2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include "ssl_locl.h"
119 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
122 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
123 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
124 SSL_SESSION **psess);
127 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
130 tls1_setup_key_block,
131 tls1_generate_master_secret,
132 tls1_change_cipher_state,
133 tls1_final_finish_mac,
134 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
135 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
136 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
137 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
139 tls1_export_keying_material,
142 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
144 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
145 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
151 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
152 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
156 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
158 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
159 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
161 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
163 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
167 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
170 s->version = s->method->version;
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
175 static int nid_list[] =
177 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
178 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
179 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
180 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
181 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
182 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
183 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
184 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
185 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
186 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
187 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
188 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
189 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
190 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
191 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
192 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
193 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
194 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
195 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
196 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
197 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
198 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
199 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
200 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
201 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
204 static int pref_list[] =
206 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
207 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
208 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
209 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
210 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
211 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
212 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
213 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
214 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
215 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
216 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
217 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
218 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
219 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
220 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
221 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
222 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
223 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
224 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
225 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
226 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
227 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
228 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
229 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
230 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
233 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
235 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
236 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
237 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
239 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
242 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
244 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
247 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
249 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
251 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
253 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
255 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
257 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
259 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
261 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
263 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
265 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
267 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
269 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
271 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
273 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
277 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
279 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
281 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
283 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
287 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
289 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
291 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
293 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
295 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
301 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
305 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
306 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
309 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
310 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
312 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
315 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
316 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
318 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
321 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
322 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
324 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
327 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
328 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
329 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
330 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
332 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
334 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
335 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
338 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
342 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
345 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
349 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
351 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
353 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
358 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
362 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
365 unsigned char *ret = p;
367 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
368 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
369 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
374 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
376 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
378 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
379 unsigned long size_str;
382 /* check for enough space.
383 4 for the servername type and entension length
384 2 for servernamelist length
385 1 for the hostname type
386 2 for hostname length
390 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
391 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
394 /* extension type and length */
395 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
398 /* length of servername list */
401 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
402 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
404 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
408 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
413 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
419 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
421 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
424 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
434 #define MIN(x,y) (((x)<(y))?(x):(y))
435 /* we add SRP username the first time only if we have one! */
436 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
437 {/* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
438 int login_len = MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) + 1, 255);
441 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
442 if (login_len > lenmax) return NULL;
445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
448 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
449 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
451 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254);
452 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254));
457 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
458 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
459 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
461 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
464 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
465 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
466 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
472 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
473 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
474 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
475 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
476 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
478 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
479 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
481 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
484 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
485 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
486 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
492 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
493 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
495 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
496 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
497 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
498 * resolves this to two bytes.
500 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
501 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
502 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
504 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
506 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
509 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
510 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
511 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
512 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
514 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
515 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
516 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
518 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
519 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
521 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
525 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
526 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
528 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
531 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
532 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
536 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
542 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
544 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
546 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
547 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
548 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
549 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
550 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
553 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
554 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
555 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
557 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
559 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
561 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
564 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
567 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
572 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
573 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
576 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
580 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
582 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
583 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
589 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
591 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
598 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
600 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
602 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
603 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
605 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
607 /* save position of id len */
608 unsigned char *q = ret;
609 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
610 /* skip over id len */
612 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
618 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
622 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
624 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
625 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
626 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
628 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
633 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
637 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
639 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
641 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
644 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
652 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
659 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
662 unsigned char *ret = p;
663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
664 int next_proto_neg_seen;
667 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
668 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
672 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
674 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
676 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
678 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
682 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
686 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
692 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
694 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
697 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
707 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
708 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
710 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
713 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
714 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
715 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
721 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
722 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
723 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
724 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
725 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
728 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
729 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
731 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
732 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
734 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
735 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
739 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
741 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
742 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
746 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
747 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
748 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
750 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
752 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
754 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
757 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
760 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
769 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
771 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
773 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
776 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
784 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
785 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
786 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
787 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
788 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
789 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
790 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
791 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
792 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
793 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
794 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
799 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
800 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
801 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
802 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
804 const unsigned char *npa;
808 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
809 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
811 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
812 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
814 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
816 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
821 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
828 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
833 unsigned char *data = *p;
834 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
837 s->servername_done = 0;
838 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
839 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
840 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
847 if (data > (d+n-len))
850 while (data <= (d+n-4))
855 if (data+size > (d+n))
858 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
860 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
861 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
862 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
863 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
865 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
866 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
867 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
868 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
869 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
870 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
871 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
872 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
873 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
874 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
875 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
876 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
877 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
878 the value of the Host: field.
879 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
880 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
881 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
882 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
886 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
888 unsigned char *sdata;
894 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
901 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
908 servname_type = *(sdata++);
914 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
917 if (s->servername_done == 0)
918 switch (servname_type)
920 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
923 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
925 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
928 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
930 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
933 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
935 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
938 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
939 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
940 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
941 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
942 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
943 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
946 s->servername_done = 1;
950 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
951 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
952 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
964 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
970 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
975 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
977 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
978 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
983 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
984 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
985 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
987 unsigned char *sdata = data;
988 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
990 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
992 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
997 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
999 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1000 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1002 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1003 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1005 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1008 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1009 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1012 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1013 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1014 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1015 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1016 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1019 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1020 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1022 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1023 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1024 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1026 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
1028 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1033 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1035 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1038 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1039 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1041 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1044 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1045 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1048 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1049 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1050 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1051 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1052 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1055 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1056 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1057 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1058 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1060 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1064 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1067 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1068 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1070 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1074 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1075 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1076 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1077 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1079 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1080 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1082 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1087 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1089 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1090 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1092 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1096 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1098 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1100 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1102 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1105 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1107 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1113 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1115 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1118 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1120 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1124 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1125 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1130 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1134 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1136 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1138 const unsigned char *sdata;
1140 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1145 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1154 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1158 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1162 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1167 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1171 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1176 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1177 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1180 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1181 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1182 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1184 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1185 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1188 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1189 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1191 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1192 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1197 /* Read in request_extensions */
1200 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1207 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1213 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1214 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1216 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1217 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1219 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1224 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1228 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1230 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1231 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1232 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1234 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1237 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1238 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1239 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1240 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1241 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1242 * anything like that, but this might change).
1244 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1245 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1246 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1247 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1248 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1249 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1253 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1254 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1256 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1268 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1270 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1271 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1273 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1275 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1283 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1284 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1285 * the length of the block. */
1286 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1288 unsigned int off = 0;
1302 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1304 unsigned short length;
1305 unsigned short type;
1306 unsigned short size;
1307 unsigned char *data = *p;
1308 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1309 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1312 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1315 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1319 if (data+length != d+n)
1321 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1325 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1330 if (data+size > (d+n))
1333 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1334 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1335 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1337 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1339 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1341 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1344 tlsext_servername = 1;
1347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1348 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1349 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1351 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1352 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1354 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1356 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1359 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1360 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1361 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1363 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1366 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1367 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1369 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1370 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1371 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1372 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1373 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1376 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1378 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1380 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1381 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1383 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1386 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1389 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1392 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1394 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1395 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1396 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1398 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1402 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1405 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1406 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1408 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1412 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1413 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1414 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1415 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1417 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1419 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1421 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1426 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1427 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1429 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1430 * a status request message.
1432 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1434 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1437 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1438 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1441 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1442 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1444 unsigned char *selected;
1445 unsigned char selected_len;
1447 /* We must have requested it. */
1448 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
1450 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1453 /* The data must be valid */
1454 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1456 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1459 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1461 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1464 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1465 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1467 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1470 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1471 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1472 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1475 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1477 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1479 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1481 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1483 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1493 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1497 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1499 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1501 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1503 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1504 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1506 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1512 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1522 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1523 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1524 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1525 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1526 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1527 * absence on initial connect only.
1529 if (!renegotiate_seen
1530 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1531 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1533 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1535 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1543 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1546 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1547 * and elliptic curves we support.
1552 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1553 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1555 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1557 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1559 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1560 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1561 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1567 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1570 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1571 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1576 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1577 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1578 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1579 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1581 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1582 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1583 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
1584 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1586 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1590 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
1591 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
1593 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1597 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1599 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1603 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1605 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1610 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1612 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1613 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1615 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1616 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1618 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1619 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1624 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1628 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1629 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1636 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1639 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1640 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1641 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1644 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1645 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1646 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1647 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1651 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1652 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1657 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1658 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1659 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1660 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1662 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1667 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1669 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1670 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1673 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1674 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1676 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1677 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1681 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1682 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1683 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1684 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1686 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1687 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1688 * the certificate has changed.
1690 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1693 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1696 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1697 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1698 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1700 /* status request response should be sent */
1701 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1702 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1703 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1705 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1707 /* something bad happened */
1708 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1709 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1710 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1715 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1717 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1719 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1720 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1721 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
1725 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1727 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1730 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1731 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1736 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1737 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1738 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1740 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1742 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1743 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1745 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1746 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1748 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1749 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1751 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1752 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1754 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1755 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1758 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1762 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1764 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1765 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1766 * abort the handshake.
1768 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1769 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1777 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1778 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1781 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1782 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1785 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1786 s->servername_done=0;
1792 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1794 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1795 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1797 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1798 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
1799 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
1800 * it must contain uncompressed.
1802 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1803 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1804 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1805 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1806 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1808 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1810 unsigned char *list;
1811 int found_uncompressed = 0;
1812 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1813 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1815 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
1817 found_uncompressed = 1;
1821 if (!found_uncompressed)
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1827 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1828 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1830 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1831 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1832 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1833 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1835 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1836 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
1838 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
1839 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
1841 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1843 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1844 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1847 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
1848 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
1849 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
1850 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
1852 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1853 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1858 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
1861 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
1862 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1865 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
1866 * there is no response.
1868 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1870 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
1871 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
1873 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
1874 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1877 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
1878 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1882 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1883 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1889 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1890 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1893 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1894 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1897 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1898 s->servername_done=0;
1904 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
1905 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
1906 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
1908 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
1909 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
1910 * extension, if any.
1911 * len: the length of the session ID.
1912 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
1913 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1914 * point to the resulting session.
1916 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1917 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1918 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
1921 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1922 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1923 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1924 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1925 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1926 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1927 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1930 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1931 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1932 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1933 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1934 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1935 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
1937 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
1938 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
1940 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
1941 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
1945 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1947 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
1948 * to permit stateful resumption.
1950 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1952 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
1956 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
1957 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1964 /* Skip past cipher list */
1969 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
1974 /* Now at start of extensions */
1975 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
1978 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
1980 unsigned short type, size;
1983 if (p + size > limit)
1985 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1990 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
1991 * currently have one. */
1992 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1995 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1997 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
1998 * decrypted rather than generating the session
1999 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2000 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2001 * calculate the master secret later. */
2004 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2007 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2008 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2010 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2012 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2013 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2015 default: /* fatal error */
2024 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2026 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2027 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2028 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2029 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2030 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2031 * point to the resulting session.
2034 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2035 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2036 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2037 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2039 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2040 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2041 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2044 unsigned char *sdec;
2045 const unsigned char *p;
2046 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2047 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2050 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2051 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2054 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2055 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2056 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2057 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2059 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2060 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2071 /* Check key name matches */
2072 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2074 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2075 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2076 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2077 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2079 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2080 * integrity checks on ticket.
2082 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2085 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2089 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2090 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2091 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2092 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2093 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2095 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2096 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2097 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2098 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2099 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2102 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2105 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2106 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2109 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2112 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2116 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2117 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2118 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2119 * as required by standard.
2122 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2123 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2131 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2136 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2144 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2146 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2149 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2151 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2152 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2153 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2156 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2157 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2161 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2163 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2166 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2169 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2173 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2176 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2178 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2184 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2187 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2189 if (table[i].id == id)
2190 return table[i].nid;
2196 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2199 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2200 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2203 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2206 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2207 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2211 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2213 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2214 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2217 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2222 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
2229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2230 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2234 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2235 return EVP_sha224();
2237 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2238 return EVP_sha256();
2240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2241 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2242 return EVP_sha384();
2244 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2245 return EVP_sha512();
2253 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2255 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2260 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2261 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2263 /* Should never happen */
2267 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2268 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2269 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2270 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2272 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2274 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2279 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2280 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2284 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2285 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2289 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2297 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2299 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2302 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2303 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2304 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2311 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2312 * supported it stays as NULL.
2314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2315 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2316 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1();
2318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2319 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2321 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2322 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2326 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2327 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa();