2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
145 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
159 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173 s->version = s->method->version;
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
178 static int nid_list[] =
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
208 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
215 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
246 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
247 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
248 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
250 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
253 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
255 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
258 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
260 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
262 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
264 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
266 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
268 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
270 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
272 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
274 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
276 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
278 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
280 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
282 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
284 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
286 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
288 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
292 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
294 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
296 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
298 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
300 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
302 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
304 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
306 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
312 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
315 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
316 const unsigned char **pcurves,
321 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
322 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
326 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
327 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
329 /* If not set use default: for now static structure */
332 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
333 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
337 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
341 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
343 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
344 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
346 /* Can't do anything on client side */
349 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
351 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
356 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
358 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
359 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
361 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
365 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
366 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
377 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
378 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
380 unsigned char *clist, *p;
382 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
383 * while curve ids < 32
385 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
386 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
389 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
391 unsigned long idmask;
393 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
395 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
406 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
410 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
415 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
418 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
420 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
424 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
426 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
428 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
430 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
431 if (nid == NID_undef)
432 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
433 if (nid == NID_undef)
434 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
435 if (nid == NID_undef)
437 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
438 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
440 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
443 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
444 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
449 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
451 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
453 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
454 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
460 const EC_METHOD *meth;
463 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
464 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
465 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
468 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
471 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
475 /* Determine curve ID */
476 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
477 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
478 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
482 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
494 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
497 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
499 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
502 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
506 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
507 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
508 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
510 const unsigned char *p;
513 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
514 * is supported (see RFC4492).
516 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
518 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
519 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
520 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
528 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
529 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
531 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
532 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
534 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
542 /* Check EC server key is compatible with client extensions */
543 int tls1_check_ec_server_key(SSL *s)
546 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->cert->pkeys + SSL_PKEY_ECC;
548 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
549 if (!cpk->x509 || !cpk->privatekey)
551 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cpk->x509);
554 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
558 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id);
560 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
561 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s)
563 unsigned char curve_id[2];
564 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
565 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
567 /* Need a shared curve */
568 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
574 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
579 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
581 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
584 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
588 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
589 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
592 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
593 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
595 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
598 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
599 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
601 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
604 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
605 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
607 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
610 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
611 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
612 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
613 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
615 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
617 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
618 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
621 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
622 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
625 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
628 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
632 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
634 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
636 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
641 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
645 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
646 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
648 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
649 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
658 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
661 unsigned char *ret = p;
662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
663 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
665 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
668 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
669 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
671 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
673 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
675 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
676 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
677 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
678 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
687 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
688 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
689 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
694 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
696 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
698 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
699 unsigned long size_str;
702 /* check for enough space.
703 4 for the servername type and entension length
704 2 for servernamelist length
705 1 for the hostname type
706 2 for hostname length
710 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
711 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
714 /* extension type and length */
715 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
718 /* length of servername list */
721 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
722 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
724 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
728 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
733 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
739 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
741 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
744 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
754 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
755 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
756 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
758 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
759 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
765 /* check for enough space.
766 4 for the srp type type and entension length
767 1 for the srp user identity
768 + srp user identity length
770 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
772 /* fill in the extension */
773 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
774 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
775 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
776 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
784 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
786 const unsigned char *plist;
788 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
790 plist = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
792 plistlen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
795 plist = ecformats_default;
796 plistlen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
799 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
800 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
807 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
808 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
809 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
810 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
813 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
814 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
815 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
817 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
818 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
819 if (plistlen > 65532)
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
825 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
826 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
828 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
829 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
830 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
831 * resolves this to two bytes.
834 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
837 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
839 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
842 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
843 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
844 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
845 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
847 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
848 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
849 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
851 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
852 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
854 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
858 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
859 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
861 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
864 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
865 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
869 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
875 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
877 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
879 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
880 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
881 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
882 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
883 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
886 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
887 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
888 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
890 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
892 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
894 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
897 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
900 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
905 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
906 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
909 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
913 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
915 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
916 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
922 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
924 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
931 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
932 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
933 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
935 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
936 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
938 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
940 /* save position of id len */
941 unsigned char *q = ret;
942 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
943 /* skip over id len */
945 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
951 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
955 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
956 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
959 * 1: peer may send requests
960 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
962 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
963 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
965 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
969 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
971 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
972 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
973 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
975 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
980 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
984 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
986 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
988 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
991 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
999 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1000 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1001 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1002 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1003 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1004 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1007 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1008 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1010 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1012 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1013 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1015 *(ret++) = list_len;
1016 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1019 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1026 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1029 unsigned char *ret = p;
1030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1031 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1034 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1035 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1039 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1041 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1043 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1045 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1049 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1053 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1059 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1061 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1064 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1073 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1074 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
1075 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1077 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1080 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1081 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
1082 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1088 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1089 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
1090 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1091 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1092 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1095 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1096 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1098 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1099 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1101 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1102 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1106 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1108 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1109 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1113 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1114 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1115 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1117 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1119 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1121 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1124 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1127 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1136 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1138 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1140 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1143 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1151 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1152 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1153 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1154 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1155 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1156 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1157 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1158 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1159 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1160 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1161 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1167 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1168 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1170 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1173 * 1: peer may send requests
1174 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1176 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1177 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1179 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1185 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1186 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1187 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1189 const unsigned char *npa;
1190 unsigned int npalen;
1193 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1194 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1196 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1197 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1199 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1201 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1206 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1208 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1210 size_t authz_length;
1211 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1212 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1213 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1214 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1215 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1217 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1219 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1220 * uint8_t authz_type
1222 * uint8_t data[length]
1224 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1225 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1227 unsigned short length;
1231 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1233 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1237 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1245 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1246 * 2 bytes for extension type
1247 * 2 bytes for extension length
1248 * 1 byte for the list length
1249 * n bytes for the list */
1250 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1252 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1253 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1255 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1256 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1260 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1262 unsigned short length;
1267 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1269 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1272 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1279 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1286 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1288 unsigned short type;
1289 unsigned short size;
1291 unsigned char *data = *p;
1292 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1293 int sigalg_seen = 0;
1295 s->servername_done = 0;
1296 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1298 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1302 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1303 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1306 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1310 if (data > (d+n-len))
1313 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1318 if (data+size > (d+n))
1321 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1323 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1324 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1325 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1326 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1328 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1329 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1330 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1331 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1332 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1333 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1334 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1335 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1336 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1337 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1338 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1339 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1340 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1341 the value of the Host: field.
1342 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1343 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1344 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1345 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1349 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1351 unsigned char *sdata;
1357 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1364 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1371 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1377 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1380 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1381 switch (servname_type)
1383 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1386 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1388 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1391 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1393 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1396 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1398 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1401 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1402 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1403 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1404 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1405 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1406 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1409 s->servername_done = 1;
1413 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1414 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1415 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1427 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1433 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1435 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1437 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1440 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1442 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1445 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1447 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1448 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1450 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1452 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1459 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1460 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1462 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1463 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1465 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1467 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1472 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1474 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1475 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1477 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1478 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1480 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1483 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1484 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1487 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1488 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1489 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1490 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1491 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1494 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1495 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1497 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1498 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1499 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1501 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1502 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1504 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1509 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1511 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1514 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1515 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1517 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1520 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1521 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1524 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1525 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1526 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1527 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1528 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1531 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1532 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1533 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1534 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1536 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1540 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1543 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1544 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1546 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1550 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1551 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1552 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1553 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1555 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1556 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1558 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1563 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1565 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1566 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1568 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1572 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1574 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1576 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1578 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1581 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1583 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1589 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1591 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1594 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1596 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1600 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1601 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1606 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1610 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1612 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1614 const unsigned char *sdata;
1616 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1621 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1630 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1634 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1638 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1643 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1647 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1652 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1653 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1656 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1657 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1658 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1660 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1661 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1664 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1665 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1667 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1668 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1673 /* Read in request_extensions */
1676 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1683 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1689 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1691 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1692 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1695 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1696 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1698 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1699 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1701 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1706 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1710 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1712 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1713 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1717 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1718 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1720 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1721 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1722 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1724 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1730 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1731 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1733 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1736 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1737 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1738 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1739 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1740 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1741 * anything like that, but this might change).
1743 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1744 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1745 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1746 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1747 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1748 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1752 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1753 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1755 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1760 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
1762 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1763 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
1767 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1771 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1773 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
1775 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1779 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
1780 * information as the original session so we ignore this
1781 * in the case of a session resumption. */
1785 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
1786 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
1787 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
1788 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
1789 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
1791 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1795 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
1796 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
1797 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1799 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
1801 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
1802 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1803 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
1804 1 /* element size */,
1807 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
1810 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
1811 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
1813 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1827 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1829 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1830 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1832 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1834 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1841 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
1844 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
1846 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1850 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
1852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1858 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1859 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1860 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1861 * the length of the block. */
1862 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1864 unsigned int off = 0;
1878 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1880 unsigned short length;
1881 unsigned short type;
1882 unsigned short size;
1883 unsigned char *data = *p;
1884 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1885 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1887 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1888 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1892 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1893 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1896 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1900 if (data+length != d+n)
1902 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1906 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1911 if (data+size > (d+n))
1914 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1915 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1916 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1918 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1920 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1922 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1925 tlsext_servername = 1;
1928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1929 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1930 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1932 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1933 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1935 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1936 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1938 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1941 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1942 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1943 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1945 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1948 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1949 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1951 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1952 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1953 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1954 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1955 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1958 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1960 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1962 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1963 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1965 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1968 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1971 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1974 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1976 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1977 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1978 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1980 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1984 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1987 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1988 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1990 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1994 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1995 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1996 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1997 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1999 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2001 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2003 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2008 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2009 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2011 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2012 * a status request message.
2014 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2016 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2019 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2020 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2023 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2024 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2026 unsigned char *selected;
2027 unsigned char selected_len;
2029 /* We must have requested it. */
2030 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
2032 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2035 /* The data must be valid */
2036 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2038 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2041 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2043 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2046 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2047 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2049 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2052 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2053 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2054 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2057 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2059 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2061 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2063 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2064 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2068 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2069 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2071 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2072 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2073 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2075 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2080 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2082 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2087 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2089 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2090 * an authz hello extension if the client
2091 * didn't request a proof. */
2092 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2093 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2095 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2097 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2103 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2107 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2108 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2110 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2114 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2115 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2116 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2117 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2119 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2123 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2131 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2135 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2137 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2139 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2141 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2142 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2144 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2150 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2160 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2161 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2162 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2163 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2164 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2165 * absence on initial connect only.
2167 if (!renegotiate_seen
2168 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2169 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2171 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2173 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2181 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2184 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2188 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2190 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2195 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2197 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2198 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2200 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2201 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2203 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2204 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2209 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2213 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2214 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2221 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2224 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
2225 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
2226 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
2229 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2230 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2231 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
2232 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
2236 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2237 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
2239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2242 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
2243 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
2244 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
2245 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
2247 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2252 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2254 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2255 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2258 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2259 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2261 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2262 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2266 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2267 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2268 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2269 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2271 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2273 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2274 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2275 * so this has to happen here in
2276 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2280 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2282 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2285 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2286 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2291 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2292 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2293 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2295 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2297 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2298 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2300 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2301 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2303 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2304 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2306 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2307 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2309 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2310 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2313 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2317 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2319 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2320 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2321 * abort the handshake.
2323 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2324 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2332 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2333 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2336 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2337 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2340 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2341 s->servername_done=0;
2347 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2349 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2352 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2353 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2354 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2355 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2357 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2360 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2361 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2362 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2363 if (certpkey == NULL)
2365 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2368 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2369 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2371 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2372 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2375 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2376 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2377 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2379 /* status request response should be sent */
2380 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2381 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2382 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2384 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2386 /* something bad happened */
2387 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2388 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2389 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2394 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2399 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2400 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2403 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2404 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2412 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2414 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2415 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2418 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2419 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2420 * it must contain uncompressed.
2422 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2423 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2424 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2425 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2426 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2428 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2430 unsigned char *list;
2431 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2432 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2433 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2435 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2437 found_uncompressed = 1;
2441 if (!found_uncompressed)
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2447 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2448 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2450 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2451 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2452 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2453 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2455 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2456 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2458 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2459 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2461 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2463 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2464 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2467 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2468 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2469 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2470 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2472 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2473 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2478 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2481 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2482 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2485 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2486 * there is no response.
2488 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2490 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2491 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2493 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2494 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2497 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2498 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2502 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2503 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2509 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2510 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2513 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2514 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2517 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2518 s->servername_done=0;
2524 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2527 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2529 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2531 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2535 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2543 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2544 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2545 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2547 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2548 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2549 * extension, if any.
2550 * len: the length of the session ID.
2551 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2552 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2553 * point to the resulting session.
2555 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2556 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2557 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2560 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2561 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2562 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2563 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2564 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2565 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2566 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2569 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2570 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2571 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2572 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2573 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2574 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2576 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2577 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2579 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2580 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2584 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2586 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2587 * to permit stateful resumption.
2589 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2591 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2595 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2596 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2603 /* Skip past cipher list */
2608 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2613 /* Now at start of extensions */
2614 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2617 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2619 unsigned short type, size;
2622 if (p + size > limit)
2624 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2629 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2630 * currently have one. */
2631 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2634 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2636 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2637 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2638 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2639 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2640 * calculate the master secret later. */
2643 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2646 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2647 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2649 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2651 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2652 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2654 default: /* fatal error */
2663 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2665 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2666 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2667 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2668 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2669 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2670 * point to the resulting session.
2673 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2674 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2675 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2676 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2678 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2679 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2680 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2683 unsigned char *sdec;
2684 const unsigned char *p;
2685 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2686 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2689 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2690 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2693 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2694 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2695 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2696 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2698 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2699 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2710 /* Check key name matches */
2711 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2713 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2714 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2715 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2716 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2718 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2719 * integrity checks on ticket.
2721 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2724 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2728 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2729 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2730 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2731 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2732 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2734 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2735 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2736 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2737 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2738 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2741 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2744 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2745 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2748 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2751 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2755 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2756 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2757 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2758 * as required by standard.
2761 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2762 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2770 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2775 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2783 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2784 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2785 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2786 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2787 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2788 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2789 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2792 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2793 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2794 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2795 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2798 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2801 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2803 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2809 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2812 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2814 if ((table[i].id) == id)
2815 return table[i].nid;
2820 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2825 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2826 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2829 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2832 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2833 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2837 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2839 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2840 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2843 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2847 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2848 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
2855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2856 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2860 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2861 return EVP_sha224();
2863 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2864 return EVP_sha256();
2866 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2867 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2868 return EVP_sha384();
2870 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2871 return EVP_sha512();
2879 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2881 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2886 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
2887 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2888 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2890 /* Should never happen */
2894 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2895 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2896 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2897 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2900 OPENSSL_free(c->sigalgs);
2901 c->sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((dsize/2) * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
2904 c->sigalgslen = dsize/2;
2906 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->sigalgs; i < dsize; i += 2, sigptr++)
2908 sigptr->rhash = data[i];
2909 sigptr->rsign = data[i + 1];
2910 sigptr->hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(sigptr->rhash, tls12_md,
2911 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2912 sigptr->sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(sigptr->rsign, tls12_sig,
2913 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2914 if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&sigptr->signandhash_nid,
2917 sigptr->signandhash_nid = NID_undef;
2918 switch(sigptr->rsign)
2920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2921 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2922 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2926 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2927 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2931 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2939 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2941 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
2944 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2945 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2946 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2953 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2954 * supported it stays as NULL.
2956 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2957 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2958 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2961 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2963 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2964 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2968 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2969 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2976 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2977 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignandhash,
2978 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2980 if (s->cert->sigalgs == NULL)
2985 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->sigalgslen)
2987 psig = s->cert->sigalgs + idx;
2989 *psign = psig->sign_nid;
2991 *phash = psig->hash_nid;
2993 *psignandhash = psig->signandhash_nid;
2995 *rsig = psig->rsign;
2997 *rhash = psig->rhash;
2999 return s->cert->sigalgslen;
3003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3005 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3007 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3008 unsigned short hbtype;
3009 unsigned int payload;
3010 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3012 /* Read type and payload length first */
3017 if (s->msg_callback)
3018 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3019 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3020 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3022 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3024 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3027 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3028 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3029 * payload, plus padding
3031 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3034 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3035 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3037 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3039 /* Random padding */
3040 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3042 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3044 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3045 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3046 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3047 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3049 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3054 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3058 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3059 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3060 * sequence number */
3063 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3066 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3074 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3076 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3078 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3079 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3081 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3082 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3083 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3089 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3090 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3092 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3096 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3097 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3103 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3104 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3106 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3108 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3109 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3110 * some random stuff.
3111 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3112 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3113 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3114 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3117 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3120 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3121 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3123 /* Sequence number */
3124 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3125 /* 16 random bytes */
3126 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3128 /* Random padding */
3129 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3131 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3134 if (s->msg_callback)
3135 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3136 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3137 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3139 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;