2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
145 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
159 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173 s->version = s->method->version;
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
178 static int nid_list[] =
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
208 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
215 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
246 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
247 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
250 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
252 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
253 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
254 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
256 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
259 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
261 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
264 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
266 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
268 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
270 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
272 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
274 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
276 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
278 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
280 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
286 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
288 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
290 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
292 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
294 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
296 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
298 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
300 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
302 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
306 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
308 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
310 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
312 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
318 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
321 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
322 const unsigned char **pcurves,
327 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
328 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
331 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
332 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
334 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
335 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
336 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
339 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
340 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
344 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
345 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
349 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
350 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
354 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
355 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
358 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
359 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
361 const unsigned char *curves;
363 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
364 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
366 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
369 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
372 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
374 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
377 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
379 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
382 else /* Should never happen */
385 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
386 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
388 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
394 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
395 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
399 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
401 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
402 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
404 /* Can't do anything on client side */
411 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
412 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
415 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
416 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
418 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
419 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
420 /* Should never happen */
423 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
426 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
433 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
435 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
436 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
438 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
442 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
443 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
454 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
455 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
457 unsigned char *clist, *p;
459 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
460 * while curve ids < 32
462 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
463 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
466 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
468 unsigned long idmask;
470 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
472 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
483 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
487 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
492 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
495 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
497 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
501 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
503 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
505 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
507 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
508 if (nid == NID_undef)
509 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
510 if (nid == NID_undef)
511 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
512 if (nid == NID_undef)
514 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
515 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
517 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
520 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
521 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
526 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
528 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
530 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
531 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
537 const EC_METHOD *meth;
540 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
541 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
542 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
545 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
548 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
552 /* Determine curve ID */
553 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
554 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
555 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
559 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
571 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
574 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
576 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
579 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
583 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
584 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
585 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
587 const unsigned char *p;
590 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
591 * is supported (see RFC4492).
593 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
595 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
596 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
597 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
607 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
608 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
610 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
611 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
613 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
618 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
625 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
628 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
630 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
632 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
633 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
637 *pformats = ecformats_default;
638 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
640 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
642 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
646 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
647 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
649 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
651 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
654 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
657 /* If not EC nothing to do */
658 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
663 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
667 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
668 * supported curves extension.
670 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
673 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
674 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
676 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
683 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
684 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
685 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
686 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
687 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
689 return 0; /* Should never happen */
690 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
691 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
693 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
697 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
698 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
700 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
705 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
706 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
708 unsigned char curve_id[2];
709 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
710 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
711 * no other curves permitted.
715 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
716 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
717 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
718 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
719 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
723 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
724 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
726 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
727 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
729 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
732 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
735 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
737 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
743 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
745 /* Need a shared curve */
746 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
752 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
757 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
759 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
763 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
767 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
769 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
771 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
772 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
775 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
776 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
778 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
781 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
782 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
784 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
787 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
788 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
790 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
793 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
794 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
795 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
796 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
798 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
799 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
800 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
801 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
804 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
805 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
808 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
810 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
811 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
815 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
816 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
817 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
820 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
822 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
825 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
827 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
828 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
829 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
831 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
832 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
835 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
836 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
840 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
841 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
843 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
844 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
846 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
848 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
849 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
853 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
855 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
857 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
860 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
863 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
864 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
866 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
867 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
869 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
870 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
871 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
872 /* Should never happen */
875 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
876 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
881 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
883 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
884 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
885 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
887 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
889 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
894 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
896 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
898 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
899 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
903 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
905 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
907 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
908 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
916 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
919 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
920 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
921 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
923 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
926 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
927 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
929 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
932 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
938 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
941 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
942 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
945 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
946 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
947 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
948 * session and not global settings.
951 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
954 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
955 size_t i, sigalgslen;
956 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
959 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
960 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
961 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
964 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
965 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
968 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
969 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
974 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
979 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
983 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
984 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
990 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
991 * signature algorithms.
995 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
996 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1000 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1001 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1005 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1006 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1009 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1011 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1012 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1015 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1016 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1017 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1019 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1020 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1022 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1026 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1027 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1029 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1030 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1039 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1042 unsigned char *ret = p;
1043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1044 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1046 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1049 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1050 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1052 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1054 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1056 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1057 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1058 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1059 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1068 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1069 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1070 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1075 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1077 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1079 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1080 unsigned long size_str;
1083 /* check for enough space.
1084 4 for the servername type and entension length
1085 2 for servernamelist length
1086 1 for the hostname type
1087 2 for hostname length
1091 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1092 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1095 /* extension type and length */
1096 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1097 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1099 /* length of servername list */
1100 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1102 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1103 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1105 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1109 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1114 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1120 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1122 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1125 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1135 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1136 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1137 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1139 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1140 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1146 /* check for enough space.
1147 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1148 1 for the srp user identity
1149 + srp user identity length
1151 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1153 /* fill in the extension */
1154 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1155 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1156 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1157 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1165 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1167 const unsigned char *plist;
1170 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1172 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1173 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1180 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1181 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1182 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1183 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1186 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1187 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1188 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1190 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1191 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1192 if (plistlen > 65532)
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1199 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1201 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1202 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1203 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1204 * resolves this to two bytes.
1207 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1210 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1212 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1215 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1216 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1217 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1218 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1220 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1221 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1222 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1224 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1225 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1227 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1231 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1232 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1234 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1237 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1238 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1242 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1248 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1251 const unsigned char *salg;
1252 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1253 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1255 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1256 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1258 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1262 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1263 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1264 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1266 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1268 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1270 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1273 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1276 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1281 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1282 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1285 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1289 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1291 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1292 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1298 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1300 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1307 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1308 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1309 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1311 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1312 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1314 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1316 /* save position of id len */
1317 unsigned char *q = ret;
1318 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1319 /* skip over id len */
1321 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1327 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1331 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1332 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1335 * 1: peer may send requests
1336 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1338 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1339 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1341 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1345 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1347 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1348 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1349 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1351 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1356 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1360 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1362 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1364 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1367 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1375 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1376 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1377 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1378 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1379 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1380 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1383 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1384 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1386 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1388 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1389 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1391 *(ret++) = list_len;
1392 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1395 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1402 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1405 unsigned char *ret = p;
1406 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1407 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1409 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1410 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1411 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1412 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1414 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1415 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1419 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1421 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1423 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1425 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1429 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1433 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1439 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1441 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1444 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1454 if (using_ecc && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1456 const unsigned char *plist;
1458 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1461 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1463 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1464 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1471 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1472 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1473 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1474 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1478 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1479 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1481 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1482 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1484 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1485 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1489 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1491 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1492 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1496 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1497 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1498 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1500 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1502 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1504 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1507 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1510 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1519 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1521 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1523 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1526 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1534 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1535 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1536 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1537 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1538 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1539 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1540 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1541 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1542 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1543 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1544 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1550 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1551 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1553 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1556 * 1: peer may send requests
1557 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1559 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1560 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1562 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1568 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1569 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1570 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1572 const unsigned char *npa;
1573 unsigned int npalen;
1576 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1577 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1579 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1580 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1582 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1584 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1589 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1591 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1593 size_t authz_length;
1594 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1595 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1596 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1597 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1598 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1600 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1602 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1603 * uint8_t authz_type
1605 * uint8_t data[length]
1607 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1608 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1610 unsigned short length;
1614 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1616 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1620 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1628 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1629 * 2 bytes for extension type
1630 * 2 bytes for extension length
1631 * 1 byte for the list length
1632 * n bytes for the list */
1633 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1635 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1636 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1638 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1639 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1643 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1645 unsigned short length;
1650 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1652 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1655 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1662 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1669 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1671 unsigned short type;
1672 unsigned short size;
1674 unsigned char *data = *p;
1675 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1678 s->servername_done = 0;
1679 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1681 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1685 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1686 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1688 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1689 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1691 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1692 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1694 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1695 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1697 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1698 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1700 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1701 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1703 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1704 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1707 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1711 if (data > (d+n-len))
1714 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1719 if (data+size > (d+n))
1722 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1724 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1725 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1726 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1727 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1729 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1730 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1731 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1732 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1733 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1734 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1735 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1736 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1737 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1738 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1739 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1740 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1741 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1742 the value of the Host: field.
1743 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1744 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1745 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1746 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1750 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1752 unsigned char *sdata;
1758 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1765 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1772 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1778 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1781 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1782 switch (servname_type)
1784 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1787 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1789 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1792 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1794 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1797 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1799 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1802 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1803 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1804 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1805 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1806 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1807 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1810 s->servername_done = 1;
1814 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1815 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1816 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1828 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1834 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1836 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1838 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1841 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1843 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1846 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1848 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1849 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1851 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1853 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1860 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1861 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1863 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1864 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1866 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1868 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1873 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1875 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1876 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1878 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1879 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1881 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1884 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1885 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1888 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1889 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1890 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1891 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1892 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1895 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1896 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1898 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1899 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1900 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1902 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1903 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1905 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1910 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1912 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1915 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1916 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1918 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1921 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1922 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1925 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1926 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1927 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1928 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1929 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1932 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1933 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1934 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1935 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1937 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1941 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1944 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1945 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1947 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1951 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1952 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1953 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1954 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1956 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1957 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1959 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1964 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1966 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1967 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1969 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1973 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1975 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1977 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1979 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1982 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
1984 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1989 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
1991 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1994 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1996 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1999 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2002 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2005 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2006 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2010 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2011 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2016 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2020 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2022 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2024 const unsigned char *sdata;
2026 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2031 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2040 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2044 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2048 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2053 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2057 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2062 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2063 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2066 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2067 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2068 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2070 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2071 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2074 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2075 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2077 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2078 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2083 /* Read in request_extensions */
2086 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2093 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2099 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2101 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2102 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2105 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2106 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2108 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2109 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2111 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2116 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2120 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2123 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2127 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2128 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2130 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2131 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2132 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2134 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2140 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2141 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2143 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2146 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2147 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2148 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2149 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2150 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2151 * anything like that, but this might change).
2153 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2154 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2155 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2156 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2157 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2158 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2162 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2163 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2165 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2170 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2172 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2173 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2177 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2181 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2183 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2185 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2189 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2190 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2191 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2194 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2195 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2196 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2197 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2198 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2200 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2204 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2205 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2206 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2208 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2210 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2211 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2212 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2213 1 /* element size */,
2216 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2219 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2220 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2222 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2236 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2238 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2239 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2241 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2243 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2246 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2247 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2248 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2253 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2256 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2258 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2262 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2271 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2272 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2273 * the length of the block. */
2274 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2276 unsigned int off = 0;
2290 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2292 unsigned short length;
2293 unsigned short type;
2294 unsigned short size;
2295 unsigned char *data = *p;
2296 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2297 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2300 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2304 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2305 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2308 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2312 if (data+length != d+n)
2314 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2318 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2323 if (data+size > (d+n))
2326 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2327 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2328 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2330 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2332 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2334 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2337 tlsext_servername = 1;
2340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2341 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2342 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2344 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2345 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2347 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2348 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2350 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2353 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2354 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2355 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2357 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2360 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2361 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2363 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2364 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2365 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2366 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2367 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2370 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2372 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2374 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2375 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2377 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2380 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2383 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2386 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2388 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2389 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2390 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2392 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2396 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2399 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2400 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2402 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2406 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2407 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2408 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2409 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2411 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2413 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2415 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2420 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2421 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2423 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2424 * a status request message.
2426 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2428 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2431 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2432 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2435 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2436 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2438 unsigned char *selected;
2439 unsigned char selected_len;
2441 /* We must have requested it. */
2442 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
2444 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2447 /* The data must be valid */
2448 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2450 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2453 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2455 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2458 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2459 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2461 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2464 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2465 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2466 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2469 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2471 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2473 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2476 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2480 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2481 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2483 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2484 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2485 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2487 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2492 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2494 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2499 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2501 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2502 * an authz hello extension if the client
2503 * didn't request a proof. */
2504 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2505 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2507 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2509 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2515 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2519 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2520 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2522 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2526 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2527 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2528 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2529 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2531 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2535 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2543 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2547 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2549 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2551 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2553 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2554 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2556 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2562 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2572 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2573 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2574 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2575 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2576 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2577 * absence on initial connect only.
2579 if (!renegotiate_seen
2580 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2581 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2583 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2585 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2593 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2596 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2600 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2602 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2607 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2609 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2610 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2612 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2613 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2615 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2616 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2618 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2621 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2625 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2626 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2633 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2638 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2640 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2641 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2644 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2645 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2647 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2648 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2652 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2653 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2654 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2655 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2657 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2659 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2660 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2661 * so this has to happen here in
2662 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2666 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2668 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2671 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2672 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2677 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2678 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2679 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2681 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2683 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2684 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2686 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2687 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2689 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2690 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2692 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2693 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2695 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2696 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2699 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2703 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2705 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2706 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2707 * abort the handshake.
2709 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2710 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2718 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2719 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2722 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2723 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2726 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2727 s->servername_done=0;
2733 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2735 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2738 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2739 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2740 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2741 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2743 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2746 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2747 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2748 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2749 if (certpkey == NULL)
2751 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2754 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2755 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2757 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2758 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2761 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2762 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2763 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2765 /* status request response should be sent */
2766 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2767 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2768 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2770 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2772 /* something bad happened */
2773 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2774 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2775 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2780 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2785 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2786 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2789 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2790 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2798 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2800 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2801 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2804 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2805 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2806 * it must contain uncompressed.
2808 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2809 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2810 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2811 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2812 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2814 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2816 unsigned char *list;
2817 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2818 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2819 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2821 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2823 found_uncompressed = 1;
2827 if (!found_uncompressed)
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2833 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2834 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2836 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2837 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2838 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2839 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2841 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2842 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2844 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2845 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2847 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2849 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2850 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2853 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2854 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2855 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2856 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2858 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2859 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2864 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2867 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2868 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2871 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2872 * there is no response.
2874 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2876 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2877 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2879 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2880 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2883 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2884 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2888 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2889 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2895 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2896 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2899 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2900 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2903 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2904 s->servername_done=0;
2910 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2913 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2915 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2917 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2921 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2929 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2930 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2931 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2933 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2934 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2935 * extension, if any.
2936 * len: the length of the session ID.
2937 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2938 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2939 * point to the resulting session.
2941 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2942 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2943 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2946 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2947 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2948 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2949 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2950 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2951 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2952 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2955 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2956 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2957 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2958 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2959 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2960 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2962 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2963 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2965 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2966 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2970 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2972 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2973 * to permit stateful resumption.
2975 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2977 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2981 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2982 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2989 /* Skip past cipher list */
2994 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2999 /* Now at start of extensions */
3000 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3003 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3005 unsigned short type, size;
3008 if (p + size > limit)
3010 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3015 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3016 * currently have one. */
3017 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3020 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3022 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3023 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3024 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3025 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3026 * calculate the master secret later. */
3029 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3032 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3033 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3035 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3037 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3038 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3040 default: /* fatal error */
3049 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3051 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3052 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3053 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3054 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3055 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3056 * point to the resulting session.
3059 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3060 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3061 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3062 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3064 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3065 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3066 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3069 unsigned char *sdec;
3070 const unsigned char *p;
3071 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3072 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3075 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3076 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3079 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3080 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3081 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3082 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3084 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3085 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3096 /* Check key name matches */
3097 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3099 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3100 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3101 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3102 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3104 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3105 * integrity checks on ticket.
3107 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3110 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3114 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3115 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3116 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3117 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3118 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3120 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3121 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3122 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3123 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3124 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3127 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3130 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3131 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3134 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3137 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3141 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3142 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3143 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3144 * as required by standard.
3147 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3148 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3156 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3161 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3169 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3170 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3171 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3172 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3173 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3174 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3175 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3178 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3179 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3180 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3181 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3184 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3187 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3189 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3195 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3198 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3200 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3201 return table[i].nid;
3206 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3211 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3212 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3215 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3218 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3219 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3223 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3225 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3226 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3229 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3234 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3242 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3246 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3247 return EVP_sha224();
3249 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3250 return EVP_sha256();
3252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3253 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3254 return EVP_sha384();
3256 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3257 return EVP_sha512();
3265 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3270 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3271 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3274 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3275 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3278 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3279 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3285 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3286 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3287 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3289 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3290 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3292 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3294 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3295 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3297 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3299 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3301 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3302 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3304 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3308 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3309 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3310 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3312 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3315 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3316 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3317 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3318 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3320 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3321 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3322 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3324 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3325 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3327 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3329 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3331 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3336 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3337 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3338 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3340 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3351 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3352 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3354 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3355 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3357 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3359 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3360 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3361 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3363 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3364 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3366 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3368 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3369 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3372 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3373 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3377 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3378 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3384 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3385 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3387 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3390 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3393 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3394 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3395 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3400 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3402 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3408 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3409 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
3410 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3412 /* Should never happen */
3416 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3417 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3419 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3420 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3422 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3424 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3425 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3427 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3428 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3430 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3431 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3432 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3433 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3435 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3436 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3441 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3442 * use the certificate for signing.
3444 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3446 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3447 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3449 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3450 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3451 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3454 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3456 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3457 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3461 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3462 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3469 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3470 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3471 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3473 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3479 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3486 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3488 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3491 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3492 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3493 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3495 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3496 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3500 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3502 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3504 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3506 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3508 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3509 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3515 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3517 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3518 unsigned short hbtype;
3519 unsigned int payload;
3520 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3522 /* Read type and payload length first */
3527 if (s->msg_callback)
3528 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3529 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3530 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3532 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3534 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3537 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3538 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3539 * payload, plus padding
3541 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3544 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3545 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3547 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3549 /* Random padding */
3550 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3552 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3554 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3555 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3556 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3557 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3559 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3564 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3568 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3569 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3570 * sequence number */
3573 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3576 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3584 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3586 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3588 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3589 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3591 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3592 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3593 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3595 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3599 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3600 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3602 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3606 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3607 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3609 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3613 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3614 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3616 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3618 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3619 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3620 * some random stuff.
3621 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3622 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3623 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3624 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3627 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3630 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3631 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3633 /* Sequence number */
3634 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3635 /* 16 random bytes */
3636 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3638 /* Random padding */
3639 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3641 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3644 if (s->msg_callback)
3645 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3646 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3647 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3649 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3658 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3663 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3666 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3668 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3671 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3672 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3674 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3676 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3678 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3686 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3687 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3688 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3689 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3690 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3691 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3694 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3695 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3696 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3697 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3700 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3702 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3703 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3706 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3707 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3711 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3712 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3713 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3717 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3719 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3722 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3724 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3729 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3730 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3732 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3734 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3735 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3736 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3737 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3739 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3747 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3748 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3749 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3750 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3754 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3755 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3756 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3757 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3763 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3767 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3771 if (default_nid == -1)
3773 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3775 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3776 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3777 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3781 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3782 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3786 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3787 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3789 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3795 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3796 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3797 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3798 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
3801 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3803 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3804 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3805 /* Strict mode flags */
3806 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3807 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3808 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3810 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3815 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3816 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3818 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3819 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3822 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3826 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3829 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3831 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3833 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3834 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3842 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3845 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3846 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3847 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3849 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3857 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3858 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3859 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
3862 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3868 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
3869 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
3872 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
3875 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3876 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3878 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3883 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3884 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3885 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3886 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3887 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3890 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3891 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3892 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3893 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3897 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3898 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3906 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
3907 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
3910 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
3913 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3914 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
3916 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3919 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
3927 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3928 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
3930 if (!check_flags) goto end;
3933 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3934 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3935 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3937 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
3942 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3950 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3951 else if(check_flags)
3952 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3954 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3955 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3956 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3957 else if (!check_flags)
3960 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3961 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3962 else if (strict_mode)
3964 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3965 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3967 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3968 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
3972 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3980 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
3982 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3987 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3990 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3993 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3998 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
3999 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4000 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4001 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4002 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4007 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4012 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4016 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4017 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4019 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4021 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4023 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4027 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4031 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4034 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4036 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4037 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4039 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4041 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4042 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4044 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4046 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4048 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4049 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4051 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4056 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4060 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4062 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4063 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4067 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4069 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4070 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4071 else if (cpk->digest)
4072 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4075 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4077 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4078 * if the chain is invalid.
4082 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4083 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4086 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4087 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4094 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4095 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4097 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4098 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4099 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4100 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4101 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4102 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4104 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4105 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4107 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);