2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
251 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
253 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
254 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
255 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
258 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
260 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
261 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
262 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
263 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
264 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
265 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
266 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
267 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
268 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
269 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
270 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
271 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
272 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
273 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
274 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
275 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
276 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
277 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
278 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
279 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
280 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
281 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
282 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
283 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
284 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
287 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
289 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
290 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
293 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
295 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
296 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
297 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
299 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
302 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
304 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
307 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
309 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
311 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
313 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
315 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
317 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
319 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
321 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
323 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
325 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
327 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
329 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
331 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
333 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
335 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
337 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
339 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
341 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
343 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
345 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
347 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
349 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
351 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
353 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
355 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
361 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
364 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
365 const unsigned char **pcurves,
370 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
371 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
374 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
375 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
377 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
378 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
379 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
382 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
383 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
387 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
388 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
392 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
393 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
397 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
398 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
401 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
402 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
404 const unsigned char *curves;
406 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
407 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
409 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
412 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
415 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
420 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
422 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
425 else /* Should never happen */
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
429 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
431 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
437 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
438 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
442 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
444 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
445 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
447 /* Can't do anything on client side */
454 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
455 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
458 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
459 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
460 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
461 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
463 /* Should never happen */
466 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
469 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
471 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
476 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
478 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
479 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
481 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
485 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
486 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
497 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
498 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
500 unsigned char *clist, *p;
502 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
503 * while curve ids < 32
505 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
506 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
509 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
511 unsigned long idmask;
513 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
515 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
526 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
530 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
535 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
538 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
540 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
544 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
546 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
548 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
550 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
551 if (nid == NID_undef)
552 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
553 if (nid == NID_undef)
554 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
555 if (nid == NID_undef)
557 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
558 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
560 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
563 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
564 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
569 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
573 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
575 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
576 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
582 const EC_METHOD *meth;
585 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
586 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
587 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
590 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
593 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
597 /* Determine curve ID */
598 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
599 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
600 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
604 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
616 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
619 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
621 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
624 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
628 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
629 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
630 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
632 const unsigned char *p;
635 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
636 * is supported (see RFC4492).
638 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
640 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
641 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
642 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
652 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
653 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
655 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
656 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
658 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
663 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
670 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
673 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
675 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
677 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
678 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
682 *pformats = ecformats_default;
683 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
685 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
687 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
691 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
692 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
694 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
696 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
699 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
702 /* If not EC nothing to do */
703 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
708 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
712 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
713 * supported curves extension.
715 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
718 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
719 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
721 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
728 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
729 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
730 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
731 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
732 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
734 return 0; /* Should never happen */
735 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
736 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
738 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
742 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
743 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
745 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
750 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
751 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
753 unsigned char curve_id[2];
754 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
755 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
756 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
757 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
760 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
761 * no other curves permitted.
765 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
766 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
767 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
768 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
769 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
773 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
774 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
776 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
777 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
779 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
782 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
785 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
787 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
793 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
795 /* Need a shared curve */
796 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
802 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
807 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
809 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
813 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
817 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
821 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
822 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
825 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
826 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
828 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
831 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
832 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
834 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
837 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
838 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
840 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
843 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
844 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
845 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
846 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
848 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
849 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
850 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
851 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
854 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
855 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
858 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
861 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
865 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
866 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
867 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
870 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
872 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
875 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
877 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
878 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
879 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
881 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
882 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
885 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
886 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
890 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
891 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
893 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
894 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
896 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
898 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
899 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
903 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
905 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
907 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
910 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
913 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
914 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
916 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
917 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
919 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
920 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
921 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
922 /* Should never happen */
925 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
926 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
931 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
933 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
934 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
935 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
937 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
942 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
947 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
949 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
952 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
956 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
958 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
961 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
969 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
972 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
973 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
974 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
976 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
979 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
980 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
985 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
991 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
994 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
995 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
998 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
999 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1000 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1001 * session and not global settings.
1004 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1007 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1008 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1009 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1012 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1013 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1014 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1017 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1018 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1021 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1022 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1026 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1027 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1031 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1032 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1037 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1043 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1044 * signature algorithms.
1048 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1049 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1053 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1054 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1058 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1059 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1062 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1064 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1065 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1069 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1070 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1072 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1075 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1079 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1080 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1082 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1083 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1092 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1095 unsigned char *ret = p;
1096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1097 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1099 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1102 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1103 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1105 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1107 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1109 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1110 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1111 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1112 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1121 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1122 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1123 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1128 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1130 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1132 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1133 unsigned long size_str;
1136 /* check for enough space.
1137 4 for the servername type and entension length
1138 2 for servernamelist length
1139 1 for the hostname type
1140 2 for hostname length
1144 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1145 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1148 /* extension type and length */
1149 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1150 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1152 /* length of servername list */
1153 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1155 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1156 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1158 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1162 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1167 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1173 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1175 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1178 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1188 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1189 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1190 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1192 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1193 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 /* check for enough space.
1200 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1201 1 for the srp user identity
1202 + srp user identity length
1204 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1206 /* fill in the extension */
1207 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1208 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1209 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1210 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1218 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1220 const unsigned char *plist;
1223 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1225 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1226 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1234 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1235 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1236 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1239 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1240 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1241 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1243 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1244 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1245 if (plistlen > 65532)
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1252 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1254 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1255 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1256 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1257 * resolves this to two bytes.
1260 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1263 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1265 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1268 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1269 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1270 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1271 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1273 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1274 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1275 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1277 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1278 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1280 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1284 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1285 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1287 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1290 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1291 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1295 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1301 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1304 const unsigned char *salg;
1305 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1306 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1308 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1309 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1311 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1315 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1316 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1318 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1320 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1322 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1325 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1328 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1333 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1336 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1340 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1342 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1343 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1349 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1351 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1358 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1360 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1362 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1363 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1365 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1367 /* save position of id len */
1368 unsigned char *q = ret;
1369 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1370 /* skip over id len */
1372 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1378 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1382 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1383 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1386 * 1: peer may send requests
1387 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1389 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1390 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1392 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1396 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1398 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1399 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1400 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1402 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1407 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1411 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1413 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1418 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1426 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1427 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1428 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1429 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1430 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1431 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1433 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1434 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1436 if (limit < ret + 6)
1439 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1440 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1442 *(ret++) = list_len;
1443 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1446 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1447 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1450 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1452 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1454 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1455 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1457 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1458 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1462 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1464 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1466 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1471 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1478 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1481 unsigned char *ret = p;
1482 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1483 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1485 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1486 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1487 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1488 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1490 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1491 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1495 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1497 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1499 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1501 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1505 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1509 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1515 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1517 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1520 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1532 const unsigned char *plist;
1534 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1537 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1539 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1540 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1547 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1548 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1549 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1550 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1554 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1555 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1557 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1558 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1560 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1561 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1565 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1567 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1568 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1572 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1573 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1575 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1577 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1579 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1582 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1585 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1594 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1596 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1598 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1601 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1609 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1610 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1611 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1612 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1613 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1614 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1615 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1616 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1617 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1618 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1619 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1625 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1626 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1628 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1631 * 1: peer may send requests
1632 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1634 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1635 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1637 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1643 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1644 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1645 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1647 const unsigned char *npa;
1648 unsigned int npalen;
1651 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1652 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1654 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1655 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1657 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1659 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1664 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1666 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1668 size_t authz_length;
1669 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1670 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1671 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1672 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1673 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1675 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1677 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1678 * uint8_t authz_type
1680 * uint8_t data[length]
1682 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1683 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1685 unsigned short length;
1689 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1691 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1695 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1703 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1704 * 2 bytes for extension type
1705 * 2 bytes for extension length
1706 * 1 byte for the list length
1707 * n bytes for the list */
1708 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1710 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1711 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1713 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1714 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1718 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1720 unsigned short length;
1725 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1727 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1730 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1737 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1738 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1742 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1745 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1747 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1749 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1750 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1752 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1753 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1755 && !record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1759 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1761 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1763 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1771 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1778 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1780 unsigned short type;
1781 unsigned short size;
1783 unsigned char *data = *p;
1784 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1787 s->servername_done = 0;
1788 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1790 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1793 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1794 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1795 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1797 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1798 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1800 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1801 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1803 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1804 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1806 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1807 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1809 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1810 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1812 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1813 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1816 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1820 if (data > (d+n-len))
1823 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1828 if (data+size > (d+n))
1831 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1833 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1834 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1835 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1836 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1838 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1839 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1840 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1841 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1842 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1843 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1844 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1845 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1846 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1847 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1848 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1849 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1850 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1851 the value of the Host: field.
1852 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1853 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1854 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1855 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1859 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1861 unsigned char *sdata;
1867 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1874 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1881 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1887 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1890 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1891 switch (servname_type)
1893 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1896 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1898 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1901 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1903 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1906 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1908 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1911 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1912 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1913 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1914 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1915 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1916 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1919 s->servername_done = 1;
1923 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1924 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1925 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1937 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1943 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1945 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1947 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1950 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1952 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1955 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1957 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1958 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1960 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1962 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1969 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1971 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1972 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1974 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1975 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1977 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1982 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1984 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1985 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1987 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1988 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1990 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1993 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1994 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1997 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1998 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1999 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2000 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2001 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2004 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2006 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2007 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2008 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2010 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2011 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2013 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2018 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2020 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2023 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2024 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2026 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2029 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2030 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2033 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2034 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2035 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2036 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2037 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2040 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2041 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2042 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2044 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2048 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2051 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2052 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2054 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2058 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2059 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2060 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2061 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2063 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2064 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2066 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2071 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2073 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2074 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2076 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2080 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2082 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2084 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2086 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2089 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2091 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2096 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2098 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2101 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2103 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2106 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2109 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2112 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2113 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2117 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
2118 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2123 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2127 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2129 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2131 const unsigned char *sdata;
2133 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2138 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2147 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2151 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2155 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2160 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2164 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2169 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2170 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2173 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2174 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2175 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2177 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2178 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2181 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2182 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2184 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2185 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2190 /* Read in request_extensions */
2193 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2200 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2206 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2208 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2209 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2212 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2213 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2215 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2216 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2218 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2223 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2227 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2230 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2234 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2235 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2237 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2238 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2239 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2241 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2247 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2248 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2250 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2253 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2254 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2255 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2256 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2257 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2258 * anything like that, but this might change).
2260 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2261 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2262 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2263 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2264 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2265 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2269 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2270 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2272 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2277 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2279 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2280 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2284 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2288 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2290 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2292 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2296 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2297 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2298 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2301 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2302 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2303 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2304 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2305 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2307 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2311 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2312 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2313 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2315 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2317 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2318 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2319 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2320 1 /* element size */,
2323 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2326 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2327 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2329 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2336 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2337 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2338 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2339 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2340 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2342 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2344 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2346 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2348 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2349 if (type == record->ext_type)
2351 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2354 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2356 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j] == type)
2358 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2364 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2367 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2368 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2369 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2370 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2371 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count*2);
2372 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2374 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2375 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2378 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2379 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count-1] = type;
2391 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2393 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2394 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2396 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2398 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2401 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2402 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2403 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2408 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2411 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2413 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2417 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2426 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2427 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2428 * the length of the block. */
2429 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2431 unsigned int off = 0;
2445 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2447 unsigned short length;
2448 unsigned short type;
2449 unsigned short size;
2450 unsigned char *data = *p;
2451 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2452 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2455 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2459 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2460 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2463 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2467 if (data+length != d+n)
2469 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2473 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2478 if (data+size > (d+n))
2481 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2482 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2483 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2485 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2487 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2489 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2492 tlsext_servername = 1;
2495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2496 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2498 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2499 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2501 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2503 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2506 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2507 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2508 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2510 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2513 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2514 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2516 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2517 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2518 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2519 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2520 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2523 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2525 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2527 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2528 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2530 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2533 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2536 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2539 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2541 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2542 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2544 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2548 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2551 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2552 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2554 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2558 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2559 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2560 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2561 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2563 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2565 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2567 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2572 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2574 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2575 * a status request message.
2577 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2579 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2582 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2583 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2586 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2587 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2589 unsigned char *selected;
2590 unsigned char selected_len;
2592 /* We must have requested it. */
2593 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2595 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2598 /* The data must be valid */
2599 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2601 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2604 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2606 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2609 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2610 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2612 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2615 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2616 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2617 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2620 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2622 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2624 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2627 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2631 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2632 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2634 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2635 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2636 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2638 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2643 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2645 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2650 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2652 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2653 * an authz hello extension if the client
2654 * didn't request a proof. */
2655 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2656 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2658 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2660 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2666 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2670 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2671 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2673 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2677 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2678 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2679 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2680 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2682 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2686 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2689 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2690 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2692 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2695 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2697 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2699 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2700 if (record->ext_type == type)
2702 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2714 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2718 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2720 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2722 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2724 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2725 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2727 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2733 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2743 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2744 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2745 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2746 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2747 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2748 * absence on initial connect only.
2750 if (!renegotiate_seen
2751 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2752 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2754 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2756 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2764 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2767 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2771 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2773 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2778 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2780 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2781 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2783 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2784 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2786 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2787 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2792 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2796 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2797 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2804 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2809 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2811 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2812 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2815 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2816 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2818 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2819 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2823 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2824 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2825 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2826 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2828 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2830 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2831 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2832 * so this has to happen here in
2833 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2837 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2839 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2842 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2843 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2848 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2849 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2850 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2852 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2854 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2855 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2857 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2858 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2860 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2861 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2863 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2864 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2866 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2867 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2870 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2874 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2876 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2877 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2878 * abort the handshake.
2880 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2881 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2889 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2890 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2893 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2894 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2897 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2898 s->servername_done=0;
2904 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2906 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2909 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2910 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2911 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2912 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2914 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2917 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2918 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2919 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2920 if (certpkey == NULL)
2922 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2925 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2926 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2928 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2929 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2932 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2933 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2934 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2936 /* status request response should be sent */
2937 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2938 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2939 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2941 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2943 /* something bad happened */
2944 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2945 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2946 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2951 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2956 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2957 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2960 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2961 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2969 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2971 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2972 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2975 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2976 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2977 * it must contain uncompressed.
2979 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2980 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2981 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2982 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2983 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2985 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2987 unsigned char *list;
2988 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2989 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2990 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2992 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2994 found_uncompressed = 1;
2998 if (!found_uncompressed)
3000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3004 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3005 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3007 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3008 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3009 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3010 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3012 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3013 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3015 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3016 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3018 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3020 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3021 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3024 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3025 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3026 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3027 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3029 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3030 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3035 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3038 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3039 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3042 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3043 * there is no response.
3045 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3047 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3048 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3050 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3051 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3054 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3055 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3059 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3060 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3066 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3067 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3070 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3071 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3074 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3075 s->servername_done=0;
3081 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3084 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3086 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3088 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3092 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3100 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3101 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3102 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3104 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3105 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3106 * extension, if any.
3107 * len: the length of the session ID.
3108 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3109 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3110 * point to the resulting session.
3112 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3113 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3114 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3117 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3118 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3119 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3120 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3121 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3122 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3123 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3126 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3127 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3128 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3129 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3130 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3131 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3133 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3134 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3136 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3137 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3141 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3143 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3144 * to permit stateful resumption.
3146 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3148 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3152 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3160 /* Skip past cipher list */
3165 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3170 /* Now at start of extensions */
3171 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3174 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3176 unsigned short type, size;
3179 if (p + size > limit)
3181 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3186 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3187 * currently have one. */
3188 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3191 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3193 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3194 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3195 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3196 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3197 * calculate the master secret later. */
3200 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3203 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3204 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3206 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3208 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3209 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3211 default: /* fatal error */
3220 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3222 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3223 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3224 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3225 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3226 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3227 * point to the resulting session.
3230 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3231 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3232 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3233 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3235 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3236 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3237 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3240 unsigned char *sdec;
3241 const unsigned char *p;
3242 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3243 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3246 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3247 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3250 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3251 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3252 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3253 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3255 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3256 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3267 /* Check key name matches */
3268 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3270 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3271 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3272 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3273 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3275 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3276 * integrity checks on ticket.
3278 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3281 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3285 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3286 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3287 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3288 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3289 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3291 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3292 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3293 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3294 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3295 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3298 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3301 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3302 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3305 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3308 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3312 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3313 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3314 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3315 * as required by standard.
3318 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3319 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3327 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3332 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3340 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3341 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3342 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3343 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3344 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3345 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3346 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3349 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3350 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3351 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3352 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3355 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3358 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3360 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3366 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3369 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3371 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3372 return table[i].nid;
3377 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3382 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3383 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3386 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3389 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3390 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3394 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3396 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3397 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3400 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3405 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3413 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3417 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3418 return EVP_sha224();
3420 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3421 return EVP_sha256();
3423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3424 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3425 return EVP_sha384();
3427 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3428 return EVP_sha512();
3436 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3441 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3442 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3445 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3446 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3449 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3450 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3456 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3457 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3458 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3460 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3461 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3463 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3465 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3466 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3468 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3470 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3472 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3473 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3475 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3479 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3480 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3481 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3483 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3486 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3487 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3488 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3489 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3491 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3492 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3493 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3495 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3496 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3498 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3500 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3502 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3507 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3508 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3509 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3511 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3522 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3523 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3525 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3526 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3528 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3530 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3531 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3532 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3534 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3535 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3537 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3539 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3540 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3543 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3544 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3548 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3549 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3555 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3556 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3558 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3561 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3564 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3565 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3566 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3571 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3573 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3579 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3580 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3581 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3583 /* Should never happen */
3587 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3588 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3590 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3591 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3593 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3595 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3596 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3598 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3599 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3601 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3603 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3605 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3608 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3609 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3610 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3611 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3612 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3614 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3615 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3621 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3622 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3624 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3625 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3627 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3628 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3629 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3630 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3632 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3633 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3638 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3639 * use the certificate for signing.
3641 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3643 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3644 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3647 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3648 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3651 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3653 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3654 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3658 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3659 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3666 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3667 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3668 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3670 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3676 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3683 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3685 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3688 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3689 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3690 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3692 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3693 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3697 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3699 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3701 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3703 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3705 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3706 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3712 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3714 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3715 unsigned short hbtype;
3716 unsigned int payload;
3717 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3719 /* Read type and payload length first */
3724 if (s->msg_callback)
3725 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3726 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3727 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3729 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3731 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3734 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3735 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3736 * payload, plus padding
3738 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3741 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3742 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3744 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3746 /* Random padding */
3747 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3749 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3751 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3752 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3753 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3754 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3756 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3761 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3765 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3766 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3767 * sequence number */
3770 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3773 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3781 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3783 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3785 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3786 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3788 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3789 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3790 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3792 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3796 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3797 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3799 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3803 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3804 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3806 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3810 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3811 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3813 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3815 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3816 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3817 * some random stuff.
3818 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3819 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3820 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3821 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3824 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3827 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3828 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3830 /* Sequence number */
3831 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3832 /* 16 random bytes */
3833 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3835 /* Random padding */
3836 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3838 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3841 if (s->msg_callback)
3842 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3843 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3844 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3846 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3855 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3860 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3863 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3865 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3868 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3869 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3871 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3873 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3875 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3883 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3884 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3885 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3886 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3887 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3888 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3891 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3892 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3893 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3894 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3897 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3899 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3900 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3903 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3904 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3908 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3909 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3910 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3914 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3918 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3921 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3923 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3928 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3929 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3931 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3933 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3934 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3935 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3936 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3938 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3946 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3947 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3948 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3949 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3953 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3954 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3955 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3956 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3962 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3966 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3970 if (default_nid == -1)
3972 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3974 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3975 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3976 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3980 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3981 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3985 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3986 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3988 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3994 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3995 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3996 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3997 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4000 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4002 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4003 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4004 /* Strict mode flags */
4005 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4006 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4007 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4009 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4014 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4015 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4017 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4018 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4021 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4025 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4028 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4030 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4032 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4033 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4036 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4037 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4038 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4040 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4041 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4050 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4053 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4054 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4055 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4057 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4065 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4066 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4067 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4070 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4076 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4077 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4080 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4083 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4084 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4086 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4091 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4092 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4093 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4094 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4095 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4098 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4099 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4100 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4101 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4105 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4106 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4114 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4115 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4118 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4121 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4122 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4124 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4127 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4135 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4136 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4138 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4141 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4142 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4143 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4145 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4150 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4158 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4159 else if(check_flags)
4160 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4162 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4163 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4164 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4165 else if (!check_flags)
4168 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4169 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4170 else if (strict_mode)
4172 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4173 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4175 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4176 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4180 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4188 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4190 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4195 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4198 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4201 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4206 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4207 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4208 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4209 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4210 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4215 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4220 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4224 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4225 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4227 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4229 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4231 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4235 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4239 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4242 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4244 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4245 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4247 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4249 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4250 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4252 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4254 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4256 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4257 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4259 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4264 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4268 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4270 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4271 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4275 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4277 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4278 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4279 else if (cpk->digest)
4280 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4283 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4285 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4286 * if the chain is invalid.
4290 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4291 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4294 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4295 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4302 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4303 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4305 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4306 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4307 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4308 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4309 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4310 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4312 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4313 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4315 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);