2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include "ssl_locl.h"
119 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
122 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
123 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
124 SSL_SESSION **psess);
127 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
130 tls1_setup_key_block,
131 tls1_generate_master_secret,
132 tls1_change_cipher_state,
133 tls1_final_finish_mac,
134 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
135 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
136 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
137 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
143 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
144 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
150 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
151 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
155 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
158 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
160 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
162 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
166 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
169 s->version = s->method->version;
172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
173 static int nid_list[] =
175 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
176 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
177 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
178 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
179 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
180 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
181 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
182 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
183 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
184 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
185 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
186 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
187 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
188 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
189 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
190 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
191 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
192 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
193 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
194 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
195 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
196 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
197 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
198 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
199 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
202 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
204 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
205 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
206 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
208 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
211 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
213 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
216 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
218 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
220 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
222 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
224 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
226 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
228 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
232 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
234 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
236 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
238 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
240 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
244 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
246 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
248 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
250 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
252 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
254 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
256 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
258 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
260 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
262 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
264 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
270 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
273 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
276 unsigned char *ret = p;
278 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
279 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
280 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
285 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
287 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
289 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
290 unsigned long size_str;
293 /* check for enough space.
294 4 for the servername type and entension length
295 2 for servernamelist length
296 1 for the hostname type
297 2 for hostname length
301 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
302 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
305 /* extension type and length */
306 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
309 /* length of servername list */
312 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
313 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
315 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
319 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
324 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
330 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
332 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
335 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
345 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
346 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
348 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
351 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
352 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
353 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
360 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
361 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
362 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
363 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
365 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
366 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
368 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
371 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
372 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
373 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
379 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
380 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
382 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
383 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
384 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
385 * resolves this to two bytes.
387 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
388 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
389 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
391 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
393 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
396 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
397 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
398 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
399 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
401 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
402 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
403 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
405 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
406 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
408 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
412 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
413 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
415 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
418 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
419 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
423 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
429 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
430 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
431 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
433 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
435 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
437 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
440 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
443 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
448 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
449 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
452 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
456 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
458 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
459 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
465 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
467 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
474 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
475 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
476 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
478 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
479 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
481 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
483 /* save position of id len */
484 unsigned char *q = ret;
485 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
486 /* skip over id len */
488 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
494 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
498 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
500 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
501 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
502 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
504 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
509 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
516 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
519 unsigned char *ret = p;
520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
521 char next_proto_neg_seen;
524 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
525 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
529 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
531 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
533 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
535 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
539 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
543 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
549 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
554 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
564 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
565 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
567 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
570 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
571 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
572 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
578 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
579 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
580 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
581 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
582 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
585 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
586 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
588 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
589 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
591 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
592 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
596 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
598 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
603 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
604 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
605 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
607 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
609 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
611 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
614 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
617 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
621 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
622 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
623 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
624 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
625 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
626 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
627 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
628 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
629 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
630 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
631 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
637 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
638 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
639 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
641 const unsigned char *npa;
645 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
646 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
648 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
649 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
651 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
653 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
658 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
665 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
670 unsigned char *data = *p;
671 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
673 s->servername_done = 0;
674 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
680 if (data > (d+n-len))
683 while (data <= (d+n-4))
688 if (data+size > (d+n))
691 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
693 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
694 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
695 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
696 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
698 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
699 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
700 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
701 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
702 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
703 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
704 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
705 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
706 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
707 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
708 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
709 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
710 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
711 the value of the Host: field.
712 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
713 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
714 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
715 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
719 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
721 unsigned char *sdata;
727 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
734 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
741 servname_type = *(sdata++);
747 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
750 if (s->servername_done == 0)
751 switch (servname_type)
753 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
754 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
756 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name ||
757 ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL))
759 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
762 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
763 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
764 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
765 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
766 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
767 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
770 s->servername_done = 1;
774 s->servername_done = strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
775 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
787 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
793 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
794 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
795 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
797 unsigned char *sdata = data;
798 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
800 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
802 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
805 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
806 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
807 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
809 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
812 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
813 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
815 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
816 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
817 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
818 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
819 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
822 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
823 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
825 unsigned char *sdata = data;
826 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
827 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
829 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
831 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
834 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
835 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
836 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
838 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
841 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
842 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
844 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
845 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
846 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
847 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
848 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
851 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
852 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
853 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
854 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
856 unsigned char *sdata = data;
860 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
863 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
864 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
866 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
870 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
871 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
872 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
873 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
875 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
876 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
878 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
883 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
885 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
886 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
888 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
892 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
894 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
896 renegotiate_seen = 1;
898 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
899 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
904 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
908 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
910 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
912 const unsigned char *sdata;
914 /* Read in responder_id_list */
919 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
928 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
935 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
940 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
944 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
949 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
950 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
953 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
954 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
955 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
957 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
958 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
961 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
962 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
964 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
965 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
970 /* Read in request_extensions */
975 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
981 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
982 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
984 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
985 || (data + dsize != sdata))
987 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
992 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
996 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
999 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1000 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1002 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1005 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1006 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1007 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1008 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1009 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1010 * anything like that, but this might change).
1012 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1013 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1014 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1015 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1016 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1017 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1021 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1029 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1031 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1032 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1034 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1036 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
1044 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1045 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1046 * the length of the block. */
1047 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1049 unsigned int off = 0;
1063 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1065 unsigned short length;
1066 unsigned short type;
1067 unsigned short size;
1068 unsigned char *data = *p;
1069 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1070 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1072 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1076 if (data+length != d+n)
1078 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1082 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1087 if (data+size > (d+n))
1090 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1091 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1092 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1094 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1096 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1098 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1101 tlsext_servername = 1;
1104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1105 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1106 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1108 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1109 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1111 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1113 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1116 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1117 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1118 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1120 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1123 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1124 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1126 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1127 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1128 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1129 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1130 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1133 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1135 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1137 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1138 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1140 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1143 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1146 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1149 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1151 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1152 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1153 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1155 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1159 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1162 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1163 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1165 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1169 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1170 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1171 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1172 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1174 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1176 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1178 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1183 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1184 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1186 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1187 * a status request message.
1189 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1191 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1194 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1195 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
1198 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1200 unsigned char *selected;
1201 unsigned char selected_len;
1203 /* We must have requested it. */
1204 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
1206 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1209 /* The data must be valid */
1210 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1212 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1215 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1217 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1220 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1221 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1223 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1226 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1227 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1230 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1232 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1234 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1241 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1245 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1247 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1249 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1251 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1252 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1254 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1260 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1270 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1271 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1272 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1273 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1274 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1275 * absence on initial connect only.
1277 if (!renegotiate_seen
1278 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1279 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1281 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1283 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1291 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1293 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1294 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1295 * and elliptic curves we support.
1300 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1301 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1303 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1305 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1307 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1308 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1309 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1315 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version == TLS1_VERSION);
1318 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1319 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1324 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1325 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1326 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1327 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1329 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1330 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1331 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2;
1332 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1334 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1338 for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <=
1339 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
1342 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1344 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1348 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1350 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1355 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1357 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1358 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1360 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1361 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1363 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1364 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1369 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1373 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1374 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1381 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1384 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1385 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1386 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1389 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1390 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1391 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1392 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1396 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1397 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1402 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1403 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1404 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1405 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1407 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1412 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1414 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1415 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1418 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1419 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1421 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1422 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1426 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1427 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1428 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1429 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1431 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1432 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1433 * the certificate has changed.
1435 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1438 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1441 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1442 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1443 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1445 /* status request response should be sent */
1446 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1447 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1448 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1450 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1452 /* something bad happened */
1453 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1454 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1455 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1460 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1462 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1464 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1465 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1466 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
1470 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1472 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1475 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1476 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1481 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1482 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1483 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1485 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1487 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1488 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1490 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1491 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1493 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1494 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1496 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1497 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1499 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1500 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1503 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1507 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1509 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1510 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1511 * abort the handshake.
1513 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1514 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1522 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1523 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1526 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1527 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1530 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1531 s->servername_done=0;
1537 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1539 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1540 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1543 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, then server
1544 * must return a an EC point formats lists containing uncompressed.
1546 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1547 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1548 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1549 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1551 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1553 unsigned char *list;
1554 int found_uncompressed = 0;
1555 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL) || (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length == 0))
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1560 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1561 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1563 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
1565 found_uncompressed = 1;
1569 if (!found_uncompressed)
1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1575 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1576 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1578 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1579 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1580 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1581 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1583 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1584 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
1586 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
1587 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
1589 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1591 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1592 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1595 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
1596 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
1597 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
1598 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
1600 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1601 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1606 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
1609 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
1610 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1613 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
1614 * there is no response.
1616 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1618 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
1619 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
1621 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
1622 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1625 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
1626 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1630 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1631 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1637 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1638 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1641 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1642 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1645 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1646 s->servername_done=0;
1652 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
1653 * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
1654 * session ticket extension at the same time.
1657 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
1658 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
1660 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
1661 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
1664 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
1665 * to permit stateful resumption.
1667 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1670 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
1674 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
1675 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1682 /* Skip past cipher list */
1687 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
1692 /* Now at start of extensions */
1693 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
1696 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
1698 unsigned short type, size;
1701 if (p + size > limit)
1703 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1705 /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will
1706 * trigger a full handshake
1708 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1710 /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
1711 * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
1715 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1716 return 0; /* Cache miss */
1718 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1720 /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of
1721 * generating the session from ticket now,
1722 * trigger abbreviated handshake based on
1723 * external mechanism to calculate the master
1727 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
1735 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
1736 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
1737 SSL_SESSION **psess)
1740 unsigned char *sdec;
1741 const unsigned char *p;
1742 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
1743 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1746 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
1747 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
1750 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1751 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
1752 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
1753 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
1755 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1756 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1767 /* Check key name matches */
1768 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
1770 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
1771 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
1772 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
1773 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
1775 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
1776 * integrity checks on ticket.
1778 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
1781 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1785 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1786 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
1787 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
1788 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
1789 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
1791 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1792 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1793 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1794 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1795 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1798 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1801 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
1802 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
1805 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1808 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1812 /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
1813 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
1814 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
1815 * as required by standard.
1818 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1819 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1821 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
1824 /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
1828 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;