2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
37 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 tls1_export_keying_material,
42 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
43 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
47 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
51 tls1_generate_master_secret,
52 tls1_change_cipher_state,
53 tls1_final_finish_mac,
54 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
55 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
58 tls1_export_keying_material,
59 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
60 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
65 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
69 tls1_generate_master_secret,
70 tls1_change_cipher_state,
71 tls1_final_finish_mac,
72 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
76 tls1_export_keying_material,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
79 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
80 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
84 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
87 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
88 * http, the cache would over fill
97 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
101 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
103 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
107 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
110 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
111 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
113 s->version = s->method->version;
116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
119 int nid; /* Curve NID */
120 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
121 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
125 * Table of curve information.
126 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
127 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
129 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
130 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
131 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
132 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
133 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
134 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
135 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
136 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
137 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
138 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
139 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
140 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
141 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
142 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
143 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
144 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
145 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
146 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
147 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
148 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
149 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
150 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
151 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
152 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
153 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
154 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
155 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
156 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
157 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
158 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
161 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
162 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
163 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
164 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
167 /* The default curves */
168 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
169 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
170 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
171 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
172 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
175 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
176 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
177 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
178 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
179 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
180 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
181 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
182 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
185 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
186 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
188 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
189 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
190 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
192 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
193 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
194 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
195 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
196 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
197 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
200 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
201 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
202 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
203 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
204 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
205 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
206 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
207 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
208 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
209 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
212 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
213 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
214 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
217 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
219 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
220 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
221 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
223 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
225 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
229 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
232 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
233 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
240 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
242 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
243 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
244 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
245 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
246 * lists in the first place.
247 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
248 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
249 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
251 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
252 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
254 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
256 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
257 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
259 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
260 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
261 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
262 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
263 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
266 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
267 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
271 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
272 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
276 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
277 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
280 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
281 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
285 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
286 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
291 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
296 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
297 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
299 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
302 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
304 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
305 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
306 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
309 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
312 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
313 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
315 const unsigned char *curves;
316 size_t num_curves, i;
317 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
318 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
320 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
322 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
325 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
326 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
328 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
329 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
331 } else /* Should never happen */
334 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
336 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
337 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
338 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
344 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
345 * if there is no match.
346 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
347 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
348 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
350 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
352 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
353 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
355 /* Can't do anything on client side */
359 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
361 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
362 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
364 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
365 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
366 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
367 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
368 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
369 /* Should never happen */
372 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
376 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
377 * but s->options is a long...
379 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
380 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
382 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
383 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
384 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
385 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
386 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
389 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
392 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
394 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
395 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
396 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
398 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
402 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
403 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
404 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
405 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
406 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
409 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
410 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
418 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
422 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
423 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
425 unsigned char *clist, *p;
428 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
431 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
432 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
435 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
436 unsigned long idmask;
438 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
440 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
449 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
453 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
457 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
460 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
462 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
468 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
470 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
472 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
474 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
475 if (nid == NID_undef)
476 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
477 if (nid == NID_undef)
478 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
479 if (nid == NID_undef)
481 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
482 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
484 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
488 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
489 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
493 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
497 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
500 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
501 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
508 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
509 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
512 /* Determine curve ID */
513 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
514 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
515 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
519 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
521 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
523 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
524 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
526 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
527 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
529 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
535 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
536 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
537 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
539 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
540 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
543 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
544 * supported (see RFC4492).
546 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
547 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
548 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
549 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
550 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
553 if (i == num_formats)
558 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
559 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
560 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
562 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
564 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
565 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
566 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
567 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
568 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
572 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
573 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
578 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
585 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
589 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
591 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
592 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
593 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
595 *pformats = ecformats_default;
596 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
598 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
600 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
605 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
606 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
608 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
610 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
613 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
616 /* If not EC nothing to do */
617 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
619 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
623 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
626 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
630 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
631 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
633 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
639 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
640 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
641 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
642 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
643 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
645 return 0; /* Should never happen */
646 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
647 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
649 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
651 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
652 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
653 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
655 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
661 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
663 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
665 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
667 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
668 * is compatible with the client extensions.
670 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
672 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
675 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
678 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
679 unsigned char curve_id[2];
680 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
681 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
682 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
683 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
684 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
688 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
689 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
693 /* Need a shared curve */
694 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
698 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
702 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
707 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
710 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
711 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
714 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
715 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
717 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
720 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
721 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
723 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
727 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
729 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
732 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
733 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
734 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
735 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
737 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
738 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
739 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
740 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
741 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
742 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
744 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
745 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
746 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
751 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
752 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
753 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
756 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
759 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
763 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
764 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
765 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
766 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
768 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
769 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
772 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
773 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
777 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
778 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
779 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
780 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
781 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
782 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
783 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
785 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
786 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
791 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
792 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
794 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
795 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
797 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
798 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
799 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
800 /* Should never happen */
803 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
804 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
809 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
810 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
811 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
812 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
814 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
818 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
819 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
822 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
823 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
824 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
825 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
828 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
829 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
831 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
837 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
841 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
842 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
843 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
844 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
847 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
848 if (i == sent_sigslen
849 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
850 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
851 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
854 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
859 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
860 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
861 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
866 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
868 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
873 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
874 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
875 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
877 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
880 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
882 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
884 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
885 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
886 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
887 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
888 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
889 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
890 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
891 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
892 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
894 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
896 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
897 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
898 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
904 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
905 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
906 * @c: cipher to check
907 * @op: Security check that you want to do
909 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
911 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
913 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
914 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
916 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
918 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
919 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
921 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
922 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
925 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
928 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
930 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
932 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
935 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
937 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
938 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
948 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
949 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
950 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
951 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
952 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
955 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
957 PACKET extensions = *packet;
958 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
959 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
962 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
963 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
966 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
967 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
973 if (num_extensions <= 1)
976 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
977 if (extension_types == NULL) {
978 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
982 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
983 extensions = *packet;
984 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
986 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
987 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
988 /* This should not happen. */
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
994 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
998 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
999 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1000 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1001 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1006 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1010 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1011 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1014 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1015 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1017 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1019 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1021 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1022 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1024 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1025 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1027 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1028 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1029 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1030 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1041 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1043 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1044 if (s->renegotiate) {
1047 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1052 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1055 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1058 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1065 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1066 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1069 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1070 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1071 unsigned long size_str;
1075 * check for enough space.
1076 * 4 for the servername type and extension length
1077 * 2 for servernamelist length
1078 * 1 for the hostname type
1079 * 2 for hostname length
1083 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1084 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1087 /* extension type and length */
1088 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1089 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1091 /* length of servername list */
1092 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1094 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1095 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1097 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1101 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1102 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1103 * Client Hello message */
1105 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1106 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1112 * check for enough space.
1113 * 4 for the srp type type and extension length
1114 * 1 for the srp user identity
1115 * + srp user identity length
1117 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1120 /* fill in the extension */
1121 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1122 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1123 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1124 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1129 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1132 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1135 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1136 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1138 unsigned char *etmp;
1140 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1142 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1144 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1146 if (num_formats > 255) {
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1151 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1152 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1153 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1154 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1155 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1159 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1161 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1162 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1165 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1167 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1169 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1174 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1176 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1177 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1178 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1179 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1180 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1184 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1186 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1187 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1188 ret += curves_list_len;
1190 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1192 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1194 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1195 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1196 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1197 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1198 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1199 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1200 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1202 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1203 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1204 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1207 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1208 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1211 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1214 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1216 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1219 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1225 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1227 const unsigned char *salg;
1228 unsigned char *etmp;
1229 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1230 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1232 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1234 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1236 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1237 /* Fill in lengths */
1238 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1243 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1245 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1249 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1250 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1251 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1257 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1258 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1264 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1266 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1267 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1269 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1270 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1272 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1273 /* save position of id len */
1274 unsigned char *q = ret;
1275 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1276 /* skip over id len */
1278 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1284 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1288 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1289 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1290 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1292 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1296 * 1: peer may send requests
1297 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1299 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1300 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1302 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1307 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1309 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1310 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1312 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1314 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1320 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1321 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1322 * (see longer comment below)
1324 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1325 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1327 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1328 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1329 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1330 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1331 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1332 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1335 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1338 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1339 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1344 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1347 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1350 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1357 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1358 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1359 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1361 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1364 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1365 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret);
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1373 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1374 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1375 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1378 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1379 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1381 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1382 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1388 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1390 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1397 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1400 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1404 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1405 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1408 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1409 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1411 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1414 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1415 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1416 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1417 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1422 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1424 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1427 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1432 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1435 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1438 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1446 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1447 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1450 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1451 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1452 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1455 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1460 const unsigned char *plist;
1463 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1467 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1469 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1471 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1473 if (plistlen > 255) {
1474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1478 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1479 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1480 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1481 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1486 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1489 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1491 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1492 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1494 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1498 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1501 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1504 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1505 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1507 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1510 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1511 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1514 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1515 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1519 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1522 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1525 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1533 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1534 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1535 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1536 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1537 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1538 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1539 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1540 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1541 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1542 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1544 if (limit - ret < 36)
1546 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1551 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1552 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1553 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1555 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1559 * 1: peer may send requests
1560 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1562 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1563 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1565 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1571 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1572 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1573 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1574 const unsigned char *npa;
1575 unsigned int npalen;
1578 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1580 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1581 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1582 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1584 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1586 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1588 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1592 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1594 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1596 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1597 * for other cases too.
1599 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1600 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1601 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1602 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1603 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1605 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1609 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1610 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1614 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1615 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1616 unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1618 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1620 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1624 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1630 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1633 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1638 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1639 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1640 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1641 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1643 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1645 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1647 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1649 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1650 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1654 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1656 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1657 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1658 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1661 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1663 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1664 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1665 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1673 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1674 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1675 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1677 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1679 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1680 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1682 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1683 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1684 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1685 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1686 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1688 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1689 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1690 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1691 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1692 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1695 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1697 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1698 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1701 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1711 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1712 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1713 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1718 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1719 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1720 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1721 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1723 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1729 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1730 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1731 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1732 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1733 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1734 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1735 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1737 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1738 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1739 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1740 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1741 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1742 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1743 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1744 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1745 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1746 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1747 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1748 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1749 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1752 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1753 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1757 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1758 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1759 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1763 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1766 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1767 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1769 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1772 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1775 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1776 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1778 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1779 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1782 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1783 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1785 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1788 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1791 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1792 s->servername_done = 0;
1793 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1794 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1795 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1798 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1799 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1800 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1801 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1802 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1803 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1805 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1806 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1810 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1811 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1812 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1814 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1815 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1816 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1817 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1820 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1821 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1824 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1826 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1829 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1832 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1836 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1837 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1840 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1842 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1845 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1846 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1847 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1848 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1850 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1851 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1853 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1854 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1857 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1859 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1860 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1861 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1862 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1863 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1864 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1865 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1866 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1867 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1868 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1869 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1870 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1871 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1872 * the value of the Host: field.
1873 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1874 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1875 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1877 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1881 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1882 unsigned int servname_type;
1883 PACKET sni, hostname;
1885 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1886 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1887 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1892 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1893 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1894 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1896 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1897 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1898 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1900 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1901 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1903 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1904 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1905 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1910 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1911 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1915 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1916 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1920 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1921 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1925 s->servername_done = 1;
1928 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1929 * fall back to a full handshake.
1931 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1932 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1933 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1937 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1940 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
1943 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1947 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1948 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1950 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1951 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1957 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1958 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1959 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1961 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
1962 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1967 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1968 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1970 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1971 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1975 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1976 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
1978 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1979 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
1980 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
1981 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
1986 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
1987 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
1989 session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
1990 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1995 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1996 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1997 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1998 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
1999 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
2000 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2002 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2005 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2006 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2008 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
2009 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2010 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2015 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2016 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2020 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2021 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2022 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2025 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2026 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2027 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2028 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2029 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2030 (&extension, &responder_id_list))
2033 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2035 PACKET responder_id;
2036 const unsigned char *id_data;
2038 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2040 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2044 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL
2045 && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2046 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) {
2047 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2051 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2052 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2053 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2057 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2058 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2062 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2063 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2064 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2069 /* Read in request_extensions */
2070 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2073 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2074 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2075 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2076 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2077 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2078 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2079 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2080 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2081 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2089 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2091 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2095 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2096 unsigned int hbtype;
2098 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2099 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2100 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2104 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2105 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2107 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2108 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2109 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2112 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2118 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2119 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2121 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2124 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2125 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2126 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2127 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2128 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2129 * anything like that, but this might change).
2131 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2132 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2133 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2134 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2135 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2137 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2141 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2142 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2143 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2147 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2149 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2150 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2151 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2155 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2156 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2158 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2159 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2163 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2164 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2165 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2166 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2167 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2170 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2171 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2176 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2178 * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
2180 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2186 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2188 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2189 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2190 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2192 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2197 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2198 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2199 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2200 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2205 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2208 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2209 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2210 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2213 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2222 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2223 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2224 * fill the length of the block.
2226 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2228 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2230 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2231 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2232 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2240 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2242 unsigned int length, type, size;
2243 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2244 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2247 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2249 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2251 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2252 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2254 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2255 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2258 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2260 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2262 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2265 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2266 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2270 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2271 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2275 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2276 const unsigned char *data;
2279 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2280 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2283 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2284 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2286 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2287 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2289 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2290 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2291 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2292 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2293 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2296 tlsext_servername = 1;
2298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2299 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2300 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2301 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2302 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2303 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2307 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2308 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2309 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2310 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2311 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2314 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2315 ecpointformatlist_length;
2316 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2317 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2318 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2319 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2325 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2327 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2328 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2329 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2330 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2332 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2335 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2336 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2339 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2340 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2342 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2345 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2346 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2349 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2350 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2354 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2355 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2356 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2358 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2359 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2360 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2361 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2362 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2363 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2365 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2367 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2368 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2369 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2372 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2377 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2378 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2379 unsigned char *selected;
2380 unsigned char selected_len;
2381 /* We must have requested it. */
2382 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2383 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2386 /* The data must be valid */
2387 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2388 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2391 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2394 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2395 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2396 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2399 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2400 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2401 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2404 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2405 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2406 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2410 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2412 /* We must have requested it. */
2413 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2414 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2418 * The extension data consists of:
2419 * uint16 list_length
2420 * uint8 proto_length;
2421 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2423 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2424 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2425 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2426 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2429 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2430 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2431 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2432 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2435 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2436 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2439 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2442 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2443 unsigned int hbtype;
2444 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2445 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2449 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2450 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2452 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2453 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2454 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2457 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2463 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2464 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2468 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2469 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2470 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2471 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2472 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2473 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2474 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2476 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2479 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2480 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2482 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2486 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2487 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2491 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2492 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2493 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2494 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2495 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2496 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2497 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2501 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2510 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2511 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2512 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2513 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2514 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2516 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2517 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2518 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2520 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2526 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2529 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2530 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2531 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2540 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2542 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2546 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2551 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2553 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2554 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2558 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2559 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2562 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2563 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2567 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2569 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2570 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2571 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2572 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2574 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2576 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2579 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2580 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2583 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2584 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2587 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2588 s->servername_done = 0;
2594 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2595 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2597 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2599 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2602 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2603 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2605 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2606 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2609 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2612 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2613 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2614 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2618 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2623 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2624 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2625 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2626 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2627 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2628 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2629 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2630 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2633 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2634 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2635 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2637 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2640 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2641 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2643 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2644 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2648 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2652 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2657 * Upon success, returns 1.
2658 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2660 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2662 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2665 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2666 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2667 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2668 * influence which certificate is sent
2670 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2672 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2673 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2674 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2675 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2677 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2678 * et al can pick it up.
2680 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2681 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2683 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2684 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2685 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2687 /* status request response should be sent */
2688 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2689 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2690 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2692 /* something bad happened */
2693 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2695 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2701 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2708 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2710 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2711 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2715 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2716 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2717 * must contain uncompressed.
2719 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2720 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2721 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2722 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2723 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2724 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2725 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2726 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2728 unsigned char *list;
2729 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2730 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2731 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2732 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2733 found_uncompressed = 1;
2737 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2739 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2743 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2744 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2746 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2748 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2749 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2750 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2751 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2753 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2755 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2758 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2759 * that we don't receive a status message
2761 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2762 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2763 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2766 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2767 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2770 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2771 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2774 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2775 s->servername_done = 0;
2781 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2784 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2786 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2787 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2791 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2799 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2800 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2801 * need to be handled at the same time.
2803 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2806 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2807 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2808 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2809 * point to the resulting session.
2811 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2812 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2813 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2816 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2817 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2818 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2819 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2820 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2821 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2822 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2825 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2826 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2827 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2828 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2829 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2830 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2832 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2835 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2836 const PACKET *session_id,
2840 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2843 int have_ticket = 0;
2844 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2847 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2848 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2851 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2854 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2857 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2861 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2862 unsigned int type, size;
2864 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2865 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2866 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2870 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2874 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2876 const unsigned char *etick;
2878 /* Duplicate extension */
2879 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2887 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2890 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2894 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2896 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2897 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2898 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2899 * calculate the master secret later.
2904 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2905 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2909 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2910 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2912 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2913 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2916 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2919 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2920 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2923 default: /* fatal error */
2929 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2930 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2931 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2937 if (have_ticket == 0)
2944 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2946 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2947 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2948 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2949 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2950 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2951 * point to the resulting session.
2954 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2955 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2956 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2957 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2958 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2960 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2961 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2962 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2965 unsigned char *sdec;
2966 const unsigned char *p;
2967 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2968 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2969 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2970 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2971 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2973 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2974 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2977 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2982 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2983 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2984 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2995 /* Check key name matches */
2996 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
2997 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3001 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3002 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3003 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3004 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3005 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3006 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3012 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3015 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3019 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3021 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3026 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3027 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3028 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3031 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3032 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3033 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3036 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3037 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3038 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3039 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3040 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3041 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3042 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3046 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3047 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3052 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3056 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3060 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3061 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3062 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3066 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3067 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3076 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3080 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3081 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3085 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3092 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3093 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3094 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3095 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3096 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3097 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3098 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3099 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3100 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3101 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3104 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3105 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3106 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3107 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3108 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3109 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3110 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3113 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3116 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3117 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3123 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3126 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3127 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3128 return table[i].nid;
3133 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3138 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3141 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3144 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3145 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3149 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3151 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3158 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3161 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3162 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3163 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3164 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3165 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3166 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3167 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3168 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3169 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3170 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3171 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3172 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3175 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3181 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3182 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3183 return tls12_md_info + i;
3189 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3191 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3192 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3194 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3197 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3200 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3204 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3205 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3208 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3209 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3212 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3213 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3216 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3217 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3219 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3220 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3222 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3223 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3229 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3230 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3231 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3233 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3234 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3236 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3237 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3239 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3241 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3242 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3244 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3246 if (psignhash_nid) {
3247 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3248 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3249 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3253 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3254 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3256 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3257 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3258 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3260 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3261 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3263 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3264 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3268 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3269 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3273 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3275 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3276 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3277 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3279 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3280 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3281 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3283 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3284 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3285 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3286 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3287 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3288 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3293 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3294 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3299 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3300 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3307 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3309 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3311 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3314 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3315 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3317 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3319 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3320 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3321 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3322 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3325 return tmpout - out;
3328 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3329 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3330 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3331 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3333 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3334 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3335 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3336 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3337 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3339 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3340 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3343 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3344 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3345 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3347 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3357 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3358 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3360 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3361 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3363 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3365 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3367 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3368 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3369 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3370 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3371 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3372 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3373 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3374 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3375 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3376 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3378 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3379 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3382 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3383 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3387 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3388 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3390 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3392 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3395 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3399 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3400 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3404 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3406 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3409 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3410 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3412 /* Should never happen */
3416 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3417 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3418 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3420 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3421 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3425 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3430 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3431 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3433 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3434 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3437 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3438 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3439 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3440 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3441 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3443 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3444 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3445 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3446 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3452 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3453 * the certificate for signing.
3455 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3457 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3458 * supported it stays as NULL.
3460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3461 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3462 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3465 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3466 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3467 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3471 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3472 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3475 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3476 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3477 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3478 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3479 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3480 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3481 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3482 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3488 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3489 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3490 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3492 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3497 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3504 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3506 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3509 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3510 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3511 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3513 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3514 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3518 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3520 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3522 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3524 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3526 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3527 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3530 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3534 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3537 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3539 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3540 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3541 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3542 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3543 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3544 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3546 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3547 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3548 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3552 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3554 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3557 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3560 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3562 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3564 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3566 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3574 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3575 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3577 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3580 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3581 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3584 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3585 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3590 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3591 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3593 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3597 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3601 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3604 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3606 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3611 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3612 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3614 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3615 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3616 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3618 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3625 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3626 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3627 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3629 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3630 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3631 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3637 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3641 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3645 if (default_nid == -1)
3647 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3649 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3650 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3651 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3656 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3657 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3661 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3662 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3663 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3670 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3671 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3672 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3673 * attempting to use them.
3676 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3678 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3679 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3680 /* Strict mode flags */
3681 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3682 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3683 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3685 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3690 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3691 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3694 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3695 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3697 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3700 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3702 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3703 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3705 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3707 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3708 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3714 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3717 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3719 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3720 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3722 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3729 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3730 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3731 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3732 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3733 else if (!check_flags)
3738 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3739 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3741 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3743 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3744 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3746 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3749 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3750 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3751 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3752 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3755 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3756 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3757 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3761 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3762 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3765 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3766 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3767 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3770 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3771 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3772 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3775 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3776 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3777 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3786 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3787 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3789 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3791 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3792 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3793 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3796 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3803 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3804 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3808 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3809 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3810 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3811 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3813 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3820 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3821 else if (check_flags)
3822 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3824 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3825 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3826 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3827 else if (!check_flags)
3830 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3831 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3832 else if (strict_mode) {
3833 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3834 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3835 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3836 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3838 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3845 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3846 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3848 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3850 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3853 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3856 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3860 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3864 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3866 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3867 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3869 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3870 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3871 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3875 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3878 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3880 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3882 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3883 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3885 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3886 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3887 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3889 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3890 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3891 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3892 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3893 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3898 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3901 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3903 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3904 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3908 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3909 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3910 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3911 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3912 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3914 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3917 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3921 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3924 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3925 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3932 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3933 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3935 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3936 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3937 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3938 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3939 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3940 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3941 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3944 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3945 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3947 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3950 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3951 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3953 int dh_secbits = 80;
3954 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3955 return DH_get_1024_160();
3956 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3957 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3962 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3963 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3966 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
3974 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
3975 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
3977 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
3978 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
3986 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
3987 return DH_get_2048_224();
3988 return DH_get_1024_160();
3992 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
3995 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
3998 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3999 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4000 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4001 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4003 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4006 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4008 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4011 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4013 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4014 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4015 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4016 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4018 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4019 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4021 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4022 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4025 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4027 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4030 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4033 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4035 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4036 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4038 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4039 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4041 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4042 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4047 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4048 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4049 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4052 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4054 int rv, start_idx, i;
4056 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4061 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4065 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4066 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4067 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);