2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
182 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
183 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
187 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
189 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
190 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
196 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
197 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
201 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
204 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
206 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
208 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
212 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
215 s->version = s->method->version;
218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
220 static int nid_list[] =
222 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
225 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
226 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
227 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
228 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
229 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
230 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
231 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
232 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
233 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
234 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
235 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
236 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
237 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
238 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
239 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
240 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
241 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
242 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
243 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
244 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
245 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
246 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
250 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
252 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
253 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
254 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
257 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
259 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
260 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
261 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
262 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
263 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
264 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
265 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
266 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
267 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
268 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
269 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
270 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
271 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
272 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
273 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
274 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
275 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
276 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
277 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
278 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
279 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
280 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
281 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
282 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
283 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
286 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
288 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
289 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
292 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
294 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
295 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
296 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
298 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
301 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
303 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
306 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
308 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
310 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
312 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
314 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
316 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
318 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
320 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
322 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
324 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
326 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
328 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
330 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
332 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
334 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
336 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
338 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
340 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
342 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
344 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
346 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
348 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
350 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
352 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
354 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
360 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
363 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
364 const unsigned char **pcurves,
369 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
370 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
373 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
374 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
376 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
377 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
378 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
381 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
382 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
386 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
387 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
391 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
392 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
396 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
397 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
400 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
401 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
403 const unsigned char *curves;
405 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
406 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
408 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
411 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
414 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
416 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
419 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
421 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
424 else /* Should never happen */
427 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
428 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
430 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
436 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
437 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
441 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
443 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
444 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
446 /* Can't do anything on client side */
453 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
454 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
457 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
458 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
459 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
460 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
461 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
462 /* Should never happen */
465 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
470 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
475 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
477 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
478 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
480 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
484 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
485 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
496 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
497 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
499 unsigned char *clist, *p;
501 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
502 * while curve ids < 32
504 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
505 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
508 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
510 unsigned long idmask;
512 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
514 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
525 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
529 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
534 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
537 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
539 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
543 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
545 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
547 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
549 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
550 if (nid == NID_undef)
551 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
552 if (nid == NID_undef)
553 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
554 if (nid == NID_undef)
556 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
557 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
559 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
562 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
563 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
568 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
572 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
574 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
575 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
581 const EC_METHOD *meth;
584 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
585 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
586 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
589 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
592 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
596 /* Determine curve ID */
597 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
598 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
599 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
603 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
615 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
618 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
620 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
623 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
627 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
628 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
629 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
631 const unsigned char *p;
634 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
635 * is supported (see RFC4492).
637 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
639 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
640 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
641 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
651 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
652 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
654 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
655 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
657 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
662 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
669 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
672 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
674 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
676 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
677 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
681 *pformats = ecformats_default;
682 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
684 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
686 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
690 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
691 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
693 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
695 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
698 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
701 /* If not EC nothing to do */
702 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
707 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
711 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
712 * supported curves extension.
714 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
717 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
718 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
720 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
727 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
728 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
729 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
730 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
731 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
733 return 0; /* Should never happen */
734 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
735 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
737 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
741 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
742 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
744 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
749 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
750 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
752 unsigned char curve_id[2];
753 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
754 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
755 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
756 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
759 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
760 * no other curves permitted.
764 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
765 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
766 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
767 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
768 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
772 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
773 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
775 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
776 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
778 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
781 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
784 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
786 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
792 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
794 /* Need a shared curve */
795 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
801 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
806 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
808 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
812 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
816 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
820 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
821 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
824 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
825 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
827 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
830 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
831 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
833 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
836 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
837 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
839 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
842 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
843 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
844 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
845 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
847 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
848 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
849 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
850 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
853 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
854 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
857 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
860 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
864 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
865 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
866 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
869 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
871 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
874 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
876 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
877 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
878 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
880 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
881 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
884 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
885 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
889 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
890 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
892 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
893 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
895 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
897 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
898 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
902 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
904 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
906 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
909 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
912 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
913 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
915 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
916 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
918 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
919 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
920 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
921 /* Should never happen */
924 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
925 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
930 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
932 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
933 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
934 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
936 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
941 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
946 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
948 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
950 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
951 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
955 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
957 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
960 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
968 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
971 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
972 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
973 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
975 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
978 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
979 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
984 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
990 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
993 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
994 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
997 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
998 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
999 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1000 * session and not global settings.
1003 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1006 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1007 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1008 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1011 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
1012 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1013 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1016 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1017 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1020 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1021 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1025 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1026 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1031 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1036 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1042 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1043 * signature algorithms.
1047 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1048 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1052 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1053 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1057 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1058 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1060 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1061 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1063 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1064 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1068 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1069 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1071 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1074 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1078 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1079 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1081 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1082 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1091 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1094 unsigned char *ret = p;
1095 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1096 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1098 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1101 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1102 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1104 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1106 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1108 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1109 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1110 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1111 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1120 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1121 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1122 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1127 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1129 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1131 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1132 unsigned long size_str;
1135 /* check for enough space.
1136 4 for the servername type and entension length
1137 2 for servernamelist length
1138 1 for the hostname type
1139 2 for hostname length
1143 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1144 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1147 /* extension type and length */
1148 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1149 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1151 /* length of servername list */
1152 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1154 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1155 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1157 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1161 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1166 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1172 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1174 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1177 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1187 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1188 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1189 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1191 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1192 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 /* check for enough space.
1199 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1200 1 for the srp user identity
1201 + srp user identity length
1203 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1205 /* fill in the extension */
1206 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1207 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1208 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1209 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1217 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1219 const unsigned char *plist;
1222 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1224 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1225 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1232 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1233 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1234 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1235 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1238 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1239 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1240 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1242 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1243 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1244 if (plistlen > 65532)
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1250 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1251 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1253 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1254 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1255 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1256 * resolves this to two bytes.
1259 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1262 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1264 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1267 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1268 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1269 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1270 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1272 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1273 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1274 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1276 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1277 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1279 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1283 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1284 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1286 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1289 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1290 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1294 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1300 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1303 const unsigned char *salg;
1304 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1305 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1307 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1308 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1310 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1314 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1315 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1317 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1319 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1321 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1324 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1327 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1332 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1335 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1339 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1341 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1342 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1348 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1350 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1357 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1358 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1359 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1361 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1362 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1364 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1366 /* save position of id len */
1367 unsigned char *q = ret;
1368 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1369 /* skip over id len */
1371 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1377 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1380 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1381 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1382 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1385 * 1: peer may send requests
1386 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1388 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1389 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1391 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1395 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1397 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1398 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1399 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1401 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1406 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1410 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1412 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1414 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1417 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1425 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1426 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1427 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1428 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1429 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1430 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1432 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1433 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1435 if (limit < ret + 6)
1438 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1439 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1441 *(ret++) = list_len;
1442 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1445 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1452 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1455 unsigned char *ret = p;
1456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1457 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1459 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1460 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1461 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1462 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1464 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1465 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1469 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1471 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1473 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1475 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1479 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1483 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1489 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1491 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1494 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1506 const unsigned char *plist;
1508 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1511 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1513 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1514 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1521 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1522 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1523 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1524 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1528 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1529 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1531 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1532 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1534 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1535 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1539 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1541 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1542 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1546 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1547 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1549 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1551 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1553 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1556 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1559 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1568 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1570 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1572 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1575 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1583 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1584 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1585 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1586 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1587 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1588 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1589 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1590 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1591 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1592 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1593 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1599 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1600 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1602 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1605 * 1: peer may send requests
1606 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1608 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1609 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1611 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1617 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1618 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1619 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1621 const unsigned char *npa;
1622 unsigned int npalen;
1625 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1626 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1628 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1629 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1631 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1633 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1638 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1640 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1642 size_t authz_length;
1643 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1644 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1645 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1646 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1647 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1649 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1651 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1652 * uint8_t authz_type
1654 * uint8_t data[length]
1656 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1657 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1659 unsigned short length;
1663 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1665 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1669 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1677 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1678 * 2 bytes for extension type
1679 * 2 bytes for extension length
1680 * 1 byte for the list length
1681 * n bytes for the list */
1682 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1684 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1685 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1687 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1688 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1692 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1694 unsigned short length;
1699 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1701 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1704 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1711 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1718 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1720 unsigned short type;
1721 unsigned short size;
1723 unsigned char *data = *p;
1724 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1727 s->servername_done = 0;
1728 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1730 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1734 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1735 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1737 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1738 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1740 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1741 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1743 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1744 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1746 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1747 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1749 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1750 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1752 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1753 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1756 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1760 if (data > (d+n-len))
1763 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1768 if (data+size > (d+n))
1771 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1773 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1774 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1775 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1776 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1778 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1779 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1780 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1781 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1782 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1783 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1784 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1785 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1786 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1787 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1788 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1789 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1790 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1791 the value of the Host: field.
1792 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1793 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1794 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1795 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1799 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1801 unsigned char *sdata;
1807 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1814 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1821 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1827 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1830 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1831 switch (servname_type)
1833 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1836 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1838 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1841 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1843 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1846 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1848 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1851 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1852 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1853 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1854 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1855 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1856 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1859 s->servername_done = 1;
1863 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1864 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1865 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1877 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1883 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1885 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1887 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1890 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1892 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1895 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1897 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1898 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1900 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1902 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1909 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1911 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1912 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1914 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1915 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1917 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1922 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1924 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1925 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1927 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1928 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1930 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1933 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1934 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1937 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1938 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1939 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1940 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1941 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1944 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
1946 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1947 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1948 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1950 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1951 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1953 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1958 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1960 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1963 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1964 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1966 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1969 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1970 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1973 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1974 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1975 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1976 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1977 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1980 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1981 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1982 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
1984 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1988 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1991 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1992 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1994 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1998 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1999 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2000 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2001 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2003 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2004 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2006 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2011 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2013 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2014 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2016 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2020 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2022 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2024 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2026 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2029 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2031 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2036 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2038 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2041 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2043 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2046 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2049 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2052 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2053 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2057 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
2058 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2063 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2067 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2069 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2071 const unsigned char *sdata;
2073 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2078 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2087 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2091 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2095 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2100 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2104 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2109 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2110 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2113 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2114 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2115 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2117 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2118 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2121 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2122 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2124 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2125 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2130 /* Read in request_extensions */
2133 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2140 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2146 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2148 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2149 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2152 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2153 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2155 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2156 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2158 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2163 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2167 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2170 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2174 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2175 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2177 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2178 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2179 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2181 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2187 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2188 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2190 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2193 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2194 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2195 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2196 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2197 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2198 * anything like that, but this might change).
2200 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2201 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2202 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2203 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2204 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2205 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2209 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2210 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2212 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2217 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2219 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2220 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2224 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2228 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2230 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2232 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2236 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2237 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2238 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2241 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2242 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2243 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2244 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2245 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2247 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2251 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2252 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2253 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2255 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2257 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2258 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2259 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2260 1 /* element size */,
2263 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2266 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2267 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2269 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2283 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2285 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2286 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2288 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2290 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2293 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2294 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2295 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2300 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2303 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2305 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2309 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2318 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2319 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2320 * the length of the block. */
2321 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2323 unsigned int off = 0;
2337 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2339 unsigned short length;
2340 unsigned short type;
2341 unsigned short size;
2342 unsigned char *data = *p;
2343 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2344 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2347 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2351 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2352 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2355 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2359 if (data+length != d+n)
2361 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2365 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2370 if (data+size > (d+n))
2373 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2374 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2375 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2377 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2379 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2381 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2384 tlsext_servername = 1;
2387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2388 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2390 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2391 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2393 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2395 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2398 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2399 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2400 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2402 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2405 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2406 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2408 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2409 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2410 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2411 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2412 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2415 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2417 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2419 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2420 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2422 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2425 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2428 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2431 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2433 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2434 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2436 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2440 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2443 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2444 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2446 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2450 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2451 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2452 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2453 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2455 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2457 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2459 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2464 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2466 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2467 * a status request message.
2469 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2471 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2474 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2475 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2478 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2479 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2481 unsigned char *selected;
2482 unsigned char selected_len;
2484 /* We must have requested it. */
2485 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2487 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2490 /* The data must be valid */
2491 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2493 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2496 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2498 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2501 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2502 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2504 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2507 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2508 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2509 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2512 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2514 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2516 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2518 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2519 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2523 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2524 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2526 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2527 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2528 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2530 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2535 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2537 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2542 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2544 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2545 * an authz hello extension if the client
2546 * didn't request a proof. */
2547 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2548 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2550 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2552 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2558 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2562 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2563 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2565 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2569 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2570 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2571 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2572 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2574 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2578 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2586 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2590 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2592 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2594 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2596 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2597 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2599 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2605 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2615 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2616 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2617 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2618 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2619 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2620 * absence on initial connect only.
2622 if (!renegotiate_seen
2623 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2624 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2626 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2628 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2636 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2639 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2643 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2645 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2650 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2652 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2653 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2655 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2656 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2658 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2659 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2664 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2668 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2669 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2676 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2681 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2683 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2684 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2687 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2688 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2690 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2691 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2695 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2696 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2697 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2698 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2700 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2702 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2703 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2704 * so this has to happen here in
2705 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2709 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2711 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2714 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2715 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2720 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2721 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2722 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2724 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2726 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2727 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2729 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2730 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2732 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2733 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2735 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2736 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2738 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2739 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2742 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2746 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2748 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2749 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2750 * abort the handshake.
2752 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2753 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2761 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2762 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2765 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2766 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2769 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2770 s->servername_done=0;
2776 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2778 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2781 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2782 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2783 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2784 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2786 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2789 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2790 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2791 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2792 if (certpkey == NULL)
2794 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2797 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2798 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2800 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2801 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2804 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2805 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2806 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2808 /* status request response should be sent */
2809 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2810 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2811 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2813 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2815 /* something bad happened */
2816 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2817 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2818 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2823 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2828 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2829 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2832 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2833 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2841 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2843 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2844 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2847 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2848 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2849 * it must contain uncompressed.
2851 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2852 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2853 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2854 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2855 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2857 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2859 unsigned char *list;
2860 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2861 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2862 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2864 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2866 found_uncompressed = 1;
2870 if (!found_uncompressed)
2872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2876 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2877 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2879 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2880 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2881 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2882 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2884 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2885 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2887 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2888 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2890 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2892 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2893 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2896 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2897 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2898 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2899 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2901 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2902 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2907 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2910 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2911 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2914 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2915 * there is no response.
2917 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2919 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2920 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2922 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2923 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2926 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2927 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2931 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2932 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2938 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2939 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2942 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2943 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2946 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2947 s->servername_done=0;
2953 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2956 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2958 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2960 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2964 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2972 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2973 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2974 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2976 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2977 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2978 * extension, if any.
2979 * len: the length of the session ID.
2980 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2981 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2982 * point to the resulting session.
2984 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2985 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2986 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2989 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2990 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2991 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2992 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2993 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2994 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2995 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2998 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2999 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3000 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3001 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3002 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3003 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3005 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3006 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3008 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3009 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3013 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3015 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3016 * to permit stateful resumption.
3018 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3020 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3024 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3032 /* Skip past cipher list */
3037 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3042 /* Now at start of extensions */
3043 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3046 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3048 unsigned short type, size;
3051 if (p + size > limit)
3053 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3058 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3059 * currently have one. */
3060 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3063 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3065 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3066 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3067 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3068 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3069 * calculate the master secret later. */
3072 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3075 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3076 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3078 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3080 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3081 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3083 default: /* fatal error */
3092 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3094 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3095 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3096 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3097 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3098 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3099 * point to the resulting session.
3102 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3103 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3104 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3105 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3107 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3108 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3109 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3112 unsigned char *sdec;
3113 const unsigned char *p;
3114 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3115 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3118 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3119 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3122 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3123 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3124 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3125 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3127 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3128 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3139 /* Check key name matches */
3140 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3142 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3143 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3144 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3145 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3147 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3148 * integrity checks on ticket.
3150 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3153 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3157 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3158 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3159 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3160 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3161 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3163 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3164 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3165 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3166 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3167 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3170 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3173 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3174 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3177 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3180 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3184 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3185 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3186 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3187 * as required by standard.
3190 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3191 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3199 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3204 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3212 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3213 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3214 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3215 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3216 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3217 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3218 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3221 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3222 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3223 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3224 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3227 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3230 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3232 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3238 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3241 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3243 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3244 return table[i].nid;
3249 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3254 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3255 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3258 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3261 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3262 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3266 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3268 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3269 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3272 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3276 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3277 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3284 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3285 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3289 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3290 return EVP_sha224();
3292 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3293 return EVP_sha256();
3295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3296 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3297 return EVP_sha384();
3299 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3300 return EVP_sha512();
3308 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3313 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3314 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3317 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3318 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3321 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3322 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3328 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3329 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3330 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3332 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3333 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3335 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3337 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3338 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3340 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3342 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3344 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3345 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3347 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3351 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3352 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3353 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3355 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3358 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3359 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3360 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3361 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3363 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3364 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3365 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3367 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3368 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3370 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3372 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3374 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3379 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3380 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3381 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3383 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3394 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3395 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3397 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3398 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3400 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3402 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3403 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3404 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3406 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3407 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3409 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3411 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3412 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3415 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3416 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3420 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3421 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3427 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3428 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3430 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3433 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3436 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3437 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3438 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3443 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3445 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3451 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3452 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3453 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3455 /* Should never happen */
3459 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3460 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3462 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3463 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3465 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3467 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3468 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3470 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3471 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3473 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3475 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3477 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3480 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3481 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3482 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3483 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3484 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3486 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3487 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3493 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3494 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3496 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3497 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3499 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3500 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3501 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3502 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3504 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3505 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3510 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3511 * use the certificate for signing.
3513 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3515 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3516 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3518 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3519 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3520 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3523 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3525 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3526 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3530 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3531 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3538 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3539 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3540 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3542 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3548 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3555 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3557 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3560 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3561 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3562 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3564 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3565 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3569 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3571 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3573 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3575 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3577 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3578 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3584 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3586 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3587 unsigned short hbtype;
3588 unsigned int payload;
3589 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3591 /* Read type and payload length first */
3596 if (s->msg_callback)
3597 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3598 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3599 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3601 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3603 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3606 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3607 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3608 * payload, plus padding
3610 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3613 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3614 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3616 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3618 /* Random padding */
3619 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3621 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3623 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3624 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3625 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3626 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3628 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3633 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3637 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3638 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3639 * sequence number */
3642 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3645 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3653 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3655 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3657 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3658 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3660 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3661 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3662 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3664 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3668 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3669 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3671 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3675 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3676 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3682 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3683 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3685 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3687 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3688 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3689 * some random stuff.
3690 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3691 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3692 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3693 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3696 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3699 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3700 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3702 /* Sequence number */
3703 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3704 /* 16 random bytes */
3705 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3707 /* Random padding */
3708 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3710 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3713 if (s->msg_callback)
3714 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3715 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3716 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3718 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3727 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3732 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3735 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3737 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3740 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3741 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3743 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3745 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3747 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3755 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3756 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3757 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3758 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3759 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3760 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3763 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3764 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3765 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3766 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3769 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3771 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3772 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3775 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3776 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3780 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3781 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3782 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3786 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3790 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3793 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3795 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3800 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3801 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3803 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3805 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3806 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3807 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3808 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3810 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3818 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3819 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3820 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3821 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3825 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3826 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3827 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3828 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3834 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3838 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3842 if (default_nid == -1)
3844 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3846 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3847 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3848 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3852 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3853 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3857 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3858 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3860 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3866 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3867 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3868 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3869 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
3872 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3874 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3875 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3876 /* Strict mode flags */
3877 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3878 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3879 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3881 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3886 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3887 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3889 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3890 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3893 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3897 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3900 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3902 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3904 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3905 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3908 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3909 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3910 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3912 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3913 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3922 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3925 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3926 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3927 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3929 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3937 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3938 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3939 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
3942 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3948 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
3949 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
3952 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
3955 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3956 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3958 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3963 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3964 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3965 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3966 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3967 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3970 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3971 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3972 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3973 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3977 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3978 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3986 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
3987 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
3990 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
3993 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3994 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
3996 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3999 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4007 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4008 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4010 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4013 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4014 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4015 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4017 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4022 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4030 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4031 else if(check_flags)
4032 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4034 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4035 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4036 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4037 else if (!check_flags)
4040 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4041 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4042 else if (strict_mode)
4044 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4045 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4047 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4048 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4052 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4060 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4062 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4067 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4070 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4073 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4078 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4079 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4080 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4081 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4082 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4087 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4092 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4096 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4097 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4099 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4101 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4103 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4107 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4111 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4114 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4116 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4117 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4119 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4121 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4122 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4124 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4126 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4128 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4129 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4131 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4136 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4140 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4142 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4143 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4147 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4149 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4150 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4151 else if (cpk->digest)
4152 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4155 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4157 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4158 * if the chain is invalid.
4162 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4163 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4166 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4167 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4174 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4175 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4177 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4178 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4179 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4180 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4181 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4182 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4184 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4185 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4187 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);