2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
117 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
118 # include <openssl/ec.h>
121 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
122 #include <openssl/rand.h>
123 #include "ssl_locl.h"
125 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
128 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
129 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
130 SSL_SESSION **psess);
131 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
132 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
135 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
138 tls1_setup_key_block,
139 tls1_generate_master_secret,
140 tls1_change_cipher_state,
141 tls1_final_finish_mac,
142 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
143 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
144 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
147 tls1_export_keying_material,
149 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
150 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
154 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
157 tls1_setup_key_block,
158 tls1_generate_master_secret,
159 tls1_change_cipher_state,
160 tls1_final_finish_mac,
161 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
162 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
163 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
166 tls1_export_keying_material,
167 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
168 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
169 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
173 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
176 tls1_setup_key_block,
177 tls1_generate_master_secret,
178 tls1_change_cipher_state,
179 tls1_final_finish_mac,
180 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
181 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
182 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
185 tls1_export_keying_material,
186 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
187 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
188 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
189 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
193 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
196 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
197 * http, the cache would over fill
199 return (60 * 60 * 2);
206 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
210 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
213 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
214 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
216 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
220 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
223 s->version = s->method->version;
226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
228 static int nid_list[] = {
229 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
230 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
231 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
232 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
235 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
236 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
237 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
238 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
239 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
240 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
241 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
243 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
244 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
245 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
246 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
247 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
248 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
249 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
250 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
251 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
252 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
253 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
254 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
255 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
256 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
259 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
265 /* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
266 static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
267 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
268 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
269 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
270 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
272 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
273 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
274 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
275 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
276 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
277 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
278 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
279 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
280 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
281 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
282 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
283 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
288 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
289 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
291 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
292 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
293 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
294 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
295 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
296 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
297 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
298 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
299 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
300 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
301 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
302 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
303 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
304 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
307 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
308 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
310 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
311 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
312 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
313 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
314 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
315 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
316 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
317 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
318 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
319 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
320 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
321 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
322 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
324 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
325 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
329 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
330 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
331 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
335 /* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */
336 static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] = {
337 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
338 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
339 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
341 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
342 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
343 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
344 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
346 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
347 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
348 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
349 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
351 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
352 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
353 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
354 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
355 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
356 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
358 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
359 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
360 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
361 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
362 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
364 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
365 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
366 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
367 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
368 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
369 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
371 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
372 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
373 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
377 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
379 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
380 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
381 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
383 return nid_list[curve_id - 1];
386 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
388 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
390 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
392 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
394 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
396 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
398 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
400 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
402 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
404 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
406 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
408 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
410 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
412 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
414 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
416 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
418 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
420 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
422 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
424 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
426 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
428 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
430 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
432 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
434 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
436 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
438 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
440 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
442 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
444 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
452 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
454 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
455 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
456 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
457 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
458 * lists in the first place.
459 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
460 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
461 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
463 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
464 const unsigned char **pcurves,
467 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
469 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
470 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
472 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
473 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
474 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
475 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
476 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
479 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
480 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
484 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
485 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
489 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
490 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
495 *pcurves = fips_curves_default;
496 pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
500 if (!s->server || (s->cert && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)) {
501 *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
502 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
504 *pcurves = eccurves_all;
505 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
510 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
511 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
516 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
521 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
522 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
524 const unsigned char *curves;
525 size_t num_curves, i;
526 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
527 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
529 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
531 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
534 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
535 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
537 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
538 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
540 } else /* Should never happen */
543 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
545 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
546 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
553 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
554 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
555 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
556 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
558 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
560 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
561 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
563 /* Can't do anything on client side */
567 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
569 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
570 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
572 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
573 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
574 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
575 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
576 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
577 /* Should never happen */
580 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
584 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
585 * but s->options is a long...
587 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
588 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
590 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
591 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
592 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
593 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
595 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
598 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
601 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
603 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
604 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
605 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
607 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
611 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
612 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
613 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
614 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
616 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
617 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
625 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
629 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
630 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
632 unsigned char *clist, *p;
635 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
638 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
639 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
643 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
646 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
647 unsigned long idmask;
649 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
651 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */
652 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25) {
657 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
658 curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]);
659 if (!curve || EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve))
660 == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
662 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
666 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
669 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
679 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
683 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
687 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
690 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
692 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
698 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
700 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
702 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
704 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
705 if (nid == NID_undef)
706 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
707 if (nid == NID_undef)
708 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
709 if (nid == NID_undef)
711 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
712 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
714 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
718 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
719 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
724 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
728 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
731 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
732 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
737 const EC_METHOD *meth;
740 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
741 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
744 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
747 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
751 /* Determine curve ID */
752 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
753 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
754 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
757 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
766 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
768 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
770 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
772 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
774 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
779 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
780 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
781 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
783 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
784 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
787 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
788 * supported (see RFC4492).
790 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
791 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
792 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
793 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
794 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
797 if (i == num_formats)
802 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
803 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
804 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
806 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
808 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
809 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
810 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
811 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
812 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
816 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
817 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
822 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
829 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
833 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
835 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
836 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
837 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
839 *pformats = ecformats_default;
840 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
842 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
844 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
849 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
850 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
852 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
854 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
857 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
860 /* If not EC nothing to do */
861 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
865 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
870 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
873 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
877 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
878 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
880 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
886 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
887 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
888 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
889 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
890 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
892 return 0; /* Should never happen */
893 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
894 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
896 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
898 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
899 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
900 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
902 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
908 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
909 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
910 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
912 unsigned char curve_id[2];
913 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
914 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
915 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
916 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
920 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
923 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
924 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
925 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
926 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
927 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
928 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
932 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
933 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
935 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
936 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
938 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
940 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
943 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
945 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
951 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
952 /* Need a shared curve */
953 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
959 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
964 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
966 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
970 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
973 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
977 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
982 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
987 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
988 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
991 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
992 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
994 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
997 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
998 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
1000 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
1003 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1004 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
1007 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
1010 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
1011 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
1012 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
1013 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
1015 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
1016 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
1017 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
1018 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1020 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
1021 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1022 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
1024 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1025 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
1029 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1030 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1031 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1032 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1035 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
1038 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1041 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1042 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1043 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1044 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1045 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
1047 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1048 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1051 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1052 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
1056 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
1057 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
1058 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1059 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1060 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1061 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1062 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1064 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1065 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1070 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1071 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1073 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1074 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1076 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1077 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1078 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1079 /* Should never happen */
1082 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1083 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1087 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1088 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1089 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1090 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1091 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1093 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1097 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1098 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1101 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1102 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1104 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1107 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1108 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1110 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1116 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1120 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1121 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1122 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1123 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1126 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1127 if (i == sent_sigslen
1128 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1129 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1133 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1139 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1141 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1142 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1147 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1148 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1149 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1152 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1155 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1156 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1157 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1160 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1161 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1162 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1166 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1167 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2.
1169 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1170 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
1171 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
1172 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1173 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1177 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1178 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1182 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1183 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1190 * Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1191 * signature algorithms.
1194 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1195 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1198 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1199 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1202 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1203 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1205 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1206 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1207 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1208 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1211 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1212 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1213 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1214 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1215 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1217 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1218 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1219 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1220 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1221 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1227 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1228 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1231 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1232 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1233 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1234 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1236 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1238 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1239 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1241 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1242 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1244 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1245 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1246 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1247 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1255 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1256 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1262 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1264 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1265 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1266 unsigned long size_str;
1270 * check for enough space.
1271 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1272 * 2 for servernamelist length
1273 * 1 for the hostname type
1274 * 2 for hostname length
1278 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1280 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1283 /* extension type and length */
1284 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1285 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1287 /* length of servername list */
1288 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1290 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1291 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1293 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1297 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1298 if (s->renegotiate) {
1301 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1306 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1309 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1312 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1319 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1320 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1321 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1322 * Client Hello message */
1324 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1325 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1331 * check for enough space.
1332 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1333 * 1 for the srp user identity
1334 * + srp user identity length
1336 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1339 /* fill in the extension */
1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1341 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1342 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1343 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1348 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1351 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1354 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1355 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1357 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1359 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1361 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1363 if (num_formats > 255) {
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1368 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1369 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1370 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1371 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1372 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1376 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1378 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1379 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1382 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1384 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1386 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1390 curves_list_len = 2 * num_curves;
1391 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1392 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1393 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1394 memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len);
1395 ret += curves_list_len;
1397 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1399 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1401 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1402 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1403 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1404 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1405 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1406 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1407 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1409 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1410 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1411 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1414 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1415 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1418 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1421 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1423 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1426 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1432 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1434 const unsigned char *salg;
1435 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1436 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1438 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1439 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1441 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1444 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1445 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1446 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1448 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1450 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1453 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1456 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1461 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1463 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1467 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1468 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1469 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1475 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1476 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1482 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1484 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1485 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1487 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1488 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1490 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1491 /* save position of id len */
1492 unsigned char *q = ret;
1493 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1494 /* skip over id len */
1496 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1502 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1504 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1505 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1506 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1508 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1512 * 1: peer may send requests
1513 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1515 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1516 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1518 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1521 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1522 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1524 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1525 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1527 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1534 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1535 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1538 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1539 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1540 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1541 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1543 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1544 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1547 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1549 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1552 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1555 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1562 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1563 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1564 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1568 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1569 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1570 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1573 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1574 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1576 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1577 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1580 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1582 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1583 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1589 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1591 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1596 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1599 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1603 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1604 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1607 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1608 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1609 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1610 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1612 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1613 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1614 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1615 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1616 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1617 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1620 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation
1622 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1627 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1629 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1630 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1631 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1634 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1638 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1641 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1646 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1649 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1652 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1659 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1661 const unsigned char *plist;
1664 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1668 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1670 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1672 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1674 if (plistlen > 255) {
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1679 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1680 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1681 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1682 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1687 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1690 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1692 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1693 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1695 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1699 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1700 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1702 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1705 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1706 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1707 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1709 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1711 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1714 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1717 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1722 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1723 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1726 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1728 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1731 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1734 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1742 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1743 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1744 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1745 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1746 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1747 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1748 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1749 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1750 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1751 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1753 if (limit - ret < 36)
1755 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1759 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1760 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1761 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1762 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1764 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1768 * 1: peer may send requests
1769 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1771 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1772 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1774 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1779 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1780 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1781 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1782 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1783 const unsigned char *npa;
1784 unsigned int npalen;
1787 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1789 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1790 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1791 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1793 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1795 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1797 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1801 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1804 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1805 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1806 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1808 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1810 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1814 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1818 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1821 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1825 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1827 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1828 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1829 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1834 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1835 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1836 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1837 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1839 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1840 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1842 unsigned short type, size;
1843 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1844 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1845 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1846 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1847 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1848 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1849 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1851 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1852 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1853 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1854 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1857 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1858 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1859 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1860 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1861 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1862 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1863 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1864 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1865 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1866 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1869 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1873 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1878 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1881 if (data + size > d + n)
1885 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1886 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1887 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1889 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1891 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1893 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1896 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1898 if (data + len != d + n)
1900 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1904 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1906 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1909 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1910 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1911 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1912 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1915 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1916 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1920 const unsigned char *selected;
1921 unsigned char selected_len;
1924 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1931 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1932 * length-prefixed strings.
1934 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1943 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1944 proto_len = data[i];
1950 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1956 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1957 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1958 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1959 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1960 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1961 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1962 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1963 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1966 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1967 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1972 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1976 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1977 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1979 unsigned short type;
1980 unsigned short size;
1982 unsigned char *data = *p;
1983 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1985 s->servername_done = 0;
1986 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1987 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1988 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1991 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1992 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1993 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1995 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1996 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1997 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2000 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2001 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2002 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
2003 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2005 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2006 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2007 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2008 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2010 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2011 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2012 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2013 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2017 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2019 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2023 if (data > (d + n - len))
2026 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2030 if (data + size > (d + n))
2033 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
2035 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2036 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2038 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2040 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2041 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2042 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2043 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2044 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2045 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2046 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2047 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2048 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2049 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2050 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2051 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2052 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2053 * the value of the Host: field.
2054 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2055 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2056 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2058 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2062 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2063 unsigned char *sdata;
2068 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2074 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2080 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2085 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2088 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2089 switch (servname_type) {
2090 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2092 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2093 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2096 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2097 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2100 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2101 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2102 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2105 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2106 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2107 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2108 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2109 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2110 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2113 s->servername_done = 1;
2116 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2117 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2118 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2119 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2130 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2135 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2136 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2137 if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2138 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2141 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2142 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2145 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2147 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2148 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2150 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2151 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2157 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2158 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2159 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2160 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2162 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2163 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2164 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2168 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2169 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2170 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2172 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2173 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2174 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2175 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2178 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2179 ecpointformatlist_length;
2180 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2181 ecpointformatlist_length);
2185 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
2186 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2187 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2188 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2189 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2190 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2192 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2193 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2194 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2195 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2197 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2198 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2199 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2200 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2201 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2205 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2206 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2209 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2210 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2211 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2212 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2215 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2216 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2217 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2218 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2222 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
2223 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2224 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2225 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2226 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2227 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2230 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2231 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2232 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2233 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2236 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2239 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2240 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2241 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2245 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2246 /* shouldn't really happen */
2247 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2250 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2251 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2252 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2254 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2255 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2256 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2257 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2262 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2263 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2264 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2265 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2267 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2270 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2271 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2273 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2274 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2276 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2277 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2282 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2283 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2286 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2287 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2290 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2293 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2297 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2299 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2300 const unsigned char *sdata;
2302 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2306 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2313 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2317 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2320 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2325 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2327 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2330 if (data != sdata) {
2331 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2332 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2335 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2336 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2337 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2338 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2339 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2342 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2343 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2344 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2349 /* Read in request_extensions */
2351 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2356 if (dsize != size) {
2357 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2362 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2363 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2364 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2367 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2368 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2369 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2370 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2376 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2379 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2381 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2382 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2384 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2385 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2387 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2388 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2389 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2392 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2397 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2398 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2399 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2400 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2402 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2405 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2406 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2407 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2408 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2409 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2410 * anything like that, but this might change).
2412 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2413 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2414 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2415 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2416 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2418 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2422 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2423 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2424 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2426 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2427 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2428 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2432 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2433 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2434 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2435 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2436 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2448 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2450 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2451 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2452 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2454 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2462 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data
2463 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking.
2466 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
2467 const unsigned char *data,
2468 const unsigned char *limit,
2471 unsigned short type, size, len;
2472 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
2473 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
2476 if (data >= limit - 2)
2480 if (data > limit - len)
2483 while (data <= limit - 4) {
2487 if (data + size > limit)
2489 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2498 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2502 unsigned char *ptmp = *p;
2504 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled
2505 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically
2506 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions
2507 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure.
2509 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2510 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2514 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2519 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2520 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, d + n, &al) <= 0) {
2521 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2528 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2530 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2531 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2532 * fill the length of the block.
2534 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2536 unsigned int off = 0;
2549 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2550 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2552 unsigned short length;
2553 unsigned short type;
2554 unsigned short size;
2555 unsigned char *data = *p;
2556 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2557 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2559 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2560 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2562 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2564 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2565 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2566 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2568 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2569 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2570 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2573 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2577 if (data + length != d + n) {
2578 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2582 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2586 if (data + size > (d + n))
2589 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2590 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2592 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2593 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2594 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2597 tlsext_servername = 1;
2599 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2600 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2601 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2602 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2604 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2605 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2609 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2610 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2611 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2612 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2613 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2614 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2617 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2618 ecpointformatlist_length;
2619 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2620 ecpointformatlist_length);
2624 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2625 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2626 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2627 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2628 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2631 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2633 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2634 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2635 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2636 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2638 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2641 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2643 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2646 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2648 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2649 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2650 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2653 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2656 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2657 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2658 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2662 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2663 /* shouldn't really happen */
2664 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2666 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2667 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2668 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2670 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2671 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2674 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2675 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2680 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2682 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2685 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2686 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2689 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2690 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2692 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2693 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2694 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2695 unsigned char *selected;
2696 unsigned char selected_len;
2698 /* We must have requested it. */
2699 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2700 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2703 /* The data must be valid */
2704 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2705 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2709 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2711 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2712 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2713 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2716 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2717 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2718 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2721 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2722 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2723 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2727 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2730 /* We must have requested it. */
2731 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2732 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2736 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2740 * The extension data consists of:
2741 * uint16 list_length
2742 * uint8 proto_length;
2743 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2748 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2749 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2753 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2754 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2757 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2758 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2759 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2760 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2761 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2764 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2765 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2768 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2769 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2771 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2773 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2774 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2776 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2777 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2779 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2780 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2781 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2784 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2789 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2790 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2791 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2796 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2797 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2799 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2805 if (data != d + n) {
2806 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2810 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2811 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2812 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2813 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2814 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2815 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2819 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2830 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2831 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2832 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2833 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2834 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2835 * initial connect only.
2837 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2838 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2839 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2841 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2848 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2851 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2855 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2856 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2858 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2863 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2864 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2865 /* shouldn't really happen */
2866 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2869 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2870 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2871 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2873 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2874 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2875 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2877 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2879 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2882 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len =
2883 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2888 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate
2889 * server opaque PRF input
2891 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
2892 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2899 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2904 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2906 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2907 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2909 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2911 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2912 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2915 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2916 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2920 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2922 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2923 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2924 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2925 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2927 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2929 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2931 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2934 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we
2935 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this
2936 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early().
2941 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2942 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2944 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2946 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2947 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2952 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2953 /* shouldn't really happen */
2954 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2956 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2958 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2959 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2960 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
2961 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) {
2963 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF
2964 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input!
2967 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2968 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2969 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2971 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2972 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2973 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2975 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2976 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2977 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2980 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
2981 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2985 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2987 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we
2988 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the
2991 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2992 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2999 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3000 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3003 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3004 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3007 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3008 s->servername_done = 0;
3014 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3018 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3019 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
3020 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3021 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3022 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3024 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3025 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
3026 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3027 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3030 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3031 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
3032 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
3033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3034 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3037 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3038 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
3039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3040 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3041 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3045 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3048 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3052 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3054 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3058 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
3059 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
3060 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
3061 * influence which certificate is sent
3063 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3065 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3066 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3067 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3068 if (certpkey == NULL) {
3069 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3073 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
3074 * et al can pick it up.
3076 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3077 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3079 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3080 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3081 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3083 /* status request response should be sent */
3084 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3085 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3086 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3088 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3090 /* something bad happened */
3091 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3092 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3093 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3097 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3101 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3102 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3105 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3106 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3114 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3116 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3117 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3119 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3121 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3122 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3123 * must contain uncompressed.
3125 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3126 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3127 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3128 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3129 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3130 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3131 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
3132 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3133 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3135 unsigned char *list;
3136 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3137 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3138 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3139 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3140 found_uncompressed = 1;
3144 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3146 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3150 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3151 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3153 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3155 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3156 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3157 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3158 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3160 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3162 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3164 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3165 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
3167 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on
3168 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a
3169 * value from the server too.
3172 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
3173 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3174 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3178 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to
3179 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size.
3181 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3182 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len !=
3183 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
3184 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3185 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3191 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
3194 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3195 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3198 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
3201 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
3202 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3203 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3205 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3206 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3208 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3209 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3212 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3213 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3218 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3219 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3222 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3223 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3226 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3227 s->servername_done = 0;
3233 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
3237 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3239 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
3240 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3244 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3252 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3253 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3254 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3256 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3257 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3258 * extension, if any.
3259 * len: the length of the session ID.
3260 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3261 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3262 * point to the resulting session.
3264 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3265 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3266 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3269 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3270 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3271 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3272 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3273 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3274 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3275 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3278 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3279 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3280 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3281 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3282 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3283 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3285 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3286 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3288 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3289 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3293 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3296 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3299 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3301 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3305 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3306 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3312 /* Skip past cipher list */
3317 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3322 /* Now at start of extensions */
3323 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3326 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
3327 unsigned short type, size;
3330 if (p + size > limit)
3332 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3336 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3339 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3342 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3344 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3345 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3346 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3347 * calculate the master secret later.
3351 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3353 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3354 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3356 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3358 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3359 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3361 default: /* fatal error */
3371 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3373 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3374 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3375 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3376 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3377 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3378 * point to the resulting session.
3381 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3382 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3383 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3384 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3386 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3387 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3388 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3391 unsigned char *sdec;
3392 const unsigned char *p;
3393 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3394 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3397 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3398 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3401 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3402 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3403 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3404 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3405 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3406 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3415 /* Check key name matches */
3416 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3418 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3419 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3420 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3421 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3424 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3427 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3429 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3433 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3434 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3435 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3436 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3437 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3438 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3441 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3442 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3443 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3444 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3445 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3447 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3450 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3451 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3452 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3457 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3460 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3464 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3465 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3466 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3470 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3471 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3480 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3485 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3492 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3493 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3494 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3495 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3496 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3497 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3498 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3501 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3502 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3503 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3504 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3507 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3510 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3511 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3517 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3520 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3521 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3522 return table[i].nid;
3527 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3533 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3534 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3537 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3540 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3541 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3545 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3547 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3548 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3551 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3554 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3555 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3556 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
3562 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3563 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3566 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3567 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3568 return EVP_sha224();
3570 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3571 return EVP_sha256();
3573 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3574 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3575 return EVP_sha384();
3577 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3578 return EVP_sha512();
3586 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3589 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3590 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3591 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3593 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3594 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3595 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3597 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3598 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3599 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3605 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3606 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3607 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3609 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3610 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3612 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3613 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3614 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3616 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3618 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3619 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3620 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3622 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3624 if (psignhash_nid) {
3625 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3626 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3628 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3632 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3633 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3634 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3635 const unsigned char *allow,
3638 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3639 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3640 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3641 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3642 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3644 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3646 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3647 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3650 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3651 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3652 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3654 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3664 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3665 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3667 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3668 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3670 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3672 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3673 if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3674 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3675 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3676 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3678 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3679 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3680 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3681 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3682 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3683 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3684 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3686 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3687 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3690 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3691 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3695 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3696 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3698 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3700 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3703 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3707 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3708 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3712 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3714 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3717 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3718 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3720 /* Should never happen */
3724 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3725 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3726 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3727 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3729 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3730 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3734 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3740 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3741 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3744 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3745 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3747 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3748 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3750 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3752 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3754 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3756 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3757 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3758 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3759 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3760 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3761 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3762 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3763 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3769 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3770 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3771 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3772 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3773 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3774 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3775 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3776 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3777 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3778 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3779 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3785 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3786 * the certificate for signing.
3788 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3790 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3791 * supported it stays as NULL.
3793 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3794 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3795 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3797 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3798 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3799 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3800 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3803 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3804 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3805 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3811 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3812 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3813 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3815 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3820 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3827 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3829 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3832 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3833 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3834 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3836 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3837 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3841 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3843 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3845 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3847 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3849 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3850 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3853 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3854 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3856 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3857 unsigned short hbtype;
3858 unsigned int payload;
3859 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3861 if (s->msg_callback)
3862 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3863 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3864 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3866 /* Read type and payload length first */
3867 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3868 return 0; /* silently discard */
3871 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3872 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3875 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3876 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3880 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3881 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3883 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3886 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3887 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3889 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3891 /* Random padding */
3892 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
3893 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3897 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3898 3 + payload + padding);
3900 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3901 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3902 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3903 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3905 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3909 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3913 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3914 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3918 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3920 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3927 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3929 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3931 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3932 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3934 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3935 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3936 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3941 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3942 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3947 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3948 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3954 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3955 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3957 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3960 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3961 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3962 * some random stuff.
3963 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3964 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3965 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3966 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3969 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3972 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3973 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3975 /* Sequence number */
3976 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3977 /* 16 random bytes */
3978 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) {
3979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3983 /* Random padding */
3984 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) {
3985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3989 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3991 if (s->msg_callback)
3992 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3993 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3994 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3996 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4006 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4010 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4013 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4015 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4018 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4021 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4023 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4025 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4027 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4035 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4036 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4037 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4038 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4039 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4040 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4044 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4045 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4046 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4047 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4050 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
4051 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4054 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4055 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4060 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
4061 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
4063 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4067 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4071 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4074 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
4077 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4082 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4083 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4085 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
4086 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4087 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4088 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4089 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4091 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4098 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4099 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4100 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4101 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4103 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4104 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4105 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4106 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4112 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4116 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4120 if (default_nid == -1)
4122 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4124 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4125 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4126 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4131 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4132 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4136 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4137 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
4138 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4145 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4146 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4147 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4148 * attempting to use them.
4151 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4153 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4154 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4155 /* Strict mode flags */
4156 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4157 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4158 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4160 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4165 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4166 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4168 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4169 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4171 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4174 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4176 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4178 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4180 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4181 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4184 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4185 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4186 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
4187 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
4188 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4189 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4196 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4199 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4200 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4201 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4203 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4210 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4211 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4212 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4213 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4214 else if (!check_flags)
4219 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4220 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4222 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4224 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4225 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4227 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4230 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4231 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4232 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4233 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4234 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4237 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4238 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4239 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4240 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4244 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4245 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4254 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4255 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4257 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4259 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4260 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4261 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4264 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4271 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4272 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4276 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4277 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4278 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4279 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4281 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4288 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4289 else if (check_flags)
4290 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4292 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4293 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4294 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4295 else if (!check_flags)
4298 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4299 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4300 else if (strict_mode) {
4301 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4302 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4303 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4304 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4306 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4313 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4314 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4318 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4321 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4324 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4329 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4330 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4331 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4332 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4333 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4337 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4341 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4343 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4344 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4346 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4347 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4348 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4352 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4355 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4357 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4359 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4360 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4362 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4363 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4364 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4366 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4367 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4368 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4369 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4370 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4375 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4378 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4380 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4381 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4385 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4386 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4387 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4388 else if (cpk->digest)
4389 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4391 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4394 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4398 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4399 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4401 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4402 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4409 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4410 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4412 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4413 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4414 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4415 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4416 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4417 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4420 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4421 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4423 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);