2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
225 static int nid_list[] =
227 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
228 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
229 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
230 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
231 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
232 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
233 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
234 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
235 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
236 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
237 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
238 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
239 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
240 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
241 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
242 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
243 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
246 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
247 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
248 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
249 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
250 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
251 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
252 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
253 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
254 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
258 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
265 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
267 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
268 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
269 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
270 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
271 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
272 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
273 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
274 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
275 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
276 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
277 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
278 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
279 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
280 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
281 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
282 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
283 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
284 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
285 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
286 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
287 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
288 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
289 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
290 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
291 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
292 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
293 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
294 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
297 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
299 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
300 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
303 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
305 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
306 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
307 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
309 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
312 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
314 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
317 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
319 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
321 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
323 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
325 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
327 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
329 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
331 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
333 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
335 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
337 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
339 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
341 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
343 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
345 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
347 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
349 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
351 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
353 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
355 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
357 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
359 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
361 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
363 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
365 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
367 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
369 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
371 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
377 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
380 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
381 const unsigned char **pcurves,
386 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
387 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
390 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
391 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
393 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
394 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
395 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
398 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
399 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
408 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
409 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
413 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
414 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
417 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
418 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
420 const unsigned char *curves;
422 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
423 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
425 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
428 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
431 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
433 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
436 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
438 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
441 else /* Should never happen */
444 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
445 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
447 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
453 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
454 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
458 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
460 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
461 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
463 /* Can't do anything on client side */
470 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
471 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
474 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
475 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
476 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
477 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
478 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
479 /* Should never happen */
482 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
485 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
487 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
492 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
494 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
495 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
497 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
501 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
502 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
513 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
514 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
516 unsigned char *clist, *p;
518 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
519 * while curve ids < 32
521 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
522 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
525 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
527 unsigned long idmask;
529 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
531 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
542 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
546 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
551 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
554 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
556 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
560 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
562 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
564 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
566 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
567 if (nid == NID_undef)
568 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
569 if (nid == NID_undef)
570 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
571 if (nid == NID_undef)
573 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
574 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
576 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
579 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
580 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
585 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
589 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
591 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
592 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
597 const EC_METHOD *meth;
600 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
601 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
604 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
607 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
611 /* Determine curve ID */
612 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
613 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
614 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
618 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
630 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
632 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
635 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
637 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
640 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
644 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
645 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
646 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
648 const unsigned char *p;
651 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
652 * is supported (see RFC4492).
654 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
656 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
657 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
658 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
668 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
669 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
671 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
672 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
674 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
679 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
686 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
689 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
691 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
693 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
694 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
698 *pformats = ecformats_default;
699 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
701 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
703 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
707 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
708 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
710 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
712 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
715 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
718 /* If not EC nothing to do */
719 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
724 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
728 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
729 * supported curves extension.
731 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
734 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
735 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
737 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
744 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
745 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
746 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
747 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
748 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
750 return 0; /* Should never happen */
751 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
752 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
754 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
758 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
759 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
761 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
766 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
767 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
769 unsigned char curve_id[2];
770 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
771 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
772 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
773 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
776 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
777 * no other curves permitted.
781 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
782 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
783 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
784 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
785 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
789 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
790 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
792 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
793 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
795 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
798 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
801 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
803 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
809 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
811 /* Need a shared curve */
812 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
818 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
823 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
825 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
829 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
835 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
840 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
844 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
845 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
848 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
849 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
851 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
854 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
855 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
857 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
860 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
861 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
863 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
866 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
867 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
868 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
869 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
871 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
873 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
874 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
877 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
878 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
881 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
884 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
885 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
886 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
887 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
890 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
892 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
896 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
900 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
906 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
907 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
911 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
912 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
914 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
915 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
917 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
919 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
920 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
924 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
925 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
928 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
929 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
931 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
932 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
934 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
935 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
936 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
937 /* Should never happen */
940 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
941 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
947 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
949 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
950 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
951 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
953 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
955 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
958 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
963 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
965 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
967 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
968 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
972 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
974 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
976 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
977 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
985 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
989 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
990 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
991 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
993 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
996 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
997 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1002 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1008 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1011 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1012 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1015 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1016 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1017 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1018 * session and not global settings.
1021 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1024 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1025 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1026 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1029 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1030 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1031 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1034 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1035 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1038 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1039 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1044 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1048 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1049 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1054 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1060 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1061 * signature algorithms.
1065 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1066 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1070 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1071 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1075 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1076 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1078 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1079 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1081 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1082 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1086 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1087 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1089 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1090 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1092 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1096 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c)
1099 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1104 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1107 unsigned char *ret = p;
1108 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1109 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1111 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1114 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1115 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1117 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1119 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1121 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1122 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1123 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1124 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1133 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1134 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1135 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1140 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1142 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1144 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1145 unsigned long size_str;
1148 /* check for enough space.
1149 4 for the servername type and entension length
1150 2 for servernamelist length
1151 1 for the hostname type
1152 2 for hostname length
1156 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1157 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1160 /* extension type and length */
1161 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1162 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1164 /* length of servername list */
1165 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1167 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1168 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1170 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1174 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1179 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1185 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1187 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1190 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1200 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1201 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1202 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1204 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1205 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1211 /* check for enough space.
1212 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1213 1 for the srp user identity
1214 + srp user identity length
1216 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1218 /* fill in the extension */
1219 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1220 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1221 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1222 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1230 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1232 const unsigned char *plist;
1235 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1237 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1238 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1245 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1246 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1247 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1248 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1251 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1252 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1253 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1255 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1256 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1257 if (plistlen > 65532)
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1263 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1264 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1266 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1267 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1268 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1269 * resolves this to two bytes.
1272 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1275 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1277 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1280 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1281 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1282 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1283 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1285 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1286 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1287 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1289 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1290 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1292 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1296 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1297 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1299 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1302 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1303 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1307 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1313 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1316 const unsigned char *salg;
1317 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1318 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1320 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1321 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1323 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1327 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1328 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1330 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1332 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1334 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1337 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1340 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1345 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1348 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1352 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1354 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1355 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1361 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1363 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1370 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1371 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1372 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1374 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1375 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1377 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1379 /* save position of id len */
1380 unsigned char *q = ret;
1381 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1382 /* skip over id len */
1384 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1390 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1394 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1395 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1398 * 1: peer may send requests
1399 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1401 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1402 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1404 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1408 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1410 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1411 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1412 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1414 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1419 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1421 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1423 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1424 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1425 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1426 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1427 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1428 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1431 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1435 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1437 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1439 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1442 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1450 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1451 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1454 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1456 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1458 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1459 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1461 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1462 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1463 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1467 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1471 return NULL; /* error */
1472 if (cb_retval == -1)
1473 continue; /* skip this extension */
1475 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1477 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1479 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1483 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1484 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1487 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
1488 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1489 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02
1491 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1492 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1495 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1496 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1497 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
1499 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1501 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1503 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1509 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1511 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1517 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1524 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1527 unsigned char *ret = p;
1529 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1531 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1533 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1534 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1535 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1536 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1537 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1539 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1540 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1544 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1546 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1548 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1550 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1554 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1558 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1566 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1569 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1581 const unsigned char *plist;
1583 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1586 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1588 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1589 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1596 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1597 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1598 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1599 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1603 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1604 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1606 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1607 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1609 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1610 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1614 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1616 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1617 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1621 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1622 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1624 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1626 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1628 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1631 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1634 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1643 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1645 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1647 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1650 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1658 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1659 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1660 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1661 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1662 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1663 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1664 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1665 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1666 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1667 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1668 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1674 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1675 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1677 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1680 * 1: peer may send requests
1681 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1683 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1684 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1686 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1691 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1692 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1693 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1694 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1696 const unsigned char *npa;
1697 unsigned int npalen;
1700 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1701 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1703 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1704 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1706 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1708 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1713 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
1715 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1716 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1719 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
1721 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1724 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1728 return NULL; /* error */
1729 if (cb_retval == -1)
1730 continue; /* skip this extension */
1731 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1733 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1735 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1738 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1739 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1741 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1742 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1744 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1745 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1748 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1754 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1756 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1757 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1759 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1761 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1765 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1769 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1776 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1778 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1779 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1780 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1783 * returns: 0 on success. */
1784 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1785 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1789 const unsigned char *selected;
1790 unsigned char selected_len;
1793 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1799 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1800 * length-prefixed strings. */
1801 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1802 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1811 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1813 proto_len = data[i];
1819 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1825 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1826 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1827 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1828 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1829 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1830 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1831 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1833 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1836 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1837 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1842 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1847 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1848 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1849 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1854 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1855 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1856 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1857 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1859 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1860 unsigned short type, size;
1861 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1862 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1863 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1864 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1865 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1866 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1867 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1869 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1870 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1871 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1872 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1875 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1876 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1877 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1878 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1879 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1880 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1881 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1882 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1883 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1884 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1887 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1896 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1899 if (data+size > d+n)
1903 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1905 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1906 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1908 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1910 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1912 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1917 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1919 if (data + len != d+n)
1921 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1925 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1927 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1929 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1931 unsigned short type;
1932 unsigned short size;
1934 unsigned char *data = *p;
1935 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1938 s->servername_done = 0;
1939 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1941 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1944 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1946 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1947 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1950 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1951 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1952 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1954 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1955 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1959 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1960 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1964 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1965 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1966 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1968 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1969 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1971 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1972 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1974 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1975 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1977 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1978 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1980 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1981 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1983 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1984 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1987 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1988 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1991 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1995 if (data > (d+n-len))
1998 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2003 if (data+size > (d+n))
2006 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2008 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2009 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2010 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2011 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2013 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2014 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2015 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2016 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2017 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2018 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2019 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2020 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2021 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2022 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2023 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2024 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2025 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2026 the value of the Host: field.
2027 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2028 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2029 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2030 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2034 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2036 unsigned char *sdata;
2042 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2049 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2056 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2062 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2065 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2066 switch (servname_type)
2068 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2071 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2073 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2076 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2078 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2081 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2083 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2086 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2087 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2088 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2089 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2090 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2091 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2094 s->servername_done = 1;
2098 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2099 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2100 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2112 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2118 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2120 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2122 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2125 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2127 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2130 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2132 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2133 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2135 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2137 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2144 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2146 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2147 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2149 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2150 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2152 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2157 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2159 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2160 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2162 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2163 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2165 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2168 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2169 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2172 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2173 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2174 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2175 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2176 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2179 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2181 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2182 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2183 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2185 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2186 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2188 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2193 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2195 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2198 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2199 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2201 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2204 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2205 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2208 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2209 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2210 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2211 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2212 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2215 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2216 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2217 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2219 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2223 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2226 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2227 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2229 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2233 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2234 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2235 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2236 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2238 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2239 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2241 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2246 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2248 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2249 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2251 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2255 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2257 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2259 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2261 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2264 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2266 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2271 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2273 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2276 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2278 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2281 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2284 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2287 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2288 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2292 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2297 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2301 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2303 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2305 const unsigned char *sdata;
2307 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2312 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2321 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2325 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2329 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2334 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2338 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2343 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2344 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2347 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2348 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2349 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2351 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2352 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2355 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2356 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2358 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2359 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2364 /* Read in request_extensions */
2367 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2374 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2380 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2382 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2383 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2386 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2387 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2389 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2390 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2392 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2397 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2401 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2404 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2408 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2409 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2411 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2412 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2413 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2415 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2421 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2422 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2423 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2425 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2428 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2429 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2430 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2431 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2432 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2433 * anything like that, but this might change).
2435 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2436 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2437 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2438 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2439 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2440 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2444 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2445 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2446 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2448 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2451 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2452 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2456 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2457 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2459 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2463 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2464 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2465 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2466 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2467 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2469 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2471 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2473 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2475 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2476 if (type == record->ext_type)
2478 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2483 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2484 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2485 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2495 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2497 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2498 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2500 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2502 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2505 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2506 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2507 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2512 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2515 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2517 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2521 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2530 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2531 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2532 * the length of the block. */
2533 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2535 unsigned int off = 0;
2549 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2551 unsigned short length;
2552 unsigned short type;
2553 unsigned short size;
2554 unsigned char *data = *p;
2555 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2556 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2559 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2562 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2564 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2565 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2568 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2569 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2570 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2573 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2574 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2577 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2581 if (data+length != d+n)
2583 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2587 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2592 if (data+size > (d+n))
2595 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2596 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2597 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2599 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2601 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2603 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2606 tlsext_servername = 1;
2609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2610 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2612 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2613 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2615 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2617 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2620 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2621 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2622 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2624 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2627 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2628 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2630 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2631 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2632 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2633 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2634 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2637 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2639 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2641 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2642 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2644 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2647 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2650 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2653 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2655 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2656 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2658 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2662 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2665 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2666 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2668 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2672 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2673 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2674 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2675 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2677 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2679 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2681 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2686 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2688 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2689 * a status request message.
2691 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2693 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2696 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2697 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2700 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2701 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2703 unsigned char *selected;
2704 unsigned char selected_len;
2706 /* We must have requested it. */
2707 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2709 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2712 /* The data must be valid */
2713 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2715 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2718 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2720 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2723 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2724 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2726 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2729 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2730 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2731 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2735 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2739 /* We must have requested it. */
2740 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2742 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2747 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2750 /* The extension data consists of:
2751 * uint16 list_length
2752 * uint8 proto_length;
2753 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2757 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2759 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2763 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2765 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2768 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2769 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2770 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2771 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2773 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2776 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2777 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2780 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2782 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2784 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2787 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2791 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2792 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2794 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2795 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2796 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2798 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2803 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2805 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2809 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2810 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2812 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2815 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2817 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2819 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2820 if (record->ext_type == type)
2822 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2828 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2829 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2831 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2832 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2833 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2842 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2846 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2848 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2850 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2852 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2853 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2855 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2861 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2871 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2872 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2873 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2874 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2875 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2876 * absence on initial connect only.
2878 if (!renegotiate_seen
2879 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2880 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2882 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2883 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2884 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2892 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2895 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2899 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2901 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2906 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2908 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2909 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2911 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2912 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2914 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2915 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2920 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2924 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2925 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2932 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2937 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2939 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2940 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2943 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2944 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2946 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2947 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2951 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2952 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2953 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2954 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2956 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2958 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2959 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2960 * so this has to happen here in
2961 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2965 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2967 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2970 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2971 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2976 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2977 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2978 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2980 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2982 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2983 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2985 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2986 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2988 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2989 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2991 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2992 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2994 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2995 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2998 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3002 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3004 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3005 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3006 * abort the handshake.
3008 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3009 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3017 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3018 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3021 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3022 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3025 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3026 s->servername_done=0;
3032 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3034 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3037 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3038 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3039 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3040 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3042 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3045 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3046 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3047 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3048 if (certpkey == NULL)
3050 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3053 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3054 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3056 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3057 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3060 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3061 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3062 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3064 /* status request response should be sent */
3065 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3066 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3067 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3069 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3071 /* something bad happened */
3072 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3073 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3074 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3079 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3084 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3085 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3088 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3089 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3097 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3099 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3100 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3103 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3104 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3105 * it must contain uncompressed.
3107 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3108 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3109 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3110 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3111 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3113 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3115 unsigned char *list;
3116 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3117 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3118 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3120 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3122 found_uncompressed = 1;
3126 if (!found_uncompressed)
3128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3132 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3133 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3135 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3136 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3137 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3138 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3140 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3141 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3143 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3144 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3146 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3148 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3149 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3152 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3153 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3154 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3155 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3157 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3158 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3163 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3166 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3167 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3170 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3171 * there is no response.
3173 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3175 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3176 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3178 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3179 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3182 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3183 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3187 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3188 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3194 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3195 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3198 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3199 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3202 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3203 s->servername_done=0;
3209 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3212 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3214 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3216 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3220 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3228 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3229 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3230 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3232 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3233 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3234 * extension, if any.
3235 * len: the length of the session ID.
3236 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3237 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3238 * point to the resulting session.
3240 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3241 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3242 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3245 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3246 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3247 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3248 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3249 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3250 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3251 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3254 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3255 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3256 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3257 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3258 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3259 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3261 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3262 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3264 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3265 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3269 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3271 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3272 * to permit stateful resumption.
3274 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3276 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3280 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3288 /* Skip past cipher list */
3293 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3298 /* Now at start of extensions */
3299 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3302 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3304 unsigned short type, size;
3307 if (p + size > limit)
3309 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3314 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3315 * currently have one. */
3316 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3319 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3321 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3322 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3323 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3324 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3325 * calculate the master secret later. */
3328 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3331 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3332 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3334 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3336 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3337 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3339 default: /* fatal error */
3348 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3350 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3351 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3352 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3353 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3354 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3355 * point to the resulting session.
3358 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3359 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3360 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3361 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3363 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3364 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3365 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3368 unsigned char *sdec;
3369 const unsigned char *p;
3370 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3371 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3374 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3375 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3378 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3379 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3380 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3381 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3383 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3384 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3395 /* Check key name matches */
3396 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3398 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3399 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3400 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3401 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3403 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3404 * integrity checks on ticket.
3406 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3409 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3413 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3414 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3415 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3416 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3417 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3419 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3420 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3421 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3422 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3423 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3426 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3429 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3430 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3433 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3436 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3440 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3441 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3442 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3443 * as required by standard.
3446 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3447 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3455 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3460 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3468 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3469 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3470 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3471 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3472 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3473 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3474 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3477 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3478 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3479 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3480 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3483 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3486 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3488 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3494 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3497 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3499 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3500 return table[i].nid;
3505 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3510 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3511 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3514 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3517 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3518 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3522 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3524 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3525 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3528 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3533 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3541 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3545 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3546 return EVP_sha224();
3548 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3549 return EVP_sha256();
3551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3552 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3553 return EVP_sha384();
3555 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3556 return EVP_sha512();
3564 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3568 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3569 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3570 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3573 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3574 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3577 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3578 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3584 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3585 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3586 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3588 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3589 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3591 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3593 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3594 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3596 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3598 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3600 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3601 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3603 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3607 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3608 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3609 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3611 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3614 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3615 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3616 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3617 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3619 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3620 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3621 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3623 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3624 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3626 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3628 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3630 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3635 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3636 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3637 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3639 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3650 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3651 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3653 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3654 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3656 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3658 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3659 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3661 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3662 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3664 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3665 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3667 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3668 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3670 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3672 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3673 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3676 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3677 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3681 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3682 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3688 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3689 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3691 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3694 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3697 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3698 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3699 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3704 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3706 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3712 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3713 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3714 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3716 /* Should never happen */
3720 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3721 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3722 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3723 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3725 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3726 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3728 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3730 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3731 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3733 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3734 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3736 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3738 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3740 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3743 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3744 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3745 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3746 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3747 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3749 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3750 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3756 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3757 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3759 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3760 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3762 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3763 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3764 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3765 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3767 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3768 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3773 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3774 * use the certificate for signing.
3776 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3778 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3779 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3782 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3783 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3786 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3788 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3789 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3792 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3793 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3794 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3801 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3802 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3803 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3805 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3811 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3818 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3820 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3823 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3824 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3825 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3827 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3828 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3832 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3834 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3836 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3838 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3840 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3841 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3847 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3849 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3850 unsigned short hbtype;
3851 unsigned int payload;
3852 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3854 /* Read type and payload length first */
3859 if (s->msg_callback)
3860 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3861 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3862 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3864 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3866 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3869 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3870 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3871 * payload, plus padding
3873 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3876 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3877 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3879 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3881 /* Random padding */
3882 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3884 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3886 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3887 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3888 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3889 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3891 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3896 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3900 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3901 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3902 * sequence number */
3905 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3908 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3916 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3918 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3920 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3921 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3923 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3924 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3925 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3931 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3932 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3938 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3939 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3945 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3946 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3948 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3950 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3951 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3952 * some random stuff.
3953 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3954 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3955 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3956 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3959 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3962 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3963 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3965 /* Sequence number */
3966 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3967 /* 16 random bytes */
3968 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3970 /* Random padding */
3971 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3973 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3976 if (s->msg_callback)
3977 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3978 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3979 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3981 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3990 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3995 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3998 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4000 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4003 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4004 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4006 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4008 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4010 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4018 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4019 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4020 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4021 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4022 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4023 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4026 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4027 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4028 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4029 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4032 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4034 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4035 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4038 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4039 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4043 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4044 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4045 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4049 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4053 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4056 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4058 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4063 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4064 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4066 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4068 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4069 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4070 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4071 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4073 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4081 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4082 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4083 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4084 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4088 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4089 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4090 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4091 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4097 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4101 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4105 if (default_nid == -1)
4107 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4109 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4110 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4111 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4115 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4116 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4120 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4121 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4123 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4129 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4130 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4131 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4132 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4135 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4137 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4138 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4139 /* Strict mode flags */
4140 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4141 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4142 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4144 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4149 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4150 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4152 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4153 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4156 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4160 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4163 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4165 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4167 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4168 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4171 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4172 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4173 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4175 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4176 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4185 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4188 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4189 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4190 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4192 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4200 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4201 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4202 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4205 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4211 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4212 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4215 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4218 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4219 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4221 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4226 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4227 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4228 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4229 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4230 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4233 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4234 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4235 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4236 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4240 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4241 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4249 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4250 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4253 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4256 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4257 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4259 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4262 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4270 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4271 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4273 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4276 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4277 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4278 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4280 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4285 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4293 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4294 else if(check_flags)
4295 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4297 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4298 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4299 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4300 else if (!check_flags)
4303 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4304 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4305 else if (strict_mode)
4307 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4308 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4310 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4311 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4315 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4323 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4325 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4330 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4333 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4336 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4341 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4342 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4343 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4344 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4345 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4350 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4355 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4359 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4360 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4362 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4364 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4366 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4370 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4374 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4377 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4379 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4380 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4382 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4384 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4385 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4387 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4389 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4391 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4392 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4394 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4399 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4403 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4405 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4406 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4410 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4412 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4413 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4414 else if (cpk->digest)
4415 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4418 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4420 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4421 * if the chain is invalid.
4425 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4426 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4429 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4430 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4437 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4438 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4440 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4441 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4442 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4443 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4444 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4445 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4447 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4448 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4450 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4456 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4458 int dh_secbits = 80;
4459 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4460 return DH_get_1024_160();
4461 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4463 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4470 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4471 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4474 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4481 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4482 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4483 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4485 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4486 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4493 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4494 return DH_get_2048_224();
4495 return DH_get_1024_160();