2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
235 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
315 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
324 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
387 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
390 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
391 const unsigned char **pcurves,
396 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
397 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
400 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
401 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
405 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
423 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
424 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
428 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
429 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
431 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
434 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
435 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
437 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
438 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
441 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
442 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
444 const unsigned char *curves;
446 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
447 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
449 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
452 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
455 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
457 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
460 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
465 else /* Should never happen */
468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
469 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
471 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
472 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
477 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
478 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
482 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
484 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
485 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
487 /* Can't do anything on client side */
494 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
495 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
498 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
499 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
500 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
501 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
502 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
503 /* Should never happen */
506 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
509 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
511 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
516 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
518 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
519 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
521 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
523 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
527 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
528 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
539 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
540 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
542 unsigned char *clist, *p;
544 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
545 * while curve ids < 32
547 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
548 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
551 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
553 unsigned long idmask;
555 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
557 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
568 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
572 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
577 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
580 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
582 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
586 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
588 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
590 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
592 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
593 if (nid == NID_undef)
594 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
595 if (nid == NID_undef)
596 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
597 if (nid == NID_undef)
599 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
600 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
602 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
605 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
606 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
611 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
615 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
617 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
618 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
623 const EC_METHOD *meth;
626 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
627 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
630 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
633 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
637 /* Determine curve ID */
638 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
639 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
640 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
644 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
656 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
658 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
661 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
663 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
666 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
670 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
671 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
672 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
674 const unsigned char *p;
677 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
678 * is supported (see RFC4492).
680 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
682 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
683 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
684 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
694 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
695 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
697 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
698 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
700 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
705 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
712 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
715 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
717 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
719 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
724 *pformats = ecformats_default;
725 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
727 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
729 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
733 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
734 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
736 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
738 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
741 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
744 /* If not EC nothing to do */
745 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
750 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
754 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
755 * supported curves extension.
757 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
760 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
761 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
763 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
770 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
771 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
772 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
773 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
774 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
776 return 0; /* Should never happen */
777 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
778 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
780 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
784 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
787 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
792 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
793 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
795 unsigned char curve_id[2];
796 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
797 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
798 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
799 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
802 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
803 * no other curves permitted.
807 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
808 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
809 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
810 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
811 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
815 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
816 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
818 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
819 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
821 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
824 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
829 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
835 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
837 /* Need a shared curve */
838 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
849 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
851 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
855 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
861 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
866 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
870 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
871 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
874 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
875 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
877 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
880 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
881 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
883 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
886 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
887 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
889 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
892 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
893 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
894 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
895 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
897 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
899 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
900 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
903 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
904 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
907 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
911 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
912 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
913 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
916 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
918 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
922 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
924 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
925 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
926 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
928 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
929 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
932 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
933 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
937 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
938 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
940 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
941 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
943 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
945 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
950 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
951 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
954 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
955 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
957 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
958 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
960 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
961 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
962 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
963 /* Should never happen */
966 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
967 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
973 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
975 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
976 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
977 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
979 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
989 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
991 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
994 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
998 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1000 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1003 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1011 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1015 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1016 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1017 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1019 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1022 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1023 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1028 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1034 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1035 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1036 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1042 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1045 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1046 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1050 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1051 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1052 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1053 * session and not global settings.
1056 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1061 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1062 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1063 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1066 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1067 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1068 * signature algorithms.
1070 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1071 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1072 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1074 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1077 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1079 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1080 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1084 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1085 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1087 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1088 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1090 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1092 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1094 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1095 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1101 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1104 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1106 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1109 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1111 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1113 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1116 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1119 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1120 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1122 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1124 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1127 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1128 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1130 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1132 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1134 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1135 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1136 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1137 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1146 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1147 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1148 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1153 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1155 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1157 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1158 unsigned long size_str;
1161 /* check for enough space.
1162 4 for the servername type and entension length
1163 2 for servernamelist length
1164 1 for the hostname type
1165 2 for hostname length
1169 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1170 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1173 /* extension type and length */
1174 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1175 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1177 /* length of servername list */
1178 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1180 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1181 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1183 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1187 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1192 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1200 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1203 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1213 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1214 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1215 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1217 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1218 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1224 /* check for enough space.
1225 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1226 1 for the srp user identity
1227 + srp user identity length
1229 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1231 /* fill in the extension */
1232 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1233 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1234 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1235 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1243 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1245 const unsigned char *plist;
1248 unsigned char *etmp;
1250 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1252 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1253 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1260 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1261 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1262 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1263 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1266 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1267 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1268 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1270 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1271 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1272 if (plistlen > 65532)
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1279 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1281 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1282 for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
1284 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1291 plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
1293 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1297 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1299 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1302 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1303 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1304 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1305 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1307 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1308 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1309 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1311 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1312 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1314 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1318 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1319 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1321 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1324 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1325 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1329 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1335 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1338 const unsigned char *salg;
1339 unsigned char *etmp;
1340 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1341 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1343 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1345 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1347 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1348 /* Fill in lengths */
1349 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1354 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1355 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1357 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1359 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1361 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1364 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1367 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1372 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1375 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1379 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1381 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1382 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1388 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1390 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1397 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1398 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1399 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1401 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1402 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1404 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1406 /* save position of id len */
1407 unsigned char *q = ret;
1408 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1409 /* skip over id len */
1411 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1417 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1421 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1422 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1424 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1427 * 1: peer may send requests
1428 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1430 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1431 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1433 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1436 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1437 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1439 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1440 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1441 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1443 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1448 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1450 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1452 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1453 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1454 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1455 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1456 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1457 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1460 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1464 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1466 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1468 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1471 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1478 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1479 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1480 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1482 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1483 if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION)
1485 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1490 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1491 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1493 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1494 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1496 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1498 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1499 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1500 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1501 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1503 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1505 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1507 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1513 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1515 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1520 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1523 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1527 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1530 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1531 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1533 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1536 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1537 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1538 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1539 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1541 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1542 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1546 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1548 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1550 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1552 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1556 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1560 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1566 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1568 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1571 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1583 const unsigned char *plist;
1585 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1588 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1590 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1591 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1598 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1599 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1600 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1601 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1605 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1606 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1608 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1610 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1611 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1615 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1617 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1618 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1622 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1623 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1625 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1627 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1629 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1632 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1635 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1640 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
1644 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1646 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1648 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1651 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1659 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1660 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1661 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1662 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1663 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1664 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1665 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1666 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1667 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1668 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1669 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1675 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1676 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1678 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1680 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1683 * 1: peer may send requests
1684 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1686 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1687 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1689 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1695 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1696 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1697 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1699 const unsigned char *npa;
1700 unsigned int npalen;
1703 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1704 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1706 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1707 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1709 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1711 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1715 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1717 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1718 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1720 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD, RC4 or SSL 3.0:
1721 * might want to disable for other cases too.
1723 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1724 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1725 || s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1726 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1729 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1735 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1737 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1738 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1740 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1742 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1746 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1750 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1753 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1757 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1759 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1760 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1761 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1764 * returns: 0 on success. */
1765 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1766 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1770 const unsigned char *selected;
1771 unsigned char selected_len;
1774 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1780 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1781 * length-prefixed strings. */
1782 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1783 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1792 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1794 proto_len = data[i];
1800 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1806 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1807 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1808 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1809 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1810 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1811 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1812 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1814 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1817 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1818 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1823 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1827 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1828 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1829 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1830 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1835 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1836 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1837 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1838 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1840 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1841 unsigned short type, size;
1842 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1843 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1844 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1845 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1846 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1847 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1848 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1850 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1851 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1852 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1853 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1856 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1857 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1858 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1859 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1860 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1861 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1862 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1863 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1864 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1865 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1868 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1877 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1880 if (data+size > d+n)
1884 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1886 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1887 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1889 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1891 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1893 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1898 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1900 if (data + len != d+n)
1902 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1906 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1908 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1911 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1913 unsigned short type;
1914 unsigned short size;
1916 unsigned char *data = *p;
1917 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1919 s->servername_done = 0;
1920 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1922 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1925 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1927 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1928 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1932 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1933 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1937 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1938 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1939 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1941 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1942 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1944 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1945 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1948 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1949 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1952 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1956 if (data > (d+n-len))
1959 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1964 if (data+size > (d+n))
1967 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1969 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1970 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1971 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1972 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1974 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1975 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1976 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1977 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1978 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1979 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1980 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1981 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1982 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1983 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1984 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1985 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1986 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1987 the value of the Host: field.
1988 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1989 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1990 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1991 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1995 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1997 unsigned char *sdata;
2003 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2010 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2017 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2023 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2026 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2027 switch (servname_type)
2029 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2032 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2034 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2037 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2039 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2042 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2044 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2047 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2048 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2049 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2050 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2051 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2052 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2055 s->servername_done = 1;
2059 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2060 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2061 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2073 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2078 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2079 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2081 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2083 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2086 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2088 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2091 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2093 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2094 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2096 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2098 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2105 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2107 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2108 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2110 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2111 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2113 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2118 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2120 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2121 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2123 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2124 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2126 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2129 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2130 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2133 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2134 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2135 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2136 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2137 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2140 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2142 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2143 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2144 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2146 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2147 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2149 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2154 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2156 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2159 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2160 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2162 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2165 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2166 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2169 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2170 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2171 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2172 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2173 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2176 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2177 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2178 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2180 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2184 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2187 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2188 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2190 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2194 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2195 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2196 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2197 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2199 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2200 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2202 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2207 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2209 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2210 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2212 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2216 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2218 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2220 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2222 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2225 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2227 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2232 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2234 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2237 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2239 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2243 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2248 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2252 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2254 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2256 const unsigned char *sdata;
2258 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2263 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2272 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2276 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2280 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2285 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2289 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2294 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2295 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2298 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2299 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2300 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2302 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2303 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2306 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2307 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2309 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2310 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2315 /* Read in request_extensions */
2318 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2325 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2331 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2333 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2334 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2337 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2338 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2340 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2341 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2343 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2348 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2352 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2355 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2359 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2360 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2362 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2363 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2364 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2366 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2372 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2373 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2374 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2376 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2379 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2380 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2381 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2382 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2383 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2384 * anything like that, but this might change).
2386 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2387 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2388 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2389 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2390 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2391 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2395 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2396 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2397 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2399 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2402 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2403 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2407 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2408 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2409 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2411 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2415 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2416 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2418 if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION)
2419 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2422 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2423 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2424 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2425 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2426 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2430 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2441 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2443 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2444 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2446 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2448 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2455 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2458 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2459 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2461 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2465 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2474 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2475 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2476 * the length of the block. */
2477 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2479 unsigned int off = 0;
2493 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2495 unsigned short length;
2496 unsigned short type;
2497 unsigned short size;
2498 unsigned char *data = *p;
2499 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2500 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2503 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2506 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2508 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2509 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2513 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2514 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2517 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2518 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2521 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2525 if (data+length != d+n)
2527 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2531 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2536 if (data+size > (d+n))
2539 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2540 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2541 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2543 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2545 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2547 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2550 tlsext_servername = 1;
2553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2554 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2556 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2557 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2559 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2561 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2566 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2567 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2568 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2570 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2573 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2574 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2577 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2578 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2579 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2580 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2581 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2584 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2586 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2588 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2589 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2591 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2594 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2596 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2599 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2601 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2602 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2604 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2608 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2611 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2612 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2614 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2618 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2619 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2620 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2621 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2623 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2625 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2627 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2632 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2634 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2635 * a status request message.
2637 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2639 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2642 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2643 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2646 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2647 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2649 unsigned char *selected;
2650 unsigned char selected_len;
2652 /* We must have requested it. */
2653 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2655 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2658 /* The data must be valid */
2659 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2661 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2664 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2666 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2669 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2670 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2672 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2675 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2676 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2677 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2681 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2685 /* We must have requested it. */
2686 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2688 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2693 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2696 /* The extension data consists of:
2697 * uint16 list_length
2698 * uint8 proto_length;
2699 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2703 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2705 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2709 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2711 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2714 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2715 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2716 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2717 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2719 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2722 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2723 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2726 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2728 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2730 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2733 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2737 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2738 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2740 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2741 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2742 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2744 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2749 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2751 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2755 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2756 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2758 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite or SSL 3.0 */
2759 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2760 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4
2761 && s->version != SSL3_VERSION)
2762 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2765 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2766 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2768 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2776 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2780 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2782 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2784 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2786 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2787 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2789 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2795 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2805 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2806 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2807 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2808 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2809 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2810 * absence on initial connect only.
2812 if (!renegotiate_seen
2813 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2814 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2816 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2818 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2826 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2829 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2833 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2835 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2840 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2842 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2843 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2845 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2846 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2848 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2849 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2854 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2858 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2859 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2866 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2871 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2873 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2874 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2877 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2878 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2880 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2881 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2885 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2886 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2887 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2888 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2890 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2892 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2893 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2894 * so this has to happen here in
2895 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2899 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2901 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2904 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2905 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2910 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2911 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2912 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2914 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2916 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2917 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2919 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2920 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2922 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2923 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2925 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2926 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2928 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2929 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2932 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2936 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2938 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2939 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2940 * abort the handshake.
2942 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2943 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2951 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2952 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2955 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2956 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2959 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2960 s->servername_done=0;
2966 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2968 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2972 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2973 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2974 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2975 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2977 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2980 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2981 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2982 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2983 if (certpkey == NULL)
2985 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2988 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2989 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2991 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2992 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2995 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2996 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2997 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2999 /* status request response should be sent */
3000 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3001 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3002 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3004 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3006 /* something bad happened */
3007 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3008 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3009 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3014 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3016 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3017 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3019 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3020 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3022 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3023 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
3025 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3026 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3029 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3030 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
3032 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s))
3034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT_LATE,
3035 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3036 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3037 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3040 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3041 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT_LATE,
3044 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3045 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3046 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3051 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3056 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3057 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3060 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3061 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3069 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3071 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3072 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3075 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3076 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3077 * it must contain uncompressed.
3079 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3080 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3081 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3082 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3083 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3085 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3087 unsigned char *list;
3088 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3089 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3090 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3092 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3094 found_uncompressed = 1;
3098 if (!found_uncompressed)
3100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3104 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3105 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3107 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3108 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3109 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3110 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3112 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3113 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3115 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3116 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3118 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3120 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3121 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3124 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3125 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3126 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3127 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3129 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3130 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3135 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3138 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3139 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3142 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3143 * there is no response.
3145 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3147 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3148 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3150 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3151 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3154 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3155 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3159 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3160 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3166 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3167 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3170 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3171 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3174 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3175 s->servername_done=0;
3181 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3184 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3186 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3188 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3192 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3200 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3201 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3202 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3204 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3205 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3206 * extension, if any.
3207 * len: the length of the session ID.
3208 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3209 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3210 * point to the resulting session.
3212 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3213 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3214 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3217 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3218 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3219 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3220 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3221 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3222 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3223 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3226 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3227 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3228 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3229 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3230 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3231 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3233 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3234 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3236 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3237 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3241 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3243 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3244 * to permit stateful resumption.
3246 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3248 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3252 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3260 /* Skip past cipher list */
3265 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3270 /* Now at start of extensions */
3271 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3274 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3276 unsigned short type, size;
3279 if (p + size > limit)
3281 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3286 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3287 * currently have one. */
3288 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3291 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3293 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3294 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3295 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3296 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3297 * calculate the master secret later. */
3300 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3303 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3304 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3306 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3308 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3309 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3311 default: /* fatal error */
3320 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3322 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3323 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3324 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3325 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3326 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3327 * point to the resulting session.
3330 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3331 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3332 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3333 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3335 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3336 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3337 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3340 unsigned char *sdec;
3341 const unsigned char *p;
3342 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3343 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3346 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3347 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3350 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3351 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3352 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3353 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3355 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3356 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3367 /* Check key name matches */
3368 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3370 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3371 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3372 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3373 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3375 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3376 * integrity checks on ticket.
3378 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3381 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3385 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3386 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3387 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3388 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3389 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3391 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3394 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3395 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3396 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3397 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3398 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3401 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3404 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3405 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3407 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3412 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3415 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3419 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3420 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3421 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3422 * as required by standard.
3425 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3426 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3434 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3439 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3447 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3448 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3449 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3450 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3451 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3452 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3453 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3456 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3457 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3458 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3459 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3462 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3465 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3467 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3473 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3476 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3478 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3479 return table[i].nid;
3484 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3489 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3490 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3493 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3496 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3497 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3501 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3503 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3504 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3511 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3514 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3515 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3518 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3520 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3523 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3525 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3526 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3527 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3529 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3530 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3532 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3533 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3534 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3536 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3537 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3541 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3545 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3547 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3550 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3552 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3553 #ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
3554 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3557 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3558 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3560 return inf->mfunc();
3563 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3568 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3569 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3571 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3572 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3573 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3576 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3577 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3583 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3584 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3585 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3587 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3588 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3590 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3592 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3593 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3595 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3597 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3599 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3600 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3602 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3606 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3607 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3608 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3610 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3613 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3614 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3616 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3617 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3618 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3620 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3621 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3623 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3624 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3627 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3628 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3629 * then RSA is disabled.
3632 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3634 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3635 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3636 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3637 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3638 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3639 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3642 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3643 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3648 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3649 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3654 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3655 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3660 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3661 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3668 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3670 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3672 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3675 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3676 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3678 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3680 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3682 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3684 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3685 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3688 return tmpout - out;
3691 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3692 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3693 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3694 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3696 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3697 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3698 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3700 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3701 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3703 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3705 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3710 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3711 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3712 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3714 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3725 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3726 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3728 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3729 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3731 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3733 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3734 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3736 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3737 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3739 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3740 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3742 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3743 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3745 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3747 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3748 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3751 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3752 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3756 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3757 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3763 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3764 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3766 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3769 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3772 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3773 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3774 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3779 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3781 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3784 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3785 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3787 /* Should never happen */
3791 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3792 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3793 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3794 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3796 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3797 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3801 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3807 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3808 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3811 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3812 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3814 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3815 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3817 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3819 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3821 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3824 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3825 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3826 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3827 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3828 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3830 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3831 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3837 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3838 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3840 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3841 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3843 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3844 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3845 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3846 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3848 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3849 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3854 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3855 * use the certificate for signing.
3857 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3859 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3860 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3863 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3864 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3866 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3867 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3869 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3870 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3873 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3874 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3875 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3882 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3883 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3884 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3886 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3892 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3899 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3901 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3904 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3905 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3906 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3908 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3909 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3913 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3915 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3917 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3919 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3921 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3922 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3928 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3930 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3931 unsigned short hbtype;
3932 unsigned int payload;
3933 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3935 if (s->msg_callback)
3936 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3937 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3938 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3940 /* Read type and payload length first */
3941 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3942 return 0; /* silently discard */
3945 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3946 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3949 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3951 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3954 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3955 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3956 * payload, plus padding
3958 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3961 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3962 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3964 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3966 /* Random padding */
3967 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3969 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3971 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3972 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3973 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3974 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3976 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3981 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3985 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3986 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3987 * sequence number */
3990 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3993 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4001 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4003 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4005 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4006 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4008 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4009 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4010 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4012 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4016 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4017 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4023 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4024 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4030 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4031 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4033 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4035 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4036 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4037 * some random stuff.
4038 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4039 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4040 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4041 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4044 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4047 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4048 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4050 /* Sequence number */
4051 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4052 /* 16 random bytes */
4053 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4055 /* Random padding */
4056 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4058 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4061 if (s->msg_callback)
4062 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4063 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4064 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4066 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4075 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4080 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4083 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4085 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4088 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4089 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4091 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4093 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4095 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4103 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4104 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4105 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4106 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4107 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4108 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4111 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4112 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4113 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4114 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4117 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4119 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4120 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4123 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4124 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4128 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4129 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4130 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4134 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4138 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4141 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4143 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4148 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4149 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4151 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4153 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4154 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4155 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4156 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4158 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4166 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4167 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4168 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4169 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4173 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4174 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4175 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4176 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4182 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4186 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4190 if (default_nid == -1)
4192 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4194 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4195 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4196 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4200 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4201 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4205 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4206 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4208 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4214 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4215 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4216 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4217 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4220 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4222 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4223 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4224 /* Strict mode flags */
4225 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4226 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4227 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4229 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4234 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4235 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4237 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4238 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4241 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4245 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4248 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4250 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4252 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4253 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4256 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4257 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4258 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4260 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4261 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4270 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4273 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4274 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4275 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4277 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4285 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4286 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4287 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4290 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4296 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4297 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4300 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4303 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4304 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4306 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4311 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4312 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4313 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4314 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4315 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4318 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4319 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4320 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4321 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4325 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4326 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4334 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4335 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4338 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4341 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4342 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4344 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4347 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4355 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4356 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4358 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4361 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4362 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4363 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4365 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4370 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4378 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4379 else if(check_flags)
4380 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4382 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4383 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4384 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4385 else if (!check_flags)
4388 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4389 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4390 else if (strict_mode)
4392 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4393 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4395 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4396 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4400 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4408 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4410 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4415 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4418 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4421 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4426 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4427 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4428 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4429 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4430 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4435 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4440 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4444 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4445 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4447 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4449 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4451 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4455 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4459 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4462 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4464 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4465 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4467 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4469 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4470 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4472 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4474 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4476 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4477 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4479 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4484 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4488 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4490 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4491 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4495 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4497 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4498 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4499 else if (cpk->digest)
4500 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4503 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4505 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4506 * if the chain is invalid.
4510 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4511 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4514 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4515 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4522 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4523 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4525 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4526 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4527 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4528 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4529 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4530 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4532 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4533 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4535 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4541 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4543 int dh_secbits = 80;
4544 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4545 return DH_get_1024_160();
4546 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4548 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4555 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4556 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4559 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4566 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4567 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4568 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4570 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4571 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4578 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4579 return DH_get_2048_224();
4580 return DH_get_1024_160();
4584 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4587 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4590 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4591 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4596 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4598 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4601 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4603 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4604 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4605 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4606 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4609 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4610 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4613 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4615 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4618 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4621 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4624 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4625 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4629 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4630 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4632 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4633 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4637 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4638 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4639 * not sending one to the peer.
4640 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4643 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4645 int rv, start_idx, i;
4648 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4654 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4658 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4660 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4661 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);