2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
235 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
315 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
324 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
387 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
390 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
391 const unsigned char **pcurves,
396 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
397 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
400 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
401 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
405 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
423 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
424 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
428 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
429 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
431 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
434 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
435 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
437 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
438 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
441 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
442 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
444 const unsigned char *curves;
446 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
447 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
449 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
452 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
455 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
457 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
460 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
465 else /* Should never happen */
468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
469 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
471 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
472 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
477 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
478 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
482 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
484 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
485 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
487 /* Can't do anything on client side */
494 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
495 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
498 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
499 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
500 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
501 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
502 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
503 /* Should never happen */
506 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
509 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
511 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
516 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
518 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
519 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
521 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
523 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
527 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
528 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
539 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
540 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
542 unsigned char *clist, *p;
544 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
545 * while curve ids < 32
547 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
548 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
551 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
553 unsigned long idmask;
555 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
557 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
568 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
572 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
577 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
580 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
582 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
586 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
588 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
590 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
592 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
593 if (nid == NID_undef)
594 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
595 if (nid == NID_undef)
596 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
597 if (nid == NID_undef)
599 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
600 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
602 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
605 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
606 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
611 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
615 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
617 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
618 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
623 const EC_METHOD *meth;
626 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
627 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
630 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
633 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
637 /* Determine curve ID */
638 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
639 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
640 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
644 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
656 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
658 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
661 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
663 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
666 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
670 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
671 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
672 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
674 const unsigned char *p;
677 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
678 * is supported (see RFC4492).
680 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
682 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
683 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
684 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
694 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
695 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
697 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
698 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
700 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
705 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
712 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
715 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
717 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
719 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
724 *pformats = ecformats_default;
725 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
727 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
729 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
733 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
734 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
736 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
738 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
741 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
744 /* If not EC nothing to do */
745 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
750 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
754 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
755 * supported curves extension.
757 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
760 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
761 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
763 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
770 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
771 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
772 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
773 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
774 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
776 return 0; /* Should never happen */
777 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
778 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
780 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
784 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
787 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
792 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
793 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
795 unsigned char curve_id[2];
796 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
797 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
798 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
799 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
802 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
803 * no other curves permitted.
807 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
808 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
809 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
810 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
811 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
815 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
816 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
818 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
819 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
821 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
824 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
829 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
835 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
837 /* Need a shared curve */
838 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
849 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
851 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
855 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
861 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
866 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
870 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
871 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
874 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
875 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
877 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
880 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
881 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
883 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
886 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
887 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
889 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
892 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
893 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
894 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
895 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
897 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
899 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
900 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
903 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
904 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
907 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
911 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
912 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
913 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
916 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
918 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
922 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
924 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
925 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
926 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
928 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
929 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
932 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
933 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
937 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
938 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
940 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
941 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
943 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
945 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
950 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
951 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
954 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
955 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
957 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
958 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
960 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
961 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
962 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
963 /* Should never happen */
966 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
967 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
973 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
975 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
976 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
977 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
979 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
989 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
991 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
994 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
998 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1000 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1003 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1011 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1015 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1016 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1017 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1019 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1022 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1023 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1028 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1034 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1035 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1036 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1042 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1045 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1046 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1050 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1051 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1052 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1053 * session and not global settings.
1056 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1061 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1062 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1063 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1066 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1067 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1068 * signature algorithms.
1070 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1071 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1072 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1074 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1077 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1079 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1080 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1084 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1085 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1087 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1088 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1090 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1092 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1094 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1095 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1101 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1104 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1106 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1109 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1111 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1113 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1116 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1119 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1120 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1122 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1124 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1127 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1128 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1130 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1132 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1134 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1135 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1136 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1137 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1146 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1147 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1148 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1153 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1155 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1157 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1158 unsigned long size_str;
1161 /* check for enough space.
1162 4 for the servername type and entension length
1163 2 for servernamelist length
1164 1 for the hostname type
1165 2 for hostname length
1169 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1170 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1173 /* extension type and length */
1174 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1175 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1177 /* length of servername list */
1178 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1180 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1181 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1183 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1187 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1192 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1200 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1203 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1213 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1214 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1215 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1217 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1218 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1224 /* check for enough space.
1225 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1226 1 for the srp user identity
1227 + srp user identity length
1229 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1231 /* fill in the extension */
1232 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1233 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1234 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1235 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1243 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1245 const unsigned char *plist;
1248 unsigned char *etmp;
1250 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1252 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1253 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1260 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1261 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1262 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1263 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1266 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1267 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1268 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1270 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1271 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1272 if (plistlen > 65532)
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1279 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1281 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1282 for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
1284 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1291 plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
1293 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1294 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1295 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1296 * resolves this to two bytes.
1298 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1304 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1307 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1308 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1309 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1310 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1312 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1313 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1314 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1316 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1317 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1319 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1323 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1324 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1326 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1329 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1330 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1334 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1340 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1343 const unsigned char *salg;
1344 unsigned char *etmp;
1345 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1346 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1348 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1350 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1352 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1353 /* Fill in lengths */
1354 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1359 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1360 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1362 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1364 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1366 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1372 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1377 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1380 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1384 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1386 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1387 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1393 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1395 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1402 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1403 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1404 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1406 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1407 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1409 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1411 /* save position of id len */
1412 unsigned char *q = ret;
1413 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1414 /* skip over id len */
1416 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1422 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1426 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1427 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1432 * 1: peer may send requests
1433 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1435 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1436 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1438 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1442 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1444 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1445 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1446 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1448 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1453 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1455 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1457 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1458 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1459 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1460 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1461 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1462 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1465 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1469 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1471 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1473 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1476 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1483 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1484 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1485 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1487 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1488 if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION)
1490 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1495 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1496 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1498 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1499 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1501 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1503 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1504 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1505 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1506 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1508 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1510 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1512 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1518 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1520 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1525 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1528 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1532 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1535 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1536 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1538 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1541 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1542 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1543 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1544 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1546 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1547 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1551 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1553 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1555 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1557 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1561 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1565 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1571 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1573 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1576 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1588 const unsigned char *plist;
1590 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1593 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1595 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1596 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1603 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1604 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1605 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1606 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1610 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1611 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1613 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1615 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1616 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1620 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1622 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1623 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1627 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1628 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1630 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1632 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1634 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1637 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1640 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1649 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1651 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1653 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1656 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1664 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1665 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1666 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1667 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1668 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1669 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1670 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1671 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1672 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1673 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1674 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1680 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1681 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1683 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1685 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1688 * 1: peer may send requests
1689 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1691 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1692 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1694 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1700 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1701 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1702 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1704 const unsigned char *npa;
1705 unsigned int npalen;
1708 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1709 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1711 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1712 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1714 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1716 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1720 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1722 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1723 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1725 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD, RC4 or SSL 3.0:
1726 * might want to disable for other cases too.
1728 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1729 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1730 || s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1731 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1734 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1740 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1742 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1743 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1745 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1747 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1751 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1755 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1758 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1762 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1764 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1765 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1766 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1769 * returns: 0 on success. */
1770 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1771 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1775 const unsigned char *selected;
1776 unsigned char selected_len;
1779 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1785 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1786 * length-prefixed strings. */
1787 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1788 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1797 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1799 proto_len = data[i];
1805 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1811 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1812 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1813 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1814 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1815 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1816 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1817 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1819 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1822 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1823 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1828 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1833 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1834 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1835 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1840 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1841 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1842 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1843 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1845 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1846 unsigned short type, size;
1847 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1848 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1849 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1850 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1851 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1852 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1853 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1855 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1856 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1857 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1858 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1861 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1862 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1863 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1864 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1865 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1866 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1867 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1868 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1869 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1870 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1873 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1882 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1885 if (data+size > d+n)
1889 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1891 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1892 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1894 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1896 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1898 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1903 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1905 if (data + len != d+n)
1907 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1911 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1913 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1916 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1918 unsigned short type;
1919 unsigned short size;
1921 unsigned char *data = *p;
1922 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1925 s->servername_done = 0;
1926 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1928 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1931 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1933 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1934 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1938 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1939 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1943 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1944 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1945 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1947 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1948 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1950 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1951 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1953 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1954 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1956 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1957 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1959 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1960 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1962 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1963 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1966 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1967 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1970 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1974 if (data > (d+n-len))
1977 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1982 if (data+size > (d+n))
1985 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1987 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1988 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1989 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1990 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1992 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1993 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1994 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1995 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1996 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1997 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1998 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1999 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2000 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2001 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2002 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2003 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2004 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2005 the value of the Host: field.
2006 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2007 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2008 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2009 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2013 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2015 unsigned char *sdata;
2021 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2028 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2035 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2041 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2044 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2045 switch (servname_type)
2047 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2050 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2052 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2055 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2057 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2060 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2062 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2065 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2066 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2067 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2068 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2069 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2070 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2073 s->servername_done = 1;
2077 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2078 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2079 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2091 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2097 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2099 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2101 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2104 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2106 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2109 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2111 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2112 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2114 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2116 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2123 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2125 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2126 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2128 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2129 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2131 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2136 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2138 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2139 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2141 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2142 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2144 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2147 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2148 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2151 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2152 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2153 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2154 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2155 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2158 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2160 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2161 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2162 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2164 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2165 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2167 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2172 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2174 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2177 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2178 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2180 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2183 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2184 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2187 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2188 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2189 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2190 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2191 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2194 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2195 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2196 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2198 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2202 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2205 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2206 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2208 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2212 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2213 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2214 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2215 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2217 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2218 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2220 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2225 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2227 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2228 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2230 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2234 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2236 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2238 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2240 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2243 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2245 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2250 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2252 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2255 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2257 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2260 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2263 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2266 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2267 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2271 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2276 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2280 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2282 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2284 const unsigned char *sdata;
2286 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2291 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2300 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2304 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2308 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2313 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2317 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2322 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2323 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2326 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2327 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2328 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2330 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2331 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2334 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2335 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2337 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2338 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2343 /* Read in request_extensions */
2346 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2353 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2359 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2361 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2362 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2365 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2366 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2368 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2369 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2371 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2376 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2380 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2383 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2387 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2388 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2390 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2391 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2392 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2394 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2400 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2401 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2402 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2404 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2407 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2408 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2409 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2410 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2411 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2412 * anything like that, but this might change).
2414 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2415 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2416 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2417 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2418 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2419 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2423 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2424 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2425 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2427 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2430 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2431 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2435 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2436 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2438 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2442 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2443 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2445 if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION)
2446 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2449 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2450 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2451 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2452 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2453 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2457 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2468 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2470 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2471 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2473 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2475 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2478 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2479 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2480 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2485 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2488 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2489 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2491 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2495 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2504 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2505 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2506 * the length of the block. */
2507 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2509 unsigned int off = 0;
2523 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2525 unsigned short length;
2526 unsigned short type;
2527 unsigned short size;
2528 unsigned char *data = *p;
2529 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2530 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2533 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2536 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2538 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2539 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2543 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2544 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2547 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2548 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2551 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2555 if (data+length != d+n)
2557 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2561 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2566 if (data+size > (d+n))
2569 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2570 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2571 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2573 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2575 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2577 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2580 tlsext_servername = 1;
2583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2584 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2586 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2587 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2589 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2591 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2596 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2597 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2598 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2600 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2603 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2604 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2607 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2608 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2609 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2610 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2611 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2614 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2616 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2618 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2619 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2621 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2624 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2626 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2629 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2631 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2632 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2634 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2638 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2641 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2642 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2644 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2648 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2649 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2650 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2651 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2653 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2655 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2657 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2662 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2664 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2665 * a status request message.
2667 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2669 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2672 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2673 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2676 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2677 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2679 unsigned char *selected;
2680 unsigned char selected_len;
2682 /* We must have requested it. */
2683 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2685 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2688 /* The data must be valid */
2689 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2691 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2694 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2696 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2699 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2700 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2702 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2705 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2706 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2707 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2711 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2715 /* We must have requested it. */
2716 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2718 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2723 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2726 /* The extension data consists of:
2727 * uint16 list_length
2728 * uint8 proto_length;
2729 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2733 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2735 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2739 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2741 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2744 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2745 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2746 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2747 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2749 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2752 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2753 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2756 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2758 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2760 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2763 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2767 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2768 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2770 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2771 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2772 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2774 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2779 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2781 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2785 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2786 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2788 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite or SSL 3.0 */
2789 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2790 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4
2791 && s->version != SSL3_VERSION)
2792 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2795 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2796 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2798 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2806 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2810 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2812 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2814 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2816 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2817 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2819 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2825 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2835 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2836 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2837 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2838 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2839 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2840 * absence on initial connect only.
2842 if (!renegotiate_seen
2843 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2844 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2846 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2848 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2856 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2859 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2863 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2865 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2870 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2872 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2873 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2875 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2876 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2878 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2879 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2884 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2888 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2889 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2896 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2901 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2903 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2904 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2907 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2908 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2910 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2911 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2915 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2916 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2917 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2918 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2920 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2922 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2923 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2924 * so this has to happen here in
2925 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2929 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2931 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2934 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2935 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2940 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2941 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2942 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2944 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2946 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2947 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2949 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2950 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2952 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2953 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2955 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2956 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2958 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2959 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2962 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2966 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2968 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2969 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2970 * abort the handshake.
2972 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2973 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2981 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2982 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2985 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2986 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2989 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2990 s->servername_done=0;
2996 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2998 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3001 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3002 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3003 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3004 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3006 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3009 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3010 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3011 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3012 if (certpkey == NULL)
3014 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3017 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3018 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3020 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3021 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3024 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3025 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3026 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3028 /* status request response should be sent */
3029 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3030 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3031 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3033 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3035 /* something bad happened */
3036 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3037 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3038 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3043 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3048 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3049 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3052 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3053 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3061 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3063 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3064 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3066 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3067 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3068 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3069 * it must contain uncompressed.
3071 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3072 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3073 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3074 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3075 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3077 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3079 unsigned char *list;
3080 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3081 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3082 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3084 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3086 found_uncompressed = 1;
3090 if (!found_uncompressed)
3092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3096 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3097 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3099 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3100 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3101 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3102 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3104 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3105 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3107 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3108 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3110 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3112 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3113 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3116 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3117 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3118 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3119 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3121 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3122 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3127 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3130 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3131 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3134 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3135 * there is no response.
3137 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3139 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3140 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3142 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3143 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3146 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3147 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3151 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3152 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3158 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3159 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3162 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3163 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3166 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3167 s->servername_done=0;
3173 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3176 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3178 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3180 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3184 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3192 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3193 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3194 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3196 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3197 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3198 * extension, if any.
3199 * len: the length of the session ID.
3200 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3201 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3202 * point to the resulting session.
3204 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3205 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3206 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3209 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3210 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3211 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3212 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3213 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3214 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3215 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3218 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3219 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3220 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3221 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3222 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3223 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3225 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3226 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3228 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3229 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3233 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3235 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3236 * to permit stateful resumption.
3238 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3240 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3244 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3252 /* Skip past cipher list */
3257 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3262 /* Now at start of extensions */
3263 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3266 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3268 unsigned short type, size;
3271 if (p + size > limit)
3273 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3278 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3279 * currently have one. */
3280 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3283 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3285 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3286 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3287 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3288 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3289 * calculate the master secret later. */
3292 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3295 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3296 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3298 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3300 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3301 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3303 default: /* fatal error */
3312 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3314 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3315 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3316 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3317 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3318 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3319 * point to the resulting session.
3322 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3323 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3324 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3325 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3327 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3328 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3329 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3332 unsigned char *sdec;
3333 const unsigned char *p;
3334 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3335 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3338 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3339 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3342 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3343 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3344 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3345 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3347 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3348 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3359 /* Check key name matches */
3360 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3362 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3363 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3364 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3365 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3367 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3368 * integrity checks on ticket.
3370 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3373 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3377 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3378 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3379 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3380 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3381 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3383 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3384 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3385 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3386 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3387 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3390 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3393 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3394 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3396 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3401 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3404 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3408 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3409 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3410 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3411 * as required by standard.
3414 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3415 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3423 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3428 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3436 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3437 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3438 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3439 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3440 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3441 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3442 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3445 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3446 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3447 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3448 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3451 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3454 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3456 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3462 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3465 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3467 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3468 return table[i].nid;
3473 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3478 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3479 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3482 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3485 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3486 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3490 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3492 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3493 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3500 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3503 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3504 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3507 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3509 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3512 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3514 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3515 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3516 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3518 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3519 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3521 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3522 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3523 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3525 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3526 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3530 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3534 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3536 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3539 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3541 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3542 #ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
3543 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3546 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3547 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3549 return inf->mfunc();
3552 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3557 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3558 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3561 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3562 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3565 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3566 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3572 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3573 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3574 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3576 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3577 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3579 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3581 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3582 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3584 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3586 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3588 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3589 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3591 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3595 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3596 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3597 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3599 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3602 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3603 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3605 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3606 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3607 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3609 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3610 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3612 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3613 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3616 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3617 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3618 * then RSA is disabled.
3621 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3623 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3624 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3625 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3626 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3627 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3628 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3631 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3632 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3637 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3638 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3643 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3644 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3649 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3650 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3657 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3659 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3661 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3664 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3665 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3667 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3669 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3671 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3673 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3674 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3677 return tmpout - out;
3680 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3681 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3682 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3683 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3685 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3686 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3687 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3689 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3690 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3692 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3694 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3699 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3700 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3701 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3703 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3714 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3715 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3717 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3718 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3720 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3722 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3723 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3725 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3726 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3728 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3729 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3731 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3732 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3734 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3736 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3737 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3740 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3741 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3745 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3746 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3752 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3753 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3755 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3758 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3761 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3762 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3763 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3768 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3770 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3776 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3777 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3778 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3780 /* Should never happen */
3784 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3785 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3786 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3787 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3789 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3790 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3792 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3794 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3795 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3797 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3798 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3800 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3802 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3804 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3807 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3808 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3809 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3810 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3811 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3813 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3814 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3820 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3821 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3823 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3824 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3826 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3827 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3828 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3829 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3831 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3832 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3837 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3838 * use the certificate for signing.
3840 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3842 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3843 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3846 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3847 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3849 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3850 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3852 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3853 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3857 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3858 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3865 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3866 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3867 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3869 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3875 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3882 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3884 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3887 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3888 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3889 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3891 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3892 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3896 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3898 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3900 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3902 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3904 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3905 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3911 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3913 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3914 unsigned short hbtype;
3915 unsigned int payload;
3916 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3918 if (s->msg_callback)
3919 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3920 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3921 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3923 /* Read type and payload length first */
3924 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3925 return 0; /* silently discard */
3928 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3929 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3932 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3934 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3937 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3938 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3939 * payload, plus padding
3941 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3944 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3945 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3947 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3949 /* Random padding */
3950 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3952 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3954 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3955 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3956 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3957 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3959 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3964 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3968 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3969 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3970 * sequence number */
3973 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3976 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3984 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3986 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3988 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3989 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3991 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3992 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3993 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3999 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4000 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4006 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4007 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4009 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4013 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4014 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4016 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4018 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4019 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4020 * some random stuff.
4021 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4022 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4023 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4024 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4027 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4030 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4031 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4033 /* Sequence number */
4034 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4035 /* 16 random bytes */
4036 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4038 /* Random padding */
4039 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4041 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4044 if (s->msg_callback)
4045 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4046 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4047 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4049 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4058 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4063 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4066 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4068 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4071 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4072 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4074 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4076 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4078 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4086 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4087 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4088 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4089 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4090 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4091 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4094 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4095 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4096 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4097 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4100 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4102 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4103 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4106 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4107 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4111 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4112 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4113 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4117 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4121 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4124 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4126 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4131 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4132 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4134 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4136 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4137 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4138 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4139 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4141 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4149 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4150 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4151 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4152 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4156 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4157 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4158 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4159 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4165 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4169 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4173 if (default_nid == -1)
4175 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4177 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4178 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4179 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4183 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4184 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4188 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4189 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4191 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4197 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4198 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4199 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4200 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4203 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4205 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4206 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4207 /* Strict mode flags */
4208 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4209 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4210 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4212 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4217 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4218 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4220 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4221 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4224 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4228 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4231 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4233 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4235 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4236 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4239 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4240 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4241 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4243 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4244 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4253 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4256 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4257 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4258 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4260 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4268 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4269 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4270 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4273 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4279 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4280 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4283 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4286 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4287 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4289 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4294 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4295 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4296 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4297 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4298 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4301 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4302 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4303 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4304 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4308 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4309 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4317 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4318 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4321 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4324 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4325 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4327 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4330 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4338 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4339 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4341 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4344 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4345 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4346 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4348 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4353 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4361 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4362 else if(check_flags)
4363 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4365 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4366 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4367 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4368 else if (!check_flags)
4371 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4372 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4373 else if (strict_mode)
4375 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4376 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4378 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4379 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4383 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4391 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4393 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4398 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4401 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4404 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4409 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4410 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4411 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4412 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4413 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4418 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4423 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4427 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4428 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4430 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4432 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4434 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4438 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4442 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4445 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4447 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4448 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4450 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4452 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4453 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4455 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4457 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4459 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4460 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4462 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4467 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4471 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4473 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4474 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4478 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4480 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4481 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4482 else if (cpk->digest)
4483 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4486 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4488 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4489 * if the chain is invalid.
4493 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4494 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4497 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4498 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4505 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4506 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4508 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4509 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4510 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4511 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4512 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4513 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4515 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4516 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4518 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4523 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4524 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4526 int dh_secbits = 80;
4527 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4528 return DH_get_1024_160();
4529 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4531 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4538 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4539 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4542 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4549 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4550 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4551 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4553 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4554 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4561 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4562 return DH_get_2048_224();
4563 return DH_get_1024_160();
4567 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4570 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4573 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4574 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4579 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4581 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4584 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4586 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4587 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4588 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4589 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4592 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4593 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4596 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4598 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4601 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4604 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4607 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4608 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4612 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4613 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4615 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4616 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4620 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4621 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4622 * not sending one to the peer.
4623 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4626 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4628 int rv, start_idx, i;
4631 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4637 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4641 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4643 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4644 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);