2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
251 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
253 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
254 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
255 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
258 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
260 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
261 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
262 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
263 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
264 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
265 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
266 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
267 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
268 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
269 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
270 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
271 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
272 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
273 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
274 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
275 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
276 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
277 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
278 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
279 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
280 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
281 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
282 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
283 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
284 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
287 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
289 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
290 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
293 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
295 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
296 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
297 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
299 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
302 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
304 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
307 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
309 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
311 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
313 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
315 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
317 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
319 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
321 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
323 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
325 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
327 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
329 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
331 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
333 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
335 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
337 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
339 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
341 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
343 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
345 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
347 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
349 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
351 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
353 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
355 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
361 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
364 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
365 const unsigned char **pcurves,
370 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
371 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
374 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
375 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
377 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
378 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
379 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
382 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
383 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
387 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
388 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
392 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
393 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
397 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
398 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
401 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
402 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
404 const unsigned char *curves;
406 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
407 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
409 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
412 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
415 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
420 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
422 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
425 else /* Should never happen */
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
429 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
431 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
437 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
438 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
442 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
444 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
445 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
447 /* Can't do anything on client side */
454 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
455 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
458 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
459 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
460 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
461 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
463 /* Should never happen */
466 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
469 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
471 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
476 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
478 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
479 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
481 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
485 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
486 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
497 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
498 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
500 unsigned char *clist, *p;
502 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
503 * while curve ids < 32
505 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
506 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
509 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
511 unsigned long idmask;
513 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
515 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
526 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
530 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
535 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
538 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
540 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
544 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
546 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
548 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
550 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
551 if (nid == NID_undef)
552 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
553 if (nid == NID_undef)
554 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
555 if (nid == NID_undef)
557 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
558 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
560 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
563 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
564 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
569 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
573 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
575 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
576 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
582 const EC_METHOD *meth;
585 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
586 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
587 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
590 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
593 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
597 /* Determine curve ID */
598 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
599 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
600 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
604 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
616 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
619 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
621 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
624 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
628 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
629 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
630 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
632 const unsigned char *p;
635 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
636 * is supported (see RFC4492).
638 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
640 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
641 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
642 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
652 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
653 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
655 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
656 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
658 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
663 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
670 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
673 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
675 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
677 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
678 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
682 *pformats = ecformats_default;
683 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
685 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
687 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
691 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
692 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
694 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
696 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
699 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
702 /* If not EC nothing to do */
703 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
708 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
712 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
713 * supported curves extension.
715 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
718 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
719 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
721 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
728 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
729 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
730 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
731 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
732 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
734 return 0; /* Should never happen */
735 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
736 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
738 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
742 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
743 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
745 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
750 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
751 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
753 unsigned char curve_id[2];
754 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
755 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
756 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
757 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
760 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
761 * no other curves permitted.
765 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
766 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
767 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
768 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
769 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
773 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
774 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
776 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
777 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
779 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
782 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
785 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
787 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
793 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
795 /* Need a shared curve */
796 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
802 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
807 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
809 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
813 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
819 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
824 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
828 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
829 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
832 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
833 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
835 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
838 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
839 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
841 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
850 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
851 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
852 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
853 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
855 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
857 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
858 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
861 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
862 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
865 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
868 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
872 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
873 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
877 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
879 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
883 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
885 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
886 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
887 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
889 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
890 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
893 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
894 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
898 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
899 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
901 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
902 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
904 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
906 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
907 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
911 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
913 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
915 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
918 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
921 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
922 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
924 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
925 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
927 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
928 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
929 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
930 /* Should never happen */
933 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
934 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
940 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
942 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
943 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
944 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
946 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
951 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
956 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
958 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
961 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
965 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
967 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
970 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
978 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
982 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
983 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
984 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
986 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
989 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
990 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
995 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1001 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1004 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1005 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1008 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1009 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1010 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1011 * session and not global settings.
1014 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1017 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1018 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1019 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1022 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1023 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1024 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1027 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1028 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1031 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1032 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1037 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1042 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1047 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1053 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1054 * signature algorithms.
1058 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1059 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1063 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1064 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1068 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1069 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1072 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1074 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1078 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1079 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1080 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1082 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1083 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1085 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1089 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1090 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1092 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1093 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1102 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1105 unsigned char *ret = p;
1106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1107 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1109 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1112 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1113 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1115 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1117 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1119 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1120 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1121 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1122 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1131 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1132 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1133 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1138 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1140 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1142 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1143 unsigned long size_str;
1146 /* check for enough space.
1147 4 for the servername type and entension length
1148 2 for servernamelist length
1149 1 for the hostname type
1150 2 for hostname length
1154 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1155 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1158 /* extension type and length */
1159 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1160 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1162 /* length of servername list */
1163 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1165 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1166 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1168 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1172 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1177 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1183 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1185 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1188 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1198 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1199 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1200 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1202 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1203 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1209 /* check for enough space.
1210 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1211 1 for the srp user identity
1212 + srp user identity length
1214 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1216 /* fill in the extension */
1217 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1218 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1219 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1220 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1228 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1230 const unsigned char *plist;
1233 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1235 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1236 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1243 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1244 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1245 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1246 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1249 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1250 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1251 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1253 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1254 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1255 if (plistlen > 65532)
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1262 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1264 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1265 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1266 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1267 * resolves this to two bytes.
1270 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1273 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1275 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1278 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1279 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1280 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1281 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1283 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1284 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1285 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1287 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1288 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1290 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1294 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1295 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1297 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1300 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1301 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1305 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1311 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1314 const unsigned char *salg;
1315 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1316 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1318 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1319 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1321 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1325 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1326 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1328 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1330 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1332 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1335 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1338 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1343 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1346 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1350 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1352 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1353 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1359 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1361 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1368 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1370 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1372 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1373 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1375 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1377 /* save position of id len */
1378 unsigned char *q = ret;
1379 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1380 /* skip over id len */
1382 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1388 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1392 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1393 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1396 * 1: peer may send requests
1397 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1399 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1400 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1402 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1406 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1408 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1409 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1410 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1412 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1417 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1419 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1421 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1422 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1423 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1424 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1425 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1426 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1429 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1433 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1435 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1437 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1440 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1448 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1449 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1450 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1451 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1452 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1453 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1455 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1456 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1458 if (limit < ret + 6)
1461 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1462 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1464 *(ret++) = list_len;
1465 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1468 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1469 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1472 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1474 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1476 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1477 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1479 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1480 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1481 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1485 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1489 return NULL; /* error */
1490 if (cb_retval == -1)
1491 continue; /* skip this extension */
1493 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1495 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1497 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1502 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1509 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1512 unsigned char *ret = p;
1513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1514 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1517 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1518 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1519 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1520 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1522 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1523 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1527 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1529 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1531 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1533 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1537 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1541 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1547 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1549 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1552 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1564 const unsigned char *plist;
1566 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1569 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1571 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1572 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1579 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1580 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1581 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1582 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1586 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1587 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1589 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1590 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1592 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1593 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1597 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1599 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1600 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1604 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1605 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1607 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1609 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1611 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1614 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1617 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1626 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1628 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1630 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1633 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1641 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1642 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1643 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1644 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1645 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1646 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1647 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1648 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1649 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1650 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1651 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1657 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1658 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1660 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1663 * 1: peer may send requests
1664 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1666 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1667 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1669 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1675 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1676 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1677 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1679 const unsigned char *npa;
1680 unsigned int npalen;
1683 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1684 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1686 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1687 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1689 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1691 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1696 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1698 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1700 size_t authz_length;
1701 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1702 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1703 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1704 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1705 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1707 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1709 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1710 * uint8_t authz_type
1712 * uint8_t data[length]
1714 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1715 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1717 unsigned short length;
1721 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1723 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1727 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1735 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1736 * 2 bytes for extension type
1737 * 2 bytes for extension length
1738 * 1 byte for the list length
1739 * n bytes for the list */
1740 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1742 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1743 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1745 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1746 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1750 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1752 unsigned short length;
1757 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1759 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1762 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1769 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1770 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1774 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1777 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1779 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1781 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1782 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1784 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1785 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1788 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1791 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1795 return NULL; /* error */
1796 if (cb_retval == -1)
1797 break; /* skip this extension */
1798 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1800 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1802 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1810 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1812 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1813 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1815 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1817 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1821 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1825 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1832 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1834 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1835 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1836 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1839 * returns: 0 on success. */
1840 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1841 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1845 const unsigned char *selected;
1846 unsigned char selected_len;
1849 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1855 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1856 * length-prefixed strings. */
1857 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1858 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1867 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1869 proto_len = data[i];
1875 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1881 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1882 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1883 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1884 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1885 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1886 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1887 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1889 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1892 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1893 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1898 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1903 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1904 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1905 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1910 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1911 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1912 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1913 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1915 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1916 unsigned short type, size;
1917 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1918 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1919 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1920 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1921 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1922 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1923 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1925 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1926 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1927 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1928 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1931 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1932 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1933 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1934 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1935 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1936 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1937 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1938 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1939 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1940 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1943 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1952 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1955 if (data+size > d+n)
1959 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1961 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1962 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1964 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1966 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1968 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1973 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1975 if (data + len != d+n)
1977 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1981 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1983 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1985 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1987 unsigned short type;
1988 unsigned short size;
1990 unsigned char *data = *p;
1991 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1994 s->servername_done = 0;
1995 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1997 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2000 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2002 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2003 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2006 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
2007 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
2008 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
2010 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
2011 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
2014 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2015 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2016 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2020 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2021 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
2022 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2024 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2025 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2027 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2028 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2030 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2031 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2033 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2034 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2036 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2037 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2039 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2040 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2043 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2047 if (data > (d+n-len))
2050 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2055 if (data+size > (d+n))
2058 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2060 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2061 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2062 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2063 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2065 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2066 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2067 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2068 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2069 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2070 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2071 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2072 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2073 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2074 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2075 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2076 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2077 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2078 the value of the Host: field.
2079 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2080 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2081 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2082 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2086 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2088 unsigned char *sdata;
2094 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2101 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2108 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2114 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2117 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2118 switch (servname_type)
2120 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2123 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2125 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2128 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2130 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2133 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2135 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2138 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2139 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2140 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2141 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2142 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2143 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2146 s->servername_done = 1;
2150 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2151 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2152 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2164 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2170 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2172 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2174 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2177 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2179 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2182 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2184 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2185 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2187 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2189 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2196 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2198 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2199 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2201 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2202 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2204 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2209 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2211 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2212 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2214 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2215 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2217 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2220 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2221 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2224 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2225 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2226 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2227 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2228 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2231 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2233 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2234 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2235 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2237 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2238 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2240 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2245 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2247 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2250 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2251 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2253 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2256 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2257 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2260 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2261 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2262 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2263 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2264 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2267 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2268 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2269 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2271 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2275 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2278 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2279 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2281 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2285 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2286 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2287 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2288 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2290 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2291 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2293 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2298 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2300 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2301 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2303 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2307 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2309 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2311 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2313 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2316 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2318 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2323 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2325 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2328 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2330 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2333 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2336 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2339 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2340 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2344 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
2345 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2350 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2354 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2356 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2358 const unsigned char *sdata;
2360 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2365 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2374 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2378 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2382 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2387 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2391 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2396 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2397 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2400 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2401 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2402 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2404 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2405 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2408 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2409 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2411 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2412 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2417 /* Read in request_extensions */
2420 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2427 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2433 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2435 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2436 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2439 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2440 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2442 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2443 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2445 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2450 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2454 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2457 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2461 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2462 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2464 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2465 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2466 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2468 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2474 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2475 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2476 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2478 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2481 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2482 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2483 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2484 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2485 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2486 * anything like that, but this might change).
2488 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2489 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2490 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2491 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2492 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2493 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2497 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2498 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2499 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2501 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2503 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2504 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2507 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2508 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2510 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2515 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2517 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2518 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2522 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2526 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2528 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2530 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2534 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2535 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2536 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2539 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2540 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2541 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2542 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2543 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2545 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2549 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2550 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2551 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2553 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2555 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2556 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2557 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2558 1 /* element size */,
2561 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2564 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2565 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2567 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2574 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2575 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2576 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2577 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2578 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2580 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2582 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2584 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2586 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2587 if (type == record->ext_type)
2591 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2592 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2594 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2596 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2601 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2602 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2605 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2606 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2607 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2608 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2609 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2610 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2612 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2613 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2616 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2617 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2629 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2631 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2632 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2634 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2636 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2639 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2640 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2641 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2646 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2649 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2651 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2655 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2664 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2665 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2666 * the length of the block. */
2667 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2669 unsigned int off = 0;
2683 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2685 unsigned short length;
2686 unsigned short type;
2687 unsigned short size;
2688 unsigned char *data = *p;
2689 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2690 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2693 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2696 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2698 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2699 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2703 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2704 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2707 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2711 if (data+length != d+n)
2713 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2717 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2722 if (data+size > (d+n))
2725 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2726 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2727 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2729 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2731 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2733 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2736 tlsext_servername = 1;
2739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2740 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2742 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2743 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2745 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2747 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2750 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2751 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2752 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2754 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2757 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2758 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2760 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2761 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2762 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2763 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2764 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2767 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2769 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2771 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2772 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2774 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2777 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2780 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2783 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2785 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2786 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2788 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2792 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2795 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2796 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2798 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2802 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2803 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2804 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2805 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2807 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2809 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2811 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2816 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2818 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2819 * a status request message.
2821 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2823 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2826 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2827 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2830 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2831 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2833 unsigned char *selected;
2834 unsigned char selected_len;
2836 /* We must have requested it. */
2837 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2839 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2842 /* The data must be valid */
2843 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2845 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2848 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2850 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2853 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2854 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2856 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2859 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2860 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2861 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2865 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2869 /* We must have requested it. */
2870 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2872 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2877 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2880 /* The extension data consists of:
2881 * uint16 list_length
2882 * uint8 proto_length;
2883 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2887 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2889 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2893 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2895 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2898 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2899 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2900 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2901 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2903 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2906 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2907 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2910 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2912 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2914 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2917 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2921 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2922 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2924 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2925 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2926 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2928 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2933 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2935 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2940 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2942 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2943 * an authz hello extension if the client
2944 * didn't request a proof. */
2945 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2946 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2948 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2950 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2956 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2960 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2961 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2963 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2967 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2968 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2969 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2970 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2972 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2976 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2979 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2980 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2982 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2985 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2987 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2989 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2990 if (record->ext_type == type)
2992 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
3004 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3008 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
3010 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
3012 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
3014 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
3015 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
3017 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3023 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3033 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
3034 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
3035 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
3036 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
3037 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
3038 * absence on initial connect only.
3040 if (!renegotiate_seen
3041 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
3042 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
3044 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3046 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
3054 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3057 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3061 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
3063 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
3068 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3070 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3071 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
3073 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3074 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3076 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3077 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3082 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3086 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
3087 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3094 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3099 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
3101 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3102 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3105 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
3106 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
3108 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
3109 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
3113 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3114 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3115 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3116 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3118 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3120 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
3121 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
3122 * so this has to happen here in
3123 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
3127 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
3129 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
3132 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3133 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3138 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3139 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3140 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3142 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3144 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3145 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3147 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3148 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3150 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3151 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3153 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3154 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3156 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3157 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3160 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3164 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3166 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3167 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3168 * abort the handshake.
3170 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3171 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3179 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3180 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3183 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3184 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3187 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3188 s->servername_done=0;
3194 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3196 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3199 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3200 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3201 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3202 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3204 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3207 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3208 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3209 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3210 if (certpkey == NULL)
3212 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3215 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3216 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3218 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3219 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3222 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3223 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3224 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3226 /* status request response should be sent */
3227 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3228 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3229 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3231 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3233 /* something bad happened */
3234 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3235 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3236 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3241 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3246 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3247 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3250 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3251 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3259 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3261 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3262 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3265 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3266 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3267 * it must contain uncompressed.
3269 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3270 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3271 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3272 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3273 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3275 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3277 unsigned char *list;
3278 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3279 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3280 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3282 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3284 found_uncompressed = 1;
3288 if (!found_uncompressed)
3290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3294 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3295 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3297 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3298 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3299 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3300 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3302 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3303 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3305 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3306 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3308 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3310 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3311 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3314 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3315 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3316 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3317 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3319 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3320 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3325 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3328 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3329 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3332 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3333 * there is no response.
3335 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3337 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3338 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3340 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3341 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3344 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3345 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3349 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3350 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3356 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3357 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3360 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3361 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3364 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3365 s->servername_done=0;
3371 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3374 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3376 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3378 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3382 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3390 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3391 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3392 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3394 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3395 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3396 * extension, if any.
3397 * len: the length of the session ID.
3398 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3399 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3400 * point to the resulting session.
3402 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3403 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3404 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3407 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3408 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3409 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3410 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3411 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3412 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3413 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3416 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3417 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3418 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3419 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3420 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3421 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3423 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3424 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3426 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3427 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3431 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3433 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3434 * to permit stateful resumption.
3436 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3438 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3442 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3450 /* Skip past cipher list */
3455 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3460 /* Now at start of extensions */
3461 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3464 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3466 unsigned short type, size;
3469 if (p + size > limit)
3471 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3476 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3477 * currently have one. */
3478 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3481 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3483 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3484 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3485 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3486 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3487 * calculate the master secret later. */
3490 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3493 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3494 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3496 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3498 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3499 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3501 default: /* fatal error */
3510 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3512 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3513 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3514 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3515 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3516 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3517 * point to the resulting session.
3520 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3521 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3522 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3523 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3525 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3526 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3527 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3530 unsigned char *sdec;
3531 const unsigned char *p;
3532 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3533 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3536 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3537 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3540 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3541 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3542 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3543 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3545 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3546 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3557 /* Check key name matches */
3558 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3560 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3561 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3562 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3563 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3565 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3566 * integrity checks on ticket.
3568 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3571 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3575 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3576 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3577 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3578 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3579 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3581 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3582 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3583 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3584 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3585 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3588 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3591 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3592 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3595 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3598 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3602 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3603 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3604 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3605 * as required by standard.
3608 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3609 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3617 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3622 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3630 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3631 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3632 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3633 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3634 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3635 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3636 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3639 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3640 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3641 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3642 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3645 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3648 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3650 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3656 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3659 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3661 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3662 return table[i].nid;
3667 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3672 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3673 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3676 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3679 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3680 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3684 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3686 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3687 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3690 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3695 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3703 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3707 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3708 return EVP_sha224();
3710 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3711 return EVP_sha256();
3713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3714 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3715 return EVP_sha384();
3717 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3718 return EVP_sha512();
3726 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3731 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3732 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3734 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3735 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3736 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3739 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3740 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3746 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3747 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3748 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3750 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3751 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3753 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3755 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3756 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3758 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3760 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3762 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3763 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3765 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3769 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3770 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3771 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3773 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3776 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3777 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3778 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3779 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3781 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3782 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3783 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3785 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3786 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3788 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3790 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3792 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3797 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3798 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3799 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3801 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3812 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3813 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3815 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3816 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3818 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3820 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3821 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3822 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3824 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3825 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3827 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3829 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3830 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3833 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3834 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3838 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3839 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3845 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3846 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3848 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3851 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3854 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3855 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3856 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3861 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3863 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3869 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3870 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3871 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3873 /* Should never happen */
3877 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3878 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3880 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3881 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3883 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3885 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3886 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3888 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3889 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3891 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3893 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3895 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3898 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3899 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3900 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3901 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3902 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3904 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3905 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3911 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3912 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3914 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3915 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3917 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3918 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3919 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3920 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3922 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3923 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3928 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3929 * use the certificate for signing.
3931 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3933 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3934 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3937 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3938 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3941 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3943 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3944 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3948 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3949 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3956 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3957 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3958 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3960 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3966 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3973 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3975 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3978 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3979 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3980 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3982 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3983 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3987 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3989 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3991 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3993 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3995 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3996 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
4000 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
4002 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4004 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
4005 unsigned short hbtype;
4006 unsigned int payload;
4007 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4009 /* Read type and payload length first */
4014 if (s->msg_callback)
4015 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4016 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
4017 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4019 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
4021 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
4024 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
4025 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
4026 * payload, plus padding
4028 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4031 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4032 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4034 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4036 /* Random padding */
4037 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4039 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4041 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4042 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4043 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4044 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4046 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4051 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4055 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4056 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4057 * sequence number */
4060 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4063 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4071 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4073 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4075 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4076 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4078 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4079 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4080 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4082 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4086 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4087 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4089 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4093 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4094 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4100 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4101 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4103 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4105 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4106 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4107 * some random stuff.
4108 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4109 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4110 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4111 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4114 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4117 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4118 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4120 /* Sequence number */
4121 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4122 /* 16 random bytes */
4123 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4125 /* Random padding */
4126 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4128 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4131 if (s->msg_callback)
4132 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4133 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4134 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4136 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4145 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4150 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4153 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4155 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4158 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4159 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4161 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4163 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4165 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4173 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4174 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4175 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4176 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4177 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4178 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4181 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4182 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4183 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4184 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4187 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4189 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4190 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4193 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4194 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4198 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4199 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4200 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4204 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4208 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4211 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4213 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4218 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4219 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4221 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4223 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4224 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4225 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4226 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4228 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4236 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4237 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4238 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4239 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4243 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4244 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4245 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4246 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4252 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4256 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4260 if (default_nid == -1)
4262 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4264 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4265 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4266 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4270 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4271 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4275 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4276 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4278 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4284 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4285 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4286 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4287 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4290 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4292 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4293 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4294 /* Strict mode flags */
4295 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4296 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4297 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4299 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4304 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4305 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4307 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4308 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4311 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4315 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4318 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4320 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4322 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4323 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4326 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4327 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4328 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4330 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4331 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4340 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4343 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4344 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4345 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4347 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4355 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4356 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4357 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4360 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4366 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4367 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4370 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4373 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4374 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4376 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4381 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4382 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4383 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4384 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4385 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4388 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4389 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4390 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4391 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4395 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4396 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4404 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4405 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4408 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4411 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4412 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4414 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4417 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4425 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4426 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4428 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4431 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4432 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4433 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4435 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4440 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4448 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4449 else if(check_flags)
4450 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4452 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4453 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4454 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4455 else if (!check_flags)
4458 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4459 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4460 else if (strict_mode)
4462 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4463 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4465 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4466 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4470 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4478 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4480 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4485 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4488 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4491 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4496 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4497 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4498 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4499 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4500 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4505 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4510 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4514 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4515 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4517 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4519 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4521 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4525 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4529 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4532 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4534 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4535 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4537 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4539 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4540 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4542 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4544 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4546 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4547 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4549 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4554 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4558 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4560 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4561 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4565 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4567 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4568 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4569 else if (cpk->digest)
4570 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4573 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4575 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4576 * if the chain is invalid.
4580 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4581 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4584 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4585 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4592 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4593 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4595 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4596 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4597 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4598 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4599 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4600 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4602 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4603 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4605 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);