2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
153 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
157 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
168 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
171 s->version = s->method->version;
174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
176 static int nid_list[] =
178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
205 static int pref_list[] =
207 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
208 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
209 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
210 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
211 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
212 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
213 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
214 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
215 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
216 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
217 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
221 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
222 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
223 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
224 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
225 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
230 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
231 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
234 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
236 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
237 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
238 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
240 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
243 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
245 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
248 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
250 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
252 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
254 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
256 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
258 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
260 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
262 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
264 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
266 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
268 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
270 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
272 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
274 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
276 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
278 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
280 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
282 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
286 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
288 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
290 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
292 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
294 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
296 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
306 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
307 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
310 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
311 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
313 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
316 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
317 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
319 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
322 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
323 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
325 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
328 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
329 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
330 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
331 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
333 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
335 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
336 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
340 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
343 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
346 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
350 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
352 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
354 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
359 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
363 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
366 unsigned char *ret = p;
368 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
369 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
370 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
375 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
377 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
379 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
380 unsigned long size_str;
383 /* check for enough space.
384 4 for the servername type and entension length
385 2 for servernamelist length
386 1 for the hostname type
387 2 for hostname length
391 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
392 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
395 /* extension type and length */
396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
399 /* length of servername list */
402 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
403 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
405 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
409 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
414 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
420 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
422 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
425 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
435 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
436 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
437 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
439 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
440 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
446 /* check for enough space.
447 4 for the srp type type and entension length
448 1 for the srp user identity
449 + srp user identity length
451 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
453 /* fill in the extension */
454 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
455 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
456 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
457 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
463 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
464 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
466 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
469 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
470 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
471 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
477 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
478 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
479 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
480 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
481 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
483 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
484 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
486 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
489 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
490 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
491 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
497 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
498 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
500 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
501 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
502 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
503 * resolves this to two bytes.
505 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
506 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
507 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
509 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
511 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
514 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
515 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
516 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
517 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
519 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
520 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
521 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
523 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
524 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
526 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
530 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
531 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
533 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
536 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
541 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
547 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
549 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
552 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
553 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
554 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
555 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
558 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
559 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
560 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
562 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
564 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
566 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
569 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
572 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
577 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
578 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
581 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
585 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
587 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
588 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
594 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
596 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
603 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
604 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
605 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
607 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
608 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
610 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
612 /* save position of id len */
613 unsigned char *q = ret;
614 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
615 /* skip over id len */
617 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
623 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
627 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
628 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
631 * 1: peer may send requests
632 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
634 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
635 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
637 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
641 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
643 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
644 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
645 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
647 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
652 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
656 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
658 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
660 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
663 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
671 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
678 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
681 unsigned char *ret = p;
682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
683 int next_proto_neg_seen;
686 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
687 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
691 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
693 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
695 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
697 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
701 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
705 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
711 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
713 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
716 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
726 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
727 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
729 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
732 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
733 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
734 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
740 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
741 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
742 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
743 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
744 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
747 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
748 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
750 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
751 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
753 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
754 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
758 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
760 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
761 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
765 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
766 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
767 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
769 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
771 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
773 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
776 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
779 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
788 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
790 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
792 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
795 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
803 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
804 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
805 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
806 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
807 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
808 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
809 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
810 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
811 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
812 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
813 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
819 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
820 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
822 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
825 * 1: peer may send requests
826 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
828 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
829 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
831 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
837 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
838 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
839 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
841 const unsigned char *npa;
845 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
846 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
848 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
849 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
851 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
853 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
858 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
865 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
870 unsigned char *data = *p;
871 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
874 s->servername_done = 0;
875 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
877 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
881 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
882 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
889 if (data > (d+n-len))
892 while (data <= (d+n-4))
897 if (data+size > (d+n))
900 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
902 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
903 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
904 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
905 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
907 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
908 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
909 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
910 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
911 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
912 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
913 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
914 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
915 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
916 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
917 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
918 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
919 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
920 the value of the Host: field.
921 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
922 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
923 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
924 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
928 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
930 unsigned char *sdata;
936 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
943 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
950 servname_type = *(sdata++);
956 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
959 if (s->servername_done == 0)
960 switch (servname_type)
962 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
965 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
967 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
970 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
972 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
975 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
977 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
980 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
981 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
982 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
983 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
984 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
985 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
988 s->servername_done = 1;
992 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
993 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
994 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1006 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1011 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1012 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1014 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1016 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1019 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1021 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1024 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1026 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1027 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1029 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1031 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1037 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1038 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1039 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1041 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1042 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1044 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1046 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1051 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1053 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1054 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1056 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1057 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1059 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1062 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1063 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1066 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1067 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1068 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1069 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1070 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1073 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1074 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1076 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1077 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1078 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1080 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1081 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1083 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1088 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1090 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1093 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1094 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1096 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1099 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1100 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1103 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1104 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1105 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1106 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1107 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1110 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1111 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1112 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1113 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1115 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1119 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1122 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1123 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1125 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1129 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1130 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1131 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1132 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1134 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1135 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1137 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1142 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1144 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1145 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1147 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1151 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1153 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1155 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1157 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1160 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1162 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1168 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1170 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1173 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1175 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1179 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1180 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1185 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1189 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1191 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1193 const unsigned char *sdata;
1195 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1200 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1209 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1213 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1217 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1222 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1226 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1231 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1232 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1235 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1236 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1237 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1239 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1240 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1243 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1244 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1246 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1247 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1252 /* Read in request_extensions */
1255 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1262 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1268 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1270 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1271 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1274 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1275 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1277 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1278 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1280 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1285 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1289 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1291 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1292 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1296 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1297 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1299 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1300 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1301 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1303 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1308 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1309 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1310 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1312 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1315 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1316 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1317 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1318 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1319 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1320 * anything like that, but this might change).
1322 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1323 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1324 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1325 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1326 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1327 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1331 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1332 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1334 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1346 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1348 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1349 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1351 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1353 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1361 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1362 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1363 * the length of the block. */
1364 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1366 unsigned int off = 0;
1380 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1382 unsigned short length;
1383 unsigned short type;
1384 unsigned short size;
1385 unsigned char *data = *p;
1386 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1387 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1390 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1394 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1395 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1398 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1402 if (data+length != d+n)
1404 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1408 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1413 if (data+size > (d+n))
1416 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1417 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1418 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1420 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1422 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1424 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1427 tlsext_servername = 1;
1430 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1431 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1432 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1434 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1435 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1437 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1438 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1440 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1443 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1444 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1445 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1447 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1450 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1451 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1453 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1454 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1455 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1456 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1457 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1460 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1462 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1464 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1465 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1467 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1470 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1473 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1476 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1478 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1479 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1480 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1482 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1486 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1489 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1490 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1492 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1496 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1497 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1498 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1499 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1501 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1503 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1505 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1510 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1511 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1513 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1514 * a status request message.
1516 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1518 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1521 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1522 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1525 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1526 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1528 unsigned char *selected;
1529 unsigned char selected_len;
1531 /* We must have requested it. */
1532 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
1534 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1537 /* The data must be valid */
1538 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1540 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1543 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1545 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1548 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1549 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1551 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1554 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1555 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1556 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1559 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1561 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1563 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1566 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1570 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1571 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1573 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1574 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1575 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1577 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1582 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1584 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1594 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1598 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1600 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1602 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1604 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1605 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1607 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1613 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1623 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1624 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1625 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1626 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1627 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1628 * absence on initial connect only.
1630 if (!renegotiate_seen
1631 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1632 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1634 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1636 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1644 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1647 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1648 * and elliptic curves we support.
1653 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1654 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1656 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1658 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1660 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1661 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1662 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1668 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1671 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1672 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1677 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1678 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1679 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1680 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1682 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1683 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1684 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
1685 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1687 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1691 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
1692 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
1694 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1698 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1700 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1704 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1706 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1711 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1713 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1714 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1716 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1717 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1719 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1720 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1725 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1729 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1730 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1737 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1740 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1741 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1742 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1745 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1746 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1747 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1748 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1752 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1753 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1758 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1759 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1760 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1761 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1763 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1768 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
1770 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1771 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1774 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1775 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1777 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1778 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1782 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1783 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1784 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1785 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1787 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1789 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1790 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1791 * so this has to happen here in
1792 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
1796 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1798 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1801 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1802 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1807 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1808 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1809 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1811 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1813 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1814 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1816 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1817 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1819 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1820 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1822 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1823 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1825 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1826 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1829 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1833 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1835 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1836 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1837 * abort the handshake.
1839 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1840 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1848 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1849 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1852 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1853 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1856 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1857 s->servername_done=0;
1863 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
1865 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1868 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1869 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1870 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
1871 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
1873 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1876 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
1877 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
1878 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1879 if (certpkey == NULL)
1881 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1884 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
1885 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
1887 s->cert->key = certpkey;
1888 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1891 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1892 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1893 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1895 /* status request response should be sent */
1896 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1897 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1898 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1900 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1902 /* something bad happened */
1903 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1904 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1905 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1910 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1915 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1916 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1919 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1920 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1928 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1930 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1931 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1934 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
1935 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
1936 * it must contain uncompressed.
1938 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1939 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1940 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1941 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1942 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1944 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1946 unsigned char *list;
1947 int found_uncompressed = 0;
1948 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1949 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1951 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
1953 found_uncompressed = 1;
1957 if (!found_uncompressed)
1959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1963 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1964 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1966 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1967 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1968 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1969 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1971 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1972 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
1974 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
1975 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
1977 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1979 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1980 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1983 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
1984 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
1985 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
1986 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
1988 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1989 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1994 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
1997 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
1998 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2001 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2002 * there is no response.
2004 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2006 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2007 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2009 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2010 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2013 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2014 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2018 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2019 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2025 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2026 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2029 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2030 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2033 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2034 s->servername_done=0;
2040 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2041 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2042 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2044 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2045 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2046 * extension, if any.
2047 * len: the length of the session ID.
2048 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2049 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2050 * point to the resulting session.
2052 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2053 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2054 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2057 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2058 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2059 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2060 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2061 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2062 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2063 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2066 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2067 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2068 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2069 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2070 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2071 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2073 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2074 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2076 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2077 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2081 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2083 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2084 * to permit stateful resumption.
2086 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2088 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2092 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2093 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2100 /* Skip past cipher list */
2105 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2110 /* Now at start of extensions */
2111 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2114 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2116 unsigned short type, size;
2119 if (p + size > limit)
2121 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2126 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2127 * currently have one. */
2128 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2131 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2133 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2134 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2135 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2136 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2137 * calculate the master secret later. */
2140 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2143 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2144 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2146 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2148 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2149 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2151 default: /* fatal error */
2160 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2162 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2163 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2164 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2165 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2166 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2167 * point to the resulting session.
2170 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2171 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2172 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2173 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2175 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2176 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2177 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2180 unsigned char *sdec;
2181 const unsigned char *p;
2182 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2183 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2186 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2187 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2190 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2191 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2192 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2193 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2195 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2196 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2207 /* Check key name matches */
2208 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2210 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2211 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2212 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2213 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2215 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2216 * integrity checks on ticket.
2218 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2221 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2225 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2226 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2227 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2228 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2229 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2231 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2232 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2233 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2234 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2235 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2238 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2241 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2242 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2245 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2248 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2252 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2253 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2254 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2255 * as required by standard.
2258 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2259 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2267 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2272 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2280 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2282 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2284 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2285 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2288 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2289 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2291 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2292 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2293 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2297 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2299 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2302 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2305 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2309 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2312 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2314 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2320 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2323 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2325 if (table[i].id == id)
2326 return table[i].nid;
2332 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2337 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2338 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2341 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2344 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2345 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2349 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2351 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2352 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2355 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2360 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
2367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2368 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2372 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2373 return EVP_sha224();
2375 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2376 return EVP_sha256();
2378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2379 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2380 return EVP_sha384();
2382 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2383 return EVP_sha512();
2391 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2393 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2398 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2399 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2401 /* Should never happen */
2405 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2406 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2407 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2408 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2410 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2412 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2417 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2418 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2422 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2423 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2427 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2435 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2437 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2440 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2441 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2442 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2449 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2450 * supported it stays as NULL.
2452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2453 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2454 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2457 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2459 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2460 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2464 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2465 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2474 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2476 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2477 unsigned short hbtype;
2478 unsigned int payload;
2479 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2481 /* Read type and payload length first */
2486 if (s->msg_callback)
2487 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2488 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2489 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2491 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
2493 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2496 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
2497 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
2498 * payload, plus padding
2500 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2503 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2504 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2506 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2508 /* Random padding */
2509 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
2511 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
2513 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2514 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2515 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2516 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2518 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2523 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
2527 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
2528 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
2529 * sequence number */
2532 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
2535 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2543 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2545 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2547 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2548 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2550 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2551 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2552 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2558 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2559 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2565 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2566 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
2568 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2572 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
2573 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2575 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2577 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2578 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2579 * some random stuff.
2580 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2581 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2582 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2583 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2586 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2589 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2590 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2592 /* Sequence number */
2593 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2594 /* 16 random bytes */
2595 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2597 /* Random padding */
2598 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
2600 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2603 if (s->msg_callback)
2604 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2605 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2606 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2608 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;