2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
117 #include <openssl/ec.h>
119 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
120 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #include "ssl_locl.h"
123 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
126 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
127 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
128 SSL_SESSION **psess);
129 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
130 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
133 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
136 tls1_setup_key_block,
137 tls1_generate_master_secret,
138 tls1_change_cipher_state,
139 tls1_final_finish_mac,
140 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
141 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
142 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
143 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 tls1_export_keying_material,
147 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
148 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
152 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
155 tls1_setup_key_block,
156 tls1_generate_master_secret,
157 tls1_change_cipher_state,
158 tls1_final_finish_mac,
159 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
160 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
161 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
162 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 tls1_export_keying_material,
165 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
166 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
167 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
171 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
174 tls1_setup_key_block,
175 tls1_generate_master_secret,
176 tls1_change_cipher_state,
177 tls1_final_finish_mac,
178 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
179 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
180 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
181 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 tls1_export_keying_material,
184 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
185 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
186 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
187 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
191 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
193 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
194 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
200 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
201 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
205 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
208 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
210 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
212 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
216 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
219 s->version = s->method->version;
222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
224 static int nid_list[] =
226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
230 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
231 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
232 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
233 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
234 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
235 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
236 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
237 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
238 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
239 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
240 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
241 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
242 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
243 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
244 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
245 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
246 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
247 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
248 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
249 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
250 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
251 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
252 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
253 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
257 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
259 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
264 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
267 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
268 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
270 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
273 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
274 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
276 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
277 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
279 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
280 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
282 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
283 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
284 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
286 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
287 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
288 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
290 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
291 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
293 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
294 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
296 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
297 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
303 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
304 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
305 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
308 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
311 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
315 /* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */
316 static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] =
318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
319 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
320 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
322 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
324 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
325 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
327 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
329 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
330 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
332 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
333 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
335 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
336 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
337 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
339 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
340 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
342 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
343 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
345 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
346 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
348 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
349 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
350 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
352 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
353 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
354 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
358 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
360 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
361 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
362 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
364 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
367 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
369 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
372 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
374 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
376 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
378 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
380 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
382 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
384 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
386 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
388 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
390 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
392 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
394 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
396 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
398 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
400 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
402 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
404 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
406 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
408 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
410 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
412 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
414 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
416 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
418 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
420 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
422 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
424 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
426 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
433 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
435 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
436 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
437 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
438 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
439 * lists in the first place.
440 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
441 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
442 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
444 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
445 const unsigned char **pcurves,
448 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
451 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
452 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
456 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
457 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
459 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
460 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
461 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
464 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
465 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
469 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
470 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
474 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
475 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
482 *pcurves = fips_curves_default;
483 *pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
488 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
489 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
493 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
496 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
502 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
506 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
507 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
509 const unsigned char *curves;
510 size_t num_curves, i;
511 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
512 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
514 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
517 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
520 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
522 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
525 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
527 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
530 else /* Should never happen */
533 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
535 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2)
537 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
544 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
545 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
546 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
547 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
549 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
551 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
552 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
554 /* Can't do anything on client side */
561 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
562 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
565 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
566 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
567 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
568 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
569 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
570 /* Should never happen */
573 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
577 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
578 * but s->options is a long...
580 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
582 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
583 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
584 if(!tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
586 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
588 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref+=2)
590 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
591 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp+=2)
593 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
597 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
598 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
606 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
610 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
611 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
613 unsigned char *clist, *p;
615 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
616 * while curve ids < 32
618 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
619 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
623 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
626 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
628 unsigned long idmask;
630 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
632 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */
633 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25)
639 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
640 curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]);
642 EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve))
643 == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
645 if(curve) EC_GROUP_free(curve);
650 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
653 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
664 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
668 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
673 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
676 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
678 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
682 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
684 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
686 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
688 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
689 if (nid == NID_undef)
690 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
691 if (nid == NID_undef)
692 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
693 if (nid == NID_undef)
695 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
696 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
698 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
701 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
702 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
707 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
711 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
713 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
714 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
719 const EC_METHOD *meth;
722 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
723 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
726 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
729 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
733 /* Determine curve ID */
734 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
735 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
736 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
740 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
752 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
754 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
757 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
759 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
762 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
766 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
767 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
768 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
770 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
771 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
773 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
774 * is supported (see RFC4492).
776 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
778 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
779 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
780 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++)
782 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
785 if (i == num_formats)
790 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
791 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
793 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
795 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
797 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] &&
798 pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
803 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
810 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
813 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
815 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
817 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
818 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
822 *pformats = ecformats_default;
823 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
825 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
827 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
831 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
832 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
834 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
836 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
839 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
842 /* If not EC nothing to do */
843 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
848 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
852 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
853 * supported curves extension.
855 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
858 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
859 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
861 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
868 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
869 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
870 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
871 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
872 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
874 return 0; /* Should never happen */
875 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
876 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
878 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
882 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
883 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
885 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
891 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
892 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
894 unsigned char curve_id[2];
895 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
896 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
897 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
898 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
901 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
902 * no other curves permitted.
906 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
907 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
908 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
909 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
910 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
914 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
915 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
917 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
918 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
920 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
923 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
926 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
928 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
934 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
936 /* Need a shared curve */
937 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
943 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
948 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
950 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
954 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
957 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
961 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
966 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
970 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
971 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
974 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
975 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
977 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
980 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
981 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
983 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
986 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
987 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
989 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
992 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
993 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
994 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
995 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
997 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
999 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
1000 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
1003 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1004 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
1006 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1007 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
1010 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1011 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1012 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1013 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1016 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
1018 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1021 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1022 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
1024 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1025 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1026 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
1028 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1029 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1032 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1033 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
1037 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
1038 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
1040 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1041 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1043 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
1045 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1046 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1050 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1051 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1054 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1055 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1057 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1058 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1060 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1061 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1062 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1063 /* Should never happen */
1066 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1067 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1072 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1073 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1075 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1076 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1077 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1079 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1084 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1089 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
1091 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1094 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1098 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1100 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1103 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1111 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1115 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1116 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1117 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1119 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1122 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1123 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1128 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1134 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1137 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1138 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1141 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1142 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1143 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1144 * session and not global settings.
1147 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1150 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1151 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1152 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1155 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1156 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1157 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1160 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1161 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1164 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1165 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1170 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1175 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1179 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1180 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1186 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1187 * signature algorithms.
1191 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1192 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1196 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1197 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1201 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1202 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1205 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1207 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1208 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1212 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1213 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1215 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1216 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1218 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1220 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1222 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1223 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1229 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1232 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1233 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1235 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1237 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1240 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1241 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1243 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1245 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1247 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1248 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1249 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1250 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1259 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1260 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1261 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1266 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1268 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1270 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1271 unsigned long size_str;
1274 /* check for enough space.
1275 4 for the servername type and entension length
1276 2 for servernamelist length
1277 1 for the hostname type
1278 2 for hostname length
1282 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1283 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1286 /* extension type and length */
1287 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1288 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1290 /* length of servername list */
1291 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1293 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1294 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1296 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1300 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1305 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1311 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1313 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1316 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1326 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1327 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1328 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1330 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1331 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1337 /* check for enough space.
1338 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1339 1 for the srp user identity
1340 + srp user identity length
1342 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1344 /* fill in the extension */
1345 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1346 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1347 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1348 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1356 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1358 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1359 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1361 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1363 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1364 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1365 if (num_formats > 255)
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1371 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1372 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1373 s2n(num_formats + 1,ret);
1374 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats ;
1375 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1378 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1379 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1380 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1383 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1384 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2) return NULL;
1385 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2)
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1390 curves_list_len = 2*num_curves;
1391 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1392 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1393 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1394 memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len);
1395 ret+=curves_list_len;
1397 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1399 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1402 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1403 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1404 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1405 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1407 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1408 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1409 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1411 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1412 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1414 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1418 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1419 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1421 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1424 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1425 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1429 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1435 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1438 const unsigned char *salg;
1439 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1440 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1442 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1443 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1445 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1449 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1450 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1452 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1454 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1456 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1459 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1462 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1467 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1470 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1474 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1476 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1477 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1483 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1485 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1492 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1493 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1494 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1496 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1497 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1499 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1501 /* save position of id len */
1502 unsigned char *q = ret;
1503 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1504 /* skip over id len */
1506 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1512 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1515 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1516 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1517 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1519 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1522 * 1: peer may send requests
1523 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1525 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1526 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1528 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1532 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1534 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1535 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1536 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1538 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1543 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1545 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1547 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1548 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1549 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1550 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1551 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1552 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1556 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1560 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1562 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1564 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1567 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1575 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1576 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1577 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1580 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1581 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1583 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1584 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1586 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1588 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1589 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1590 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1591 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1593 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1595 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1597 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1603 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1605 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1610 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1613 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1617 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1620 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1621 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1623 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1626 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1627 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1628 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1629 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1631 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1632 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1636 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1638 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1640 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1642 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1646 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1650 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1656 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1658 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1661 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1663 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1673 const unsigned char *plist;
1675 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1678 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1680 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1681 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1688 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1689 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1690 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1691 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1695 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1696 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1698 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1699 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1701 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1702 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1706 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1708 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1709 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1713 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1714 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1716 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1718 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1720 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1723 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1726 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1731 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1732 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
1736 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1738 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1740 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1743 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1752 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1753 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1754 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1755 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1756 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1757 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1758 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1759 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1760 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1761 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1762 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1768 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1769 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1771 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1773 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1776 * 1: peer may send requests
1777 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1779 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1780 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1782 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1787 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1788 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1789 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1790 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1792 const unsigned char *npa;
1793 unsigned int npalen;
1796 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1797 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1799 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1800 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1802 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1804 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1808 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1811 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1813 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1814 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1816 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1818 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1822 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1826 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1829 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1834 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1835 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1836 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1841 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1842 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1843 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1844 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1846 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1847 unsigned short type, size;
1848 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1849 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1850 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1851 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1852 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1853 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1854 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1856 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1857 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1858 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1859 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1862 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1863 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1864 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1865 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1866 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1867 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1868 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1869 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1870 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1871 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1874 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1883 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1886 if (data+size > d+n)
1890 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1892 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1893 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1895 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1897 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1899 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1904 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1906 if (data + len != d+n)
1908 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1912 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1914 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1916 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1918 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1919 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1920 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1923 * returns: 0 on success. */
1924 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1925 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1929 const unsigned char *selected;
1930 unsigned char selected_len;
1933 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1939 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1940 * length-prefixed strings. */
1941 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1942 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1951 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1953 proto_len = data[i];
1959 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1965 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1966 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1967 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1968 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1969 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1970 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1971 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1973 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1976 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1977 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1982 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1986 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1988 unsigned short type;
1989 unsigned short size;
1991 unsigned char *data = *p;
1992 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1994 s->servername_done = 0;
1995 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1997 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2000 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2002 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2003 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2006 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2007 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2008 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2011 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2012 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2013 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
2014 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2016 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2017 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2019 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2020 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2023 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2024 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2026 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2027 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2031 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2033 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2037 if (data > (d+n-len))
2040 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2045 if (data+size > (d+n))
2048 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2050 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2051 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2052 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2053 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2055 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2056 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2057 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2058 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2059 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2060 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2061 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2062 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2063 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2064 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2065 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2066 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2067 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2068 the value of the Host: field.
2069 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2070 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2071 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2072 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2076 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2078 unsigned char *sdata;
2084 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2091 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2098 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2104 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2107 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2108 switch (servname_type)
2110 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2113 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2115 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2118 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2120 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2123 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2125 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2128 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2129 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2130 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2131 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2132 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2133 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2136 s->servername_done = 1;
2140 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2141 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2142 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2154 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2160 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2162 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2164 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2167 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2169 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2172 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2174 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2175 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2177 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2179 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2186 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2188 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2189 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2191 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2192 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2194 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2199 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2201 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2202 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2204 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2205 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2207 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2210 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2211 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2214 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2215 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2216 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2217 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2218 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2221 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2223 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2224 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2225 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2227 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2228 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2229 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2230 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
2232 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2237 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2239 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2242 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2243 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2245 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2248 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2249 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2252 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2253 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2254 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2255 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2256 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2259 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2260 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2261 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2263 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2267 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2270 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2271 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2273 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2277 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2278 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2279 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2280 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2282 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2283 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2285 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2290 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2292 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2293 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2295 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2299 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2301 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2303 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2305 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2308 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2310 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2315 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2317 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2320 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2322 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2326 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2331 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2335 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2337 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2339 const unsigned char *sdata;
2341 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2346 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2355 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2359 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2363 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2368 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2372 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2377 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2378 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2381 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2382 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2383 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2385 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2386 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2389 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2390 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2392 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2393 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2398 /* Read in request_extensions */
2401 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2408 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2414 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2416 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2417 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2420 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2421 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2423 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2424 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2426 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2431 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2435 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2438 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2442 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2443 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2445 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2446 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2447 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2449 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2455 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2456 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2457 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2459 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2462 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2463 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2464 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2465 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2466 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2467 * anything like that, but this might change).
2469 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2470 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2471 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2472 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2473 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2474 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2478 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2479 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2480 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2482 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2485 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2486 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2490 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2492 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2493 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2495 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2508 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2510 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2511 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2513 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2515 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2523 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data
2524 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking.
2527 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *limit, int *al)
2529 unsigned short type, size, len;
2530 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
2531 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
2534 if (data >= limit - 2)
2538 if (data > limit - len)
2541 while (data <= limit - 4)
2546 if (data+size > limit)
2548 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2557 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2560 unsigned char *ptmp = *p;
2562 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled
2563 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically
2564 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions
2565 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure.
2567 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2569 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2573 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2579 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2580 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, d + n, &al) <= 0)
2582 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2590 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2591 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2592 * the length of the block. */
2593 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2595 unsigned int off = 0;
2609 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2611 unsigned short length;
2612 unsigned short type;
2613 unsigned short size;
2614 unsigned char *data = *p;
2615 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2616 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2619 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2621 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2623 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2625 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2626 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2629 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2630 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2631 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2634 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2638 if (data+length != d+n)
2640 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2644 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2649 if (data+size > (d+n))
2652 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2653 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2654 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2656 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2658 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2660 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2663 tlsext_servername = 1;
2666 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2667 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2669 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2670 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2672 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2674 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2679 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2680 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2681 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2683 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2686 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2687 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2690 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2691 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2692 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2693 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2694 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2697 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2699 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2701 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2702 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2704 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2707 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2710 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2713 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2715 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2716 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2718 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2722 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2725 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2726 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2728 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2732 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2733 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2734 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2735 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2737 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2739 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2741 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2746 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2748 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2749 * a status request message.
2751 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2753 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2756 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2757 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2760 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2761 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2763 unsigned char *selected;
2764 unsigned char selected_len;
2766 /* We must have requested it. */
2767 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2769 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2772 /* The data must be valid */
2773 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2775 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2778 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2780 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2783 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2784 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2786 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2789 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2790 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2791 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2795 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2799 /* We must have requested it. */
2800 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2802 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2807 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2810 /* The extension data consists of:
2811 * uint16 list_length
2812 * uint8 proto_length;
2813 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2817 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2819 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2823 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2825 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2828 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2829 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2830 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2831 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2833 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2836 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2837 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2840 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2842 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2844 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2847 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2851 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2852 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2854 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2855 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2856 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2858 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2864 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2866 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2871 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2872 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2874 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2882 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2886 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2888 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2890 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2892 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2893 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2895 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2901 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2911 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2912 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2913 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2914 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2915 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2916 * absence on initial connect only.
2918 if (!renegotiate_seen
2919 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2920 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2922 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2924 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2932 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2935 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2939 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2941 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2946 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2948 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2949 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2951 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2952 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2954 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2955 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2960 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2964 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2965 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2972 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2977 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2979 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2980 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2983 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2984 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2986 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2987 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2991 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2992 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2993 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2994 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2996 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2998 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2999 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
3000 * so this has to happen here in
3001 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
3005 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
3007 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
3010 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3011 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3016 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3017 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3018 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3020 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3022 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3023 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3025 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3026 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3028 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3029 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3031 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3032 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3034 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3035 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3038 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3042 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3044 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3045 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3046 * abort the handshake.
3048 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3049 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3057 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3058 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3061 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3062 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3065 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3066 s->servername_done=0;
3072 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3076 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3077 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3079 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3080 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3082 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3083 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
3085 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3086 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3089 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3090 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
3092 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s))
3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3095 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3096 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3099 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3100 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3103 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3104 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3109 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3112 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3116 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3118 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3121 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3122 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3123 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3124 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3126 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3129 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3130 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3131 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3132 if (certpkey == NULL)
3134 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3137 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3138 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3140 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3141 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3144 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3145 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3146 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3148 /* status request response should be sent */
3149 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3150 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3151 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3153 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3155 /* something bad happened */
3156 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3157 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3158 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3163 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3168 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3169 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3172 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3173 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3181 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3183 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3184 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3187 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3188 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3189 * it must contain uncompressed.
3191 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3192 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3193 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3194 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3195 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3197 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3199 unsigned char *list;
3200 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3201 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3202 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3204 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3206 found_uncompressed = 1;
3210 if (!found_uncompressed)
3212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3216 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3217 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3219 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3220 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3221 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3222 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3224 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3225 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3227 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3228 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3230 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3232 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3233 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3236 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3237 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3238 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3239 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3241 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3242 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3247 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3250 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3251 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3254 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3255 * there is no response.
3257 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3259 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3260 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3262 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3263 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3266 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3267 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3271 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3272 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3278 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3279 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3282 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3283 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3286 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3287 s->servername_done=0;
3293 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3296 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3298 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3300 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3304 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3312 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3313 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3314 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3316 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3317 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3318 * extension, if any.
3319 * len: the length of the session ID.
3320 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3321 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3322 * point to the resulting session.
3324 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3325 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3326 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3329 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3330 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3331 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3332 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3333 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3334 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3335 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3338 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3339 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3340 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3341 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3342 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3343 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3345 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3346 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3348 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3349 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3353 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3355 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3356 * to permit stateful resumption.
3358 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3360 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3364 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3372 /* Skip past cipher list */
3377 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3382 /* Now at start of extensions */
3383 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3386 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3388 unsigned short type, size;
3391 if (p + size > limit)
3393 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3398 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3399 * currently have one. */
3400 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3403 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3405 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3406 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3407 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3408 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3409 * calculate the master secret later. */
3412 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3415 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3416 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3418 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3420 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3421 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3423 default: /* fatal error */
3432 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3434 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3435 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3436 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3437 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3438 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3439 * point to the resulting session.
3442 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3443 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3444 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3445 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3447 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3448 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3449 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3452 unsigned char *sdec;
3453 const unsigned char *p;
3454 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3455 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3458 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3459 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3462 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3463 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3464 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3465 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3467 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3468 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3479 /* Check key name matches */
3480 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3482 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3483 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3484 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3485 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3487 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3488 * integrity checks on ticket.
3490 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3493 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3497 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3498 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3499 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3500 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3501 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3503 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3506 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3507 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3508 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3509 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3510 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3513 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3516 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3517 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3519 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3524 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3527 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3531 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3532 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3533 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3534 * as required by standard.
3537 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3538 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3546 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3551 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3559 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3560 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3561 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3562 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3563 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3564 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3565 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3568 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3569 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3570 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3571 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3574 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3577 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3579 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3585 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3588 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3590 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3591 return table[i].nid;
3596 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3601 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3602 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3605 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3608 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3609 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3613 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3615 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3616 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3619 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3624 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3632 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3635 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3636 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3637 return EVP_sha224();
3639 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3640 return EVP_sha256();
3642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3643 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3644 return EVP_sha384();
3646 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3647 return EVP_sha512();
3655 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3660 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3661 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3664 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3665 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3668 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3669 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3675 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3676 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3677 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3679 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3680 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3682 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3684 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3685 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3687 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3689 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3691 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3692 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3694 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3698 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3699 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3700 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3702 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3705 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3706 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3707 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3708 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3710 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3711 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3712 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3714 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3715 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3717 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3719 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3721 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3726 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3727 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3728 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3730 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3741 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3742 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3744 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3745 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3747 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3749 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3750 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3752 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3753 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3755 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3756 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3758 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3759 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3761 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3763 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3764 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3767 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3768 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3772 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3773 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3779 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3780 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3782 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3785 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3788 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3789 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3790 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3795 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3797 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3800 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3801 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3803 /* Should never happen */
3807 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3808 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3809 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3810 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3812 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3813 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3817 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3823 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3824 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3827 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3828 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3830 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3831 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3833 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3835 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3837 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3840 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3841 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3842 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3843 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3844 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3846 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3847 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3853 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3854 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3856 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3857 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3859 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3860 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3861 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3862 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3864 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3865 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3870 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3871 * use the certificate for signing.
3873 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3875 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3876 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3879 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3880 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3883 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3885 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3886 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3890 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3891 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3898 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3899 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3900 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3902 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3908 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3915 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3917 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3920 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3921 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3922 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3924 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3925 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3929 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3931 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3933 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3935 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3937 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3938 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3944 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3946 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3947 unsigned short hbtype;
3948 unsigned int payload;
3949 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3951 if (s->msg_callback)
3952 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3953 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3954 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3956 /* Read type and payload length first */
3957 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3958 return 0; /* silently discard */
3961 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3962 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3965 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3967 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3970 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3971 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3972 * payload, plus padding
3974 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3977 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3978 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3980 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3982 /* Random padding */
3983 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3985 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3987 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3988 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3989 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3990 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3992 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3997 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4001 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4002 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4003 * sequence number */
4006 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4009 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4017 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4019 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4021 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4022 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4024 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4025 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4026 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4032 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4033 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4039 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4040 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4042 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4046 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4047 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4049 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4051 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4052 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4053 * some random stuff.
4054 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4055 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4056 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4057 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4060 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4063 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4064 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4066 /* Sequence number */
4067 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4068 /* 16 random bytes */
4069 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4071 /* Random padding */
4072 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4074 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4077 if (s->msg_callback)
4078 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4079 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4080 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4082 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4091 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4096 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4099 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4101 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4104 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4105 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4107 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4109 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4111 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4119 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4120 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4121 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4122 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4123 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4124 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4127 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4128 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4129 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4130 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4133 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4135 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4136 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4139 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4140 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4144 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4145 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4146 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4150 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4154 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4157 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4159 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4164 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4165 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4167 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4169 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4170 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4171 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4172 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4174 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4182 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4183 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4184 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4185 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4189 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4190 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4191 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4192 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4198 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4202 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4206 if (default_nid == -1)
4208 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4210 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4211 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4212 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4216 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4217 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4221 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4222 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4224 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4230 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4231 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4232 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4233 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4236 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4238 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4239 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4240 /* Strict mode flags */
4241 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4242 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4243 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4245 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4250 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4251 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4253 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4254 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4257 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4261 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4264 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4266 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4268 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4269 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4272 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4273 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4274 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4276 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4277 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4286 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4289 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4290 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4291 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4293 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4301 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4302 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4303 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4304 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4305 else if (!check_flags)
4309 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4310 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4313 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4316 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4317 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4319 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4324 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4325 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4326 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4327 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4328 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4331 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4332 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4333 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4334 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4338 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4339 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4347 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4348 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4351 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4354 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4355 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4357 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4360 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4368 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4369 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4371 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4374 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4375 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4376 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4378 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4383 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4391 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4392 else if(check_flags)
4393 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4395 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4396 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4397 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4398 else if (!check_flags)
4401 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4402 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4403 else if (strict_mode)
4405 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4406 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4408 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4409 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4413 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4421 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4423 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4428 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4431 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4434 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4439 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4440 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4441 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4442 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4443 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4448 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4453 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4457 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4458 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4460 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4462 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4464 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4468 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4472 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4475 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4477 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4478 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4480 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4482 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4483 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4485 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4487 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4489 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4490 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4492 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4497 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4501 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4503 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4504 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4508 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4510 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4511 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4512 else if (cpk->digest)
4513 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4516 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4518 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4519 * if the chain is invalid.
4523 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4524 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4527 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4528 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4535 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4536 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4538 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4539 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4540 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4541 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4542 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4543 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4545 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4546 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4548 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);