2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
251 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
253 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
254 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
255 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
258 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
260 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
261 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
262 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
263 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
264 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
265 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
266 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
267 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
268 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
269 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
270 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
271 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
272 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
273 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
274 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
275 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
276 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
277 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
278 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
279 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
280 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
281 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
282 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
283 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
284 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
287 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
289 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
290 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
293 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
295 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
296 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
297 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
299 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
302 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
304 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
307 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
309 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
311 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
313 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
315 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
317 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
319 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
321 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
323 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
325 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
327 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
329 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
331 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
333 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
335 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
337 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
339 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
341 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
343 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
345 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
347 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
349 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
351 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
353 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
355 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
361 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
364 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
365 const unsigned char **pcurves,
370 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
371 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
374 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
375 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
377 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
378 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
379 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
382 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
383 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
387 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
388 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
392 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
393 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
397 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
398 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
401 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
402 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
404 const unsigned char *curves;
406 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
407 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
409 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
412 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
415 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
420 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
422 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
425 else /* Should never happen */
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
429 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
431 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
437 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
438 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
442 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
444 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
445 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
447 /* Can't do anything on client side */
454 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
455 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
458 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
459 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
460 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
461 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
463 /* Should never happen */
466 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
469 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
471 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
476 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
478 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
479 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
481 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
485 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
486 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
497 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
498 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
500 unsigned char *clist, *p;
502 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
503 * while curve ids < 32
505 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
506 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
509 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
511 unsigned long idmask;
513 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
515 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
526 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
530 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
535 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
538 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
540 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
544 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
546 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
548 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
550 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
551 if (nid == NID_undef)
552 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
553 if (nid == NID_undef)
554 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
555 if (nid == NID_undef)
557 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
558 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
560 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
563 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
564 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
569 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
573 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
575 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
576 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
582 const EC_METHOD *meth;
585 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
586 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
587 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
590 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
593 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
597 /* Determine curve ID */
598 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
599 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
600 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
604 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
616 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
619 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
621 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
624 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
628 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
629 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
630 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
632 const unsigned char *p;
635 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
636 * is supported (see RFC4492).
638 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
640 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
641 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
642 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
652 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
653 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
655 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
656 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
658 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
663 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
670 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
673 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
675 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
677 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
678 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
682 *pformats = ecformats_default;
683 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
685 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
687 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
691 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
692 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
694 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
696 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
699 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
702 /* If not EC nothing to do */
703 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
708 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
712 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
713 * supported curves extension.
715 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
718 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
719 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
721 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
728 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
729 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
730 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
731 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
732 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
734 return 0; /* Should never happen */
735 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
736 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
738 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
742 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
743 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
745 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
750 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
751 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
753 unsigned char curve_id[2];
754 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
755 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
756 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
757 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
760 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
761 * no other curves permitted.
765 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
766 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
767 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
768 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
769 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
773 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
774 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
776 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
777 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
779 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
782 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
785 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
787 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
793 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
795 /* Need a shared curve */
796 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
802 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
807 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
809 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
813 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
817 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
821 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
822 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
825 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
826 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
828 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
831 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
832 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
834 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
837 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
838 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
840 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
843 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
844 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
845 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
846 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
848 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
849 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
850 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
851 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
854 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
855 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
858 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
861 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
865 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
866 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
867 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
870 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
872 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
875 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
877 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
878 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
879 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
881 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
882 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
885 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
886 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
890 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
891 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
893 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
894 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
896 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
898 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
899 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
903 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
905 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
907 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
910 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
913 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
914 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
916 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
917 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
919 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
920 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
921 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
922 /* Should never happen */
925 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
926 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
931 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
933 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
934 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
935 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
937 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
942 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
947 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
949 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
952 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
956 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
958 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
961 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
969 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
972 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
973 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
974 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
976 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
979 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
980 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
985 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
991 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
994 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
995 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
998 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
999 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1000 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1001 * session and not global settings.
1004 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1007 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1008 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1009 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1012 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1013 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1014 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1017 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1018 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1021 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1022 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1026 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1027 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1031 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1032 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1037 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1043 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1044 * signature algorithms.
1048 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1049 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1053 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1054 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1058 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1059 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1062 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1064 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1065 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1069 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1070 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1072 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1075 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1079 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1080 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1082 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1083 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1092 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1095 unsigned char *ret = p;
1096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1097 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1099 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1102 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1103 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1105 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1107 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1109 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1110 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1111 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1112 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1121 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1122 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1123 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1128 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1130 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1132 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1133 unsigned long size_str;
1136 /* check for enough space.
1137 4 for the servername type and entension length
1138 2 for servernamelist length
1139 1 for the hostname type
1140 2 for hostname length
1144 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1145 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1148 /* extension type and length */
1149 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1150 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1152 /* length of servername list */
1153 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1155 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1156 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1158 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1162 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1167 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1173 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1175 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1178 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1188 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1189 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1190 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1192 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1193 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 /* check for enough space.
1200 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1201 1 for the srp user identity
1202 + srp user identity length
1204 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1206 /* fill in the extension */
1207 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1208 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1209 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1210 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1218 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1220 const unsigned char *plist;
1223 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1225 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1226 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1234 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1235 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1236 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1239 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1240 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1241 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1243 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1244 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1245 if (plistlen > 65532)
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1252 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1254 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1255 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1256 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1257 * resolves this to two bytes.
1260 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1263 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1265 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1268 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1269 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1270 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1271 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1273 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1274 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1275 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1277 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1278 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1280 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1284 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1285 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1287 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1290 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1291 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1295 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1301 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1304 const unsigned char *salg;
1305 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1306 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1308 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1309 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1311 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1315 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1316 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1318 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1320 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1322 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1325 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1328 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1333 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1336 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1340 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1342 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1343 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1349 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1351 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1358 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1360 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1362 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1363 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1365 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1367 /* save position of id len */
1368 unsigned char *q = ret;
1369 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1370 /* skip over id len */
1372 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1378 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1382 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1383 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1386 * 1: peer may send requests
1387 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1389 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1390 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1392 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1396 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1398 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1399 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1400 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1402 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1407 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1411 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1413 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1418 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1426 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1427 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1428 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1429 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1430 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1431 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1433 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1434 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1436 if (limit < ret + 6)
1439 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1440 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1442 *(ret++) = list_len;
1443 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1446 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1447 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1450 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1452 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1454 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1455 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1457 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1458 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1459 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1463 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1467 return NULL; /* error */
1468 if (cb_retval == -1)
1469 continue; /* skip this extension */
1471 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1473 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1475 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1480 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1487 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1490 unsigned char *ret = p;
1491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1492 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1494 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1495 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1496 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1497 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1499 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1500 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1504 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1506 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1508 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1510 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1514 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1518 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1524 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1526 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1529 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1541 const unsigned char *plist;
1543 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1546 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1548 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1549 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1556 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1557 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1558 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1559 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1563 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1564 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1566 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1567 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1569 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1570 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1574 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1576 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1577 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1581 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1582 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1584 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1586 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1588 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1591 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1594 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1603 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1605 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1607 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1610 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1618 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1619 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1620 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1621 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1622 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1623 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1624 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1625 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1626 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1627 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1628 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1634 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1635 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1637 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1640 * 1: peer may send requests
1641 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1643 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1644 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1646 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1652 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1653 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1654 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1656 const unsigned char *npa;
1657 unsigned int npalen;
1660 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1661 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1663 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1664 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1666 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1668 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1673 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1675 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1677 size_t authz_length;
1678 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1679 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1680 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1681 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1682 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1684 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1686 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1687 * uint8_t authz_type
1689 * uint8_t data[length]
1691 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1692 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1694 unsigned short length;
1698 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1700 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1704 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1712 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1713 * 2 bytes for extension type
1714 * 2 bytes for extension length
1715 * 1 byte for the list length
1716 * n bytes for the list */
1717 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1719 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1720 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1722 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1723 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1727 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1729 unsigned short length;
1734 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1736 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1739 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1746 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1747 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1751 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1754 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1756 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1758 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1759 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1761 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1762 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1765 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1768 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1772 return NULL; /* error */
1773 if (cb_retval == -1)
1774 break; /* skip this extension */
1775 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1777 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1779 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1787 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1794 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1796 unsigned short type;
1797 unsigned short size;
1799 unsigned char *data = *p;
1800 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1803 s->servername_done = 0;
1804 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1806 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1810 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1811 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1813 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1814 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1816 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1817 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1819 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1820 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1822 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1823 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1825 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1826 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1828 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1829 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1832 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1836 if (data > (d+n-len))
1839 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1844 if (data+size > (d+n))
1847 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1849 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1850 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1851 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1852 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1854 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1855 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1856 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1857 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1858 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1859 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1860 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1861 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1862 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1863 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1864 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1865 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1866 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1867 the value of the Host: field.
1868 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1869 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1870 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1871 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1875 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1877 unsigned char *sdata;
1883 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1890 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1897 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1903 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1906 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1907 switch (servname_type)
1909 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1912 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1914 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1917 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1919 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1922 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1924 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1927 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1928 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1929 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1930 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1931 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1932 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1935 s->servername_done = 1;
1939 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1940 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1941 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1953 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1959 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1961 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1963 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1966 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1968 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1971 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1973 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1974 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1976 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1978 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1985 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1987 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1988 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1990 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1991 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1993 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1998 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2000 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2001 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2003 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2004 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2006 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2009 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2010 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2013 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2014 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2015 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2016 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2017 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2020 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2022 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2023 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2024 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2026 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2027 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2029 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2034 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2036 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2039 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2040 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2042 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2045 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2046 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2049 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2050 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2051 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2052 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2053 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2056 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2057 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2058 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2060 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2064 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2067 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2068 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2070 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2074 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2075 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2076 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2077 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2079 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2080 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2082 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2087 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2089 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2090 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2092 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2096 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2098 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2100 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2102 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2105 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2107 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2112 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2114 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2117 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2119 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2122 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2125 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2128 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2129 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2133 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
2134 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2139 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2143 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2145 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2147 const unsigned char *sdata;
2149 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2154 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2163 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2167 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2171 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2176 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2180 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2185 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2186 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2189 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2190 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2191 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2193 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2194 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2197 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2198 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2200 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2201 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2206 /* Read in request_extensions */
2209 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2216 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2222 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2224 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2225 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2228 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2229 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2231 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2232 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2234 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2239 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2243 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2246 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2250 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2251 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2253 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2254 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2255 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2257 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2263 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2264 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2266 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2269 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2270 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2271 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2272 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2273 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2274 * anything like that, but this might change).
2276 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2277 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2278 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2279 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2280 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2281 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2285 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2286 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2288 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2293 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2295 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2296 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2300 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2304 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2306 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2308 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2312 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2313 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2314 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2317 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2318 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2319 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2320 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2321 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2323 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2327 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2328 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2329 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2331 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2333 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2334 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2335 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2336 1 /* element size */,
2339 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2342 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2343 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2345 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2352 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2353 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2354 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2355 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2356 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2358 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2360 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2362 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2364 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2365 if (type == record->ext_type)
2367 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2370 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2372 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j] == type)
2374 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2380 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2383 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2384 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2385 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2386 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2387 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count*2);
2388 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2390 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2391 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2394 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2395 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count-1] = type;
2407 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2409 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2410 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2412 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2414 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2417 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2418 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2419 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2424 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2427 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2429 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2433 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2442 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2443 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2444 * the length of the block. */
2445 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2447 unsigned int off = 0;
2461 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2463 unsigned short length;
2464 unsigned short type;
2465 unsigned short size;
2466 unsigned char *data = *p;
2467 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2468 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2471 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2475 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2476 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2479 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2483 if (data+length != d+n)
2485 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2489 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2494 if (data+size > (d+n))
2497 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2498 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2499 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2501 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2503 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2505 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2508 tlsext_servername = 1;
2511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2512 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2514 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2515 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2517 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2519 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2522 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2523 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2524 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2526 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2529 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2530 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2532 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2533 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2534 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2535 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2536 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2539 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2541 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2543 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2544 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2546 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2549 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2552 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2555 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2557 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2558 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2560 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2564 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2567 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2568 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2570 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2574 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2575 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2576 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2577 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2579 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2581 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2583 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2588 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2590 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2591 * a status request message.
2593 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2595 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2598 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2599 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2602 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2603 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2605 unsigned char *selected;
2606 unsigned char selected_len;
2608 /* We must have requested it. */
2609 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2611 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2614 /* The data must be valid */
2615 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2617 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2620 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2622 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2625 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2626 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2628 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2631 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2632 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2633 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2636 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2638 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2640 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2643 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2647 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2648 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2650 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2651 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2652 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2654 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2659 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2661 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2666 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2668 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2669 * an authz hello extension if the client
2670 * didn't request a proof. */
2671 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2672 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2674 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2676 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2682 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2686 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2687 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2689 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2693 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2694 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2695 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2696 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2698 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2702 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2705 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2706 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2708 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2711 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2713 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2715 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2716 if (record->ext_type == type)
2718 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2730 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2734 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2736 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2738 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2740 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2741 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2743 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2749 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2759 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2760 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2761 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2762 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2763 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2764 * absence on initial connect only.
2766 if (!renegotiate_seen
2767 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2768 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2770 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2772 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2780 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2783 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2787 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2789 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2794 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2796 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2797 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2799 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2800 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2802 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2803 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2808 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2812 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2813 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2820 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2825 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2827 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2828 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2831 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2832 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2834 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2835 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2839 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2840 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2841 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2842 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2844 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2846 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2847 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2848 * so this has to happen here in
2849 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2853 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2855 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2858 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2859 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2864 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2865 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2866 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2868 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2870 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2871 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2873 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2874 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2876 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2877 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2879 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2880 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2882 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2883 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2886 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2890 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2892 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2893 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2894 * abort the handshake.
2896 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2897 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2905 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2906 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2909 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2910 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2913 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2914 s->servername_done=0;
2920 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2922 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2925 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2926 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2927 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2928 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2930 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2933 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2934 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2935 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2936 if (certpkey == NULL)
2938 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2941 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2942 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2944 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2945 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2948 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2949 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2950 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2952 /* status request response should be sent */
2953 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2954 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2955 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2957 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2959 /* something bad happened */
2960 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2961 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2962 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2967 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2972 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2973 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2976 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2977 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2985 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2987 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2988 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2991 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2992 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2993 * it must contain uncompressed.
2995 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2996 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2997 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2998 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2999 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3001 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3003 unsigned char *list;
3004 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3005 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3006 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3008 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3010 found_uncompressed = 1;
3014 if (!found_uncompressed)
3016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3020 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3021 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3023 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3024 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3025 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3026 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3028 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3029 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3031 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3032 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3034 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3036 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3037 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3040 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3041 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3042 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3043 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3045 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3046 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3051 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3054 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3055 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3058 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3059 * there is no response.
3061 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3063 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3064 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3066 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3067 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3070 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3071 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3075 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3076 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3082 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3083 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3086 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3087 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3090 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3091 s->servername_done=0;
3097 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3100 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3102 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3104 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3108 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3116 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3117 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3118 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3120 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3121 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3122 * extension, if any.
3123 * len: the length of the session ID.
3124 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3125 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3126 * point to the resulting session.
3128 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3129 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3130 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3133 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3134 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3135 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3136 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3137 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3138 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3139 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3142 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3143 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3144 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3145 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3146 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3147 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3149 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3150 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3152 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3153 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3157 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3159 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3160 * to permit stateful resumption.
3162 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3164 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3168 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3176 /* Skip past cipher list */
3181 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3186 /* Now at start of extensions */
3187 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3190 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3192 unsigned short type, size;
3195 if (p + size > limit)
3197 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3202 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3203 * currently have one. */
3204 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3207 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3209 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3210 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3211 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3212 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3213 * calculate the master secret later. */
3216 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3219 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3220 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3222 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3224 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3225 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3227 default: /* fatal error */
3236 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3238 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3239 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3240 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3241 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3242 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3243 * point to the resulting session.
3246 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3247 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3248 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3249 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3251 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3252 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3253 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3256 unsigned char *sdec;
3257 const unsigned char *p;
3258 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3259 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3262 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3263 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3266 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3267 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3268 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3269 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3271 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3272 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3283 /* Check key name matches */
3284 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3286 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3287 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3288 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3289 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3291 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3292 * integrity checks on ticket.
3294 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3297 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3301 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3302 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3303 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3304 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3305 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3307 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3308 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3309 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3310 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3311 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3314 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3317 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3318 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3321 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3324 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3328 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3329 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3330 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3331 * as required by standard.
3334 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3335 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3343 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3348 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3356 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3357 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3358 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3359 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3360 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3361 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3362 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3365 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3366 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3367 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3368 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3371 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3374 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3376 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3382 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3385 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3387 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3388 return table[i].nid;
3393 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3398 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3399 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3402 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3405 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3406 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3410 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3412 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3413 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3416 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3421 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3429 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3433 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3434 return EVP_sha224();
3436 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3437 return EVP_sha256();
3439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3440 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3441 return EVP_sha384();
3443 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3444 return EVP_sha512();
3452 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3457 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3458 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3461 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3462 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3465 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3466 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3472 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3473 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3474 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3476 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3477 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3479 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3481 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3482 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3484 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3486 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3488 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3489 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3491 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3495 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3496 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3497 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3499 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3502 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3503 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3504 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3505 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3507 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3508 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3509 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3511 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3512 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3514 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3516 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3518 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3523 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3524 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3525 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3527 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3538 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3539 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3541 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3542 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3544 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3546 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3547 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3548 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3550 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3551 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3553 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3555 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3556 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3559 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3560 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3564 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3565 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3571 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3572 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3574 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3577 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3580 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3581 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3582 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3587 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3589 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3595 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3596 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3597 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3599 /* Should never happen */
3603 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3604 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3606 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3607 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3609 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3611 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3612 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3614 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3615 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3617 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3619 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3621 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3624 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3625 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3626 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3627 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3628 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3630 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3631 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3637 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3638 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3640 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3641 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3643 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3644 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3645 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3646 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3648 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3649 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3654 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3655 * use the certificate for signing.
3657 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3659 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3660 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3663 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3664 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3666 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3667 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3669 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3670 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3674 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3675 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3682 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3683 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3684 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3686 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3692 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3699 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3701 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3704 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3705 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3706 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3708 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3709 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3713 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3715 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3717 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3719 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3721 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3722 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3726 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3728 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3730 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3731 unsigned short hbtype;
3732 unsigned int payload;
3733 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3735 /* Read type and payload length first */
3740 if (s->msg_callback)
3741 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3742 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3743 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3745 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3747 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3750 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3751 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3752 * payload, plus padding
3754 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3757 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3758 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3760 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3762 /* Random padding */
3763 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3765 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3767 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3768 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3769 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3770 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3772 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3777 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3781 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3782 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3783 * sequence number */
3786 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3789 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3797 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3799 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3801 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3802 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3804 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3805 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3806 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3808 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3812 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3813 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3819 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3820 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3826 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3827 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3829 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3831 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3832 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3833 * some random stuff.
3834 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3835 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3836 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3837 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3840 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3843 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3844 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3846 /* Sequence number */
3847 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3848 /* 16 random bytes */
3849 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3851 /* Random padding */
3852 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3854 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3857 if (s->msg_callback)
3858 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3859 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3860 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3862 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3871 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3876 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3879 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3881 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3884 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3885 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3887 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3889 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3891 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3899 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3900 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3901 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3902 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3903 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3904 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3907 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3908 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3909 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3910 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3913 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3915 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3916 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3919 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3920 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3924 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3925 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3926 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3930 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3934 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3937 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3939 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3944 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3945 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3947 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3949 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3950 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3951 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3952 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3954 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3962 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3963 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3964 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3965 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3969 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3970 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3971 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3972 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3978 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3982 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3986 if (default_nid == -1)
3988 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3990 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3991 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3992 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3996 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3997 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4001 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4002 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4004 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4010 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4011 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4012 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4013 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4016 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4018 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4019 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4020 /* Strict mode flags */
4021 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4022 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4023 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4025 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4030 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4031 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4033 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4034 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4037 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4041 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4044 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4046 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4048 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4049 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4052 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4053 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4054 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4056 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4057 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4066 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4069 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4070 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4071 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4073 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4081 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4082 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4083 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4086 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4092 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4093 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4096 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4099 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4100 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4102 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4107 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4108 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4109 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4110 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4111 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4114 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4115 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4116 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4117 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4121 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4122 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4130 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4131 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4134 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4137 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4138 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4140 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4143 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4151 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4152 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4154 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4157 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4158 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4159 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4161 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4166 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4174 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4175 else if(check_flags)
4176 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4178 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4179 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4180 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4181 else if (!check_flags)
4184 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4185 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4186 else if (strict_mode)
4188 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4189 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4191 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4192 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4196 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4204 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4206 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4211 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4214 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4217 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4222 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4223 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4224 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4225 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4226 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4231 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4236 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4240 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4241 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4243 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4245 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4247 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4251 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4255 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4258 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4260 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4261 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4263 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4265 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4266 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4268 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4270 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4272 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4273 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4275 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4280 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4284 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4286 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4287 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4291 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4293 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4294 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4295 else if (cpk->digest)
4296 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4299 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4301 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4302 * if the chain is invalid.
4306 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4307 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4310 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4311 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4318 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4319 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4321 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4322 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4323 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4324 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4325 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4326 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4328 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4329 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4331 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);