2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include "ssl_locl.h"
119 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
122 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
123 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
124 SSL_SESSION **psess);
127 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
130 tls1_setup_key_block,
131 tls1_generate_master_secret,
132 tls1_change_cipher_state,
133 tls1_final_finish_mac,
134 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
135 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
136 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
137 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
143 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
144 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
150 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
151 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
155 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
158 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
160 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
162 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
166 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
169 s->version = s->method->version;
172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
173 static int nid_list[] =
175 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
176 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
177 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
178 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
179 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
180 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
181 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
182 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
183 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
184 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
185 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
186 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
187 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
188 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
189 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
190 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
191 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
192 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
193 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
194 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
195 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
196 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
197 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
198 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
199 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
202 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
204 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
205 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
206 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
208 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
211 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
213 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
216 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
218 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
220 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
222 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
224 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
226 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
228 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
232 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
234 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
236 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
238 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
240 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
244 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
246 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
248 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
250 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
252 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
254 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
256 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
258 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
260 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
262 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
264 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
270 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
274 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
275 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
278 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
279 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
281 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
284 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
285 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
287 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
290 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
291 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
293 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
296 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
297 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
298 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
299 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
301 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
303 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
304 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
307 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
308 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
311 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
314 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
320 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
323 unsigned char *ret = p;
325 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
326 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
327 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
332 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
334 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
336 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
337 unsigned long size_str;
340 /* check for enough space.
341 4 for the servername type and entension length
342 2 for servernamelist length
343 1 for the hostname type
344 2 for hostname length
348 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
349 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
352 /* extension type and length */
353 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
356 /* length of servername list */
359 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
360 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
362 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
366 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
371 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
377 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
379 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
382 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
392 #define MIN(x,y) (((x)<(y))?(x):(y))
393 /* we add SRP username the first time only if we have one! */
394 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
395 {/* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
396 int login_len = MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) + 1, 255);
399 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
400 if (login_len > lenmax) return NULL;
403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
406 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
407 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
409 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254);
410 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254));
415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
416 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
417 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
419 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
422 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
423 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
424 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
430 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
431 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
432 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
433 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
434 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
436 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
437 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
439 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
442 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
443 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
444 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
450 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
451 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
453 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
454 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
455 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
456 * resolves this to two bytes.
458 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
459 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
460 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
462 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
464 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
467 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
468 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
469 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
470 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
472 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
473 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
474 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
476 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
477 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
479 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
483 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
484 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
486 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
489 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
490 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
494 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
500 if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
502 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
504 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
505 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
506 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
507 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
508 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
511 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
512 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
513 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
515 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
517 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
519 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
522 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
525 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
530 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
531 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
534 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
538 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
540 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
541 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
547 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
549 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
556 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
557 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
558 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
560 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
561 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
563 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
565 /* save position of id len */
566 unsigned char *q = ret;
567 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
568 /* skip over id len */
570 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
576 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
580 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
582 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
583 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
584 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
586 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
591 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
598 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
601 unsigned char *ret = p;
602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
603 int next_proto_neg_seen;
606 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
607 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
611 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
613 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
615 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
617 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
621 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
625 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
631 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
633 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
636 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
646 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
647 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
649 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
652 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
653 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
654 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
660 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
661 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
662 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
663 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
664 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
667 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
668 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
670 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
671 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
673 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
674 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
678 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
680 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
681 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
685 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
686 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
687 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
689 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
691 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
693 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
696 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
699 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
703 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
704 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
705 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
706 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
707 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
708 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
709 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
710 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
711 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
712 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
713 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
719 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
720 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
721 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
723 const unsigned char *npa;
727 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
728 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
730 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
731 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
733 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
735 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
740 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
747 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
752 unsigned char *data = *p;
753 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
756 s->servername_done = 0;
757 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
763 if (data > (d+n-len))
766 while (data <= (d+n-4))
771 if (data+size > (d+n))
774 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
776 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
777 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
778 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
779 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
781 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
782 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
783 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
784 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
785 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
786 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
787 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
788 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
789 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
790 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
791 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
792 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
793 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
794 the value of the Host: field.
795 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
796 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
797 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
798 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
802 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
804 unsigned char *sdata;
810 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
817 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
824 servname_type = *(sdata++);
830 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
833 if (s->servername_done == 0)
834 switch (servname_type)
836 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
839 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
841 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
844 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
846 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
849 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
851 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
854 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
855 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
856 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
857 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
858 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
859 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
862 s->servername_done = 1;
866 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
867 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
868 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
880 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
885 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
886 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
891 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
893 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
894 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
900 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
901 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
903 unsigned char *sdata = data;
904 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
906 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
908 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
913 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
915 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
916 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
918 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
919 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
921 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
924 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
925 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
928 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
929 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
930 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
931 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
932 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
935 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
936 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
938 unsigned char *sdata = data;
939 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
940 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
942 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
944 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
949 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
951 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
954 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
955 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
957 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
960 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
961 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
964 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
965 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
966 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
967 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
968 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
971 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
972 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
973 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
974 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
976 unsigned char *sdata = data;
980 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
983 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
984 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
986 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
990 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
991 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
992 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
993 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
995 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
996 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
998 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1003 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1005 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1006 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1008 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1012 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1014 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1016 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1018 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1021 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1023 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1029 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1031 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1034 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1036 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1040 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1041 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1046 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1050 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1052 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1054 const unsigned char *sdata;
1056 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1061 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1070 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1074 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1078 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1083 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1087 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1092 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1093 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1096 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1097 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1098 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1100 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1101 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1104 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1105 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1107 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1108 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1113 /* Read in request_extensions */
1116 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1123 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1129 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1130 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1132 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1133 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1135 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1140 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1144 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1147 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1148 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1150 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1153 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1154 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1155 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1156 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1157 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1158 * anything like that, but this might change).
1160 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1161 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1162 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1163 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1164 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1165 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1169 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1177 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1179 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1180 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1182 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1184 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1192 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1193 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1194 * the length of the block. */
1195 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1197 unsigned int off = 0;
1211 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1213 unsigned short length;
1214 unsigned short type;
1215 unsigned short size;
1216 unsigned char *data = *p;
1217 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1218 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1220 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1224 if (data+length != d+n)
1226 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1230 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1235 if (data+size > (d+n))
1238 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1239 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1240 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1242 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1244 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1246 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1249 tlsext_servername = 1;
1252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1253 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1254 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1256 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1257 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1259 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1261 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1264 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1265 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1266 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1268 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1271 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1272 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1274 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1275 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1276 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1277 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1278 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1281 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1283 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1285 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1286 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1288 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1291 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1294 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1297 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1299 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1300 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1301 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1303 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1307 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1310 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1311 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1313 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1317 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1318 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1319 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1320 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1322 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1324 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1326 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1331 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1332 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1334 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1335 * a status request message.
1337 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1339 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1342 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1343 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1346 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1348 unsigned char *selected;
1349 unsigned char selected_len;
1351 /* We must have requested it. */
1352 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
1354 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1357 /* The data must be valid */
1358 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1360 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1363 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1365 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1368 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1369 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1371 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1374 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1375 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1378 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1380 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1382 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1389 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1393 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1395 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1397 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1399 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1400 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1402 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1408 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1418 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1419 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1420 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1421 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1422 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1423 * absence on initial connect only.
1425 if (!renegotiate_seen
1426 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1427 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1429 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1431 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1439 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1442 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1443 * and elliptic curves we support.
1448 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1449 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1451 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1453 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1455 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1456 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1457 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1463 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1466 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1467 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1472 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1473 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1474 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1475 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1477 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1478 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1479 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2;
1480 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1482 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1486 for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <=
1487 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
1490 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1492 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1496 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1498 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1503 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1505 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1506 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1508 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1509 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1511 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1512 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1517 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1521 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1522 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1529 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1532 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1533 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1534 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1537 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1538 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1539 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1540 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1544 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1545 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1550 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1551 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1552 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1553 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1555 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1560 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1562 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1563 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1566 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1567 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1569 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1570 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1574 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1575 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1576 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1577 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1579 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1580 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1581 * the certificate has changed.
1583 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1586 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1589 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1590 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1591 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1593 /* status request response should be sent */
1594 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1595 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1596 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1598 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1600 /* something bad happened */
1601 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1602 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1603 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1608 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1610 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1612 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1613 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1614 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
1618 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1620 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1623 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1624 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1629 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1630 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1631 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1633 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1635 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1636 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1638 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1639 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1641 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1642 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1644 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1645 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1647 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1648 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1651 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1655 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1657 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1658 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1659 * abort the handshake.
1661 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1662 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1670 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1671 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1674 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1675 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1678 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1679 s->servername_done=0;
1685 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1687 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1688 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1691 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
1692 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
1693 * it must contain uncompressed.
1695 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1696 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1697 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1698 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1699 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1701 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1703 unsigned char *list;
1704 int found_uncompressed = 0;
1705 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1706 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1708 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
1710 found_uncompressed = 1;
1714 if (!found_uncompressed)
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1720 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1721 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1723 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1724 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1725 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1726 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1728 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1729 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
1731 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
1732 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
1734 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1736 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1737 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1740 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
1741 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
1742 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
1743 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
1745 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1746 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1751 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
1754 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
1755 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1758 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
1759 * there is no response.
1761 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1763 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
1764 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
1766 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
1767 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1770 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
1771 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1775 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1776 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1782 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1783 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1786 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1787 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1790 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1791 s->servername_done=0;
1797 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
1798 * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
1799 * session ticket extension at the same time.
1802 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
1803 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
1805 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
1806 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
1809 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
1810 * to permit stateful resumption.
1812 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1815 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
1819 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
1820 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1827 /* Skip past cipher list */
1832 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
1837 /* Now at start of extensions */
1838 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
1841 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
1843 unsigned short type, size;
1846 if (p + size > limit)
1848 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1850 /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will
1851 * trigger a full handshake
1853 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1855 /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
1856 * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
1860 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1861 return 0; /* Cache miss */
1863 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1865 /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of
1866 * generating the session from ticket now,
1867 * trigger abbreviated handshake based on
1868 * external mechanism to calculate the master
1872 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
1880 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
1881 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
1882 SSL_SESSION **psess)
1885 unsigned char *sdec;
1886 const unsigned char *p;
1887 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
1888 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1891 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
1892 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
1895 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1896 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
1897 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
1898 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
1900 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1901 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1912 /* Check key name matches */
1913 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
1915 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
1916 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
1917 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
1918 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
1920 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
1921 * integrity checks on ticket.
1923 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
1926 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1930 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1931 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
1932 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
1933 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
1934 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
1936 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1937 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1938 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1939 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1940 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1943 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1946 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
1947 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
1950 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1953 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1957 /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
1958 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
1959 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
1960 * as required by standard.
1963 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1964 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1966 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
1969 /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
1973 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1977 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
1985 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
1986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
1987 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
1989 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1990 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
1993 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
1994 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
1996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
1997 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
1998 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2002 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2004 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2006 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2007 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2009 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2010 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2014 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2017 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2019 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2025 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2028 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2030 if (table[i].id == id)
2031 return table[i].nid;
2037 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2040 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2041 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2044 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2047 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2048 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2052 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2054 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2055 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2058 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2062 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2063 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
2066 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2067 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2071 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2072 return EVP_sha224();
2074 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2075 return EVP_sha256();
2077 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2078 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2079 return EVP_sha384();
2081 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2082 return EVP_sha512();
2090 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2092 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2097 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2098 if (s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2100 /* Should never happen */
2104 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2105 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2106 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2107 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2109 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2111 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2116 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2117 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2121 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2122 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2126 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2134 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2136 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2139 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2140 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2141 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2148 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2149 * supported it stays as NULL.
2151 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2152 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2153 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1();
2155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2156 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2158 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2159 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2163 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2164 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa();