2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include "ssl_locl.h"
119 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
122 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
123 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
124 SSL_SESSION **psess);
127 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
130 tls1_setup_key_block,
131 tls1_generate_master_secret,
132 tls1_change_cipher_state,
133 tls1_final_finish_mac,
134 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
135 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
136 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
137 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
143 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
144 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
150 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
151 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
155 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
158 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
160 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
162 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
166 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
169 s->version = s->method->version;
172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
173 static int nid_list[] =
175 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
176 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
177 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
178 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
179 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
180 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
181 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
182 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
183 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
184 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
185 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
186 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
187 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
188 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
189 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
190 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
191 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
192 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
193 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
194 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
195 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
196 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
197 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
198 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
199 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
202 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
204 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
205 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
206 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
208 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
211 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
213 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
216 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
218 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
220 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
222 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
224 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
226 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
228 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
232 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
234 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
236 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
238 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
240 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
244 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
246 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
248 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
250 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
252 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
254 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
256 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
258 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
260 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
262 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
264 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
270 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
273 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
276 unsigned char *ret = p;
278 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
279 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
280 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
285 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
287 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
289 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
290 unsigned long size_str;
293 /* check for enough space.
294 4 for the servername type and entension length
295 2 for servernamelist length
296 1 for the hostname type
297 2 for hostname length
301 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
302 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
305 /* extension type and length */
306 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
309 /* length of servername list */
312 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
313 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
315 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
319 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
324 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
330 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
332 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
335 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
345 #define MIN(x,y) (((x)<(y))?(x):(y))
346 /* we add SRP username the first time only if we have one! */
347 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
348 {/* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
349 int login_len = MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) + 1, 255);
352 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
353 if (login_len > lenmax) return NULL;
356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
360 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
362 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254);
363 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254));
368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
369 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
370 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
372 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
375 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
376 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
377 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
383 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
384 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
385 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
386 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
387 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
389 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
390 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
392 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
395 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
396 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
397 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
403 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
404 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
406 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
407 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
408 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
409 * resolves this to two bytes.
411 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
412 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
413 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
415 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
417 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
420 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
421 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
422 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
423 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
425 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
426 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
427 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
429 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
430 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
432 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
436 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
437 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
439 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
442 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
443 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
447 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
453 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
454 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
455 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
457 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
459 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
461 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
464 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
467 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
472 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
473 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
476 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
480 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
482 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
483 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
489 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
491 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
498 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
499 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
500 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
502 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
503 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
505 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
507 /* save position of id len */
508 unsigned char *q = ret;
509 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
510 /* skip over id len */
512 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
518 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
522 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
524 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
525 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
526 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
528 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
533 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
540 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
543 unsigned char *ret = p;
544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
545 int next_proto_neg_seen;
548 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
549 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
553 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
555 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
557 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
559 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
563 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
567 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
573 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
575 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
578 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
588 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
589 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
591 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
594 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
595 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
596 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
602 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
603 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
604 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
605 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
606 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
609 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
610 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
612 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
613 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
615 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
616 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
620 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
622 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
623 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
627 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
628 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
629 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
631 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
633 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
635 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
638 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
641 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
645 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
646 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
647 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
648 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
649 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
650 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
651 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
652 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
653 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
654 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
655 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
661 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
662 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
663 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
665 const unsigned char *npa;
669 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
670 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
672 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
673 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
675 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
677 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
682 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
689 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
694 unsigned char *data = *p;
695 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
697 s->servername_done = 0;
698 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
704 if (data > (d+n-len))
707 while (data <= (d+n-4))
712 if (data+size > (d+n))
715 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
717 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
718 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
719 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
720 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
722 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
723 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
724 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
725 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
726 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
727 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
728 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
729 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
730 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
731 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
732 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
733 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
734 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
735 the value of the Host: field.
736 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
737 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
738 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
739 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
743 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
745 unsigned char *sdata;
751 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
758 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
765 servname_type = *(sdata++);
771 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
774 if (s->servername_done == 0)
775 switch (servname_type)
777 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
780 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
782 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
785 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
787 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
790 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
792 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
795 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
796 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
797 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
798 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
799 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
800 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
803 s->servername_done = 1;
807 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
808 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
809 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
821 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
827 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
832 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
834 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
835 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
841 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
842 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
844 unsigned char *sdata = data;
845 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
847 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
849 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
854 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
856 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
857 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
859 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
860 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
862 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
865 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
866 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
869 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
870 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
871 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
872 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
873 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
876 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
877 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
879 unsigned char *sdata = data;
880 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
881 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
883 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
885 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
890 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
892 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
895 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
896 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
898 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
901 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
902 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
905 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
906 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
907 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
908 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
909 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
912 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
913 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
914 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
915 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
917 unsigned char *sdata = data;
921 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
924 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
925 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
927 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
931 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
932 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
933 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
934 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
936 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
937 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
939 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
944 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
946 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
947 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
949 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
953 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
955 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
957 renegotiate_seen = 1;
959 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
960 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
965 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
969 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
971 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
973 const unsigned char *sdata;
975 /* Read in responder_id_list */
980 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
989 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
997 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1002 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1006 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1011 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1012 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1015 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1016 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1017 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1019 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1020 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1023 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1024 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1026 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1027 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1032 /* Read in request_extensions */
1035 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1042 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1048 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1049 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1051 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1052 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1054 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1059 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1063 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1065 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1066 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1067 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1069 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1072 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1073 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1074 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1075 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1076 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1077 * anything like that, but this might change).
1079 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1080 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1081 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1082 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1083 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1084 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1088 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1096 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1098 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1099 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1101 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1103 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1110 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1111 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1112 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1113 * the length of the block. */
1114 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1116 unsigned int off = 0;
1130 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1132 unsigned short length;
1133 unsigned short type;
1134 unsigned short size;
1135 unsigned char *data = *p;
1136 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1137 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1139 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1143 if (data+length != d+n)
1145 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1149 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1154 if (data+size > (d+n))
1157 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1158 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1159 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1161 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1163 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1165 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1168 tlsext_servername = 1;
1171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1172 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1173 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1175 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1176 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1178 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1180 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1183 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1184 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1185 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1187 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1190 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1191 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1193 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1194 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1195 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1196 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1197 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1200 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1202 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1204 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1205 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1207 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1210 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1213 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1216 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1218 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1219 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1220 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1222 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1226 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1229 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1230 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1232 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1236 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1237 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1238 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1239 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1241 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1243 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1245 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1250 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1251 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1253 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1254 * a status request message.
1256 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1258 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1261 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1262 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1265 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1267 unsigned char *selected;
1268 unsigned char selected_len;
1270 /* We must have requested it. */
1271 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
1273 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1276 /* The data must be valid */
1277 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1279 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1282 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1284 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1287 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1288 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1290 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1293 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1294 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1297 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1299 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1301 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1308 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1312 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1314 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1316 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1318 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1319 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1321 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1327 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1337 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1338 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1339 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1340 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1341 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1342 * absence on initial connect only.
1344 if (!renegotiate_seen
1345 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1346 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1348 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1350 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1358 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1361 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1362 * and elliptic curves we support.
1367 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1368 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1370 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1372 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1374 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1375 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1376 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1382 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1385 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1386 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1391 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1392 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1393 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1394 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1396 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1397 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1398 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2;
1399 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1401 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1405 for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <=
1406 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
1409 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1411 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1415 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1417 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1422 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1424 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1425 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1427 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1428 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1430 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1431 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1436 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1440 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1441 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1448 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1451 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1452 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1453 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1456 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1457 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1458 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1459 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1463 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1464 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1469 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1470 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1471 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1472 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1474 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1479 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1481 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1482 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1485 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1486 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1488 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1489 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1493 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1494 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1495 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1496 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1498 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1499 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1500 * the certificate has changed.
1502 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1505 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1508 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1509 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1510 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1512 /* status request response should be sent */
1513 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1514 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1515 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1517 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1519 /* something bad happened */
1520 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1521 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1522 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1527 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1529 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1531 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1532 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1533 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
1537 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1539 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1542 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1543 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1548 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1549 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1550 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1552 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1554 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1555 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1557 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1558 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1560 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1561 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1563 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1564 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1566 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1567 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1570 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1574 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1576 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1577 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1578 * abort the handshake.
1580 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1581 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1589 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1590 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1593 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1594 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1597 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1598 s->servername_done=0;
1604 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1606 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1607 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1610 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
1611 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
1612 * it must contain uncompressed.
1614 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1615 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1616 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1617 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1618 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1620 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1622 unsigned char *list;
1623 int found_uncompressed = 0;
1624 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1625 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1627 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
1629 found_uncompressed = 1;
1633 if (!found_uncompressed)
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1639 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1640 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1642 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1643 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1644 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1645 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1647 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1648 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
1650 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
1651 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
1653 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1655 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1656 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1659 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
1660 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
1661 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
1662 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
1664 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1665 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1670 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
1673 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
1674 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1677 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
1678 * there is no response.
1680 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1682 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
1683 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
1685 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
1686 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1689 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
1690 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1694 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1695 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1701 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1702 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1705 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1706 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1709 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1710 s->servername_done=0;
1716 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
1717 * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
1718 * session ticket extension at the same time.
1721 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
1722 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
1724 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
1725 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
1728 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
1729 * to permit stateful resumption.
1731 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1734 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
1738 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
1739 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1746 /* Skip past cipher list */
1751 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
1756 /* Now at start of extensions */
1757 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
1760 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
1762 unsigned short type, size;
1765 if (p + size > limit)
1767 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1769 /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will
1770 * trigger a full handshake
1772 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1774 /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
1775 * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
1779 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1780 return 0; /* Cache miss */
1782 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1784 /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of
1785 * generating the session from ticket now,
1786 * trigger abbreviated handshake based on
1787 * external mechanism to calculate the master
1791 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
1799 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
1800 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
1801 SSL_SESSION **psess)
1804 unsigned char *sdec;
1805 const unsigned char *p;
1806 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
1807 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1810 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
1811 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
1814 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1815 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
1816 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
1817 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
1819 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1820 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1831 /* Check key name matches */
1832 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
1834 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
1835 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
1836 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
1837 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
1839 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
1840 * integrity checks on ticket.
1842 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
1845 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1849 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1850 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
1851 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
1852 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
1853 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
1855 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1856 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1857 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1858 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1859 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1862 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1865 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
1866 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
1869 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1872 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1876 /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
1877 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
1878 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
1879 * as required by standard.
1882 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1883 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1885 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
1888 /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
1892 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;