2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
153 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
157 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
168 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
171 s->version = s->method->version;
174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
176 static int nid_list[] =
178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
205 static int pref_list[] =
207 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
208 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
209 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
210 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
211 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
212 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
213 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
214 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
215 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
216 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
217 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
221 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
222 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
223 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
224 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
225 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
230 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
231 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
234 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
236 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
237 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
238 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
240 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
243 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
245 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
248 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
250 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
252 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
254 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
256 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
258 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
260 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
262 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
264 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
266 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
268 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
270 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
272 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
274 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
276 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
278 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
280 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
282 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
286 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
288 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
290 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
292 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
294 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
296 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
306 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
307 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
310 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
311 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
313 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
316 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
317 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
319 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
322 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
323 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
325 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
328 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
329 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
330 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
331 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
333 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
335 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
336 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
340 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
343 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
346 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
350 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
352 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
354 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
359 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
363 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
366 unsigned char *ret = p;
368 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
369 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
370 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
375 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
377 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
379 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
380 unsigned long size_str;
383 /* check for enough space.
384 4 for the servername type and entension length
385 2 for servernamelist length
386 1 for the hostname type
387 2 for hostname length
391 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
392 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
395 /* extension type and length */
396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
399 /* length of servername list */
402 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
403 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
405 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
409 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
414 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
420 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
422 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
425 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
435 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
436 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
437 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
439 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
440 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
446 /* check for enough space.
447 4 for the srp type type and entension length
448 1 for the srp user identity
449 + srp user identity length
451 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
453 /* fill in the extension */
454 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
455 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
456 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
457 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
463 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
464 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
466 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
469 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
470 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
471 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
477 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
478 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
479 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
480 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
481 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
483 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
484 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
486 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
489 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
490 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
491 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
497 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
498 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
500 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
501 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
502 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
503 * resolves this to two bytes.
505 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
506 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
507 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
509 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
511 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
514 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
515 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
516 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
517 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
519 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
520 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
521 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
523 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
524 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
526 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
530 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
531 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
533 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
536 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
541 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
547 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
549 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
552 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
553 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
554 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
555 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
558 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
559 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
560 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
562 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
564 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
566 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
569 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
572 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
577 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
578 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
581 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
585 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
587 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
588 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
594 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
596 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
603 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
604 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
605 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
607 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
608 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
610 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
612 /* save position of id len */
613 unsigned char *q = ret;
614 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
615 /* skip over id len */
617 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
623 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
627 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
628 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
631 * 1: peer may send requests
632 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
634 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
635 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
637 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
641 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
643 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
644 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
645 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
647 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
653 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
657 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
659 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
661 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
664 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
673 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
680 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
683 unsigned char *ret = p;
684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
685 int next_proto_neg_seen;
688 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
689 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
693 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
695 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
697 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
699 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
703 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
707 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
713 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
715 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
718 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
728 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
729 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
731 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
734 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
735 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
736 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
742 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
743 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
744 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
745 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
746 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
749 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
750 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
752 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
753 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
755 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
756 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
760 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
762 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
763 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
767 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
768 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
769 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
771 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
773 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
775 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
778 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
781 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
791 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
793 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
795 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
798 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
807 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
808 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
809 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
810 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
811 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
812 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
813 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
814 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
815 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
816 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
817 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
822 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
823 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
824 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
826 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
829 * 1: peer may send requests
830 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
832 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
833 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
835 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
841 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
842 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
843 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
845 const unsigned char *npa;
849 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
850 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
852 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
853 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
855 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
857 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
862 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
870 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
871 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
872 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
877 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
878 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
879 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
880 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
882 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
883 unsigned short type, size;
884 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
885 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
886 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
887 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
888 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
889 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
890 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
892 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
893 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
894 0x01, /* 1 point format */
895 0x00, /* uncompressed */
898 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
899 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
900 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
901 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
902 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
903 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
904 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
905 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
906 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
907 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
919 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
926 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
928 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
929 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
931 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
933 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
935 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
940 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
942 if (data + len != d+n)
944 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
948 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
950 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
952 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
957 unsigned char *data = *p;
958 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
961 s->servername_done = 0;
962 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
964 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
968 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
969 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
973 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
974 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
975 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
981 if (data > (d+n-len))
984 while (data <= (d+n-4))
989 if (data+size > (d+n))
992 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
994 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
995 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
996 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
997 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
999 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1000 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1001 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1002 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1003 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1004 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1005 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1006 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1007 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1008 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1009 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1010 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1011 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1012 the value of the Host: field.
1013 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1014 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1015 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1016 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1020 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1022 unsigned char *sdata;
1028 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1035 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1042 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1048 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1051 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1052 switch (servname_type)
1054 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1057 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1059 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1062 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1064 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1067 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1069 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1072 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1073 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1074 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1075 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1076 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1077 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1080 s->servername_done = 1;
1084 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1085 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1086 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1098 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1103 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1104 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1106 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1108 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1111 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1113 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1116 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1118 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1119 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1121 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1123 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1129 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1130 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1131 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1133 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1134 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1136 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1138 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1143 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1145 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1146 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1148 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1149 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1151 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1154 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1155 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1158 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1159 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1160 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1161 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1162 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1165 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1166 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1168 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1169 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1170 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1172 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1173 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1175 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1180 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1182 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1185 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1186 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1188 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1191 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1192 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1195 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1196 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1197 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1198 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1199 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1202 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1203 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1204 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1205 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1207 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1211 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1214 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1215 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1217 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1221 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1222 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1223 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1224 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1226 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1227 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1229 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1234 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1236 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1237 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1239 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1243 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1245 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1247 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1249 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1252 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1254 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1260 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1262 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1265 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1267 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1271 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1272 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1277 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1281 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1283 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1285 const unsigned char *sdata;
1287 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1292 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1301 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1305 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1309 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1314 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1318 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1323 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1324 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1327 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1328 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1329 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1331 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1332 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1335 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1336 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1338 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1339 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1344 /* Read in request_extensions */
1347 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1354 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1360 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1362 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1363 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1366 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1367 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1369 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1370 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1372 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1377 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1381 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1384 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1388 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1389 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1391 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1392 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1393 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1395 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1401 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1402 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1404 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1407 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1408 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1409 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1410 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1411 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1412 * anything like that, but this might change).
1414 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1415 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1416 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1417 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1418 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1419 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1423 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1425 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1427 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1440 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1442 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1443 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1445 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1447 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1455 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1456 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1457 * the length of the block. */
1458 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1460 unsigned int off = 0;
1474 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1476 unsigned short length;
1477 unsigned short type;
1478 unsigned short size;
1479 unsigned char *data = *p;
1480 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1481 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1484 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1488 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1489 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1492 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1496 if (data+length != d+n)
1498 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1502 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1507 if (data+size > (d+n))
1510 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1511 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1512 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1514 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1516 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1518 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1521 tlsext_servername = 1;
1524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1525 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1526 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1528 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1529 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1531 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1532 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1534 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1537 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1538 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1539 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1541 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1544 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1545 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1547 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1548 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1549 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1550 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1551 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1554 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1556 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1558 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1559 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1561 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1564 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1567 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1570 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1572 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1573 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1574 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1576 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1580 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1583 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1584 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1586 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1590 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1591 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1592 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1593 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1595 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1597 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1599 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1604 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1605 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1607 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1608 * a status request message.
1610 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1612 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1615 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1616 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1619 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1620 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1622 unsigned char *selected;
1623 unsigned char selected_len;
1625 /* We must have requested it. */
1626 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
1628 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1631 /* The data must be valid */
1632 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1634 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1637 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1639 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1642 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1643 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1645 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1648 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1649 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1650 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1653 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1655 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1657 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1660 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1664 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1665 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1667 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1668 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1669 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1671 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1677 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1679 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1690 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1694 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1696 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1698 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1700 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1701 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1703 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1709 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1719 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1720 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1721 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1722 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1723 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1724 * absence on initial connect only.
1726 if (!renegotiate_seen
1727 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1728 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1730 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1732 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1740 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1743 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1744 * and elliptic curves we support.
1749 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1750 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1752 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1754 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1756 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1757 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1758 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1764 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1767 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1768 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1773 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1774 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1775 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1776 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1778 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1779 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1780 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
1781 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1783 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1787 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
1788 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
1790 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1794 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1796 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1800 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1802 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1807 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1809 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1810 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1812 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1813 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1815 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1816 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1821 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1825 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1826 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1833 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1835 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1836 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1837 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1838 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1841 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1842 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1843 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1844 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1848 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1849 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1854 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1855 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1856 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1857 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1859 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1864 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
1866 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1867 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1870 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1871 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1873 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1874 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1878 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1879 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1880 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1881 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1883 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1885 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1886 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1887 * so this has to happen here in
1888 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
1892 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1894 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1897 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1898 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1903 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1904 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1905 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1907 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1909 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1910 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1912 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1913 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1915 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1916 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1918 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1919 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1921 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1922 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1925 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1929 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1931 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1932 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1933 * abort the handshake.
1935 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1936 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1944 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1945 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1948 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1949 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1952 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1953 s->servername_done=0;
1959 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
1961 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1964 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1965 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1966 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
1967 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
1969 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1972 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
1973 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
1974 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1975 if (certpkey == NULL)
1977 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1980 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
1981 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
1983 s->cert->key = certpkey;
1984 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1987 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1988 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1989 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1991 /* status request response should be sent */
1992 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1993 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1994 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1996 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1998 /* something bad happened */
1999 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2000 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2001 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2006 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2011 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2012 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2015 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2016 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2024 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2026 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2027 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2029 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2030 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2031 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2032 * it must contain uncompressed.
2034 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2035 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2036 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2037 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2038 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2040 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2042 unsigned char *list;
2043 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2044 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2045 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2047 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2049 found_uncompressed = 1;
2053 if (!found_uncompressed)
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2059 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2060 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2062 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2063 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2064 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2065 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2067 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2068 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2070 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2071 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2073 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2075 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2076 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2079 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2080 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2081 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2082 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2084 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2085 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2090 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2093 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2094 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2097 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2098 * there is no response.
2100 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2102 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2103 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2105 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2106 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2109 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2110 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2114 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2115 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2121 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2122 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2125 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2126 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2129 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2130 s->servername_done=0;
2136 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2137 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2138 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2140 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2141 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2142 * extension, if any.
2143 * len: the length of the session ID.
2144 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2145 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2146 * point to the resulting session.
2148 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2149 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2150 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2153 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2154 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2155 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2156 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2157 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2158 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2159 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2162 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2163 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2164 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2165 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2166 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2167 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2169 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2170 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2172 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2173 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2177 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2179 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2180 * to permit stateful resumption.
2182 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2184 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2188 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2189 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2196 /* Skip past cipher list */
2201 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2206 /* Now at start of extensions */
2207 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2210 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2212 unsigned short type, size;
2215 if (p + size > limit)
2217 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2222 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2223 * currently have one. */
2224 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2227 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2229 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2230 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2231 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2232 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2233 * calculate the master secret later. */
2236 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2239 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2240 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2242 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2244 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2245 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2247 default: /* fatal error */
2256 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2258 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2259 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2260 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2261 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2262 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2263 * point to the resulting session.
2266 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2267 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2268 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2269 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2271 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2272 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2273 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2276 unsigned char *sdec;
2277 const unsigned char *p;
2278 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2279 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2282 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2283 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2286 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2287 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2288 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2289 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2291 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2292 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2303 /* Check key name matches */
2304 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2306 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2307 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2308 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2309 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2311 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2312 * integrity checks on ticket.
2314 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2317 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2321 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2322 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2323 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2324 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2325 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2327 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2328 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2329 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2330 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2331 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2334 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2337 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2338 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2341 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2344 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2348 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2349 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2350 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2351 * as required by standard.
2354 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2355 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2363 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2368 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2376 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2378 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2380 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2381 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2384 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2385 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2388 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2389 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2393 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2395 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2398 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2401 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2405 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2408 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2410 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2416 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2419 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2421 if (table[i].id == id)
2422 return table[i].nid;
2428 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2433 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2434 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2437 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2440 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2441 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2445 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2447 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2448 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2451 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2456 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
2463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2464 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2468 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2469 return EVP_sha224();
2471 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2472 return EVP_sha256();
2474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2475 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2476 return EVP_sha384();
2478 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2479 return EVP_sha512();
2487 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2489 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2494 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2495 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2497 /* Should never happen */
2501 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2502 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2503 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2504 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2506 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2508 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2513 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2514 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2517 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2518 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2519 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2523 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2531 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2533 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2536 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2537 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2538 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2545 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2546 * supported it stays as NULL.
2548 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2549 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2550 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2552 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2553 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2555 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2556 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2560 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2561 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2568 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2570 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2572 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2573 unsigned short hbtype;
2574 unsigned int payload;
2575 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2577 /* Read type and payload length first */
2582 if (s->msg_callback)
2583 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2584 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2585 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2587 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
2589 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2592 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
2593 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
2594 * payload, plus padding
2596 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2599 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2600 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2602 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2604 /* Random padding */
2605 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
2607 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
2609 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2610 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2611 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2612 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2614 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2619 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
2623 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
2624 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
2625 * sequence number */
2628 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
2631 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2639 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2641 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2643 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2644 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2646 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2647 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2648 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2654 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2655 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2661 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2662 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
2664 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2668 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
2669 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2671 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2673 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2674 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2675 * some random stuff.
2676 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2677 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2678 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2679 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2682 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2685 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2686 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2688 /* Sequence number */
2689 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2690 /* 16 random bytes */
2691 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2693 /* Random padding */
2694 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
2696 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2699 if (s->msg_callback)
2700 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2701 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2702 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2704 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;