2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
153 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
157 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
168 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
171 s->version = s->method->version;
174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
176 static int nid_list[] =
178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
206 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
208 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
209 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
213 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
215 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
216 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
217 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
218 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
219 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
220 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
221 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
222 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
223 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
224 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
225 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
226 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
227 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
228 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
229 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
230 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
231 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
232 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
233 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
234 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
235 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
236 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
237 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
242 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
244 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
245 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
246 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
248 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
251 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
253 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
256 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
258 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
260 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
262 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
264 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
266 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
268 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
270 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
272 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
274 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
276 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
278 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
280 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
282 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
284 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
286 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
288 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
290 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
292 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
294 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
296 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
298 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
300 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
302 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
304 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
310 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
313 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
314 const unsigned char **pcurves,
319 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
320 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
324 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
325 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
327 /* If not set use default: for now static structure */
330 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
331 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
335 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
339 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
341 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
342 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
344 /* Can't do anything on client side */
347 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
349 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
354 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
356 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
357 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
359 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
363 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
364 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
375 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
376 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
378 unsigned char *clist, *p;
380 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
381 * while curve ids < 32
383 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
384 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
387 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
389 unsigned long idmask;
391 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
393 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
404 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
408 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
413 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
416 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
418 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
422 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
424 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
426 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
428 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
429 if (nid == NID_undef)
430 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
431 if (nid == NID_undef)
432 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
433 if (nid == NID_undef)
435 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
436 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
438 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
441 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
442 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
447 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
449 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
451 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
452 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
458 const EC_METHOD *meth;
461 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
462 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
463 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
466 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
469 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
473 /* Determine curve ID */
474 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
475 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
476 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
480 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
492 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
495 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
497 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
500 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
504 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
505 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
506 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
508 const unsigned char *p;
511 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
512 * is supported (see RFC4492).
514 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
516 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
517 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
518 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
526 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
527 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
529 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
530 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
532 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
540 /* Check EC server key is compatible with client extensions */
541 int tls1_check_ec_server_key(SSL *s)
544 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->cert->pkeys + SSL_PKEY_ECC;
546 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
547 if (!cpk->x509 || !cpk->privatekey)
549 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cpk->x509);
552 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
556 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id);
558 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
559 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s)
561 unsigned char curve_id[2];
562 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
563 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
565 /* Need a shared curve */
566 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
572 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
577 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
579 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
582 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
586 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
587 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
590 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
591 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
593 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
596 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
597 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
599 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
602 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
603 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
605 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
608 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
609 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
610 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
611 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
613 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
615 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
616 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
619 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
620 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
623 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
626 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
630 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
632 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
634 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
639 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
643 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
646 unsigned char *ret = p;
647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
648 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
650 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
653 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
654 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
656 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
658 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
660 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
661 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
662 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
663 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
672 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
673 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
674 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
679 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
681 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
683 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
684 unsigned long size_str;
687 /* check for enough space.
688 4 for the servername type and entension length
689 2 for servernamelist length
690 1 for the hostname type
691 2 for hostname length
695 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
696 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
699 /* extension type and length */
700 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
703 /* length of servername list */
706 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
707 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
709 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
713 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
718 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
724 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
726 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
729 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
739 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
740 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
741 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
743 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
744 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
750 /* check for enough space.
751 4 for the srp type type and entension length
752 1 for the srp user identity
753 + srp user identity length
755 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
757 /* fill in the extension */
758 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
759 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
760 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
761 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
769 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
771 const unsigned char *plist;
773 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
775 plist = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
777 plistlen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
780 plist = ecformats_default;
781 plistlen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
784 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
785 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
792 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
793 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
794 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
795 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
798 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
799 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
800 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
802 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
803 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
804 if (plistlen > 65532)
806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
810 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
811 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
813 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
814 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
815 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
816 * resolves this to two bytes.
819 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
822 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
824 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
827 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
828 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
829 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
830 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
832 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
833 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
834 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
836 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
837 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
839 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
843 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
844 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
846 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
849 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
850 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
854 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
860 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
862 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
864 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
865 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
866 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
867 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
868 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
871 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
872 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
873 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
875 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
877 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
879 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
882 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
885 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
890 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
891 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
894 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
898 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
900 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
901 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
907 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
909 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
916 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
917 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
918 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
920 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
921 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
923 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
925 /* save position of id len */
926 unsigned char *q = ret;
927 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
928 /* skip over id len */
930 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
936 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
940 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
941 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
944 * 1: peer may send requests
945 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
947 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
948 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
950 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
954 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
956 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
957 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
958 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
960 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
965 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
969 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
971 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
973 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
976 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
978 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
984 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
991 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
994 unsigned char *ret = p;
995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
996 int next_proto_neg_seen;
999 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1000 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1004 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1006 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1008 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1010 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1014 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1018 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1024 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1026 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1029 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1039 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
1040 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1042 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1045 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1046 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
1047 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
1049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1053 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1054 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
1055 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1056 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1057 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1060 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1061 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1063 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1064 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1066 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1067 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1071 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1073 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1074 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1078 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1079 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1080 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1082 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1084 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1086 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1089 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1092 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1101 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1103 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1105 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1108 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1116 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1117 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1118 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1119 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1120 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1121 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1122 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1123 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1124 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1125 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1126 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1132 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1133 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1135 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1138 * 1: peer may send requests
1139 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1141 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1142 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1144 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1150 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1151 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1152 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1154 const unsigned char *npa;
1155 unsigned int npalen;
1158 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1159 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1161 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1162 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1164 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1166 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1171 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1178 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1180 unsigned short type;
1181 unsigned short size;
1183 unsigned char *data = *p;
1184 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1185 int sigalg_seen = 0;
1187 s->servername_done = 0;
1188 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1190 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1194 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1195 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1198 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1202 if (data > (d+n-len))
1205 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1210 if (data+size > (d+n))
1213 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1215 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1216 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1217 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1218 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1220 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1221 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1222 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1223 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1224 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1225 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1226 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1227 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1228 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1229 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1230 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1231 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1232 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1233 the value of the Host: field.
1234 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1235 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1236 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1237 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1241 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1243 unsigned char *sdata;
1249 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1256 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1263 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1269 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1272 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1273 switch (servname_type)
1275 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1278 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1280 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1283 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1285 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1288 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1290 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1293 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1294 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1295 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1296 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1297 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1298 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1301 s->servername_done = 1;
1305 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1306 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1307 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1319 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1325 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1327 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1329 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1332 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1334 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1337 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1339 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1340 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1342 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1344 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1351 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1352 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1354 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1355 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1357 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1359 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1364 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1366 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1367 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1369 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1370 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1372 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1375 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1376 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1379 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1380 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1381 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1382 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1383 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1386 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1387 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1389 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1390 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1391 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1393 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
1395 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1400 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1402 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1405 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1406 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1408 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1411 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1412 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1415 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1416 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1417 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1418 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1419 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1422 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1423 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1424 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1425 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1427 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1431 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1434 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1435 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1437 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1441 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1442 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1443 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1444 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1446 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1447 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1449 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1454 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1456 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1457 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1459 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1463 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1465 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1467 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1469 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1472 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1474 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1480 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1482 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1485 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1487 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1491 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1492 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1497 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1501 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1503 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1505 const unsigned char *sdata;
1507 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1512 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1521 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1525 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1529 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1534 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1538 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1543 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1544 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1547 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1548 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1549 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1551 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1552 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1555 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1556 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1558 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1559 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1564 /* Read in request_extensions */
1567 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1574 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1580 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1582 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1583 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1586 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1587 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1589 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1590 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1592 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1597 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1601 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1604 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1608 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1609 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1611 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1612 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1613 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1615 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1621 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1622 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1624 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1627 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1628 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1629 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1630 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1631 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1632 * anything like that, but this might change).
1634 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1635 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1636 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1637 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1638 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1639 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1643 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1644 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1646 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1658 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1660 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1661 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1663 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1665 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1673 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1674 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1675 * the length of the block. */
1676 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1678 unsigned int off = 0;
1692 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1694 unsigned short length;
1695 unsigned short type;
1696 unsigned short size;
1697 unsigned char *data = *p;
1698 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1699 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1702 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1706 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1707 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1710 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1714 if (data+length != d+n)
1716 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1720 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1725 if (data+size > (d+n))
1728 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1729 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1730 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1732 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1734 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1736 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1739 tlsext_servername = 1;
1742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1743 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1744 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1746 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1747 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1749 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1751 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1754 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1755 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1756 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1758 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1761 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1762 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1764 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1765 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1766 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1767 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1768 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1771 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1773 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1775 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1776 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1778 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1781 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1784 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1787 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1789 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1790 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1791 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1793 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1797 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1800 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1801 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1803 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1807 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1808 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1809 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1810 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1812 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1814 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1816 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1821 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1822 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1824 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1825 * a status request message.
1827 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1829 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1832 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1833 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1835 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1836 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1837 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1839 unsigned char *selected;
1840 unsigned char selected_len;
1842 /* We must have requested it. */
1843 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
1845 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1848 /* The data must be valid */
1849 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1851 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1854 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1856 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1859 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1860 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1862 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1865 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1866 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1867 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1870 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1872 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1874 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1877 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1881 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1882 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1884 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1885 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1886 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1888 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1893 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1895 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1905 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1909 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1911 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1913 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1915 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1916 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1918 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1924 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1934 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1935 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1936 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1937 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1938 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1939 * absence on initial connect only.
1941 if (!renegotiate_seen
1942 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1943 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1945 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1947 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1955 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1958 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1962 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1964 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1969 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1971 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1972 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1974 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1975 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1977 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1978 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1983 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1987 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1988 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1995 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1998 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1999 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
2000 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
2003 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2004 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2005 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
2006 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
2010 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2011 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
2013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2016 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
2017 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
2018 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
2019 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
2021 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2026 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2028 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2029 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2031 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2032 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2033 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2035 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2036 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2040 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2041 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2042 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2043 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2045 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2046 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2047 * the certificate has changed.
2049 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2052 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2055 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2056 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2057 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2059 /* status request response should be sent */
2060 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2061 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2062 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2064 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2066 /* something bad happened */
2067 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2068 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2069 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2074 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2076 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2078 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2079 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2080 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
2084 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2086 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2089 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2090 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2095 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2096 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2097 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2099 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2101 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2102 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2104 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2105 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2107 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2108 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2110 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2111 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2113 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2114 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2117 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2121 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2123 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2124 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2125 * abort the handshake.
2127 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2128 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2136 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2137 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2140 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2141 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2144 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2145 s->servername_done=0;
2151 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2153 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2154 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2156 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2157 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2158 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2159 * it must contain uncompressed.
2161 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2162 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2163 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2164 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2165 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2167 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2169 unsigned char *list;
2170 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2171 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2172 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2174 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2176 found_uncompressed = 1;
2180 if (!found_uncompressed)
2182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2186 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2187 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2189 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2190 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2191 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2192 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2194 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2195 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2197 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2198 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2200 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2202 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2203 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2206 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2207 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2208 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2209 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2211 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2212 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2217 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2220 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2221 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2224 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2225 * there is no response.
2227 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2229 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2230 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2232 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2233 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2236 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2237 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2241 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2242 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2248 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2249 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2252 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2253 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2256 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2257 s->servername_done=0;
2263 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2264 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2265 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2267 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2268 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2269 * extension, if any.
2270 * len: the length of the session ID.
2271 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2272 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2273 * point to the resulting session.
2275 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2276 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2277 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2280 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2281 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2282 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2283 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2284 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2285 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2286 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2289 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2290 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2291 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2292 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2293 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2294 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2296 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2297 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2299 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2300 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2304 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2306 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2307 * to permit stateful resumption.
2309 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2311 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2315 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2316 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2323 /* Skip past cipher list */
2328 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2333 /* Now at start of extensions */
2334 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2337 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2339 unsigned short type, size;
2342 if (p + size > limit)
2344 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2349 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2350 * currently have one. */
2351 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2354 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2356 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2357 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2358 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2359 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2360 * calculate the master secret later. */
2363 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2366 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2367 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2369 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2371 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2372 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2374 default: /* fatal error */
2383 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2385 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2386 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2387 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2388 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2389 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2390 * point to the resulting session.
2393 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2394 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2395 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2396 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2398 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2399 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2400 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2403 unsigned char *sdec;
2404 const unsigned char *p;
2405 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2406 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2409 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2410 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2413 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2414 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2415 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2416 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2418 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2419 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2430 /* Check key name matches */
2431 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2433 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2434 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2435 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2436 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2438 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2439 * integrity checks on ticket.
2441 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2444 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2448 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2449 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2450 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2451 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2452 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2454 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2455 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2456 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2457 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2458 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2461 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2464 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2465 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2468 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2471 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2475 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2476 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2477 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2478 * as required by standard.
2481 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2482 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2490 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2495 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2503 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2504 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2505 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2506 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2507 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2508 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2509 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2512 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2513 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2514 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2515 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2518 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2521 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2523 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2529 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2532 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2534 if ((table[i].id) == id)
2535 return table[i].nid;
2540 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2545 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2546 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2549 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2552 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2553 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2557 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2559 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2560 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2563 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2568 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
2575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2576 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2580 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2581 return EVP_sha224();
2583 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2584 return EVP_sha256();
2586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2587 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2588 return EVP_sha384();
2590 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2591 return EVP_sha512();
2599 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2601 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2606 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
2607 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2608 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2610 /* Should never happen */
2614 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2615 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2616 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2617 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2620 OPENSSL_free(c->sigalgs);
2621 c->sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((dsize/2) * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
2624 c->sigalgslen = dsize/2;
2626 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->sigalgs; i < dsize; i += 2, sigptr++)
2628 sigptr->rhash = data[i];
2629 sigptr->rsign = data[i + 1];
2630 sigptr->hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(sigptr->rhash, tls12_md,
2631 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2632 sigptr->sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(sigptr->rsign, tls12_sig,
2633 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2634 if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&sigptr->signandhash_nid,
2637 sigptr->signandhash_nid = NID_undef;
2638 switch(sigptr->rsign)
2640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2641 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2642 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2646 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2647 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2651 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2659 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2661 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
2664 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2665 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2666 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2673 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2674 * supported it stays as NULL.
2676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2677 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2678 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1();
2680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2681 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2683 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2684 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2688 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2689 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa();
2696 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2697 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignandhash,
2698 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2700 if (s->cert->sigalgs == NULL)
2705 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->sigalgslen)
2707 psig = s->cert->sigalgs + idx;
2709 *psign = psig->sign_nid;
2711 *phash = psig->hash_nid;
2713 *psignandhash = psig->signandhash_nid;
2715 *rsig = psig->rsign;
2717 *rhash = psig->rhash;
2719 return s->cert->sigalgslen;
2723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2725 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2727 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2728 unsigned short hbtype;
2729 unsigned int payload;
2730 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2732 /* Read type and payload length first */
2737 if (s->msg_callback)
2738 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2739 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2740 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2742 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
2744 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2747 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
2748 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
2749 * payload, plus padding
2751 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2754 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2755 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2757 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2759 /* Random padding */
2760 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
2762 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
2764 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2765 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2766 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2767 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2769 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2774 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
2778 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
2779 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
2780 * sequence number */
2783 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
2786 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2794 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2796 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2798 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2799 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2801 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2802 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2803 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2809 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2810 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
2812 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2816 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2817 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2823 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
2824 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2826 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2828 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2829 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2830 * some random stuff.
2831 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2832 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2833 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2834 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2837 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2840 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2841 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2843 /* Sequence number */
2844 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2845 /* 16 random bytes */
2846 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2848 /* Random padding */
2849 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
2851 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2854 if (s->msg_callback)
2855 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2856 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2857 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2859 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;