2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
37 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 tls1_export_keying_material,
42 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
43 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
57 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
58 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
60 tls1_export_keying_material,
61 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
62 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
63 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
64 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
65 tls_close_construct_packet,
69 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
73 tls1_generate_master_secret,
74 tls1_change_cipher_state,
75 tls1_final_finish_mac,
76 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
77 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
78 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
80 tls1_export_keying_material,
81 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
82 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
83 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
84 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
85 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
86 tls_close_construct_packet,
90 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
93 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
94 * http, the cache would over fill
103 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
107 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
109 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
113 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
116 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
117 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
119 s->version = s->method->version;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
125 int nid; /* Curve NID */
126 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
127 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
131 * Table of curve information.
132 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
133 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
135 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
136 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
137 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
138 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
139 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
140 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
141 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
142 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
143 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
144 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
145 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
146 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
147 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
148 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
149 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
150 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
151 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
152 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
153 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
154 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
155 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
156 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
157 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
158 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
159 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
160 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
161 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
162 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
164 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
167 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
168 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
169 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
170 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
173 /* The default curves */
174 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
175 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
176 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
177 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
178 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
181 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
182 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
183 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
184 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
185 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
186 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
187 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
188 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
191 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
192 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
194 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
195 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
196 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
197 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
198 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
199 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
200 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
201 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
202 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
203 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
204 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
205 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
206 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
207 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
208 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
209 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
210 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
211 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
212 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
213 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
214 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
215 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
218 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
219 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
220 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
223 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
225 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
226 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
227 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
229 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
231 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
235 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
238 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
239 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
246 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
248 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
249 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
250 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
251 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
252 * lists in the first place.
253 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
254 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
255 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
257 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
258 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
260 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
262 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
263 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
265 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
266 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
267 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
268 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
269 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
272 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
273 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
277 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
278 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
282 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
283 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
286 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
287 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
291 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
292 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
297 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
302 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
303 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
305 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
308 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
310 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
311 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
312 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
315 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
318 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
319 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
321 const unsigned char *curves;
322 size_t num_curves, i;
323 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
324 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
326 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
328 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
331 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
332 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
334 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
335 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
337 } else /* Should never happen */
340 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
342 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
343 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
344 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
350 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
351 * if there is no match.
352 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
353 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
354 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
356 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
358 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
359 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
361 /* Can't do anything on client side */
365 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
367 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
368 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
370 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
371 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
372 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
373 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
374 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
375 /* Should never happen */
378 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
382 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
383 * but s->options is a long...
385 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
386 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
388 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
389 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
390 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
391 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
392 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
395 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
398 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
400 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
401 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
402 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
404 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
408 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
409 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
410 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
411 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
412 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
415 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
416 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
424 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
428 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
429 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
431 unsigned char *clist, *p;
434 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
437 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
438 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
441 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
442 unsigned long idmask;
444 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
446 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
455 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
459 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
463 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
466 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
468 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
474 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
476 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
478 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
480 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
481 if (nid == NID_undef)
482 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
483 if (nid == NID_undef)
484 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
485 if (nid == NID_undef)
487 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
488 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
490 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
494 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
495 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
499 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
503 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
506 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
507 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
514 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
515 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
518 /* Determine curve ID */
519 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
520 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
521 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
525 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
527 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
529 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
530 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
532 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
533 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
535 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
541 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
542 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
543 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
545 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
546 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
549 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
550 * supported (see RFC4492).
552 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
553 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
554 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
555 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
556 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
559 if (i == num_formats)
564 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
565 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
566 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
568 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
570 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
571 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
572 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
573 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
574 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
578 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
579 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
584 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
591 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
595 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
597 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
598 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
599 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
601 *pformats = ecformats_default;
602 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
604 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
606 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
611 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
612 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
614 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
616 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
619 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
622 /* If not EC nothing to do */
623 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
625 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
629 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
632 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
636 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
637 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
639 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
645 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
646 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
647 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
648 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
649 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
651 return 0; /* Should never happen */
652 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
653 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
655 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
657 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
658 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
659 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
661 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
667 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
669 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
671 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
673 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
674 * is compatible with the client extensions.
676 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
678 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
681 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
684 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
685 unsigned char curve_id[2];
686 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
687 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
688 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
689 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
690 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
694 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
695 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
699 /* Need a shared curve */
700 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
704 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
708 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
713 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
716 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
717 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
720 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
721 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
723 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
726 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
727 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
729 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
735 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
738 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
739 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
740 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
741 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
743 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
744 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
745 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
746 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
747 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
748 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
750 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
751 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
752 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
757 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
758 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
759 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
762 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
765 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
768 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
769 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
770 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
771 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
772 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
774 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
775 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
778 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
779 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
783 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
784 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
785 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
786 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
787 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
788 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
789 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
791 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
792 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
797 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
798 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
800 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
801 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
803 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
804 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
805 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
806 /* Should never happen */
809 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
810 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
815 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
816 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
817 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
818 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
820 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
824 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
825 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
828 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
829 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
831 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
834 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
835 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
837 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
843 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
847 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
848 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
849 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
850 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
853 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
854 if (i == sent_sigslen
855 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
856 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
860 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
865 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
866 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
867 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
872 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
874 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
879 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
880 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
881 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
883 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
886 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
888 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
890 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
891 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
892 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
893 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
895 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
896 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
897 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
898 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
900 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
902 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
903 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
904 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
910 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
911 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
912 * @c: cipher to check
913 * @op: Security check that you want to do
915 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
917 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
919 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
920 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
922 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
924 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
925 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
927 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
928 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
931 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
934 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
936 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
938 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
941 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
943 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
944 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
954 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
955 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
956 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
957 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
958 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
961 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
963 PACKET extensions = *packet;
964 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
965 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
968 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
969 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
972 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
973 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
979 if (num_extensions <= 1)
982 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
983 if (extension_types == NULL) {
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
988 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
989 extensions = *packet;
990 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
992 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
993 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
994 /* This should not happen. */
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1000 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1004 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1005 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1006 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1007 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1012 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1016 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1019 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1021 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1023 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1024 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1026 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1027 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1029 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1030 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1031 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1032 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1040 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1041 if (s->renegotiate) {
1042 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, 2)
1043 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1044 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1049 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1050 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1053 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1054 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1055 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, 2)
1056 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1057 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1058 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1059 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1060 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name, 1)
1061 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1062 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1063 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1064 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1069 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1070 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1071 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1072 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, 2)
1073 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1074 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1075 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1076 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1077 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1078 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1079 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1080 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1081 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1088 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1091 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1093 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1094 size_t num_curves, num_formats;
1097 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1099 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, 2)
1100 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1101 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1102 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1103 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1109 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1111 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1112 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1117 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, 2)
1118 /* Sub-packet for curves extension */
1119 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1120 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1124 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1125 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1126 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1127 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, pcurves[0], 1)
1128 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, pcurves[1], 1)) {
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1130 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1135 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1140 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1142 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1144 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1145 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1146 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1147 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1148 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1149 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1150 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1155 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1156 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1159 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1160 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1163 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, 2)
1164 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1172 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1174 const unsigned char *salg;
1176 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1178 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, 2)
1179 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1180 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1181 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1182 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1183 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1184 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1185 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1191 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1194 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, 2)
1195 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1196 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1197 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp, 1)
1198 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1199 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1203 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1204 unsigned char *idbytes;
1208 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1209 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1211 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1212 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1213 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1218 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1219 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1223 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1224 unsigned char *extbytes;
1225 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1231 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1232 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1238 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1245 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1250 * 1: peer may send requests
1251 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1253 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1254 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1256 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1258 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, 2)
1259 /* Sub-packet for Hearbeat extension */
1260 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1261 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, mode, 1)
1262 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1270 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1272 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1273 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1275 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, 2)
1276 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1284 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1285 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1286 * (see longer comment below)
1288 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1289 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt,
1290 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, 2)
1291 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1292 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1293 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1294 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1295 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1299 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1302 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1303 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = 0;
1304 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1307 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, 2)
1308 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1309 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1310 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1311 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1315 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1316 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1317 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1318 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, prof->id, 2)) {
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1323 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1329 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1330 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1331 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1336 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, 2)
1337 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1343 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1344 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, 2)
1345 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1352 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, 2)
1353 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1359 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1360 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1361 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1364 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1365 unsigned char *padbytes;
1368 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1373 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1374 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1380 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, 2)
1381 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1385 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1393 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1394 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1397 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1398 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1400 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1403 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1404 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1405 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1406 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1411 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1413 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1416 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1421 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1424 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1427 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1435 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1436 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1439 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1440 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1441 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1444 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1449 const unsigned char *plist;
1452 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1456 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1458 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1460 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1462 if (plistlen > 255) {
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1467 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1468 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1469 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1470 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1475 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1478 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1480 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1481 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1483 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1487 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1490 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1493 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1494 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1496 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1499 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1500 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1503 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1504 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1508 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1511 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1514 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1522 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1523 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1524 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1525 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1526 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1527 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1528 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1529 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1530 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1531 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1533 if (limit - ret < 36)
1535 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1540 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1541 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1542 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1544 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1548 * 1: peer may send requests
1549 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1551 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1552 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1554 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1560 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1561 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1562 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1563 const unsigned char *npa;
1564 unsigned int npalen;
1567 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1569 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1570 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1571 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1573 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1575 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1577 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1581 if (!custom_ext_add_old(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1583 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1585 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1586 * for other cases too.
1588 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1589 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1590 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1591 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1592 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1594 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1598 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1603 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1604 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1605 unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1607 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1609 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1613 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1619 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1622 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1627 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1628 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1629 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1630 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1632 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1634 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1636 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1638 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1639 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1643 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1645 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1646 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1647 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1650 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1652 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1653 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1654 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1662 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1663 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1664 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1666 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1668 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1669 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1671 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1672 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1673 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1674 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1675 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1677 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1678 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1679 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1680 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1681 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1684 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1686 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1687 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1690 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1698 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1700 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1701 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1702 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1707 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1708 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1709 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1710 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1712 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1718 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1719 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1720 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1721 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1722 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1723 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1724 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1726 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1727 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1728 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1729 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1730 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1731 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1732 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1733 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1734 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1735 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1736 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1737 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1738 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1741 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1742 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1746 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1747 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1748 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1752 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1755 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1756 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1758 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1761 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1764 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1765 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1767 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1768 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1771 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1772 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1774 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1777 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1780 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1781 s->servername_done = 0;
1782 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1784 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1787 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1788 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1789 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1790 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1791 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1792 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1793 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1794 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1795 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1798 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1799 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1800 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1801 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1803 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1804 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1805 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1806 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1809 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1810 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1813 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1815 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1818 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1821 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1825 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1826 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1829 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1831 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1834 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1835 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1836 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1837 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1839 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1840 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1842 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1843 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1846 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1848 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1849 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1850 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1851 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1852 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1853 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1854 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1855 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1856 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1857 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1858 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1859 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1860 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1861 * the value of the Host: field.
1862 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1863 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1864 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1866 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1870 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1871 unsigned int servname_type;
1872 PACKET sni, hostname;
1874 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1875 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1876 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1881 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1882 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1883 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1885 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1886 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1887 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1889 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1890 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1892 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1893 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1894 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1899 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1900 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1904 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1905 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1909 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1910 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1914 s->servername_done = 1;
1917 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1918 * fall back to a full handshake.
1920 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1921 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1922 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1926 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1929 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
1932 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1936 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1937 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1939 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1940 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1947 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1948 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1950 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
1951 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1956 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1957 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1959 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1960 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1964 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1965 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
1967 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1968 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
1969 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
1970 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
1975 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
1976 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
1978 session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
1979 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1984 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1985 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1986 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1987 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
1988 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1989 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1991 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1994 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
1995 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
1997 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
1998 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
1999 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2004 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2005 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2009 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2010 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2011 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2014 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2015 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2016 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2017 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2018 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2019 (&extension, &responder_id_list))
2022 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2024 PACKET responder_id;
2025 const unsigned char *id_data;
2027 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2029 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2033 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL
2034 && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2035 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) {
2036 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2040 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2041 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2042 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2046 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2047 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2051 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2052 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2053 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2058 /* Read in request_extensions */
2059 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2062 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2063 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2064 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2065 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2066 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2067 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2068 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2069 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2070 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2078 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2080 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2084 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2085 unsigned int hbtype;
2087 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2088 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2089 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2093 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2094 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2096 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2097 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2098 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2101 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2107 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2108 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2110 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2113 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2114 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2115 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2116 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2117 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2118 * anything like that, but this might change).
2120 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2121 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2122 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2123 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2124 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2126 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2130 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2131 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2132 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2136 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2138 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2139 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2140 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2144 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2145 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2147 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2148 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2152 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2153 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2154 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2155 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2156 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2159 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2160 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2165 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2167 * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
2169 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2175 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2177 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2178 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2179 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2181 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2186 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2187 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2188 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2189 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2194 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2197 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2198 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2199 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2202 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2211 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2212 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2213 * fill the length of the block.
2215 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2217 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2219 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2220 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2221 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2229 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2231 unsigned int length, type, size;
2232 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2233 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2235 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2236 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2238 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2240 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2241 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2243 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2244 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2247 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2249 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2251 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2254 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2255 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2259 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2260 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2264 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2265 const unsigned char *data;
2268 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2269 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2272 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2273 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2275 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2276 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2278 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2279 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2280 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2281 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2282 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2285 tlsext_servername = 1;
2287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2288 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2289 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2290 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2291 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2292 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2296 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2297 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2298 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2299 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2300 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2303 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2304 ecpointformatlist_length;
2305 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2306 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2307 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2308 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2314 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2316 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2317 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2318 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2319 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2321 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2324 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2325 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2328 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2329 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2331 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2334 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2335 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2338 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2339 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2343 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2344 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2345 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2347 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2348 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2349 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2350 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2351 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2352 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2354 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2356 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2357 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2358 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2361 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2366 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2367 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2368 unsigned char *selected;
2369 unsigned char selected_len;
2370 /* We must have requested it. */
2371 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2372 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2375 /* The data must be valid */
2376 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2377 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2380 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2383 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2384 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2385 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2388 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2389 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2390 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2393 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2394 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2395 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2399 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2401 /* We must have requested it. */
2402 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2403 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2407 * The extension data consists of:
2408 * uint16 list_length
2409 * uint8 proto_length;
2410 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2412 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2413 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2414 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2415 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2418 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2419 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2420 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2421 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2424 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2425 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2428 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2430 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2431 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2432 unsigned int hbtype;
2433 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2434 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2438 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2439 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2441 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2442 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2443 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2446 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2451 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2452 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2453 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2457 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2458 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2459 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2460 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2461 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2462 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2463 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2465 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2468 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2469 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2471 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2475 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2476 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2480 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2481 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2482 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2483 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2484 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2485 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2486 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2490 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2499 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2500 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2501 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2502 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2503 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2505 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2506 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2507 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2509 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2515 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2518 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2519 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2520 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2529 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2531 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2535 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2540 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2542 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2543 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2547 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2548 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2551 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2552 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2556 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2558 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2559 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2560 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2561 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2563 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2565 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2568 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2569 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2572 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2573 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2576 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2577 s->servername_done = 0;
2583 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2584 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2586 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2588 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2591 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2592 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2594 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2595 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2598 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2601 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2602 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2603 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2607 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2612 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2613 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2614 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2615 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2616 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2617 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2618 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2619 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2622 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2623 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2624 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2625 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2626 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2629 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2630 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2632 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2633 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2637 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2641 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2646 * Upon success, returns 1.
2647 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2649 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2651 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2654 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2655 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2656 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2657 * influence which certificate is sent
2659 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2661 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2662 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2663 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2664 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2666 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2667 * et al can pick it up.
2669 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2670 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2672 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2673 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2674 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2676 /* status request response should be sent */
2677 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2678 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2679 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2681 /* something bad happened */
2682 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2684 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2690 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2697 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2699 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2700 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2704 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2705 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2706 * must contain uncompressed.
2708 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2709 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2710 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2711 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2712 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2713 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2714 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2715 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2717 unsigned char *list;
2718 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2719 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2720 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2721 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2722 found_uncompressed = 1;
2726 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2728 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2732 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2733 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2735 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2737 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2738 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2739 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2740 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2742 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2744 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2747 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2748 * that we don't receive a status message
2750 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2751 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2752 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2755 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2756 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2759 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2760 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2763 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2764 s->servername_done = 0;
2770 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2773 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2775 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2776 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2780 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2788 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2789 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2790 * need to be handled at the same time.
2792 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2795 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2796 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2797 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2798 * point to the resulting session.
2800 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2801 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2802 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2805 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2806 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2807 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2808 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2809 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2810 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2811 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2814 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2815 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2816 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2817 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2818 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2819 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2821 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2824 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2825 const PACKET *session_id,
2829 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2832 int have_ticket = 0;
2833 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2836 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2837 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2840 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2843 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2846 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2850 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2851 unsigned int type, size;
2853 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2854 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2855 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2859 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2863 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2865 const unsigned char *etick;
2867 /* Duplicate extension */
2868 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2876 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2879 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2883 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2885 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2886 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2887 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2888 * calculate the master secret later.
2893 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2894 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2898 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2899 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2901 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2902 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2905 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2908 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2909 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2912 default: /* fatal error */
2918 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2919 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2920 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2926 if (have_ticket == 0)
2933 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2935 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2936 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2937 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2938 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2939 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2940 * point to the resulting session.
2943 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2944 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2945 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2946 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2947 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2949 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2950 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2951 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2954 unsigned char *sdec;
2955 const unsigned char *p;
2956 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2957 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2958 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2959 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2960 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2962 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2963 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2966 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2971 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2972 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2973 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2984 /* Check key name matches */
2985 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
2986 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
2990 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
2991 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
2992 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
2993 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
2994 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
2995 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3001 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3004 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3008 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3010 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3015 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3016 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3017 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3020 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3021 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3022 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3025 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3026 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3027 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3028 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3029 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3030 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3031 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3035 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3036 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3041 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3045 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3049 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3050 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3051 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3055 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3056 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3065 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3069 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3070 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3074 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3081 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3082 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3083 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3084 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3085 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3086 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3087 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3088 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3089 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3090 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3093 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3094 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3095 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3096 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3097 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3098 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3099 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3102 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3105 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3106 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3112 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3115 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3116 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3117 return table[i].nid;
3122 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3127 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3130 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3133 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3134 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3138 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3140 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3147 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3150 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3151 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3152 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3153 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3154 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3155 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3156 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3157 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3158 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3159 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3160 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3161 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3164 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3170 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3171 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3172 return tls12_md_info + i;
3178 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3180 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3181 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3183 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3186 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3189 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3193 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3194 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3197 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3198 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3201 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3202 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3205 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3206 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3208 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3209 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3211 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3212 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3218 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3219 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3220 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3222 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3223 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3225 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3226 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3228 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3230 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3231 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3233 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3235 if (psignhash_nid) {
3236 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3237 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3238 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3242 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3243 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3245 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3246 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3247 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3249 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3250 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3252 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3253 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3257 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3258 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3262 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3264 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3265 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3266 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3268 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3269 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3270 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3272 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3273 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3274 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3276 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3277 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3282 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3283 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3288 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3289 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3296 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3298 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3300 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3304 * Old version of the tls12_copy_sigalgs function used by code that has not
3305 * yet been converted to WPACKET yet. It will be deleted once WPACKET conversion
3309 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs_old(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3310 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3312 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3314 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3315 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3316 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3317 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3320 return tmpout - out;
3323 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3324 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3328 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3329 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3330 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, psig[0], 1)
3331 || !WPACKET_put_bytes(pkt, psig[1], 1))
3338 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3339 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3340 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3341 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3343 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3344 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3345 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3346 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3347 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3349 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3350 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3353 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3354 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3355 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3357 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3367 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3368 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3370 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3371 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3373 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3375 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3377 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3378 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3379 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3380 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3381 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3382 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3383 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3384 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3385 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3386 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3388 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3389 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3392 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3393 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3397 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3398 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3400 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3402 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3405 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3409 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3410 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3414 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3416 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3419 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3420 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3422 /* Should never happen */
3426 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3427 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3428 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3430 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3431 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3435 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3440 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3441 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3443 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3444 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3447 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3448 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3449 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3450 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3451 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3453 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3454 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3455 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3456 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3462 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3463 * the certificate for signing.
3465 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3467 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3468 * supported it stays as NULL.
3470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3471 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3472 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3475 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3476 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3477 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3481 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3482 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3485 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3486 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3487 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3488 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3489 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3490 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3491 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3492 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3498 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3499 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3500 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3502 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3507 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3514 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3516 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3519 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3520 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3521 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3523 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3524 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3528 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3530 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3532 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3534 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3536 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3537 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3540 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3544 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3547 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3549 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3550 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3551 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3552 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3553 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3554 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3556 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3557 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3558 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3562 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3564 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3567 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3570 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3572 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3574 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3576 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3584 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3585 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3587 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3590 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3591 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3594 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3595 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3600 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3601 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3603 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3607 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3611 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3614 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3616 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3621 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3622 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3624 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3625 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3626 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3628 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3635 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3636 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3637 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3639 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3640 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3641 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3647 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3651 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3655 if (default_nid == -1)
3657 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3659 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3660 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3661 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3666 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3667 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3671 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3672 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3673 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3680 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3681 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3682 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3683 * attempting to use them.
3686 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3688 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3689 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3690 /* Strict mode flags */
3691 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3692 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3693 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3695 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3700 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3701 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3704 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3705 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3707 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3710 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3712 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3713 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3715 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3717 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3718 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3724 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3727 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3729 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3730 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3732 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3739 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3740 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3741 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3742 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3743 else if (!check_flags)
3748 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3749 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3751 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3753 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3754 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3756 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3759 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3760 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3761 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3762 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3765 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3766 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3767 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3771 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3772 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3775 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3776 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3777 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3780 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3781 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3782 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3785 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3786 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3787 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3796 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3797 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3799 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3801 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3802 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3803 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3806 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3813 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3814 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3818 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3819 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3820 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3821 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3823 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3830 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3831 else if (check_flags)
3832 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3834 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3835 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3836 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3837 else if (!check_flags)
3840 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3841 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3842 else if (strict_mode) {
3843 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3844 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3845 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3846 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3848 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3855 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3856 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3858 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3860 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3863 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3866 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3870 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3874 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3876 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3877 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3879 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3880 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3881 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3885 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3888 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3890 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3892 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3893 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3895 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3896 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3897 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3899 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3900 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3901 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3902 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3903 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3908 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3911 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3913 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3914 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3918 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3919 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3920 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3921 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3922 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3924 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3927 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3931 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3934 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3935 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3942 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3943 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3945 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3946 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3947 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3948 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3949 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3950 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3951 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3954 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3955 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3957 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3961 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3963 int dh_secbits = 80;
3964 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3965 return DH_get_1024_160();
3966 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3967 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3972 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3973 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3976 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
3984 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
3985 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
3987 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
3988 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
3996 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
3997 return DH_get_2048_224();
3998 return DH_get_1024_160();
4002 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4005 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4008 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4009 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4010 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4011 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4013 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4016 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4018 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4021 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4023 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4024 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4025 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4026 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4028 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4029 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4031 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4032 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4035 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4037 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4040 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4043 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4045 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4046 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4048 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4049 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4051 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4052 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4057 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4058 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4059 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4062 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4064 int rv, start_idx, i;
4066 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4071 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4075 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4076 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4077 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);