2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
37 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 tls1_export_keying_material,
42 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
43 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
57 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
58 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
60 tls1_export_keying_material,
61 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
62 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
63 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
64 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
65 tls_close_construct_packet,
69 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
73 tls1_generate_master_secret,
74 tls1_change_cipher_state,
75 tls1_final_finish_mac,
76 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
77 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
78 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
80 tls1_export_keying_material,
81 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
82 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
83 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
84 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
85 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
86 tls_close_construct_packet,
90 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
93 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
94 * http, the cache would over fill
103 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
107 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
109 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
113 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
116 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
117 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
119 s->version = s->method->version;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
125 int nid; /* Curve NID */
126 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
127 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
131 * Table of curve information.
132 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
133 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
135 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
136 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
137 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
138 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
139 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
140 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
141 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
142 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
143 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
144 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
145 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
146 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
147 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
148 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
149 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
150 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
151 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
152 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
153 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
154 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
155 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
156 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
157 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
158 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
159 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
160 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
161 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
162 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
164 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
167 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
168 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
169 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
170 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
173 /* The default curves */
174 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
175 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
176 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
177 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
178 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
181 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
182 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
183 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
184 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
185 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
186 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
187 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
188 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
191 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
192 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
194 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
195 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
196 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
197 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
198 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
199 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
200 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
201 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
202 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
203 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
204 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
205 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
206 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
207 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
208 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
209 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
210 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
211 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
212 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
213 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
214 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
215 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
218 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
219 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
220 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
223 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
225 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
226 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
227 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
229 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
231 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
235 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
238 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
239 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
246 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
248 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
249 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
250 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
251 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
252 * lists in the first place.
253 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
254 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
255 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
257 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
258 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
260 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
262 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
263 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
265 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
266 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
267 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
268 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
269 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
272 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
273 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
277 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
278 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
282 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
283 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
286 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
287 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
291 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
292 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
297 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
302 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
303 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
305 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
308 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
310 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
311 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
312 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
315 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
318 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
319 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
321 const unsigned char *curves;
322 size_t num_curves, i;
323 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
324 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
326 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
328 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
331 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
332 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
334 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
335 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
337 } else /* Should never happen */
340 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
342 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
343 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
344 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
350 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
351 * if there is no match.
352 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
353 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
354 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
356 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
358 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
359 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
361 /* Can't do anything on client side */
365 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
367 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
368 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
370 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
371 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
372 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
373 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
374 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
375 /* Should never happen */
378 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
382 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
383 * but s->options is a long...
385 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
386 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
388 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
389 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
390 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
391 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
392 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
395 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
398 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
400 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
401 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
402 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
404 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
408 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
409 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
410 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
411 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
412 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
415 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
416 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
424 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
428 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
429 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
431 unsigned char *clist, *p;
434 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
437 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
438 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
441 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
442 unsigned long idmask;
444 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
446 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
455 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
459 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
463 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
466 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
468 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
474 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
476 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
478 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
480 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
481 if (nid == NID_undef)
482 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
483 if (nid == NID_undef)
484 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
485 if (nid == NID_undef)
487 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
488 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
490 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
494 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
495 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
499 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
503 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
506 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
507 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
514 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
515 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
518 /* Determine curve ID */
519 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
520 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
521 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
525 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
527 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
529 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
530 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
532 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
533 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
535 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
541 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
542 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
543 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
545 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
546 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
549 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
550 * supported (see RFC4492).
552 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
553 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
554 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
555 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
556 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
559 if (i == num_formats)
564 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
565 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
566 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
568 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
570 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
571 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
572 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
573 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
574 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
578 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
579 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
584 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
591 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
595 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
597 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
598 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
599 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
601 *pformats = ecformats_default;
602 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
604 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
606 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
611 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
612 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
614 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
616 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
619 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
622 /* If not EC nothing to do */
623 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
625 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
629 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
632 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
636 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
637 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
639 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
645 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
646 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
647 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
648 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
649 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
651 return 0; /* Should never happen */
652 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
653 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
655 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
657 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
658 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
659 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
661 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
667 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
669 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
671 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
673 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
674 * is compatible with the client extensions.
676 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
678 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
681 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
684 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
685 unsigned char curve_id[2];
686 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
687 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
688 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
689 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
690 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
694 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
695 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
699 /* Need a shared curve */
700 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
704 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
708 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
713 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
716 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
717 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
720 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
721 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
723 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
726 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
727 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
729 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
735 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
738 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
739 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
740 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
741 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
743 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
744 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
745 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
746 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
747 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
748 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
750 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
751 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
752 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
757 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
758 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
759 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
762 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
765 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
768 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
769 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
770 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
771 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
772 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
774 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
775 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
778 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
779 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
783 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
784 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
785 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
786 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
787 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
788 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
789 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
791 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
792 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
797 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
798 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
800 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
801 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
803 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
804 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
805 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
806 /* Should never happen */
809 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
810 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
815 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
816 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
817 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
818 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
820 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
824 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
825 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
828 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
829 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
831 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
834 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
835 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
837 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
843 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
847 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
848 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
849 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
850 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
853 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
854 if (i == sent_sigslen
855 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
856 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
860 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
865 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
866 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
867 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
872 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
874 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
879 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
880 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
881 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
883 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
886 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
888 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
890 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
891 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
892 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
893 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
895 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
896 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
897 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
898 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
900 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
902 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
903 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
904 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
910 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
911 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
912 * @c: cipher to check
913 * @op: Security check that you want to do
915 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
917 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
919 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
920 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
922 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
924 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
925 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
927 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
928 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
931 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
934 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
936 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
938 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
941 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
943 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
944 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
954 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
955 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
956 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
957 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
958 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
961 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
963 PACKET extensions = *packet;
964 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
965 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
968 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
969 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
972 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
973 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
979 if (num_extensions <= 1)
982 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
983 if (extension_types == NULL) {
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
988 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
989 extensions = *packet;
990 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
992 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
993 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
994 /* This should not happen. */
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1000 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1004 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1005 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1006 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1007 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1012 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1016 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1019 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1021 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1023 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1024 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1026 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1027 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1029 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1030 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1031 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1032 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1040 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1041 if (s->renegotiate) {
1042 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, 2)
1043 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1044 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len, 2)) {
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1049 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1050 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1053 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1054 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1055 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, 2)
1056 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1057 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1058 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1059 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1060 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name, 1)
1061 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1062 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname), 2)
1063 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1064 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1069 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1070 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1071 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1072 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, 2)
1073 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1074 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1075 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1076 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1077 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1078 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1079 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1080 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1081 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1088 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1091 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1093 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1094 size_t num_curves, num_formats;
1097 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1099 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, 2)
1100 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1101 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1102 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy(pkt, pformats, num_formats, 1)
1103 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1109 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1111 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1112 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1117 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, 2)
1118 /* Sub-packet for curves extension */
1119 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1120 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1124 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1125 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1126 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1127 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, pcurves[0], 1)
1128 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, pcurves[1], 1)) {
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1130 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1135 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1140 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1142 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1144 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1145 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1146 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1147 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1148 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1149 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1150 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1155 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1156 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1159 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1160 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1163 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, 2)
1164 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1172 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1174 const unsigned char *salg;
1176 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1178 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, 2)
1179 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1180 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1181 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1182 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1183 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1184 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1185 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1191 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1194 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, 2)
1195 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1196 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1197 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp, 1)
1198 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1199 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1203 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1204 unsigned char *idbytes;
1208 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1209 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1211 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1212 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1213 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1214 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen
1215 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1220 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1221 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1225 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1226 unsigned char *extbytes;
1227 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1234 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1240 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1247 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1252 * 1: peer may send requests
1253 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1255 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1256 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1258 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1260 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, 2)
1261 /* Sub-packet for Hearbeat extension */
1262 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1263 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, mode, 1)
1264 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1272 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1274 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1275 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1277 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, 2)
1278 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1286 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1287 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1288 * (see longer comment below)
1290 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1291 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt,
1292 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, 2)
1293 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1294 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1295 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1296 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, 2)
1297 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1301 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1304 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1305 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = 0;
1306 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1309 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, 2)
1310 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1311 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1312 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1313 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1317 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1318 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1319 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1320 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, prof->id, 2)) {
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1325 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1331 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1332 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1333 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, 2)
1339 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1345 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1346 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, 2)
1347 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1354 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, 2)
1355 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1361 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1362 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1363 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1366 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1367 unsigned char *padbytes;
1370 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1375 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1376 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1382 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, 2)
1383 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1384 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1388 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1389 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1400 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1401 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1404 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1405 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1407 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1410 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1411 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1412 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1413 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1418 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1420 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1423 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1428 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1431 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1434 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1442 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1443 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1446 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1447 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1448 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1451 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1456 const unsigned char *plist;
1459 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1463 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1465 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1467 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1469 if (plistlen > 255) {
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1474 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1475 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1476 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1477 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1482 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1485 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1487 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1488 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1490 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1494 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1497 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1500 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1501 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1503 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1507 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1510 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1511 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1515 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1518 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1521 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1529 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1530 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1531 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1532 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1533 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1534 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1535 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1536 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1537 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1538 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1540 if (limit - ret < 36)
1542 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1547 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1548 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1549 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1555 * 1: peer may send requests
1556 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1558 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1559 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1561 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1567 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1568 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1569 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1570 const unsigned char *npa;
1571 unsigned int npalen;
1574 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1576 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1577 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1578 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1580 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1582 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1584 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1588 if (!custom_ext_add_old(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1590 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1592 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1593 * for other cases too.
1595 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1596 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1597 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1598 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1599 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1601 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1605 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1606 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1610 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1611 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1612 unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1614 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1616 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1620 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1626 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1629 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1634 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1635 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1636 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1637 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1639 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1641 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1643 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1645 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1646 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1650 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1652 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1653 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1654 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1657 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1659 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1660 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1661 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1669 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1670 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1671 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1673 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1675 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1676 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1678 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1679 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1680 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1681 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1682 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1684 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1685 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1686 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1687 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1688 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1691 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1693 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1694 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1697 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1707 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1708 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1709 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1714 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1715 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1716 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1717 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1719 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1725 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1726 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1727 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1728 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1729 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1730 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1731 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1733 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1734 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1735 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1736 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1737 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1738 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1739 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1740 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1741 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1742 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1743 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1744 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1745 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1748 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1749 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1753 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1754 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1755 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1759 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1762 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1763 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1765 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1768 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1771 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1772 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1774 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1775 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1778 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1779 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1781 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1784 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1787 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1788 s->servername_done = 0;
1789 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1791 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1794 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1795 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1796 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1797 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1798 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1799 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1800 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1801 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1802 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1806 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1807 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1808 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1810 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1811 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1812 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1813 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1816 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1817 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1820 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1822 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1825 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1828 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1832 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1833 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1836 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1838 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1841 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1842 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1843 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1844 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1846 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1847 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1849 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1850 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1853 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1855 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1856 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1857 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1858 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1859 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1860 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1861 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1862 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1863 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1864 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1865 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1866 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1867 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1868 * the value of the Host: field.
1869 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1870 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1871 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1873 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1877 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1878 unsigned int servname_type;
1879 PACKET sni, hostname;
1881 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1882 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1883 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1888 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1889 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1890 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1892 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1893 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1894 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1896 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1897 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1899 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1900 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1901 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1906 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1907 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1911 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1912 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1916 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1917 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1921 s->servername_done = 1;
1924 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1925 * fall back to a full handshake.
1927 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1928 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1929 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1932 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1933 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1936 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
1939 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1943 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1944 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1946 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1947 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1954 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1955 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1957 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
1958 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1963 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1964 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1966 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1967 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1971 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1972 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
1974 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1975 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
1976 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
1977 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
1982 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
1983 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
1985 session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
1986 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1991 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1992 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1993 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1994 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
1995 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1996 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1998 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2001 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2002 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2004 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
2005 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2006 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2011 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2012 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2016 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2017 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2018 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2021 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2022 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2023 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2024 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2025 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2026 (&extension, &responder_id_list))
2029 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2031 PACKET responder_id;
2032 const unsigned char *id_data;
2034 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2036 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2040 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL
2041 && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2042 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) {
2043 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2047 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2048 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2049 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2053 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2054 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2058 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2059 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2060 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2065 /* Read in request_extensions */
2066 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2069 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2070 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2071 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2072 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2073 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2074 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2075 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2076 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2077 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2085 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2087 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2091 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2092 unsigned int hbtype;
2094 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2095 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2096 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2100 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2101 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2103 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2104 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2105 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2108 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2114 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2115 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2117 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2120 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2121 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2122 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2123 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2124 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2125 * anything like that, but this might change).
2127 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2128 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2129 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2130 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2131 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2133 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2137 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2138 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2139 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2143 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2145 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2146 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2147 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2151 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2152 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2154 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2155 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2159 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2160 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2161 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2162 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2163 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2166 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2167 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2172 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2174 * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
2176 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2182 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2184 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2185 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2186 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2188 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2193 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2194 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2195 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2196 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2201 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2204 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2205 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2206 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2209 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2218 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2219 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2220 * fill the length of the block.
2222 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2224 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2226 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2227 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2228 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2236 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2238 unsigned int length, type, size;
2239 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2240 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2243 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2245 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2247 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2248 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2250 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2251 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2254 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2256 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2258 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2261 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2262 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2266 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2267 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2271 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2272 const unsigned char *data;
2275 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2276 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2279 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2280 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2282 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2283 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2285 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2286 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2287 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2288 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2289 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2292 tlsext_servername = 1;
2294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2295 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2296 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2297 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2298 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2299 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2303 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2304 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2305 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2306 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2307 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2310 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2311 ecpointformatlist_length;
2312 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2313 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2314 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2315 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2321 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2323 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2324 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2325 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2326 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2328 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2331 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2332 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2335 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2336 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2338 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2341 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2342 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2345 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2346 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2350 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2351 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2352 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2354 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2355 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2356 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2357 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2358 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2359 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2361 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2363 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2364 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2365 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2368 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2373 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2374 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2375 unsigned char *selected;
2376 unsigned char selected_len;
2377 /* We must have requested it. */
2378 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2379 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2382 /* The data must be valid */
2383 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2384 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2387 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2390 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2391 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2392 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2395 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2396 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2397 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2400 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2401 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2402 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2406 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2408 /* We must have requested it. */
2409 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2410 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2414 * The extension data consists of:
2415 * uint16 list_length
2416 * uint8 proto_length;
2417 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2419 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2420 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2421 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2422 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2425 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2426 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2427 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2428 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2431 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2432 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2435 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2438 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2439 unsigned int hbtype;
2440 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2441 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2445 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2446 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2448 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2449 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2450 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2453 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2459 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2460 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2464 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2465 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2466 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2467 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2468 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2469 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2470 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2472 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2475 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2476 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2478 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2482 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2483 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2487 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2488 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2489 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2490 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2491 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2492 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2493 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2497 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2506 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2507 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2508 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2509 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2510 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2512 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2513 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2514 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2516 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2522 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2525 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2526 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2527 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2536 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2538 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2542 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2547 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2549 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2550 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2552 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2554 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2555 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2558 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2559 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2563 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2565 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2566 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2567 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2568 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2570 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2572 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2575 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2576 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2579 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2580 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2583 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2584 s->servername_done = 0;
2590 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2591 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2593 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2595 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2598 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2599 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2601 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2602 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2604 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2605 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2608 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2609 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2610 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2614 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2619 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2620 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2621 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2622 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2623 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2624 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2625 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2626 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2629 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2630 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2631 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2632 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2633 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2636 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2637 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2639 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2640 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2644 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2648 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2653 * Upon success, returns 1.
2654 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2656 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2658 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2661 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2662 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2663 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2664 * influence which certificate is sent
2666 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2668 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2669 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2670 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2671 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2673 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2674 * et al can pick it up.
2676 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2677 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2679 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2680 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2681 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2683 /* status request response should be sent */
2684 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2685 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2686 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2688 /* something bad happened */
2689 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2691 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2697 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2704 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2706 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2707 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2711 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2712 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2713 * must contain uncompressed.
2715 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2716 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2717 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2718 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2719 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2720 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2721 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2722 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2724 unsigned char *list;
2725 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2726 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2727 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2728 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2729 found_uncompressed = 1;
2733 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2735 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2739 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2740 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2742 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2744 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2745 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2746 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2747 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2749 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2751 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2754 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2755 * that we don't receive a status message
2757 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2758 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2759 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2762 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2763 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2766 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2767 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2770 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2771 s->servername_done = 0;
2777 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2780 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2782 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2783 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2787 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2795 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2796 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2797 * need to be handled at the same time.
2799 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2802 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2803 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2804 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2805 * point to the resulting session.
2807 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2808 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2809 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2812 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2813 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2814 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2815 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2816 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2817 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2818 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2821 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2822 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2823 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2824 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2825 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2826 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2828 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2831 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2832 const PACKET *session_id,
2836 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2839 int have_ticket = 0;
2840 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2843 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2844 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2847 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2850 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2853 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2857 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2858 unsigned int type, size;
2860 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2861 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2862 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2866 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2870 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2872 const unsigned char *etick;
2874 /* Duplicate extension */
2875 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2883 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2886 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2890 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2892 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2893 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2894 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2895 * calculate the master secret later.
2900 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2901 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2905 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2906 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2908 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2909 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2912 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2915 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2916 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2919 default: /* fatal error */
2925 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2926 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2927 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2933 if (have_ticket == 0)
2940 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2942 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2943 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2944 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2945 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2946 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2947 * point to the resulting session.
2950 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2951 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2952 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2953 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2954 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2956 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2957 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2958 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2961 unsigned char *sdec;
2962 const unsigned char *p;
2963 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2964 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2965 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2966 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2967 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2969 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2970 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2973 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2978 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2979 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2980 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2991 /* Check key name matches */
2992 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
2993 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
2997 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
2998 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
2999 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3000 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3001 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3002 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3008 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3011 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3015 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3017 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3022 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3023 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3024 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3027 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3028 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3029 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3032 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3033 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3034 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3035 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3036 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3037 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3038 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3042 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3043 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3048 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3052 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3056 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3057 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3058 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3062 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3063 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3072 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3076 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3077 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3081 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3088 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3089 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3090 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3091 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3092 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3093 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3094 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3095 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3096 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3097 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3100 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3101 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3102 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3103 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3104 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3105 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3106 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3109 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3112 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3113 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3119 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3122 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3123 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3124 return table[i].nid;
3129 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3134 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3137 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3140 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3141 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3145 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3147 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3154 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3157 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3158 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3159 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3160 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3161 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3162 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3163 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3164 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3165 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3166 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3167 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3168 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3171 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3177 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3178 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3179 return tls12_md_info + i;
3185 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3187 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3188 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3190 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3193 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3196 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3200 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3201 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3204 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3205 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3208 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3209 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3212 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3213 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3215 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3216 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3218 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3219 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3225 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3226 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3227 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3229 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3230 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3232 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3233 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3235 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3237 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3238 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3240 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3242 if (psignhash_nid) {
3243 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3244 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3245 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3249 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3250 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3252 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3253 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3254 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3256 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3257 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3259 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3260 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3264 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3265 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3269 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3271 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3272 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3273 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3275 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3276 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3277 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3279 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3280 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3281 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3283 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3284 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3289 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3290 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3295 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3296 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3303 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3305 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3307 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3311 * Old version of the tls12_copy_sigalgs function used by code that has not
3312 * yet been converted to WPACKET yet. It will be deleted once WPACKET conversion
3316 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs_old(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3317 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3319 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3321 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3322 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3323 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3324 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3327 return tmpout - out;
3330 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3331 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3334 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3335 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3336 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, psig[0], 1)
3337 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, psig[1], 1))
3344 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3345 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3346 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3347 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3349 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3350 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3351 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3352 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3353 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3355 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3356 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3359 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3360 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3361 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3363 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3373 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3374 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3376 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3377 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3379 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3381 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3383 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3384 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3385 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3386 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3387 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3388 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3389 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3390 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3391 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3392 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3394 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3395 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3398 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3399 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3403 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3404 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3406 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3408 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3411 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3415 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3416 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3420 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3422 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3425 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3426 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3428 /* Should never happen */
3432 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3433 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3434 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3436 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3437 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3441 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3446 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3447 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3449 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3450 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3453 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3454 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3455 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3456 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3457 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3459 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3460 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3461 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3462 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3468 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3469 * the certificate for signing.
3471 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3473 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3474 * supported it stays as NULL.
3476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3477 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3478 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3481 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3482 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3483 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3487 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3488 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3491 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3492 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3493 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3494 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3495 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3496 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3497 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3498 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3504 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3505 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3506 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3508 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3513 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3520 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3522 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3525 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3526 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3527 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3529 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3530 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3534 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3536 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3538 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3540 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3542 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3543 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3546 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3550 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3553 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3555 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3556 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3557 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3558 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3559 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3560 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3562 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3563 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3564 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3568 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3570 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3573 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3576 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3578 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3580 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3582 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3590 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3591 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3593 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3596 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3597 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3600 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3601 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3606 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3607 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3609 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3613 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3617 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3620 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3622 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3627 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3628 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3630 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3631 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3632 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3634 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3641 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3642 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3643 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3645 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3646 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3647 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3653 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3657 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3661 if (default_nid == -1)
3663 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3665 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3666 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3667 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3672 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3673 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3677 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3678 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3679 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3686 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3687 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3688 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3689 * attempting to use them.
3692 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3694 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3695 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3696 /* Strict mode flags */
3697 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3698 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3699 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3701 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3706 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3707 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3710 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3711 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3713 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3716 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3718 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3719 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3721 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3723 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3724 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3730 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3733 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3735 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3736 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3738 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3745 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3746 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3747 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3748 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3749 else if (!check_flags)
3754 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3755 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3757 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3759 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3760 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3762 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3765 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3766 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3767 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3768 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3771 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3772 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3773 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3777 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3778 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3781 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3782 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3783 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3786 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3787 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3788 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3791 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3792 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3793 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3802 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3803 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3805 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3807 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3808 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3809 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3812 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3819 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3820 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3824 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3825 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3826 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3827 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3829 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3836 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3837 else if (check_flags)
3838 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3840 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3841 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3842 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3843 else if (!check_flags)
3846 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3847 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3848 else if (strict_mode) {
3849 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3850 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3851 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3852 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3854 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3861 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3862 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3864 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3866 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3869 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3872 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3876 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3880 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3882 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3883 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3885 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3886 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3887 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3891 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3894 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3896 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3898 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3899 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3901 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3902 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3903 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3905 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3906 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3907 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3908 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3909 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3914 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3917 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3919 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3920 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3924 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3925 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3926 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3927 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3928 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3930 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3933 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3937 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3940 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3941 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3948 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3949 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3951 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3952 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3953 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3954 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3955 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3956 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3957 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3960 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3961 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3963 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3967 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3969 int dh_secbits = 80;
3970 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3971 return DH_get_1024_160();
3972 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3973 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3978 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3979 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3982 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
3990 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
3991 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
3993 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
3994 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4002 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4003 return DH_get_2048_224();
4004 return DH_get_1024_160();
4008 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4011 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4014 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4015 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4016 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4017 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4019 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4022 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4024 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4027 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4029 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4030 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4031 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4032 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4034 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4035 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4037 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4038 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4041 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4043 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4046 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4049 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4051 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4052 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4054 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4055 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4057 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4058 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4063 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4064 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4065 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4068 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4070 int rv, start_idx, i;
4072 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4077 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4081 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4082 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4083 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);