2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
117 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
118 # include <openssl/ec.h>
121 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
122 #include <openssl/rand.h>
123 #include "ssl_locl.h"
125 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
128 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
129 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
130 SSL_SESSION **psess);
131 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
132 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
135 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
138 tls1_setup_key_block,
139 tls1_generate_master_secret,
140 tls1_change_cipher_state,
141 tls1_final_finish_mac,
142 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
143 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
144 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
147 tls1_export_keying_material,
149 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
150 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
154 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
157 tls1_setup_key_block,
158 tls1_generate_master_secret,
159 tls1_change_cipher_state,
160 tls1_final_finish_mac,
161 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
162 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
163 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
166 tls1_export_keying_material,
167 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
168 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
169 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
173 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
176 tls1_setup_key_block,
177 tls1_generate_master_secret,
178 tls1_change_cipher_state,
179 tls1_final_finish_mac,
180 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
181 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
182 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
185 tls1_export_keying_material,
186 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
187 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
188 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
189 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
193 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
196 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
197 * http, the cache would over fill
199 return (60 * 60 * 2);
206 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
210 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
213 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
214 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
216 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
220 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
223 s->version = s->method->version;
226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
228 static int nid_list[] = {
229 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
230 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
231 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
232 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
235 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
236 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
237 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
238 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
239 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
240 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
241 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
243 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
244 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
245 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
246 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
247 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
248 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
249 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
250 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
251 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
252 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
253 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
254 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
255 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
256 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
259 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
265 /* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
266 static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
267 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
268 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
269 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
270 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
272 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
273 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
274 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
275 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
276 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
277 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
278 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
279 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
280 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
281 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
282 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
283 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
288 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
289 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
291 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
292 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
293 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
294 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
295 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
296 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
297 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
298 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
299 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
300 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
301 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
302 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
303 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
304 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
307 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
308 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
310 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
311 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
312 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
313 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
314 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
315 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
316 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
317 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
318 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
319 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
320 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
321 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
322 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
324 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
325 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
329 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
330 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
331 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
335 /* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */
336 static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] = {
337 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
338 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
339 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
341 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
342 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
343 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
344 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
346 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
347 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
348 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
349 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
351 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
352 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
353 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
354 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
355 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
356 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
358 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
359 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
360 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
361 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
362 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
364 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
365 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
366 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
367 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
368 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
369 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
371 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
372 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
373 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
377 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
379 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
380 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
381 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
383 return nid_list[curve_id - 1];
386 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
388 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
390 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
392 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
394 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
396 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
398 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
400 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
402 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
404 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
406 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
408 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
410 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
412 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
414 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
416 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
418 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
420 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
422 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
424 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
426 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
428 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
430 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
432 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
434 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
436 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
438 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
440 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
442 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
444 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
452 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
454 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
455 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
456 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
457 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
458 * lists in the first place.
459 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
460 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
461 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
463 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
464 const unsigned char **pcurves,
467 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
469 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
470 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
472 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
473 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
474 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
475 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
476 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
479 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
480 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
484 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
485 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
489 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
490 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
495 *pcurves = fips_curves_default;
496 pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
500 if (!s->server || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
501 *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
502 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
504 *pcurves = eccurves_all;
505 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
510 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
511 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
516 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
521 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
522 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
524 const unsigned char *curves;
525 size_t num_curves, i;
526 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
527 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
529 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
531 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
534 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
535 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
537 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
538 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
540 } else /* Should never happen */
543 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
545 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
546 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
553 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
554 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
555 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
556 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
558 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
560 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
561 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
563 /* Can't do anything on client side */
567 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
569 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
570 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
572 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
573 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
574 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
575 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
576 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
577 /* Should never happen */
580 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
584 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
585 * but s->options is a long...
587 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
588 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
590 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
591 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
592 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
593 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
595 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
598 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
601 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
603 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
604 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
605 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
607 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
611 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
612 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
613 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
614 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
616 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
617 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
625 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
629 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
630 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
632 unsigned char *clist, *p;
635 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
638 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
639 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
643 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
646 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
647 unsigned long idmask;
649 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
651 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */
652 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25) {
657 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
658 curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]);
659 if (!curve || EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve))
660 == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) {
662 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
666 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
669 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
679 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
683 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
687 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
690 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
692 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
698 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
700 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
702 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
704 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
705 if (nid == NID_undef)
706 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
707 if (nid == NID_undef)
708 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
709 if (nid == NID_undef)
711 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
712 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
714 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
718 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
719 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
724 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
728 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
731 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
732 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
737 const EC_METHOD *meth;
740 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
741 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
744 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
747 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
751 /* Determine curve ID */
752 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
753 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
754 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
757 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
766 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
768 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
770 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
772 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
774 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
779 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
780 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
781 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
783 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
784 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
787 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
788 * supported (see RFC4492).
790 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
791 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
792 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
793 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
794 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
797 if (i == num_formats)
802 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
803 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
804 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
806 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
808 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
809 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
810 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
811 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
812 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
816 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
817 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
822 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
829 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
833 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
835 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
836 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
837 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
839 *pformats = ecformats_default;
840 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
842 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
844 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
849 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
850 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
852 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
854 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
857 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
860 /* If not EC nothing to do */
861 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
865 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
870 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
873 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
877 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
878 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
880 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
886 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
887 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
888 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
889 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
890 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
892 return 0; /* Should never happen */
893 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
894 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
896 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
898 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
899 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
900 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
902 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
908 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
909 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
910 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
912 unsigned char curve_id[2];
913 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
914 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
915 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
916 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
920 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
923 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
924 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
925 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
926 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
927 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
928 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
932 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
933 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
935 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
936 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
938 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
940 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
943 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
945 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
951 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
952 /* Need a shared curve */
953 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
959 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
964 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
966 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
970 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
973 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
977 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
982 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
987 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
988 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
991 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
992 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
994 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
997 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
998 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
1000 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
1003 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1004 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
1007 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
1010 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
1011 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
1012 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
1013 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
1015 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
1016 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
1017 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
1018 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1020 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
1021 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1022 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
1024 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1025 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
1029 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1030 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1031 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1032 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1035 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
1038 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1041 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1042 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1043 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1044 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1045 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
1047 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1048 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1051 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1052 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
1056 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
1057 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
1058 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1059 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1060 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1061 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1062 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1064 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1065 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1070 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1071 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1073 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1074 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1076 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1077 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1078 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1079 /* Should never happen */
1082 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1083 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1087 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1088 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1089 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1090 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1091 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1093 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1097 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1098 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1101 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1102 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1104 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1107 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1108 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1110 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1116 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1120 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1121 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1122 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1123 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1126 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1127 if (i == sent_sigslen
1128 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1129 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1133 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1139 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1141 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1142 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1147 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1148 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1149 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1152 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1155 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1156 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1157 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1160 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1161 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1162 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1166 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1167 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2.
1169 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1170 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
1171 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
1172 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1173 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1177 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1178 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1182 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1183 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1190 * Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1191 * signature algorithms.
1194 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1195 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1198 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1199 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1202 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1203 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1205 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1206 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1207 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1208 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1211 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1212 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1213 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1214 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1215 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1217 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1218 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1219 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1220 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1221 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1227 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1228 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1231 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1232 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1233 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1234 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1236 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1238 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1239 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1241 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1242 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1244 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1245 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1246 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1247 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1255 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1256 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1262 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1264 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1265 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1269 * check for enough space.
1270 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1271 * 2 for servernamelist length
1272 * 1 for the hostname type
1273 * 2 for hostname length
1276 size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname);
1277 if (ret >= limit || (size_t)(limit - ret) < 9 + size_str)
1280 /* extension type and length */
1281 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1282 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1284 /* length of servername list */
1285 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1287 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1288 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1290 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1294 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1295 if (s->renegotiate) {
1298 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1303 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1306 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1309 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1316 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1317 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1318 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1319 * Client Hello message */
1321 size_t login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1322 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1328 * check for enough space.
1329 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1330 * 1 for the srp user identity
1331 * + srp user identity length
1333 if (ret >= limit || (size_t)(limit - ret) < 5 + login_len)
1336 /* fill in the extension */
1337 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1338 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1339 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1340 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1345 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1348 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1350 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1351 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1353 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1355 if (num_formats > 255) {
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1360 * check for enough space.
1361 * 4 bytes for the ec point formats type and extension length
1362 * 1 byte for the length of the formats
1365 if (ret >= limit || (size_t)(limit - ret) < 5 + num_formats)
1368 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1369 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1370 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1371 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1372 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1376 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1378 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1379 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1382 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1386 curves_list_len = 2 * num_curves;
1388 * check for enough space.
1389 * 4 bytes for the ec curves type and extension length
1390 * 2 bytes for the curve list length
1391 * + curve list length
1393 if (ret >= limit || (size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + curves_list_len)
1396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1397 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1398 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1399 memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len);
1400 ret += curves_list_len;
1402 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1404 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1406 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1407 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1408 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1409 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1410 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1411 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1412 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1414 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1415 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1416 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1419 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1420 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1423 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1426 if (ret >= limit || (size_t)(limit - ret) < 4 + ticklen)
1428 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1431 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1437 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1439 const unsigned char *salg;
1440 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1443 * check for enough space.
1444 * 4 bytes for the sigalgs type and extension length
1445 * 2 bytes for the sigalg list length
1446 * + sigalg list length
1448 if (ret >= limit || (size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1450 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1451 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1453 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1456 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1457 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1458 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1460 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1462 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1465 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1468 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1473 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1475 size_t extlen, idlen;
1480 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1481 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1482 lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1485 idlen += (size_t)lentmp + 2;
1488 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1489 lentmp = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1492 extlen = (size_t)lentmp;
1496 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1499 * 2 bytes for status request type
1500 * 2 bytes for status request len
1501 * 1 byte for OCSP request type
1502 * 2 bytes for length of ids
1503 * 2 bytes for length of extensions
1505 if (ret >= limit || (size_t)(limit - ret) < 9 + idlen + extlen)
1508 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1509 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1510 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1512 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1513 /* save position of id len */
1514 unsigned char *q = ret;
1515 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1516 /* skip over id len */
1518 lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1524 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1526 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1527 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1530 * check for enough space.
1531 * 4 bytes for the heartbeat ext type and extension length
1532 * 1 byte for the mode
1534 if (ret >= limit || limit - ret < 5)
1537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1541 * 1: peer may send requests
1542 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1544 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1545 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1547 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1550 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1551 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1553 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1554 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1558 * check for enough space.
1559 * 4 bytes for the NPN ext type and extension length
1561 if (ret >= limit || limit - ret < 4)
1563 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1568 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1570 * check for enough space.
1571 * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length
1572 * 2 bytes for the ALPN protocol list length
1573 * + ALPN protocol list length
1575 if (ret >= limit || limit - ret < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1577 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1578 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1579 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1580 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1581 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1582 s->cert->alpn_sent = 1;
1584 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1585 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1588 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1591 * check for enough space.
1592 * 4 bytes for the SRTP type and extension length
1593 * + SRTP profiles length
1595 if (ret >= limit || limit - ret < 4 + el)
1598 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1601 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1608 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1609 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1610 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1614 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1615 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1616 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1619 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1620 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1622 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1623 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1626 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1628 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1629 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1636 * check for enough space. Strictly speaking we know we've already
1637 * got enough space because to get here the message size is < 0x200,
1638 * but we know that we've allocated far more than that in the buffer
1639 * - but for consistency and robustness we're going to check anyway.
1641 * 4 bytes for the padding type and extension length
1644 if (ret >= limit || limit - ret < 4 + hlen)
1646 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1648 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1653 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1656 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1660 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1661 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1664 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1665 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1666 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1667 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1669 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1670 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1671 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1672 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1673 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1674 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1677 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation
1679 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1684 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1686 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1687 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1688 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1691 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1695 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1698 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1704 * check for enough space.
1705 * 4 bytes for the reneg type and extension length
1706 * + reneg data length
1708 if (ret >= limit || limit - ret < 4 + el)
1711 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1714 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1721 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1723 const unsigned char *plist;
1726 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1729 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1731 if (plistlen > 255) {
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1737 * check for enough space.
1738 * 4 bytes for the ec points format type and extension length
1739 * 1 byte for the points format list length
1740 * + length of points format list
1742 if (ret >= limit || (size_t)(limit - ret) < 5 + plistlen)
1745 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1746 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1747 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1748 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1753 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1756 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1758 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1760 * check for enough space.
1761 * 4 bytes for the Ticket type and extension length
1763 if (ret >= limit || limit - ret < 4)
1765 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1769 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1771 * check for enough space.
1772 * 4 bytes for the Status request type and extension length
1774 if (ret >= limit || limit - ret < 4)
1776 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1779 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1780 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1781 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1783 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1785 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1788 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1791 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1796 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1797 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1800 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1803 * check for enough space.
1804 * 4 bytes for the SRTP profiles type and extension length
1805 * + length of the SRTP profiles list
1807 if (ret >= limit || limit - ret < 4 + el)
1810 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1813 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1821 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1822 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1823 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1824 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1825 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1826 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1827 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1828 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1829 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1830 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1833 /* check for enough space. */
1834 if (ret >= limit || (size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(cryptopro_ext))
1836 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext));
1837 ret += sizeof(cryptopro_ext);
1840 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1841 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1842 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1844 * check for enough space.
1845 * 4 bytes for the Heartbeat type and extension length
1846 * 1 byte for the mode
1848 if (ret >= limit || limit - ret < 5)
1850 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1854 * 1: peer may send requests
1855 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1857 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1858 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1860 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1865 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1866 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1867 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1868 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1869 const unsigned char *npa;
1870 unsigned int npalen;
1873 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1875 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1876 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1878 * check for enough space.
1879 * 4 bytes for the NPN type and extension length
1880 * + length of protocols list
1882 if (ret >= limit || limit - ret < 4 + npalen)
1884 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1886 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1888 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1892 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1895 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1896 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1897 size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1900 * check for enough space.
1901 * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length
1902 * 2 bytes for ALPN data length
1903 * 1 byte for selected protocol length
1904 * + length of the selected protocol
1906 if (ret >= limit || (size_t)(limit - ret) < 7 + len)
1908 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1912 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1916 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1919 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1923 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1925 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1926 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1927 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1932 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1933 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1934 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1935 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1937 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1938 const unsigned char *limit)
1940 unsigned short type, size;
1941 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1942 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1943 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1944 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1945 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1946 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1947 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1949 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1950 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1951 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1952 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1955 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1956 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1957 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1958 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1959 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1960 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1961 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1962 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1963 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1964 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1967 if (limit - data <= 2)
1971 if (limit - data < 4)
1976 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1979 if (limit - data < size)
1983 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1984 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1985 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1987 if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
1989 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1991 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1994 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1996 if (limit - data != (int)(len))
1998 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
2002 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
2004 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2007 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to save the ALPN extension in a
2008 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
2009 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
2010 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
2013 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
2014 unsigned data_len, int *al)
2023 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
2024 * length-prefixed strings.
2026 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
2035 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
2036 proto_len = data[i];
2042 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
2048 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL)
2049 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed);
2050 s->cert->alpn_proposed = OPENSSL_malloc(data_len);
2051 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed == NULL) {
2052 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2055 memcpy(s->cert->alpn_proposed, data, data_len);
2056 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = data_len;
2060 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2065 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
2066 * ret: a pointer to the TLSEXT return value: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_*
2067 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
2068 * returns 1 on success, 0 on failure: al/ret set only on failure
2070 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al)
2072 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2073 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2075 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2076 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2077 s->cert->alpn_proposed,
2078 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len,
2079 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
2081 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2082 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2083 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2084 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2085 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2086 *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2089 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
2090 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2091 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2092 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2093 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2101 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2102 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
2104 unsigned short type;
2105 unsigned short size;
2107 unsigned char *data = *p;
2108 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2110 s->servername_done = 0;
2111 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2112 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2113 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2116 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2117 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2118 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2120 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
2121 if (s->cert->alpn_proposed) {
2122 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed);
2123 s->cert->alpn_proposed = NULL;
2125 s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
2126 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2127 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2128 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2131 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2132 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2133 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit);
2134 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2136 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2137 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2138 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2139 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2141 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2142 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2143 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2144 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2148 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2153 if (limit - data < 2)
2158 if (limit - data != len)
2161 while (limit - data >= 4) {
2165 if (limit - data < size)
2168 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
2170 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2171 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2173 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2175 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2176 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2177 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2178 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2179 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2180 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2181 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2182 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2183 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2184 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2185 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2186 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2187 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2188 * the value of the Host: field.
2189 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2190 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2191 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2193 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2197 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2198 unsigned char *sdata;
2211 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2218 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2219 switch (servname_type) {
2220 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2222 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2225 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2226 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2229 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2230 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2231 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2234 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2235 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2236 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2237 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2238 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2239 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2242 s->servername_done = 1;
2245 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2246 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2247 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2248 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2262 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2263 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2264 if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1))
2266 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2268 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2270 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2271 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2273 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2278 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2279 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2280 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2281 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2283 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2284 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2287 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2288 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2289 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2291 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2292 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2293 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2294 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2297 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2298 ecpointformatlist_length;
2299 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2300 ecpointformatlist_length);
2304 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
2305 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2306 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2307 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2308 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2309 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2311 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2312 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2313 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2314 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2316 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2317 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2318 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2319 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
2323 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2326 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2327 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2328 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2329 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2332 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2333 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2334 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2335 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2339 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
2340 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2341 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2342 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2343 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2344 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2347 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2348 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2349 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2350 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2353 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2356 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2357 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2358 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2362 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2363 /* shouldn't really happen */
2364 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2367 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2368 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2369 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2371 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2372 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2373 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2374 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2379 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2380 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2381 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2382 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2384 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2387 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2388 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2390 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2391 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2393 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2397 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2399 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2401 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2406 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2408 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2409 const unsigned char *sdata;
2411 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2418 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2419 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2421 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2424 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2425 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2426 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2430 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2439 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2445 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2448 if (data != sdata) {
2449 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2452 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2453 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2454 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2459 /* Read in request_extensions */
2468 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2469 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2470 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2473 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2474 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2475 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2480 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2483 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2485 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2486 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2488 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2489 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2491 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2492 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2493 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2496 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2501 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2502 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2503 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2505 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2508 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2509 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2510 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2511 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2512 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2513 * anything like that, but this might change).
2515 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2516 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2517 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2518 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2519 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2521 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2525 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2526 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2527 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2531 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2532 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2533 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2534 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2535 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2543 /* Spurious data on the end */
2551 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2553 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2554 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2555 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2557 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2563 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2568 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data
2569 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking.
2572 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
2573 const unsigned char *data,
2574 const unsigned char *limit,
2577 unsigned short type, size, len;
2578 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
2579 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
2582 if (limit - data <= 2)
2586 if (limit - data < len)
2589 while (limit - data >= 4) {
2593 if (limit - data < size)
2595 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2604 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2605 unsigned char *limit)
2608 unsigned char *ptmp = *p;
2610 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled
2611 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically
2612 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions
2613 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure.
2615 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, limit, &al) <= 0) {
2616 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2620 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2625 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2626 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, limit, &al) <= 0) {
2627 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2634 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2636 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2637 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2638 * fill the length of the block.
2640 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2642 unsigned int off = 0;
2655 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2656 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2658 unsigned short length;
2659 unsigned short type;
2660 unsigned short size;
2661 unsigned char *data = *p;
2662 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2663 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2665 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2666 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2668 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2670 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2671 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2672 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2674 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2675 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2676 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2679 if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
2683 if ((d + n) - data != length) {
2684 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2688 while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
2692 if ((d + n) - data < size)
2695 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2696 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2698 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2699 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2700 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2703 tlsext_servername = 1;
2705 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2706 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2707 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2708 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2710 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2711 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2715 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2716 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2717 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2718 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2719 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2720 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2723 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2724 ecpointformatlist_length;
2725 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2726 ecpointformatlist_length);
2730 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2731 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2732 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2733 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2734 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2737 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2739 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2740 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2741 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2742 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2744 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2747 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2749 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2752 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2754 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2755 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2756 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2759 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2762 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2763 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2764 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2768 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2769 /* shouldn't really happen */
2770 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2772 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2773 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2774 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2776 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2777 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2780 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2781 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2786 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2788 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2791 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2792 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2795 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2796 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2798 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2799 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2800 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2801 unsigned char *selected;
2802 unsigned char selected_len;
2804 /* We must have requested it. */
2805 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2806 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2809 /* The data must be valid */
2810 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2811 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2815 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2817 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2818 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2819 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2823 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2824 * a single Serverhello
2826 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2827 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2828 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2829 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2832 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2833 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2834 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2838 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2841 /* We must have requested it. */
2842 if (!s->cert->alpn_sent) {
2843 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2847 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2851 * The extension data consists of:
2852 * uint16 list_length
2853 * uint8 proto_length;
2854 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2859 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2860 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2864 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2865 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2868 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2869 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2870 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2871 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2872 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2875 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2876 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2879 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2880 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2882 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2884 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2885 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2887 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2888 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2890 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2891 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2892 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2895 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2900 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2901 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2902 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2907 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2908 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2910 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2916 if (data != d + n) {
2917 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2921 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2922 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2923 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2924 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2925 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2926 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2930 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2941 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2942 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2943 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2944 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2945 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2946 * initial connect only.
2948 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2949 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2950 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2952 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2959 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2962 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2966 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2967 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2969 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2974 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2975 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2976 /* shouldn't really happen */
2977 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2980 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2981 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2982 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2984 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2985 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2986 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2988 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2990 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2993 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len =
2994 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2999 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate
3000 * server opaque PRF input
3002 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
3003 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3007 s->cert->alpn_sent = 0;
3011 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3016 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
3018 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3019 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3021 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3023 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
3024 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
3027 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
3028 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
3032 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3034 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3035 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3036 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3037 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3039 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3041 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3043 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3046 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we
3047 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this
3048 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early().
3053 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
3054 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
3056 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
3058 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3059 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3064 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
3065 /* shouldn't really happen */
3066 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3068 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3070 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
3071 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3072 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
3073 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) {
3075 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF
3076 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input!
3079 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
3080 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3081 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
3083 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
3084 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
3085 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3087 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
3088 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3089 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3092 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
3093 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3097 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
3099 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we
3100 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the
3103 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3104 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3111 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3112 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3115 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3116 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3119 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3120 s->servername_done = 0;
3126 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3130 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3131 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
3132 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3133 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3134 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3136 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3137 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
3138 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3139 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3142 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3143 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
3144 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
3145 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3146 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3149 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3150 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
3151 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3152 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3153 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3157 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3160 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3164 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3166 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3170 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
3171 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
3172 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
3173 * influence which certificate is sent
3175 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3177 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3178 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3179 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3180 if (certpkey == NULL) {
3181 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3185 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
3186 * et al can pick it up.
3188 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3189 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3191 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3192 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3193 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3195 /* status request response should be sent */
3196 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3197 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3198 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3200 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3202 /* something bad happened */
3203 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3204 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3205 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3209 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3211 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, &ret, &al)) {
3217 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3218 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3221 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3222 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3230 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3232 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3233 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3235 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3237 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3238 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3239 * must contain uncompressed.
3241 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3242 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3243 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3244 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3245 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3246 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3247 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
3248 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3249 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3251 unsigned char *list;
3252 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3253 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3254 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3255 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3256 found_uncompressed = 1;
3260 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3262 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3266 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3267 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3269 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3271 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3272 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3273 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3274 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3276 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3278 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3280 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3281 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
3283 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on
3284 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a
3285 * value from the server too.
3288 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
3289 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3290 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3294 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to
3295 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size.
3297 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3298 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len !=
3299 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
3300 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3301 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3306 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3307 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3308 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3310 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
3313 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3314 && !(s->hit) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3317 * Call callback with resp == NULL and resplen == -1 so callback
3318 * knows there is no response
3320 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3322 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3323 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3326 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3327 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3332 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3333 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3336 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3337 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3340 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3341 s->servername_done = 0;
3347 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
3351 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3353 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
3354 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3358 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3366 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3367 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3368 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3370 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3371 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3372 * extension, if any.
3373 * len: the length of the session ID.
3374 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3375 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3376 * point to the resulting session.
3378 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3379 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3380 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3383 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3384 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3385 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3386 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3387 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3388 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3389 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3392 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3393 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3394 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3395 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3396 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3397 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3399 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3400 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3402 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3403 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3407 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3410 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3413 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3415 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3419 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3420 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3428 /* Skip past cipher list */
3434 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3440 /* Now at start of extensions */
3444 while (limit - p >= 4) {
3445 unsigned short type, size;
3448 if (limit - p < size)
3450 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3454 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3457 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3460 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3462 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3463 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3464 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3465 * calculate the master secret later.
3469 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3471 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3472 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3474 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3476 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3477 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3479 default: /* fatal error */
3489 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3491 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3492 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3493 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3494 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3495 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3496 * point to the resulting session.
3499 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3500 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3501 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3502 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3504 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3505 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3506 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3509 unsigned char *sdec;
3510 const unsigned char *p;
3511 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3512 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3515 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3517 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3518 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3519 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3520 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3521 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3522 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3531 /* Check key name matches */
3532 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3534 if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3535 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) <= 0
3536 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3537 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3543 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3546 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3550 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3551 if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) {
3552 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3553 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3558 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3559 if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3560 || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3563 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3564 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3565 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3568 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3569 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3570 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3571 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3572 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3574 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3575 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3579 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3580 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3585 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3588 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3592 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3593 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3594 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3598 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3599 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3608 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3612 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3613 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3617 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3624 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3625 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3626 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3627 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3628 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3629 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3630 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3633 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3634 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3635 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3636 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3639 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3642 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3643 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3649 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3652 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3653 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3654 return table[i].nid;
3659 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3665 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3666 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3669 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3672 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3673 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3677 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3679 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3680 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3683 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3686 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3687 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3688 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
3694 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3695 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3698 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3699 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3700 return EVP_sha224();
3702 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3703 return EVP_sha256();
3705 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3706 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3707 return EVP_sha384();
3709 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3710 return EVP_sha512();
3718 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3721 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3722 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3723 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3725 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3726 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3727 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3729 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3730 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3731 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3737 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3738 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3739 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3741 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3742 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3744 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3745 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3746 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3748 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3750 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3751 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3752 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3754 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3756 if (psignhash_nid) {
3757 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3758 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3760 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3764 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3765 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3766 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3767 const unsigned char *allow,
3770 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3771 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3772 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3773 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3774 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3776 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3778 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3779 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3782 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3783 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3784 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3786 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3796 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3797 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3799 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3800 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3802 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3804 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3805 if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3806 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3807 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3808 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3810 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3811 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3812 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3813 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3814 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3815 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3816 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3818 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3819 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3822 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3823 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3827 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3828 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3830 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3832 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3835 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3839 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3840 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3844 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3846 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3849 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3850 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3852 /* Should never happen */
3856 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3857 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3858 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3859 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3861 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3862 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3866 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3872 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3873 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3876 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3877 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3879 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3880 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3882 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3884 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3886 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3888 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3889 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3890 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3891 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3892 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3893 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3894 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3895 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3901 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3902 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3903 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3904 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3905 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3906 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3907 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3908 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3909 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3910 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3911 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3917 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3918 * the certificate for signing.
3920 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3922 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3923 * supported it stays as NULL.
3925 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3926 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3927 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3929 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3930 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3931 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3932 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3935 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3936 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3937 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3943 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3944 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3945 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3947 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3952 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3959 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3961 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3964 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3965 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3966 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3968 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3969 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3973 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3975 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3977 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3979 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3981 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3982 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3985 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3986 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3988 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3989 unsigned short hbtype;
3990 unsigned int payload;
3991 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3993 if (s->msg_callback)
3994 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3995 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3996 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3998 /* Read type and payload length first */
3999 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
4000 return 0; /* silently discard */
4003 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
4004 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
4007 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
4008 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
4012 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
4013 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
4015 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4020 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4021 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4023 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4025 /* Random padding */
4026 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
4027 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4031 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
4032 3 + payload + padding);
4034 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4035 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4036 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4037 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4039 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4043 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
4047 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
4048 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
4052 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
4054 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4061 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4063 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4065 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4066 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4068 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4069 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4070 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
4071 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4075 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4076 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
4077 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4081 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4082 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
4083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4088 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
4089 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4091 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4094 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4095 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4096 * some random stuff.
4097 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4098 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4099 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4100 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4103 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4108 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4109 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4111 /* Sequence number */
4112 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4113 /* 16 random bytes */
4114 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
4115 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4119 /* Random padding */
4120 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
4121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4125 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4127 if (s->msg_callback)
4128 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4129 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4130 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4132 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4142 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4146 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4149 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4151 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4154 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4157 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4159 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4161 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4163 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4171 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4172 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4173 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4174 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4175 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4176 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4180 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4181 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4182 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4183 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4186 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
4187 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4190 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4191 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4196 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
4197 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
4199 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4203 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4207 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4210 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
4213 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4218 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4219 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4221 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
4222 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4223 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4224 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4225 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4227 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4234 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4235 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4236 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4237 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4239 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4240 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4241 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4242 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4248 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4252 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4256 if (default_nid == -1)
4258 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4260 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4261 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4262 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4267 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4268 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4272 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4273 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
4274 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4281 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4282 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4283 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4284 * attempting to use them.
4287 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4289 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4290 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4291 /* Strict mode flags */
4292 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4293 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4294 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4296 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4301 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4302 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4304 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4305 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4307 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4310 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4312 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4314 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4316 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4317 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4320 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4321 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4322 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
4323 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
4324 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4325 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4332 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4335 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4336 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4337 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4339 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4346 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4347 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4348 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4349 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4350 else if (!check_flags)
4355 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4356 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4358 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4360 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4361 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4363 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4366 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4367 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4368 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4369 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4370 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4373 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4374 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4375 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4376 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4380 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4381 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4390 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4391 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4393 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4395 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4396 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4397 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4400 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4407 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4408 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4412 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4413 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4414 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4415 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4417 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4424 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4425 else if (check_flags)
4426 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4428 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4429 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4430 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4431 else if (!check_flags)
4434 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4435 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4436 else if (strict_mode) {
4437 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4438 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4439 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4440 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4442 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4449 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4450 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4454 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4457 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4460 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4465 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4466 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4467 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4468 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4469 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4473 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4477 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4479 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4480 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4482 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4483 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4484 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4488 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4491 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4493 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4495 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4496 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4498 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4499 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4500 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4502 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4503 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4504 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4505 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4506 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4511 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4514 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4516 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4517 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4521 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4522 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4523 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4524 else if (cpk->digest)
4525 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4527 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4530 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4534 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4535 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4537 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4538 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4545 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4546 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4548 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4549 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4550 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4551 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4552 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4553 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4556 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4557 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4559 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);