2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
117 #include <openssl/ec.h>
119 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
120 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #include "ssl_locl.h"
123 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
126 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
127 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
128 SSL_SESSION **psess);
129 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
130 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
133 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
136 tls1_setup_key_block,
137 tls1_generate_master_secret,
138 tls1_change_cipher_state,
139 tls1_final_finish_mac,
140 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
141 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
142 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
143 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 tls1_export_keying_material,
147 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
148 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
152 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
155 tls1_setup_key_block,
156 tls1_generate_master_secret,
157 tls1_change_cipher_state,
158 tls1_final_finish_mac,
159 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
160 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
161 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
162 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 tls1_export_keying_material,
165 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
166 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
167 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
171 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
174 tls1_setup_key_block,
175 tls1_generate_master_secret,
176 tls1_change_cipher_state,
177 tls1_final_finish_mac,
178 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
179 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
180 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
181 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 tls1_export_keying_material,
184 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
185 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
186 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
187 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
191 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
193 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
194 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
200 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
201 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
205 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
208 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
210 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
212 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
216 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
219 s->version = s->method->version;
222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
224 static int nid_list[] =
226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
230 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
231 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
232 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
233 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
234 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
235 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
236 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
237 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
238 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
239 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
240 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
241 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
242 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
243 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
244 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
245 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
246 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
247 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
248 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
249 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
250 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
251 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
252 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
253 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
257 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
259 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
264 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
267 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
268 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
270 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
273 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
274 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
276 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
277 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
279 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
280 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
282 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
283 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
284 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
286 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
287 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
288 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
290 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
291 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
293 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
294 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
296 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
297 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
303 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
304 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
305 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
308 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
311 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
315 /* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */
316 static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] =
318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
319 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
320 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
322 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
324 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
325 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
327 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
329 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
330 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
332 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
333 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
335 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
336 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
337 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
339 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
340 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
342 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
343 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
345 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
346 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
348 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
349 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
350 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
352 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
353 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
354 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
358 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
360 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
361 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
362 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
364 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
367 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
369 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
372 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
374 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
376 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
378 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
380 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
382 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
384 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
386 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
388 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
390 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
392 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
394 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
396 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
398 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
400 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
402 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
404 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
406 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
408 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
410 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
412 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
414 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
416 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
418 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
420 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
422 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
424 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
426 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
433 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
435 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
436 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
437 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
438 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
439 * lists in the first place.
440 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
441 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
442 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
444 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
445 const unsigned char **pcurves,
448 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
451 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
452 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
456 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
457 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
459 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
460 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
461 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
464 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
465 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
469 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
470 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
474 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
475 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
482 *pcurves = fips_curves_default;
483 *pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
488 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
489 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
493 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
496 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
502 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
506 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
507 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
509 const unsigned char *curves;
510 size_t num_curves, i;
511 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
512 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
514 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
517 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
520 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
522 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
525 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
527 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
530 else /* Should never happen */
533 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
535 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2)
537 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
544 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
545 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
546 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
547 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
549 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
551 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
552 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
554 /* Can't do anything on client side */
561 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
562 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
565 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
566 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
567 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
568 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
569 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
570 /* Should never happen */
573 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
577 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
578 * but s->options is a long...
580 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
582 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
583 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
584 if(!tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
586 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
588 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref+=2)
590 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
591 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp+=2)
593 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
597 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
598 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
606 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
610 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
611 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
613 unsigned char *clist, *p;
615 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
616 * while curve ids < 32
618 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
619 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
623 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
626 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
628 unsigned long idmask;
630 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
632 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */
633 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25)
639 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
640 curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]);
642 EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve))
643 == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
645 if(curve) EC_GROUP_free(curve);
650 EC_GROUP_free(curve);
653 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
664 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
668 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
673 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
676 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
678 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
682 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
684 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
686 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
688 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
689 if (nid == NID_undef)
690 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
691 if (nid == NID_undef)
692 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
693 if (nid == NID_undef)
695 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
696 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
698 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
701 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
702 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
707 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
711 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
713 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
714 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
719 const EC_METHOD *meth;
722 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
723 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
726 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
729 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
733 /* Determine curve ID */
734 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
735 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
736 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
740 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
752 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
754 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
757 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
759 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
762 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
766 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
767 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
768 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
770 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
771 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
773 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
774 * is supported (see RFC4492).
776 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
778 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
779 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
780 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++)
782 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
785 if (i == num_formats)
790 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
791 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
793 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
795 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
797 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] &&
798 pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
803 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
810 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
813 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
815 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
817 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
818 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
822 *pformats = ecformats_default;
823 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
825 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
827 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
831 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
832 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
834 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
836 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
839 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
842 /* If not EC nothing to do */
843 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
848 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
852 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
853 * supported curves extension.
855 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
858 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
859 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
861 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
868 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
869 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
870 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
871 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
872 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
874 return 0; /* Should never happen */
875 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
876 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
878 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
882 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
883 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
885 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
891 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
892 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
894 unsigned char curve_id[2];
895 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
896 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
897 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
898 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
901 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
902 * no other curves permitted.
906 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
907 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
908 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
909 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
910 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
914 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
915 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
917 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
918 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
920 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
923 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
926 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
928 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
934 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
936 /* Need a shared curve */
937 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
943 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
948 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
950 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
954 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
957 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
961 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
966 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
970 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
971 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
974 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
975 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
977 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
980 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
981 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
983 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
986 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
987 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
989 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
992 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
993 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
994 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
995 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
997 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
999 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
1000 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
1003 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1004 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
1006 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1007 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
1010 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1011 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
1012 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1013 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1016 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
1018 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1021 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1022 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
1024 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1025 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1026 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
1028 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1029 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1032 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1033 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
1037 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
1038 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
1040 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1041 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1043 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
1045 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1046 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1050 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1051 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1054 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1055 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1057 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1058 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1060 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1061 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1062 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1063 /* Should never happen */
1066 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1067 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1072 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1073 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1075 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1076 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1077 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1079 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1084 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1089 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
1091 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1094 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1098 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1100 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1103 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1111 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1115 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1116 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1117 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1119 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1122 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1123 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1128 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1134 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1137 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1138 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1141 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1142 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1143 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1144 * session and not global settings.
1147 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1150 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1151 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1152 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1155 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1156 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1157 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1160 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1161 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1164 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1165 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1170 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1175 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1179 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1180 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1186 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1187 * signature algorithms.
1191 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1192 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1196 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1197 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1201 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1202 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1205 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1207 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1208 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1212 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1213 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1215 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1216 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1218 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1220 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1222 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1223 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1229 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1232 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1233 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1235 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1237 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1240 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1241 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1243 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1245 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1247 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1248 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1249 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1250 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1259 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1260 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1261 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1266 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1268 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1270 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1271 unsigned long size_str;
1275 * check for enough space.
1276 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1277 * 2 for servernamelist length
1278 * 1 for the hostname type
1279 * 2 for hostname length
1283 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1284 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1287 /* extension type and length */
1288 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1289 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1291 /* length of servername list */
1292 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1294 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1295 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1297 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1301 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1306 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1312 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1314 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1317 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1327 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1328 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1329 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1331 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1332 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1339 * check for enough space.
1340 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1341 * 1 for the srp user identity
1342 * + srp user identity length
1344 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1346 /* fill in the extension */
1347 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1348 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1349 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1350 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1355 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1358 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1360 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1361 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1363 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1365 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1366 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1367 if (num_formats > 255)
1369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1373 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1374 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1375 s2n(num_formats + 1,ret);
1376 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats ;
1377 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1380 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1381 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1382 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1385 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1386 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2) return NULL;
1387 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2)
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1392 curves_list_len = 2*num_curves;
1393 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1394 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1395 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1396 memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len);
1397 ret+=curves_list_len;
1399 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1401 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1404 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1405 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1406 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1407 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1409 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1410 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1411 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1413 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1414 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1416 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1420 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1421 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1423 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1426 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1427 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1431 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1437 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1440 const unsigned char *salg;
1441 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1442 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1444 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1445 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1447 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1451 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1452 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1454 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1456 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1458 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1461 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1464 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1469 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1472 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1476 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1478 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1479 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1485 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1487 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1494 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1495 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1496 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1498 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1499 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1501 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1503 /* save position of id len */
1504 unsigned char *q = ret;
1505 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1506 /* skip over id len */
1508 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1514 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1517 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1518 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1519 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1521 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1525 * 1: peer may send requests
1526 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1528 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1529 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1531 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1535 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1537 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1538 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1539 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1541 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1546 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1548 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1550 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1551 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1552 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1553 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1554 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1555 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1559 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1563 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1565 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1567 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1570 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1578 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1579 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1580 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1583 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1584 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1586 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1587 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1589 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1591 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1592 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1593 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1594 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1596 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1598 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1600 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1606 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1608 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1613 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1616 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1620 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1623 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1624 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1626 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1628 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1629 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1630 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1631 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1632 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1634 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1635 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1639 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1641 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1643 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1645 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1649 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1653 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1659 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1661 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1664 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1676 const unsigned char *plist;
1678 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1681 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1683 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1684 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1691 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1692 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1693 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1694 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1698 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1699 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1701 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1702 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1704 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1705 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1709 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1711 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1712 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1716 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1717 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1719 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1721 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1723 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1726 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1729 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1734 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1735 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
1739 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1741 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1743 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1746 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1755 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1756 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1757 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1758 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1759 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1760 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1761 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1762 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1763 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1764 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1765 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1770 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1771 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1772 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1774 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1776 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1780 * 1: peer may send requests
1781 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1783 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1784 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1786 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1791 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1792 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1793 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1794 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1796 const unsigned char *npa;
1797 unsigned int npalen;
1800 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1801 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1803 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1804 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1806 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1808 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1812 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1815 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1817 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1818 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1820 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1822 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1826 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1830 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1833 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1839 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1840 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1841 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1846 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1847 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1848 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1849 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1851 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1852 unsigned short type, size;
1853 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1854 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1855 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1856 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1857 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1858 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1859 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1861 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1862 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1863 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1864 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1867 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1868 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1869 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1870 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1871 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1872 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1873 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1874 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1875 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1876 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1879 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1888 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1891 if (data+size > d+n)
1895 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1897 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1898 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1900 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1902 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1904 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1909 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1911 if (data + len != d+n)
1913 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1917 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1919 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1921 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1923 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1924 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1925 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1928 * returns: 0 on success. */
1929 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1930 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1934 const unsigned char *selected;
1935 unsigned char selected_len;
1938 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1944 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1945 * length-prefixed strings. */
1946 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1947 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1956 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1958 proto_len = data[i];
1964 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1970 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1971 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1972 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1973 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1974 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1975 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1976 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1978 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1981 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1982 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1987 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1991 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1993 unsigned short type;
1994 unsigned short size;
1996 unsigned char *data = *p;
1997 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1999 s->servername_done = 0;
2000 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2001 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2002 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2005 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2007 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2008 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2011 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2012 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2013 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2017 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2018 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
2019 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2021 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2022 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2024 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2025 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2029 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2031 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2032 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2036 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2038 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2042 if (data > (d+n-len))
2045 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2050 if (data+size > (d+n))
2053 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2055 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2056 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2057 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2059 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2061 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2062 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2063 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2064 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2065 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2066 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2067 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2068 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2069 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2070 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2071 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2072 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2073 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2074 * the value of the Host: field.
2075 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2076 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2077 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2079 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2083 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2085 unsigned char *sdata;
2091 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2098 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2105 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2111 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2114 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2115 switch (servname_type)
2117 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2120 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2122 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2125 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2127 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2130 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2132 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2135 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2136 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2137 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2138 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2139 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2140 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2143 s->servername_done = 1;
2147 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2148 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2149 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2161 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2167 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2169 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2171 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2174 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2176 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2179 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2181 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2182 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2184 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2186 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2193 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2195 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2196 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2198 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2199 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2201 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2206 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2208 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2209 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2211 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2212 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2214 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2217 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2218 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2221 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2222 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2223 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2224 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2225 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2228 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2230 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2231 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2232 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2234 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2235 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2236 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2237 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
2239 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2244 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2246 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2249 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2250 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2252 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2255 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2256 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2259 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2260 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2261 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2262 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2263 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2266 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2267 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2268 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2270 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2274 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2277 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2278 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2280 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2284 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2286 /* shouldn't really happen */
2287 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2290 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2291 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2292 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2294 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2295 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2297 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2302 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2304 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2305 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2307 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2311 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2313 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2315 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2317 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2320 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2322 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2327 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2329 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2332 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2334 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2338 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2343 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2347 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2349 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2351 const unsigned char *sdata;
2353 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2358 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2367 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2371 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2375 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2380 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2384 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2389 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2390 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2393 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2394 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2395 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2397 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2398 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2401 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2402 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2404 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2405 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2410 /* Read in request_extensions */
2413 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2420 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2426 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2428 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2429 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2432 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2433 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2435 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2436 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2438 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2443 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2447 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2449 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2450 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2454 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2455 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2457 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2458 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2459 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2461 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2467 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2468 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2469 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2472 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2475 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2476 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2477 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2478 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2479 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2480 * anything like that, but this might change).
2482 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2483 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2484 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2485 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2486 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2488 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2492 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2493 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2494 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2496 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2499 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2500 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2504 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2506 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2507 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2509 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2522 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2524 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2525 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2527 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2529 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2537 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data
2538 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking.
2541 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *limit, int *al)
2543 unsigned short type, size, len;
2544 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
2545 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
2548 if (data >= limit - 2)
2552 if (data > limit - len)
2555 while (data <= limit - 4)
2560 if (data+size > limit)
2562 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2571 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2574 unsigned char *ptmp = *p;
2576 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled
2577 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically
2578 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions
2579 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure.
2581 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2583 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2587 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2593 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2594 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, d + n, &al) <= 0)
2596 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2604 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2605 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2606 * the length of the block. */
2607 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2609 unsigned int off = 0;
2623 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2625 unsigned short length;
2626 unsigned short type;
2627 unsigned short size;
2628 unsigned char *data = *p;
2629 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2630 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2633 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2635 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2637 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2639 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2640 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2644 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2645 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2648 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2652 if (data+length != d+n)
2654 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2658 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2663 if (data+size > (d+n))
2666 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2667 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2668 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2670 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2672 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2674 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2677 tlsext_servername = 1;
2680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2681 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2683 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2684 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2686 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2688 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2693 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2694 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2695 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2697 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2700 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2701 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2704 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2705 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2706 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2707 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2708 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2711 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2713 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2715 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2716 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2718 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2721 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2724 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2727 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2729 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2730 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2732 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2736 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2739 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2740 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2742 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2746 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2748 /* shouldn't really happen */
2749 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2751 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2753 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2754 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2758 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2761 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2763 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2768 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2770 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2771 * a status request message.
2773 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2775 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2778 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2779 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2782 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2783 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2785 unsigned char *selected;
2786 unsigned char selected_len;
2788 /* We must have requested it. */
2789 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2791 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2794 /* The data must be valid */
2795 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2797 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2800 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2802 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2805 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2806 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2808 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2811 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2812 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2813 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2817 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2821 /* We must have requested it. */
2822 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2824 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2829 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2833 * The extension data consists of:
2834 * uint16 list_length
2835 * uint8 proto_length;
2836 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2841 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2843 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2847 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2849 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2852 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2853 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2854 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2855 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2857 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2860 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2861 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2864 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2866 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2868 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2871 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2875 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2876 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2878 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2879 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2880 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2882 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2887 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2888 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2890 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2895 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2896 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2898 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2906 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2910 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2912 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2914 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2916 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2917 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2919 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2925 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2935 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2936 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2937 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2938 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2939 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2940 * absence on initial connect only.
2942 if (!renegotiate_seen
2943 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2944 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2946 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2948 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2956 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2959 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2963 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2965 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2970 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2972 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2974 /* shouldn't really happen */
2975 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2978 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2980 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2981 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2985 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2987 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2992 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2996 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2997 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3004 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3009 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
3011 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3012 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3014 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3015 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
3016 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
3018 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
3019 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
3023 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3024 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3025 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3026 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3028 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3030 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
3031 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
3032 * so this has to happen here in
3033 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
3037 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
3039 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
3042 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3043 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3048 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3050 /* shouldn't really happen */
3051 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3053 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3055 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3057 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3058 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3060 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3061 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3063 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3065 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3066 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
3070 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3072 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3074 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3075 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3078 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3082 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3084 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3085 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3086 * abort the handshake.
3088 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3089 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3097 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3098 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3101 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3102 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3105 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3106 s->servername_done=0;
3112 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3116 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3117 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3119 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3120 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3122 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3123 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
3125 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3126 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3129 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3130 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
3132 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s))
3134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3135 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3136 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3139 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3140 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3143 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3144 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3149 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3152 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3156 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3158 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3161 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3162 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3163 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3164 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3166 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3169 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3170 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3171 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3172 if (certpkey == NULL)
3174 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3177 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3178 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3180 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3181 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3184 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3185 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3186 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3188 /* status request response should be sent */
3189 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3190 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3191 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3193 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3195 /* something bad happened */
3196 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3197 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3198 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3203 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3208 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3209 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3212 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3213 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3221 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3223 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3224 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3227 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3228 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3229 * it must contain uncompressed.
3231 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3232 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3233 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3234 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3235 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3237 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3239 unsigned char *list;
3240 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3241 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3242 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3244 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3246 found_uncompressed = 1;
3250 if (!found_uncompressed)
3252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3256 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3257 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3259 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3260 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3261 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3262 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3264 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3265 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3267 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3268 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3270 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3272 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3273 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3276 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3277 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3278 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3279 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3281 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3282 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3287 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3290 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3291 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3294 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3295 * there is no response.
3297 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3299 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3300 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3302 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3303 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3306 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3307 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3311 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3312 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3318 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3319 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3322 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3323 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3326 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3327 s->servername_done=0;
3333 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3336 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3338 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3340 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3344 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3353 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3354 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3355 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3357 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3358 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3359 * extension, if any.
3360 * len: the length of the session ID.
3361 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3362 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3363 * point to the resulting session.
3365 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3366 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3367 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3370 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3371 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3372 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3373 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3374 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3375 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3376 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3379 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3380 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3381 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3382 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3383 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3384 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3386 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3387 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3389 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3390 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3394 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3396 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3397 * to permit stateful resumption.
3399 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3401 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3405 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3413 /* Skip past cipher list */
3418 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3423 /* Now at start of extensions */
3424 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3427 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3429 unsigned short type, size;
3432 if (p + size > limit)
3434 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3439 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3440 * currently have one. */
3441 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3444 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3446 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3447 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3448 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3449 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3450 * calculate the master secret later. */
3453 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3456 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3457 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3459 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3461 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3462 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3464 default: /* fatal error */
3474 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3476 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3477 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3478 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3479 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3480 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3481 * point to the resulting session.
3484 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3485 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3486 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3487 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3489 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3490 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3491 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3494 unsigned char *sdec;
3495 const unsigned char *p;
3496 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3497 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3500 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3501 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3504 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3505 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3506 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3507 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3509 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3510 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3521 /* Check key name matches */
3522 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3524 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3525 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3526 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3527 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3529 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3530 * integrity checks on ticket.
3532 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3535 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3539 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3540 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3541 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3542 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3543 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3545 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3548 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3549 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3550 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3551 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3552 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3555 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3558 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3559 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3561 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3566 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3569 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3573 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3574 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3575 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3576 * as required by standard.
3579 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3580 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3588 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3593 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3601 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3602 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3603 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3604 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3605 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3606 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3607 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3610 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3611 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3612 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3613 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3616 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3619 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3621 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3627 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3630 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3632 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3633 return table[i].nid;
3638 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3643 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3644 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3647 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3650 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3651 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3655 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3657 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3658 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3661 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3666 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3674 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3678 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3679 return EVP_sha224();
3681 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3682 return EVP_sha256();
3684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3685 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3686 return EVP_sha384();
3688 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3689 return EVP_sha512();
3697 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3702 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3703 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3706 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3707 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3710 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3711 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3717 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3718 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3719 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3721 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3722 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3724 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3726 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3727 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3729 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3731 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3733 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3734 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3736 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3740 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3741 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3742 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3744 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3747 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3748 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3749 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3750 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3752 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3753 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3754 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3756 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3757 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3759 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3761 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3763 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3768 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3769 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3770 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3772 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3783 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3784 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3786 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3787 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3789 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3791 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3792 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3794 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3795 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3797 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3798 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3800 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3801 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3803 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3805 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3806 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3809 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3810 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3814 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3815 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3821 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3822 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3824 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3827 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3830 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3831 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3832 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3837 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3839 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3842 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3843 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3845 /* Should never happen */
3849 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3850 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3851 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3852 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3854 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3855 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3859 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3865 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3866 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3869 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3870 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3872 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3873 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3875 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3877 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3879 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3882 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3883 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3884 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3885 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3886 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3888 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3889 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3895 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3896 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3898 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3899 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3901 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3902 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3903 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3904 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3906 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3907 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3912 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3913 * use the certificate for signing.
3915 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3917 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3918 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3921 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3922 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3925 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3927 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3928 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3932 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3933 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3940 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3941 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3942 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3944 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3950 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3957 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3959 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3962 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3963 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3964 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3966 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3967 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3971 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3973 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3975 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3977 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3979 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3980 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3986 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3988 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3989 unsigned short hbtype;
3990 unsigned int payload;
3991 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3993 if (s->msg_callback)
3994 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3995 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3996 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3998 /* Read type and payload length first */
3999 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
4000 return 0; /* silently discard */
4003 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
4004 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
4007 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
4009 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
4012 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
4013 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
4014 * payload, plus padding
4016 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4019 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4020 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4022 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4024 /* Random padding */
4025 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4027 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4029 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4030 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4031 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4032 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4034 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4039 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4043 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4044 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4045 * sequence number */
4048 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4051 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4059 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4061 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4063 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4064 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4066 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4067 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4068 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4070 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4074 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4075 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4077 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4081 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4082 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4088 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4089 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4091 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4094 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4095 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4096 * some random stuff.
4097 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4098 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4099 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4100 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4103 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4106 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4107 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4109 /* Sequence number */
4110 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4111 /* 16 random bytes */
4112 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4114 /* Random padding */
4115 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4117 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4120 if (s->msg_callback)
4121 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4122 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4123 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4125 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4134 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4139 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4142 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4144 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4147 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4148 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4150 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4152 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4154 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4162 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4163 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4164 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4165 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4166 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4167 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4170 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4171 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4172 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4173 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4176 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4178 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4179 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4182 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4183 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4187 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4188 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4189 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4193 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4197 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4200 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4202 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4207 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4208 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4210 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4212 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4213 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4214 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4215 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4217 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4225 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4226 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4227 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4228 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4232 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4233 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4234 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4235 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4241 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4245 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4249 if (default_nid == -1)
4251 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4253 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4254 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4255 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4259 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4260 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4264 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4265 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4267 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4273 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4274 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4275 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4276 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4279 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4281 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4282 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4283 /* Strict mode flags */
4284 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4285 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4286 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4288 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4293 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4294 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4296 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4297 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4300 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4304 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4307 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4309 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4311 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4312 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4315 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4316 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4317 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4319 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4320 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4329 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4332 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4333 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4334 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4336 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4344 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4345 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4346 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4347 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4348 else if (!check_flags)
4352 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4353 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4356 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4359 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4360 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4362 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4367 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4368 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4369 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4370 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4371 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4374 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4375 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4376 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4377 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4381 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4382 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4390 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4391 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4394 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4397 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4398 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4400 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4403 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4411 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4412 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4414 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4417 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4418 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4419 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4421 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4426 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4434 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4435 else if(check_flags)
4436 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4438 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4439 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4440 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4441 else if (!check_flags)
4444 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4445 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4446 else if (strict_mode)
4448 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4449 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4451 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4452 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4456 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4464 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4466 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4471 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4474 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4477 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4482 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4483 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4484 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4485 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4486 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4491 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4496 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4500 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4501 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4503 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4505 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4507 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4511 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4515 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4518 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4520 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4521 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4523 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4525 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4526 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4528 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4530 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4532 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4533 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4535 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4540 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4544 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4546 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4547 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4551 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4553 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4554 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4555 else if (cpk->digest)
4556 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4559 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4561 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4562 * if the chain is invalid.
4566 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4567 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4570 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4571 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4578 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4579 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4581 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4582 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4583 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4584 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4585 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4586 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4588 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4589 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4591 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);