2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
117 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
118 # include <openssl/ec.h>
121 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
122 #include <openssl/rand.h>
123 #include "ssl_locl.h"
125 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
128 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
129 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
130 SSL_SESSION **psess);
131 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
132 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
135 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
138 tls1_setup_key_block,
139 tls1_generate_master_secret,
140 tls1_change_cipher_state,
141 tls1_final_finish_mac,
142 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
143 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
144 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
147 tls1_export_keying_material,
149 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
150 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
154 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
157 tls1_setup_key_block,
158 tls1_generate_master_secret,
159 tls1_change_cipher_state,
160 tls1_final_finish_mac,
161 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
162 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
163 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
166 tls1_export_keying_material,
167 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
168 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
169 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
173 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
176 tls1_setup_key_block,
177 tls1_generate_master_secret,
178 tls1_change_cipher_state,
179 tls1_final_finish_mac,
180 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
181 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
182 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
185 tls1_export_keying_material,
186 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
187 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
188 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
189 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
193 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
196 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
197 * http, the cache would over fill
199 return (60 * 60 * 2);
206 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
210 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
213 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
214 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
216 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
220 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
223 s->version = s->method->version;
226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
228 static int nid_list[] = {
229 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
230 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
231 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
232 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
235 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
236 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
237 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
238 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
239 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
240 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
241 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
243 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
244 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
245 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
246 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
247 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
248 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
249 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
250 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
251 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
252 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
253 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
254 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
255 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
256 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
259 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
265 /* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
266 static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
267 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
268 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
269 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
270 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
272 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
273 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
274 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
275 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
276 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
277 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
278 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
279 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
280 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
281 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
282 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
283 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
288 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
289 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
291 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
292 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
293 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
294 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
295 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
296 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
297 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
298 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
299 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
300 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
301 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
302 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
303 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
304 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
307 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
308 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
310 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
311 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
312 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
313 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
314 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
315 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
316 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
317 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
318 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
319 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
320 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
321 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
322 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
324 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
325 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
329 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
330 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
331 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
335 /* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */
336 static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] = {
337 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
338 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
339 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
341 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
342 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
343 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
344 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
346 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
347 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
348 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
349 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
351 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
352 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
353 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
354 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
355 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
356 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
358 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
359 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
360 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
361 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
362 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
364 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
365 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
366 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
367 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
368 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
369 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
371 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
372 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
373 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
377 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
379 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
380 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
381 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
383 return nid_list[curve_id - 1];
386 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
388 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
390 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
392 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
394 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
396 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
398 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
400 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
402 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
404 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
406 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
408 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
410 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
412 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
414 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
416 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
418 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
420 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
422 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
424 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
426 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
428 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
430 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
432 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
434 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
436 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
438 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
440 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
442 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
444 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
452 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
454 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
455 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
456 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
457 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
458 * lists in the first place.
459 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
460 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
461 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
463 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
464 const unsigned char **pcurves,
467 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
469 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
470 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
472 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
473 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
474 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
475 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
476 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
479 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
480 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
484 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
485 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
489 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
490 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
495 *pcurves = fips_curves_default;
496 pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
500 if (!s->server || (s->cert && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)) {
501 *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
502 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
504 *pcurves = eccurves_all;
505 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
510 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
511 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
516 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
521 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
522 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
524 const unsigned char *curves;
525 size_t num_curves, i;
526 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
527 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
529 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
531 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
534 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
535 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
537 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
538 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
540 } else /* Should never happen */
543 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
545 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
546 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
553 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
554 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
555 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
556 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
558 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
560 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
561 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
563 /* Can't do anything on client side */
567 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
569 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
570 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
572 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
573 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
574 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
575 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
576 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
577 /* Should never happen */
580 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
584 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
585 * but s->options is a long...
587 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
588 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
590 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
591 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
592 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
593 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
595 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
597 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
598 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
599 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
600 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
602 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
603 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
611 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
615 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
616 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
618 unsigned char *clist, *p;
621 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
624 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
625 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
629 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
632 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
633 unsigned long idmask;
635 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
637 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */
638 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25) {
643 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
644 curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]);
645 if (!curve || EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve))
646 == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
648 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
652 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
655 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
665 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
669 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
673 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
676 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
678 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
684 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
686 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
688 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
690 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
691 if (nid == NID_undef)
692 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
693 if (nid == NID_undef)
694 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
695 if (nid == NID_undef)
697 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
698 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
700 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
704 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
705 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
710 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
714 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
717 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
718 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
723 const EC_METHOD *meth;
726 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
727 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
730 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
733 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
737 /* Determine curve ID */
738 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
739 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
740 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
743 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
752 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
754 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
756 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
758 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
760 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
765 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
766 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
767 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
769 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
770 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
773 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
774 * supported (see RFC4492).
776 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
777 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
778 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
779 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
780 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
783 if (i == num_formats)
788 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
789 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
790 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
792 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
794 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
795 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
796 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
797 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
798 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
802 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
803 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
808 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
815 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
819 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
821 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
822 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
823 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
825 *pformats = ecformats_default;
826 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
828 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
830 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
835 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
836 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
838 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
840 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
843 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
846 /* If not EC nothing to do */
847 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
851 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
856 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
859 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
863 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
864 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
866 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
872 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
873 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
874 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
875 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
876 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
878 return 0; /* Should never happen */
879 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
880 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
882 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
884 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
885 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
886 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
888 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
894 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
895 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
896 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
898 unsigned char curve_id[2];
899 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
900 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
901 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
902 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
906 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
909 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
910 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
911 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
912 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
913 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
914 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
918 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
919 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
921 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
922 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
924 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
926 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
929 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
931 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
937 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
938 /* Need a shared curve */
939 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
945 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
950 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
952 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
956 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
959 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
963 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
968 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
973 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
974 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
977 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
978 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
980 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
983 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
984 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
986 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
989 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
990 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
993 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
996 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
997 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
998 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
999 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
1001 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
1002 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
1003 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
1004 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1006 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
1007 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1008 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
1010 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1011 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
1015 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1016 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1017 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1018 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1021 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
1024 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1027 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1028 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1029 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1030 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1031 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
1033 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1034 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1037 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1038 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
1042 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
1043 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
1044 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1045 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1046 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1047 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1048 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1050 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1051 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1056 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1057 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1059 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1060 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1062 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1063 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1064 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1065 /* Should never happen */
1068 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1069 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
1070 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1073 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1074 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1075 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1076 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1077 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1079 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1083 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1084 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1087 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1088 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1090 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1093 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1094 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1096 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1102 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1106 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1107 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1108 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1109 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1112 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1113 if (i == sent_sigslen
1114 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1115 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1116 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1119 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1125 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1127 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1128 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1133 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1134 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1135 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1138 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1141 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1142 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1143 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1146 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1147 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1148 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1152 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1153 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2.
1155 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1156 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
1157 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
1158 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1159 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1163 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1164 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1168 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1169 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1176 * Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1177 * signature algorithms.
1180 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1181 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1184 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1185 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1188 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1189 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1191 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1192 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1193 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1194 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1197 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1198 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1199 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1200 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1201 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1203 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1204 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1205 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1206 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1207 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1213 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1214 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1217 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1218 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1219 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1220 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1222 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1224 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1225 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1227 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1228 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1230 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1231 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1232 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1233 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1241 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1242 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1248 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1250 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1251 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1252 unsigned long size_str;
1256 * check for enough space.
1257 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1258 * 2 for servernamelist length
1259 * 1 for the hostname type
1260 * 2 for hostname length
1264 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1266 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1269 /* extension type and length */
1270 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1271 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1273 /* length of servername list */
1274 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1276 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1277 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1279 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1283 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1284 if (s->renegotiate) {
1287 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1292 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1295 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1298 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1305 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1306 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1307 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1308 * Client Hello message */
1310 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1311 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1317 * check for enough space.
1318 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1319 * 1 for the srp user identity
1320 * + srp user identity length
1322 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1325 /* fill in the extension */
1326 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1327 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1328 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1329 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1334 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1337 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1340 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1341 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1343 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1345 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1347 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1349 if (num_formats > 255) {
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1354 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1355 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1356 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1357 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1358 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1362 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1364 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1365 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1368 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1370 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1372 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1376 curves_list_len = 2 * num_curves;
1377 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1378 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1379 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1380 memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len);
1381 ret += curves_list_len;
1383 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1385 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1387 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1388 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1389 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1390 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1391 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1392 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1393 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1395 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1396 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1397 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1400 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1401 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1404 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1407 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1409 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1412 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1418 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1420 const unsigned char *salg;
1421 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1422 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1424 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1425 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1427 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1430 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1431 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1432 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1434 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1436 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1439 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1442 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1447 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1449 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1453 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1454 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1455 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1461 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1462 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1468 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1470 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1471 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1473 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1474 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1476 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1477 /* save position of id len */
1478 unsigned char *q = ret;
1479 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1480 /* skip over id len */
1482 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1488 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1490 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1491 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1492 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1494 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1498 * 1: peer may send requests
1499 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1501 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1502 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1504 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1507 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1508 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1510 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1511 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1513 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1515 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1520 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1521 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1523 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1524 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1525 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1526 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1527 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1529 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1530 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1533 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1535 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1538 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1541 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1548 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1549 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1550 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1554 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1555 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1556 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1559 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1560 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1562 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1563 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1566 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1568 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1569 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1575 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1577 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1582 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1585 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1589 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1590 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1593 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1594 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1595 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1596 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1598 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1599 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1600 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1601 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1602 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1603 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1606 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation
1608 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1613 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1615 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1616 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1617 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1620 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1624 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1627 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1632 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1635 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1638 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1645 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1647 const unsigned char *plist;
1650 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1654 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1656 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1658 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1660 if (plistlen > 255) {
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1665 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1666 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1667 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1668 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1673 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1676 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1678 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1679 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1681 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1685 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1686 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1688 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1691 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1692 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1693 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1695 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1697 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1700 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1703 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1708 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1709 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1712 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1714 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1717 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1720 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1728 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1729 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1730 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1731 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1732 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1733 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1734 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1735 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1736 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1737 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1739 if (limit - ret < 36)
1741 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1745 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1746 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1747 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1748 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1750 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1754 * 1: peer may send requests
1755 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1757 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1758 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1760 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1765 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1766 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1767 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1768 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1769 const unsigned char *npa;
1770 unsigned int npalen;
1773 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1775 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1776 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1777 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1779 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1781 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1783 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1787 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1790 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1791 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1792 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1794 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1796 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1800 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1804 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1807 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1811 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1813 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1814 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1815 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1820 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1821 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1822 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1823 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1825 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1826 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1828 unsigned short type, size;
1829 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1830 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1831 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1832 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1833 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1834 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1835 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1837 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1838 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1839 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1840 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1843 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1844 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1845 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1846 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1847 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1848 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1849 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1850 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1851 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1852 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1855 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1859 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1864 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1867 if (data + size > d + n)
1871 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1872 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1873 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1875 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1877 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1879 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1882 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1884 if (data + len != d + n)
1886 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1890 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1892 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1895 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1896 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1897 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1898 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1901 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1902 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1906 const unsigned char *selected;
1907 unsigned char selected_len;
1910 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1917 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1918 * length-prefixed strings.
1920 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1929 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1930 proto_len = data[i];
1936 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1942 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1943 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1944 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1945 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1946 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1947 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1948 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1949 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1952 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1953 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1958 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1962 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1963 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1965 unsigned short type;
1966 unsigned short size;
1968 unsigned char *data = *p;
1969 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1971 s->servername_done = 0;
1972 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1973 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1974 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1977 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1978 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1979 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1981 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1982 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1983 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1986 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1987 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1988 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1989 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1991 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1992 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
1993 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1994 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1996 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1997 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1998 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1999 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2003 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2005 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2009 if (data > (d + n - len))
2012 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2016 if (data + size > (d + n))
2019 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
2021 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2022 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2024 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2026 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2027 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2028 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2029 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2030 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2031 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2032 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2033 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2034 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2035 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2036 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2037 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2038 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2039 * the value of the Host: field.
2040 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2041 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2042 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2044 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2048 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2049 unsigned char *sdata;
2054 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2060 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2066 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2071 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2074 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2075 switch (servname_type) {
2076 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2078 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2079 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2082 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2083 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2086 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2087 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2088 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2091 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2092 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2093 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2094 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2095 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2096 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2099 s->servername_done = 1;
2102 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2103 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2104 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2105 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2116 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2121 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2122 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2123 if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2124 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2127 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2128 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2131 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2133 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2134 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2136 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2137 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2143 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2144 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2145 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2146 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2148 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2149 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2150 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2154 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2155 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2156 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2158 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2159 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2160 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2161 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2164 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2165 ecpointformatlist_length;
2166 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2167 ecpointformatlist_length);
2171 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
2172 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2173 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2174 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2175 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2176 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2178 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2179 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2180 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2181 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2183 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2184 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2185 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2186 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2187 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2191 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2192 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2195 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2196 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2197 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2198 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2201 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2202 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2203 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2204 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2208 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
2209 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2210 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2211 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2212 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2213 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2216 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2217 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2218 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2219 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2222 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2225 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2226 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2227 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2231 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2232 /* shouldn't really happen */
2233 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2236 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2237 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2238 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2240 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2241 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2242 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2243 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2248 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2249 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2250 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2251 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2253 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2256 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2257 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2259 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2260 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2262 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2263 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2268 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2269 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2272 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2273 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2276 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2279 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2283 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2285 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2286 const unsigned char *sdata;
2288 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2292 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2299 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2303 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2306 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2311 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2313 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2316 if (data != sdata) {
2317 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2318 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2321 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2322 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2323 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2324 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2325 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2328 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2329 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2330 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2335 /* Read in request_extensions */
2337 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2342 if (dsize != size) {
2343 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2348 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2349 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2350 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2353 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2354 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2355 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2356 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2362 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2365 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2367 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2368 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2370 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2371 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2373 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2374 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2375 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2378 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2383 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2384 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2385 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2386 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2388 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2391 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2392 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2393 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2394 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2395 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2396 * anything like that, but this might change).
2398 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2399 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2400 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2401 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2402 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2404 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2408 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2409 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2410 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2412 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2413 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2414 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2418 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2419 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2420 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2421 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2422 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2434 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2436 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2437 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2438 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2440 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2448 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data
2449 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking.
2452 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
2453 const unsigned char *data,
2454 const unsigned char *limit,
2457 unsigned short type, size, len;
2458 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
2459 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
2462 if (data >= limit - 2)
2466 if (data > limit - len)
2469 while (data <= limit - 4) {
2473 if (data + size > limit)
2475 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2484 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2488 unsigned char *ptmp = *p;
2490 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled
2491 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically
2492 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions
2493 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure.
2495 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2496 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2500 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2505 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2506 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, d + n, &al) <= 0) {
2507 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2514 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2516 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2517 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2518 * fill the length of the block.
2520 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2522 unsigned int off = 0;
2535 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2536 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2538 unsigned short length;
2539 unsigned short type;
2540 unsigned short size;
2541 unsigned char *data = *p;
2542 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2543 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2545 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2546 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2548 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2550 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2551 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2552 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2554 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2555 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2556 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2559 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2563 if (data + length != d + n) {
2564 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2568 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2572 if (data + size > (d + n))
2575 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2576 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2578 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2579 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2580 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2583 tlsext_servername = 1;
2585 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2586 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2587 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2588 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2590 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2591 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2595 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2596 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2597 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2598 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2599 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2600 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2603 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2604 ecpointformatlist_length;
2605 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2606 ecpointformatlist_length);
2610 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2611 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2612 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2613 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2614 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2617 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2619 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2620 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2621 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2622 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2624 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2627 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2629 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2632 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2634 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2635 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2636 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2639 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2642 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2643 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2644 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2648 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2649 /* shouldn't really happen */
2650 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2652 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2653 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2654 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2656 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2657 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2660 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2661 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2666 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2668 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2671 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2672 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2675 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2676 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2678 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2679 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2680 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2681 unsigned char *selected;
2682 unsigned char selected_len;
2684 /* We must have requested it. */
2685 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2686 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2689 /* The data must be valid */
2690 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2691 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2695 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2697 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2698 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2699 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2702 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2703 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2704 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2707 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2708 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2709 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2713 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2716 /* We must have requested it. */
2717 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2718 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2722 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2726 * The extension data consists of:
2727 * uint16 list_length
2728 * uint8 proto_length;
2729 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2734 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2735 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2739 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2740 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2743 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2744 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2745 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2746 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2747 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2750 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2751 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2754 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2755 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2757 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2759 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2760 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2762 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2763 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2765 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2766 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2767 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2770 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2775 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2776 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2777 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2782 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2783 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2785 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2791 if (data != d + n) {
2792 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2796 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2797 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2798 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2799 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2800 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2801 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2805 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2816 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2817 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2818 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2819 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2820 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2821 * initial connect only.
2823 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2824 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2825 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2827 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2834 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2837 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2841 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2842 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2844 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2849 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2850 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2851 /* shouldn't really happen */
2852 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2855 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2856 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2857 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2859 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2860 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2861 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2863 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2865 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2868 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len =
2869 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2874 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate
2875 * server opaque PRF input
2877 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
2878 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2885 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2890 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2892 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2893 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2895 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2897 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2898 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2901 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2902 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2906 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2908 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2909 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2910 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2911 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2913 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2915 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2917 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2920 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we
2921 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this
2922 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early().
2927 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2928 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2930 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2932 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2933 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2938 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2939 /* shouldn't really happen */
2940 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2942 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2944 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2945 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2946 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
2947 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) {
2949 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF
2950 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input!
2953 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2954 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2955 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2957 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2958 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2959 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2961 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2962 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2963 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2966 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
2967 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2971 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2973 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we
2974 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the
2977 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2978 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2985 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2986 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2989 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2990 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2993 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2994 s->servername_done = 0;
3000 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3004 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3005 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
3006 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3007 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3008 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3010 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3011 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
3012 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3013 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3016 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3017 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
3018 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3020 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3023 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3024 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
3025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3026 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3027 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3031 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3034 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3038 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3040 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3044 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
3045 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
3046 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
3047 * influence which certificate is sent
3049 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3051 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3052 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3053 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3054 if (certpkey == NULL) {
3055 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3059 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
3060 * et al can pick it up.
3062 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3063 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3065 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3066 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3067 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3069 /* status request response should be sent */
3070 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3071 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3072 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3074 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3076 /* something bad happened */
3077 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3078 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3079 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3083 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3087 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3088 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3091 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3092 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3100 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3102 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3103 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3105 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3107 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3108 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3109 * must contain uncompressed.
3111 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3112 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3113 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3114 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3115 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3116 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3117 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
3118 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3119 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3121 unsigned char *list;
3122 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3123 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3124 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3125 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3126 found_uncompressed = 1;
3130 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3132 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3136 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3137 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3139 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3141 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3142 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3143 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3144 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3146 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3148 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3150 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3151 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
3153 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on
3154 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a
3155 * value from the server too.
3158 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
3159 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3160 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3164 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to
3165 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size.
3167 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3168 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len !=
3169 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
3170 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3171 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3177 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
3180 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3181 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3184 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
3187 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
3188 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3189 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3191 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3192 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3194 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3195 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3198 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3199 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3204 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3205 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3208 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3209 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3212 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3213 s->servername_done = 0;
3219 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
3223 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3225 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
3226 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3230 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3238 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3239 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3240 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3242 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3243 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3244 * extension, if any.
3245 * len: the length of the session ID.
3246 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3247 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3248 * point to the resulting session.
3250 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3251 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3252 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3255 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3256 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3257 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3258 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3259 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3260 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3261 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3264 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3265 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3266 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3267 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3268 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3269 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3271 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3272 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3274 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3275 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3279 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3282 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3285 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3287 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3291 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3292 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3298 /* Skip past cipher list */
3303 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3308 /* Now at start of extensions */
3309 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3312 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
3313 unsigned short type, size;
3316 if (p + size > limit)
3318 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3322 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3325 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3328 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3330 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3331 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3332 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3333 * calculate the master secret later.
3337 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3339 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3340 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3342 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3344 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3345 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3347 default: /* fatal error */
3357 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3359 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3360 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3361 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3362 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3363 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3364 * point to the resulting session.
3367 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3368 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3369 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3370 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3372 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3373 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3374 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3377 unsigned char *sdec;
3378 const unsigned char *p;
3379 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3380 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3383 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3384 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3387 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3388 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3389 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3390 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3391 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3392 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3401 /* Check key name matches */
3402 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3404 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3405 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3406 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3407 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3410 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3413 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3415 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3419 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3420 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3421 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3422 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3423 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3424 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3427 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3428 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3429 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3430 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3431 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3433 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3436 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3437 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3438 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3443 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3446 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3450 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3451 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3452 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3456 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3457 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3466 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3471 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3478 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3479 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3480 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3481 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3482 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3483 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3484 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3487 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3488 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3489 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3490 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3493 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3496 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3497 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3503 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3506 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3507 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3508 return table[i].nid;
3513 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3519 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3520 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3523 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3526 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3527 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3531 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3533 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3534 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3537 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3540 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3541 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3542 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
3548 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3549 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3552 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3553 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3554 return EVP_sha224();
3556 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3557 return EVP_sha256();
3559 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3560 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3561 return EVP_sha384();
3563 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3564 return EVP_sha512();
3572 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3575 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3576 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3577 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3579 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3580 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3581 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3583 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3584 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3585 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3591 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3592 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3593 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3595 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3596 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3598 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3599 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3600 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3602 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3604 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3605 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3606 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3608 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3610 if (psignhash_nid) {
3611 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3612 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3614 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3618 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3619 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3620 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3621 const unsigned char *allow,
3624 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3625 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3626 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3627 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3628 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3630 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3632 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3633 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3636 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3637 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3638 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3640 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3650 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3651 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3653 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3654 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3656 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3658 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3659 if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3660 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3661 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3662 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3664 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3665 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3666 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3667 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3668 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3669 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3670 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3672 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3673 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3676 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3677 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3681 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3682 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3684 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3686 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3689 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3693 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3694 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3698 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3700 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3703 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3704 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3706 /* Should never happen */
3710 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3711 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3712 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3713 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3715 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3716 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3720 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3726 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3727 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3730 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3731 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3733 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3734 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3736 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3738 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3740 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3742 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3743 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3744 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3745 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3746 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3747 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3748 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3749 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3755 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3756 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3757 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3758 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3759 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3760 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3761 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3762 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3763 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3764 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3765 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3771 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3772 * the certificate for signing.
3774 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3776 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3777 * supported it stays as NULL.
3779 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3780 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3781 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3783 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3784 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3786 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3789 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3790 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3791 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3797 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3798 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3799 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3801 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3806 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3813 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3815 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3818 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3819 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3820 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3822 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3823 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3827 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3829 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3831 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3833 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3835 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3836 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3839 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3840 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3842 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3843 unsigned short hbtype;
3844 unsigned int payload;
3845 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3847 if (s->msg_callback)
3848 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3849 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3850 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3852 /* Read type and payload length first */
3853 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3854 return 0; /* silently discard */
3857 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3858 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3861 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3862 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3866 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3867 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3869 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3872 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3873 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3875 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3877 /* Random padding */
3878 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
3879 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3883 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3884 3 + payload + padding);
3886 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3887 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3888 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3889 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3891 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3895 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3899 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3900 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3904 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3906 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3913 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3915 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3917 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3918 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3920 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3921 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3922 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3923 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3927 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3928 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3929 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3933 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3934 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3940 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3941 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3943 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3946 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3947 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3948 * some random stuff.
3949 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3950 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3951 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3952 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3955 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3958 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3959 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3961 /* Sequence number */
3962 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3963 /* 16 random bytes */
3964 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) {
3965 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3969 /* Random padding */
3970 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) {
3971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3975 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3977 if (s->msg_callback)
3978 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3979 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3980 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3982 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3992 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3996 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3999 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4001 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4004 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4007 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4009 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4011 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4013 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4021 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4022 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4023 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4024 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4025 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4026 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4030 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4031 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4032 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4033 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4036 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
4037 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4040 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4041 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4046 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
4047 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
4049 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4053 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4057 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4060 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
4063 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4068 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4069 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4071 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
4072 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4073 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4074 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4075 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4077 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4084 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4085 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4086 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4087 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4089 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4090 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4091 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4092 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4098 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4102 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4106 if (default_nid == -1)
4108 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4110 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4111 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4112 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4117 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4118 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4122 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4123 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
4124 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4131 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4132 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4133 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4134 * attempting to use them.
4137 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4139 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4140 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4141 /* Strict mode flags */
4142 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4143 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4144 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4146 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4151 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4152 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4154 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4155 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4157 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4160 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4162 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4164 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4166 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4167 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4170 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4171 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4172 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
4173 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
4174 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4175 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4182 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4185 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4186 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4187 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4189 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4196 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4197 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4198 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4199 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4200 else if (!check_flags)
4205 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4206 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4208 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4210 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4211 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4213 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4216 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4217 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4218 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4219 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4220 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4223 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4224 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4225 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4226 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4230 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4231 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4240 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4241 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4243 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4245 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4246 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4247 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4250 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4257 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4258 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4262 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4263 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4264 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4265 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4267 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4274 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4275 else if (check_flags)
4276 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4278 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4279 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4280 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4281 else if (!check_flags)
4284 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4285 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4286 else if (strict_mode) {
4287 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4288 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4289 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4290 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4292 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4299 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4300 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4304 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4307 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4310 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4315 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4316 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4317 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4318 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4319 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4323 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4327 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4329 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4330 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4332 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4333 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4334 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4338 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4341 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4343 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4345 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4346 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4348 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4349 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4350 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4352 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4353 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4354 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4355 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4356 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4361 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4364 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4366 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4367 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4371 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4372 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4373 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4374 else if (cpk->digest)
4375 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4377 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4380 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4384 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4385 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4387 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4388 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4395 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4396 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4398 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4399 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4400 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4401 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4402 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4403 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4406 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4407 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4409 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);