 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1687 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1688 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1689 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1692 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1694 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1695 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1698 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1708 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1709 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1710 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1715 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1716 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1717 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1718 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1720 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1726 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1727 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1728 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1729 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1730 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1731 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1732 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1734 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1735 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1736 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1737 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1738 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1739 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1740 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1741 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1742 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1743 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1744 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1745 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1746 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1749 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1750 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1754 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1755 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1756 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1760 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1763 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1764 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1766 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1769 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1772 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1773 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1775 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1776 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1779 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1780 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1782 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1785 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1788 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1789 s->servername_done = 0;
1790 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1791 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1792 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1795 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1796 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1797 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1798 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1799 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1800 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1801 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1802 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1803 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1807 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1808 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1809 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1811 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1812 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1813 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1814 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1816 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1817 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1818 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1821 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1823 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1826 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1829 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1833 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1834 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1837 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1839 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1842 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1843 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1844 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1845 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1847 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1848 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1850 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1851 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1854 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1856 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1857 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1858 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1859 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1860 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1861 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1862 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1863 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1864 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1865 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1866 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1867 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1868 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1869 * the value of the Host: field.
1870 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1871 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1872 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1874 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1878 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1879 unsigned int servname_type;
1880 PACKET sni, hostname;
1882 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1883 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1884 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1889 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1890 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1891 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1893 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1894 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1895 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1897 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1898 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1900 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1901 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1902 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1907 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1908 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1912 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1913 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1917 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1918 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1922 s->servername_done = 1;
1925 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1926 * fall back to a full handshake.
1928 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1929 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1930 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1934 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1937 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
1940 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1944 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1945 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1947 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1948 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1955 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1956 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1958 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
1959 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1964 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1965 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1967 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1968 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1972 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1973 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
1975 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1976 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
1977 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
1978 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
1983 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
1984 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
1986 session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
1987 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1992 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1993 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1994 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1995 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
1996 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1997 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1999 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2002 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2003 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2005 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
2006 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2007 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2012 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2013 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2017 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2018 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2019 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2023 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2024 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2025 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2026 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2027 (&extension, &responder_id_list))
2030 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2032 PACKET responder_id;
2033 const unsigned char *id_data;
2035 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2037 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2041 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL
2042 && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2043 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) {
2044 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2048 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2049 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2050 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2054 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2055 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2059 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2060 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2061 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2066 /* Read in request_extensions */
2067 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2070 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2071 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2072 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2073 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2074 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2075 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2076 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2077 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2078 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2086 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2088 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2092 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2093 unsigned int hbtype;
2095 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2096 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2097 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2101 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2102 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2104 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2105 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2106 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2109 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2115 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2116 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2118 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2121 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2122 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2123 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2124 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2125 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2126 * anything like that, but this might change).
2128 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2129 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2130 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2131 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2132 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2134 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2138 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2139 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2140 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2144 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2146 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2147 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2148 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2152 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2153 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2155 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2156 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2160 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2161 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2162 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2163 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2164 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2167 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2168 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2173 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2175 * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
2177 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2183 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2185 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2186 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2187 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2189 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2194 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2195 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2196 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2197 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2202 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2205 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2206 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2207 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2210 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2219 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2220 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2221 * fill the length of the block.
2223 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2225 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2227 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2228 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2229 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2237 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2239 unsigned int length, type, size;
2240 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2241 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2244 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2246 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2248 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2249 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2251 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2252 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2255 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2257 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2259 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2262 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2263 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2267 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2268 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2272 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2273 const unsigned char *data;
2276 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2277 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2280 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2281 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2283 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2284 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2286 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2287 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2288 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2289 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2290 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2293 tlsext_servername = 1;
2295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2296 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2297 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2298 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2299 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2300 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2304 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2305 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2306 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2307 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2308 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2311 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2312 ecpointformatlist_length;
2313 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2314 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2315 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2316 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2322 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2324 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2325 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2326 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2327 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2329 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2332 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2333 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2336 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2337 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2339 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2342 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2343 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2346 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2347 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2351 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2352 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2353 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2355 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2356 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2357 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2358 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2359 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2360 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2362 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2364 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2365 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2366 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2369 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2374 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2375 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2376 unsigned char *selected;
2377 unsigned char selected_len;
2378 /* We must have requested it. */
2379 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2380 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2383 /* The data must be valid */
2384 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2385 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2388 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2391 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2392 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2393 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2396 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2397 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2398 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2401 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2402 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2403 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2407 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2409 /* We must have requested it. */
2410 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2411 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2415 * The extension data consists of:
2416 * uint16 list_length
2417 * uint8 proto_length;
2418 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2420 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2421 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2422 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2423 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2426 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2427 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2428 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2429 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2432 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2433 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2436 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2439 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2440 unsigned int hbtype;
2441 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2442 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2446 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2447 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2449 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2450 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2451 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2454 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2459 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2460 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2461 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2465 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2466 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2467 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2468 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2469 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2470 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2471 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2473 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2476 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2477 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2479 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2483 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2484 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2488 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2489 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2490 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2491 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2492 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2493 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2494 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2498 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2507 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2508 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2509 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2510 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2511 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2513 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2514 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2515 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2517 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2523 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2526 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2527 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2528 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2537 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2539 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2543 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2548 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2550 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2551 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2555 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2556 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2559 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2560 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2564 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2566 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2567 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2568 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2569 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2571 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2573 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2576 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2577 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2580 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2581 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2584 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2585 s->servername_done = 0;
2591 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2592 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2594 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2596 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2599 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2600 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2602 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2603 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2606 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2609 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2610 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2611 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2615 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2620 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2621 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2622 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2623 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2624 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2625 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2626 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2627 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2630 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2631 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2632 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2633 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2634 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2637 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2638 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2640 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2641 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2645 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2649 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2654 * Upon success, returns 1.
2655 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2657 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2659 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2662 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2663 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2664 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2665 * influence which certificate is sent
2667 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2669 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2670 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2671 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2672 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2674 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2675 * et al can pick it up.
2677 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2678 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2680 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2681 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2682 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2684 /* status request response should be sent */
2685 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2686 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2687 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2689 /* something bad happened */
2690 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2692 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2698 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2705 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2707 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2708 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2712 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2713 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2714 * must contain uncompressed.
2716 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2717 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2718 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2719 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2720 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2721 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2722 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2723 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2725 unsigned char *list;
2726 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2727 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2728 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2729 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2730 found_uncompressed = 1;
2734 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2736 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2740 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2741 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2743 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2745 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2746 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2747 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2748 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2750 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2752 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2755 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2756 * that we don't receive a status message
2758 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2759 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2760 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2763 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2764 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2767 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2768 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2771 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2772 s->servername_done = 0;
2778 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2781 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2783 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2784 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2788 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2796 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2797 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2798 * need to be handled at the same time.
2800 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2803 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2804 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2805 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2806 * point to the resulting session.
2808 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2809 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2810 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2813 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2814 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2815 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2816 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2817 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2818 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2819 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2822 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2823 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2824 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2825 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2826 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2827 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2829 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2832 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2833 const PACKET *session_id,
2837 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2840 int have_ticket = 0;
2841 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2844 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2845 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2848 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2851 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2854 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2858 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2859 unsigned int type, size;
2861 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2862 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2863 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2867 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2871 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2873 const unsigned char *etick;
2875 /* Duplicate extension */
2876 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2884 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2887 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2891 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2893 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2894 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2895 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2896 * calculate the master secret later.
2901 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2902 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2906 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2907 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2909 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2910 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2913 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2916 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2917 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2920 default: /* fatal error */
2926 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2927 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2928 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2934 if (have_ticket == 0)
2941 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2943 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2944 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2945 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2946 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2947 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2948 * point to the resulting session.
2951 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2952 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2953 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2954 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2955 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2957 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2958 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2959 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2962 unsigned char *sdec;
2963 const unsigned char *p;
2964 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2965 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2966 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2967 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2968 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2970 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2971 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2974 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2979 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2980 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2981 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2992 /* Check key name matches */
2993 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
2994 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
2998 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
2999 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3000 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3001 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3002 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3003 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3009 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3012 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3016 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3018 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3023 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3024 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3025 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3028 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3029 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3030 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3033 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3034 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3035 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3036 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3037 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3038 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3039 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3043 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3044 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3049 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3053 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3057 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3058 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3059 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3063 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3064 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3073 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3077 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3078 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3082 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3089 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3090 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3091 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3092 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3093 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3094 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3095 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3096 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3097 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3098 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3101 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3102 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3103 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3104 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3105 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3106 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3107 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3110 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3113 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3114 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3120 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3123 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3124 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3125 return table[i].nid;
3130 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3135 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3138 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3141 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3142 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3146 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3148 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3155 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3158 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3159 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3160 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3161 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3162 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3163 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3164 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3165 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3166 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3167 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3168 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3169 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3172 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3178 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3179 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3180 return tls12_md_info + i;
3186 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3188 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3189 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3191 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3194 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3197 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3201 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3202 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3205 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3206 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3209 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3210 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3213 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3214 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3216 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3217 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3219 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3220 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3226 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3227 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3228 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3230 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3231 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3233 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3234 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3236 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3238 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3239 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3241 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3243 if (psignhash_nid) {
3244 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3245 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3246 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3250 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3251 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3253 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3254 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3255 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3257 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3258 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3260 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3261 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3265 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3266 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3270 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3272 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3273 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3274 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3276 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3277 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3278 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3280 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3281 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3282 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3284 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3285 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3290 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3291 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3296 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3297 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3304 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3306 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3308 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3312 * Old version of the tls12_copy_sigalgs function used by code that has not
3313 * yet been converted to WPACKET yet. It will be deleted once WPACKET conversion
3317 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs_old(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3318 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3320 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3322 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3323 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3324 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3325 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3328 return tmpout - out;
3331 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3332 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3335 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3336 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3337 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, psig[0], 1)
3338 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, psig[1], 1))
3345 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3346 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3347 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3348 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3350 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3351 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3352 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3353 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3354 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3356 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3357 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3360 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3361 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3362 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3364 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3374 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3375 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3377 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3378 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3380 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3382 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3384 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3385 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3386 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3387 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3388 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3389 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3390 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3391 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3392 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3393 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3395 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3396 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3399 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3400 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3404 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3405 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3407 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3409 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3412 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3416 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3417 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3421 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3423 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3426 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3427 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3429 /* Should never happen */
3433 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3434 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3435 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3437 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3438 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3442 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3447 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3448 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3450 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3451 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3454 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3455 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3456 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3457 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3458 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3460 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3461 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3462 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3463 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3469 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3470 * the certificate for signing.
3472 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3474 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3475 * supported it stays as NULL.
3477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3478 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3479 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3482 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3483 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3484 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3488 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3489 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3492 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3493 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3494 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3495 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3496 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3497 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3498 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3499 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3505 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3506 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3507 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3509 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3514 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3521 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3523 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3526 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3527 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3528 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3530 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3531 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3535 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3537 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3539 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3541 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3543 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3544 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3547 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3551 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3554 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3556 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3557 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3558 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3559 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3560 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3561 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3563 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3564 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3565 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3569 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3571 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3574 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3577 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3579 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3581 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3583 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3591 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3592 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3594 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3597 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3598 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3601 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3602 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3607 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3608 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3610 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3614 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3618 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3621 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3623 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3628 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3629 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3631 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3632 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3633 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3635 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3642 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3643 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3644 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3646 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3647 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3648 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3654 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3658 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3662 if (default_nid == -1)
3664 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3666 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3667 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3668 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3673 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3674 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3678 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3679 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3680 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3687 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3688 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3689 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3690 * attempting to use them.
3693 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3695 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3696 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3697 /* Strict mode flags */
3698 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3699 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3700 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3702 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3707 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3708 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3711 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3712 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3714 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3717 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3719 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3720 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3722 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3724 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3725 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3731 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3734 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3736 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3737 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3739 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3746 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3747 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3748 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3749 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3750 else if (!check_flags)
3755 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3756 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3758 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3760 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3761 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3763 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3766 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3767 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3768 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3769 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3772 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3773 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3774 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3778 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3779 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3782 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3783 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3784 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3787 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3788 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3789 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3792 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3793 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3794 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3803 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3804 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3806 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3808 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3809 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3810 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3813 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3820 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3821 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3825 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3826 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3827 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3828 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3830 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3837 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3838 else if (check_flags)
3839 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3841 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3842 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3843 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3844 else if (!check_flags)
3847 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3848 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3849 else if (strict_mode) {
3850 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3851 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3852 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3853 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3855 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3862 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3863 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3865 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3867 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3870 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3873 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3877 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3881 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3883 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3884 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3886 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3887 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3888 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3892 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3895 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3897 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3899 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3900 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3902 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3903 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3904 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3906 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3907 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3908 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3909 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3910 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3915 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3918 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3920 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3921 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3925 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3926 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3927 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3928 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3929 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3931 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3934 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3938 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3941 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3942 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3949 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3950 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3952 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3953 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3954 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3955 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3956 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3957 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3958 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3961 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3962 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3964 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3968 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3970 int dh_secbits = 80;
3971 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3972 return DH_get_1024_160();
3973 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3974 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3979 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3980 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3983 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
3991 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
3992 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
3994 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
3995 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4003 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4004 return DH_get_2048_224();
4005 return DH_get_1024_160();
4009 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4012 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4015 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4016 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4017 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4018 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4020 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4023 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4025 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4028 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4030 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4031 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4032 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4033 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4035 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4036 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4038 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4039 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4042 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4044 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4047 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4050 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4052 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4053 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4055 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4056 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4058 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4059 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4064 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4065 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4066 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4069 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4071 int rv, start_idx, i;
4073 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4078 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4082 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4083 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4084 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);