2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
249 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
250 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
254 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
256 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
261 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
263 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
264 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
265 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
266 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
268 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
269 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
272 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
273 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
277 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
278 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
279 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
280 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
281 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
282 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
283 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
286 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
287 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
288 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
295 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
296 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
299 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
301 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
302 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
303 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
305 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
308 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
310 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
313 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
315 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
319 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
321 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
325 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
327 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
329 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
331 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
333 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
335 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
337 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
339 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
341 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
343 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
345 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
347 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
349 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
351 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
353 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
355 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
357 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
359 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
361 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
363 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
365 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
367 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
373 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
376 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
377 const unsigned char **pcurves,
382 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
383 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
386 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
387 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
389 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
390 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
391 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
394 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
395 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
399 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
400 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
404 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
405 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
409 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
410 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
413 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
414 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
416 const unsigned char *curves;
418 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
419 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
421 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
424 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
427 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
429 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
432 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
434 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
437 else /* Should never happen */
440 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
441 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
443 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
449 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
450 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
454 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
456 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
457 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
459 /* Can't do anything on client side */
466 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
467 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
470 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
472 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
473 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
474 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
475 /* Should never happen */
478 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
481 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
483 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
488 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
490 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
491 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
493 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
497 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
498 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
509 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
510 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
512 unsigned char *clist, *p;
514 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
515 * while curve ids < 32
517 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
518 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
521 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
523 unsigned long idmask;
525 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
527 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
538 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
542 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
547 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
550 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
552 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
556 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
558 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
560 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
562 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
563 if (nid == NID_undef)
564 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
565 if (nid == NID_undef)
566 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
567 if (nid == NID_undef)
569 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
570 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
572 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
575 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
576 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
581 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
585 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
587 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
588 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
593 const EC_METHOD *meth;
596 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
597 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
600 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
603 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
607 /* Determine curve ID */
608 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
610 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
614 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
626 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
628 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
631 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
633 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
636 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
640 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
641 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
642 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
644 const unsigned char *p;
647 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
648 * is supported (see RFC4492).
650 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
652 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
653 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
654 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
664 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
665 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
667 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
668 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
670 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
675 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
682 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
685 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
687 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
689 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
694 *pformats = ecformats_default;
695 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
697 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
699 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
703 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
704 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
706 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
708 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
711 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
714 /* If not EC nothing to do */
715 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
720 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
724 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
725 * supported curves extension.
727 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
730 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
731 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
733 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
740 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
741 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
742 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
743 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
744 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
746 return 0; /* Should never happen */
747 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
748 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
750 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
754 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
755 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
757 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
762 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
763 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
765 unsigned char curve_id[2];
766 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
767 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
768 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
769 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
772 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
773 * no other curves permitted.
777 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
778 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
779 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
780 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
781 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
785 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
786 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
788 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
789 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
791 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
794 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
797 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
799 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
805 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
807 /* Need a shared curve */
808 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
814 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
819 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
821 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
825 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
831 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
836 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
840 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
841 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
850 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
851 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
853 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
856 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
857 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
859 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
862 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
863 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
864 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
865 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
867 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
869 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
870 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
873 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
877 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
881 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
882 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
883 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
886 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
888 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
892 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
894 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
895 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
896 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
907 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
908 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
910 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
911 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
913 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
915 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
916 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
920 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
921 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
924 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
925 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
927 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
928 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
930 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
931 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
932 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
933 /* Should never happen */
936 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
937 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
943 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
945 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
946 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
947 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
949 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
954 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
959 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
961 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
964 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
968 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
970 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
973 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
981 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
985 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
986 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
987 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
989 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
992 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
993 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
998 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1004 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1007 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1008 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1011 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1012 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1013 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1014 * session and not global settings.
1017 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1020 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1021 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1022 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1025 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1026 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1027 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1030 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1031 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1034 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1040 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1045 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1050 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1056 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1057 * signature algorithms.
1061 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1066 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1067 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1071 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1075 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1077 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1078 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1082 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1083 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1085 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1086 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1088 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1090 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1092 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1093 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1099 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1102 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1103 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1105 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1107 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1110 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1111 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1113 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1115 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1117 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1118 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1119 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1120 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1129 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1130 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1131 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1136 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1138 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1140 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1141 unsigned long size_str;
1144 /* check for enough space.
1145 4 for the servername type and entension length
1146 2 for servernamelist length
1147 1 for the hostname type
1148 2 for hostname length
1152 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1153 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1156 /* extension type and length */
1157 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1158 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1160 /* length of servername list */
1161 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1163 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1164 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1166 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1170 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1175 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1181 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1183 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1186 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1196 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1197 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1198 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1200 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1201 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1207 /* check for enough space.
1208 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1209 1 for the srp user identity
1210 + srp user identity length
1212 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1214 /* fill in the extension */
1215 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1216 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1217 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1218 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1226 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1228 const unsigned char *plist;
1231 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1233 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1234 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1241 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1242 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1243 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1244 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1247 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1248 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1249 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1251 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1252 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1253 if (plistlen > 65532)
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1259 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1260 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1262 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1263 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1264 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1265 * resolves this to two bytes.
1268 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1271 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1273 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1276 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1277 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1278 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1279 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1281 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1282 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1283 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1285 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1286 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1288 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1292 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1293 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1295 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1298 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1299 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1303 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1309 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1312 const unsigned char *salg;
1313 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1314 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1316 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1317 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1319 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1323 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1324 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1326 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1328 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1330 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1333 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1336 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1341 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1344 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1348 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1350 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1351 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1357 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1359 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1366 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1367 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1368 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1370 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1371 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1373 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1375 /* save position of id len */
1376 unsigned char *q = ret;
1377 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1378 /* skip over id len */
1380 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1386 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1390 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1391 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1393 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1396 * 1: peer may send requests
1397 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1399 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1400 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1402 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1406 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1408 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1409 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1410 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1412 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1417 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1419 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1421 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1422 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1423 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1424 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1425 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1426 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1429 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1433 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1435 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1437 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1440 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1447 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1448 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1449 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1452 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1453 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1455 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1456 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1458 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1460 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1461 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1462 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1463 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1465 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1467 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1469 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1475 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1477 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1482 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1485 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1489 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1492 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1493 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1495 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1498 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1499 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1500 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1501 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1503 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1504 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1508 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1510 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1512 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1514 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1518 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1522 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1528 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1530 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1533 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1545 const unsigned char *plist;
1547 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1550 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1552 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1553 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1560 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1561 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1562 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1563 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1567 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1568 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1570 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1571 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1573 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1574 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1578 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1580 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1581 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1585 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1586 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1588 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1590 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1592 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1595 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1598 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1607 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1609 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1611 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1614 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1622 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1623 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1624 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1625 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1626 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1627 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1628 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1629 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1630 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1631 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1632 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1638 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1639 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1641 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1643 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1646 * 1: peer may send requests
1647 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1649 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1650 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1652 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1658 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1659 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1660 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1662 const unsigned char *npa;
1663 unsigned int npalen;
1666 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1667 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1669 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1670 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1672 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1674 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1678 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1681 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1683 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1684 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1686 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1688 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1692 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1696 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1699 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1703 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1704 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1705 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1706 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1711 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1712 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1713 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1714 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1716 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1717 unsigned short type, size;
1718 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1719 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1720 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1721 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1722 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1723 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1724 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1726 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1727 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1728 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1729 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1732 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1733 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1734 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1735 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1736 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1737 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1738 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1739 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1740 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1741 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1744 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1753 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1756 if (data+size > d+n)
1760 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1762 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1763 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1765 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1767 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1769 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1774 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1776 if (data + len != d+n)
1778 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1782 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1784 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1786 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1788 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1789 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1790 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1793 * returns: 0 on success. */
1794 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1795 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1799 const unsigned char *selected;
1800 unsigned char selected_len;
1803 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1809 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1810 * length-prefixed strings. */
1811 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1812 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1821 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1823 proto_len = data[i];
1829 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1835 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1836 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1837 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1838 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1839 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1840 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1841 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1843 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1846 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1847 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1852 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1856 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1858 unsigned short type;
1859 unsigned short size;
1861 unsigned char *data = *p;
1862 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1865 s->servername_done = 0;
1866 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1868 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1871 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1873 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1874 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1878 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1879 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1883 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1884 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1885 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1887 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1888 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1890 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1891 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1893 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1894 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1896 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1897 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1899 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1900 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1902 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1903 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1906 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1910 if (data > (d+n-len))
1913 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1918 if (data+size > (d+n))
1921 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1923 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1924 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1925 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1926 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1928 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1929 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1930 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1931 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1932 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1933 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1934 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1935 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1936 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1937 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1938 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1939 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1940 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1941 the value of the Host: field.
1942 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1943 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1944 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1945 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1949 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1951 unsigned char *sdata;
1957 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1964 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1971 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1977 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1980 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1981 switch (servname_type)
1983 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1986 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1988 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1991 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1993 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1996 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1998 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2001 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2002 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2003 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2004 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2005 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2006 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2009 s->servername_done = 1;
2013 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2014 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2015 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2027 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2032 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2033 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2035 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2037 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2040 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2042 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2045 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2047 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2048 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2050 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2052 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2058 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2059 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2061 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2062 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2064 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2065 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2067 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2072 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2074 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2075 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2077 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2078 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2080 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2083 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2084 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2087 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2088 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2089 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2090 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2091 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2094 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2096 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2097 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2098 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2100 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2101 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2103 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2108 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2110 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2113 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2114 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2116 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2119 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2120 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2123 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2124 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2125 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2126 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2127 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2130 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2131 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2132 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2134 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2138 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2141 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2142 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2144 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2148 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2149 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2150 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2151 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2153 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2154 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2156 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2161 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2163 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2164 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2166 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2170 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2172 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2174 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2176 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2179 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2181 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2186 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2188 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2191 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2193 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2196 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2199 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2202 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2203 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2207 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2212 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2216 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2218 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2220 const unsigned char *sdata;
2222 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2227 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2236 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2240 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2244 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2249 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2253 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2258 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2259 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2262 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2263 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2264 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2266 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2267 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2270 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2271 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2273 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2274 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2279 /* Read in request_extensions */
2282 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2289 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2295 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2297 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2298 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2301 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2302 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2304 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2305 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2307 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2312 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2316 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2319 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2323 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2324 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2326 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2327 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2328 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2330 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2336 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2337 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2338 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2340 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2343 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2344 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2345 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2346 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2347 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2348 * anything like that, but this might change).
2350 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2351 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2352 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2353 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2354 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2355 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2359 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2360 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2361 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2363 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2366 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2367 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2371 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2372 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2374 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2378 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2379 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2380 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2381 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2382 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2386 if (!custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al))
2397 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2399 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2400 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2402 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2404 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2407 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2408 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2409 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2414 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2417 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2418 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2420 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2424 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2433 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2434 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2435 * the length of the block. */
2436 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2438 unsigned int off = 0;
2452 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2454 unsigned short length;
2455 unsigned short type;
2456 unsigned short size;
2457 unsigned char *data = *p;
2458 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2459 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2462 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2465 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2467 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2468 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2472 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2473 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2476 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2480 if (data+length != d+n)
2482 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2486 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2491 if (data+size > (d+n))
2494 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2495 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2496 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2498 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2500 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2502 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2505 tlsext_servername = 1;
2508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2509 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2511 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2512 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2514 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2516 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2521 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2522 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2523 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2525 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2528 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2529 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2532 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2533 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2534 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2535 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2536 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2539 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2541 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2543 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2544 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2546 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2549 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2552 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2555 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2557 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2558 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2560 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2564 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2567 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2568 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2570 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2574 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2575 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2576 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2577 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2579 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2581 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2583 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2588 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2590 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2591 * a status request message.
2593 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2595 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2598 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2599 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2602 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2603 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2605 unsigned char *selected;
2606 unsigned char selected_len;
2608 /* We must have requested it. */
2609 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2611 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2614 /* The data must be valid */
2615 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2617 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2620 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2622 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2625 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2626 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2628 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2631 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2632 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2633 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2637 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2641 /* We must have requested it. */
2642 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2644 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2649 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2652 /* The extension data consists of:
2653 * uint16 list_length
2654 * uint8 proto_length;
2655 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2659 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2661 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2665 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2667 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2670 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2671 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2672 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2673 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2675 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2678 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2679 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2682 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2684 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2686 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2689 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2693 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2694 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2696 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2697 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2698 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2700 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2705 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2707 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2711 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2712 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2714 else if (!custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al))
2722 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2726 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2728 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2730 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2732 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2733 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2735 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2741 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2751 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2752 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2753 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2754 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2755 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2756 * absence on initial connect only.
2758 if (!renegotiate_seen
2759 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2760 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2762 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2764 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2772 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2775 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2779 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2781 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2786 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2788 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2789 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2791 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2792 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2794 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2795 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2800 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2804 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2805 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2812 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2817 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2819 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2820 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2822 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2823 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2824 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2826 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2827 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2831 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2832 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2833 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2834 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2836 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2838 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2839 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2840 * so this has to happen here in
2841 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2845 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2847 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2850 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2851 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2856 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2857 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2858 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2860 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2862 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2863 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2865 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2866 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2868 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2869 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2871 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2872 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2874 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2875 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2878 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2882 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2884 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2885 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2886 * abort the handshake.
2888 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2889 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2897 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2898 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2901 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2902 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2905 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2906 s->servername_done=0;
2912 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2914 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2917 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2918 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2919 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2920 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2922 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2925 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2926 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2927 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2928 if (certpkey == NULL)
2930 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2933 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2934 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2936 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2937 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2940 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2941 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2942 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2944 /* status request response should be sent */
2945 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2946 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2947 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2949 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2951 /* something bad happened */
2952 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2953 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2954 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2959 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2964 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2965 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2968 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2969 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2977 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2979 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2980 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2983 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2984 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2985 * it must contain uncompressed.
2987 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2988 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2989 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2990 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2991 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2993 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2995 unsigned char *list;
2996 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2997 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2998 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3000 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3002 found_uncompressed = 1;
3006 if (!found_uncompressed)
3008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3012 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3013 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3015 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3016 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3017 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3018 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3020 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3021 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3023 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3024 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3026 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3028 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3029 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3032 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3033 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3034 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3035 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3037 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3038 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3043 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3046 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3047 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3050 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3051 * there is no response.
3053 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3055 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3056 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3058 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3059 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3062 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3063 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3067 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3068 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3074 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3075 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3078 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3079 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3082 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3083 s->servername_done=0;
3089 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3092 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3094 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3096 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3100 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3102 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3108 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3109 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3110 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3112 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3113 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3114 * extension, if any.
3115 * len: the length of the session ID.
3116 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3117 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3118 * point to the resulting session.
3120 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3121 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3122 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3125 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3126 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3127 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3128 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3129 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3130 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3131 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3134 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3135 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3136 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3137 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3138 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3139 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3141 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3142 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3144 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3145 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3149 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3151 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3152 * to permit stateful resumption.
3154 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3156 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3160 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3168 /* Skip past cipher list */
3173 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3178 /* Now at start of extensions */
3179 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3182 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3184 unsigned short type, size;
3187 if (p + size > limit)
3189 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3194 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3195 * currently have one. */
3196 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3199 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3201 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3202 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3203 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3204 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3205 * calculate the master secret later. */
3208 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3211 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3212 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3214 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3216 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3217 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3219 default: /* fatal error */
3228 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3230 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3231 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3232 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3233 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3234 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3235 * point to the resulting session.
3238 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3239 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3240 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3241 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3243 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3244 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3245 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3248 unsigned char *sdec;
3249 const unsigned char *p;
3250 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3251 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3254 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3255 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3258 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3259 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3260 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3261 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3263 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3264 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3275 /* Check key name matches */
3276 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3278 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3279 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3280 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3281 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3283 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3284 * integrity checks on ticket.
3286 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3289 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3293 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3294 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3295 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3296 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3297 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3299 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3300 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3301 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3302 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3303 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3306 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3309 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3310 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3312 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3317 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3320 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3324 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3325 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3326 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3327 * as required by standard.
3330 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3331 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3339 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3344 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3352 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3353 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3354 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3355 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3356 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3357 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3358 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3361 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3362 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3363 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3364 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3367 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3370 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3372 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3378 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3381 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3383 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3384 return table[i].nid;
3389 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3394 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3395 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3398 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3401 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3402 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3406 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3408 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3409 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3412 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3417 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3425 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3429 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3430 return EVP_sha224();
3432 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3433 return EVP_sha256();
3435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3436 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3437 return EVP_sha384();
3439 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3440 return EVP_sha512();
3448 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3453 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3454 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3457 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3458 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3461 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3462 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3468 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3469 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3470 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3472 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3473 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3475 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3477 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3478 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3480 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3482 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3484 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3485 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3487 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3491 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3492 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3493 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3495 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3498 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3499 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3500 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3501 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3503 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3504 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3505 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3507 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3508 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3510 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3512 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3514 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3519 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3520 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3521 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3523 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3534 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3535 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3537 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3538 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3540 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3542 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3543 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3545 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3546 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3548 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3549 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3551 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3552 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3554 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3556 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3557 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3560 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3561 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3565 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3566 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3572 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3573 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3575 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3578 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3581 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3582 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3583 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3588 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3590 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3596 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3597 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3598 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3600 /* Should never happen */
3604 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3605 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3606 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3607 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3609 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3610 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3612 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3614 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3615 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3617 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3618 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3620 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3622 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3624 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3627 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3628 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3629 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3630 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3631 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3633 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3634 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3640 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3641 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3643 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3644 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3646 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3647 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3648 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3649 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3651 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3652 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3657 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3658 * use the certificate for signing.
3660 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3662 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3663 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3666 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3667 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3670 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3672 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3673 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3677 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3678 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3685 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3686 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3687 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3689 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3695 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3702 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3704 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3707 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3708 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3709 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3711 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3712 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3716 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3718 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3720 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3722 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3724 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3725 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3731 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3733 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3734 unsigned short hbtype;
3735 unsigned int payload;
3736 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3738 if (s->msg_callback)
3739 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3740 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3741 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3743 /* Read type and payload length first */
3744 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3745 return 0; /* silently discard */
3748 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3749 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3752 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3754 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3757 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3758 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3759 * payload, plus padding
3761 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3764 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3765 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3767 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3769 /* Random padding */
3770 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3772 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3774 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3775 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3776 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3777 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3779 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3784 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3788 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3789 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3790 * sequence number */
3793 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3796 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3804 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3806 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3808 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3809 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3811 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3812 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3813 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3819 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3820 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3826 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3827 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3829 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3833 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3834 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3836 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3838 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3839 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3840 * some random stuff.
3841 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3842 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3843 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3844 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3847 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3850 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3851 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3853 /* Sequence number */
3854 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3855 /* 16 random bytes */
3856 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3858 /* Random padding */
3859 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3861 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3864 if (s->msg_callback)
3865 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3866 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3867 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3869 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3878 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3883 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3886 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3888 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3891 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3892 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3894 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3896 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3898 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3906 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3907 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3908 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3909 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3910 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3911 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3914 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3915 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3916 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3917 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3920 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3922 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3923 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3926 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3927 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3931 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3932 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3933 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3937 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3941 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3944 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3946 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3951 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3952 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3954 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3956 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3957 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3958 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3959 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3961 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3969 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3970 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3971 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3972 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3976 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3977 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3978 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3979 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3985 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3989 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3993 if (default_nid == -1)
3995 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3997 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3998 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3999 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4003 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4004 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4008 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4009 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4011 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4017 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4018 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4019 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4020 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4023 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4025 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4026 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4027 /* Strict mode flags */
4028 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4029 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4030 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4032 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4037 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4038 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4040 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4041 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4044 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4048 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4051 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4053 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4055 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4056 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4059 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4060 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4061 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4063 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4064 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4073 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4076 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4077 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4078 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4080 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4088 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4089 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4090 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4093 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4099 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4100 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4103 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4106 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4107 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4109 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4114 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4115 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4116 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4117 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4118 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4121 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4122 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4123 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4124 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4128 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4129 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4137 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4138 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4141 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4144 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4145 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4147 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4150 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4158 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4159 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4161 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4164 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4165 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4166 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4168 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4173 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4181 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4182 else if(check_flags)
4183 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4185 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4186 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4187 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4188 else if (!check_flags)
4191 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4192 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4193 else if (strict_mode)
4195 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4196 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4198 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4199 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4203 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4211 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4213 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4218 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4221 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4224 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4229 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4230 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4231 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4232 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4233 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4238 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4243 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4247 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4248 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4250 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4252 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4254 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4258 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4262 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4265 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4267 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4268 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4270 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4272 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4273 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4275 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4277 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4279 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4280 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4282 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4287 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4291 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4293 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4294 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4298 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4300 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4301 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4302 else if (cpk->digest)
4303 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4306 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4308 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4309 * if the chain is invalid.
4313 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4314 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4317 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4318 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4325 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4326 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4328 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4329 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4330 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4331 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4332 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4333 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4335 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4336 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4338 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);