2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
235 static tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
315 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
324 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
387 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
390 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
391 const unsigned char **pcurves,
396 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
397 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
400 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
401 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
405 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
423 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
424 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
428 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
429 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
431 tls_curve_info *cinfo;
434 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
435 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
437 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
438 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
441 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
442 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
444 const unsigned char *curves;
446 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
447 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
449 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
452 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
455 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
457 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
460 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
465 else /* Should never happen */
468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
469 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
471 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
472 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
477 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
478 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
482 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
484 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
485 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
487 /* Can't do anything on client side */
494 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
495 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
498 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
499 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
500 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
501 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
502 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
503 /* Should never happen */
506 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
509 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
511 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
516 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
518 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
519 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
521 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
523 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
527 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
528 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
539 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
540 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
542 unsigned char *clist, *p;
544 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
545 * while curve ids < 32
547 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
548 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
551 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
553 unsigned long idmask;
555 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
557 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
568 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
572 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
577 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
580 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
582 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
586 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
588 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
590 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
592 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
593 if (nid == NID_undef)
594 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
595 if (nid == NID_undef)
596 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
597 if (nid == NID_undef)
599 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
600 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
602 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
605 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
606 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
611 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
615 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
617 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
618 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
623 const EC_METHOD *meth;
626 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
627 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
630 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
633 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
637 /* Determine curve ID */
638 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
639 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
640 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
644 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
656 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
658 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
661 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
663 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
666 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
670 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
671 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
672 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
674 const unsigned char *p;
677 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
678 * is supported (see RFC4492).
680 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
682 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
683 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
684 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
694 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
695 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
697 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
698 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
700 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
705 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
712 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
715 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
717 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
719 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
724 *pformats = ecformats_default;
725 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
727 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
729 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
733 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
734 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
736 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
738 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
741 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
744 /* If not EC nothing to do */
745 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
750 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
754 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
755 * supported curves extension.
757 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
760 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
761 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
763 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
770 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
771 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
772 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
773 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
774 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
776 return 0; /* Should never happen */
777 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
778 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
780 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
784 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
787 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
792 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
793 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
795 unsigned char curve_id[2];
796 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
797 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
798 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
799 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
802 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
803 * no other curves permitted.
807 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
808 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
809 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
810 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
811 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
815 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
816 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
818 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
819 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
821 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
824 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
829 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
835 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
837 /* Need a shared curve */
838 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
849 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
851 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
855 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
861 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
866 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
870 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
871 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
874 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
875 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
877 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
880 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
881 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
883 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
886 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
887 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
889 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
892 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
893 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
894 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
895 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
897 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
899 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
900 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
903 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
904 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
907 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
911 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
912 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
913 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
916 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
918 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
922 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
924 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
925 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
926 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
928 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
929 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
932 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
933 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
937 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
938 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
940 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
941 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
943 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
945 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
950 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
951 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
954 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
955 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
957 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
958 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
960 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
961 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
962 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
963 /* Should never happen */
966 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
967 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
973 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
975 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
976 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
977 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
979 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
989 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
991 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
994 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
998 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1000 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1003 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1011 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1015 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1016 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1017 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1019 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1022 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1023 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1028 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1034 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1035 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1036 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1042 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1045 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1046 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1050 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1051 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1052 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1053 * session and not global settings.
1056 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1061 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1062 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1063 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1066 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1067 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1068 * signature algorithms.
1070 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1071 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1072 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1074 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1077 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1079 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1080 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1084 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1085 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1087 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1088 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1090 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1092 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1094 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1095 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1101 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1104 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1106 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1109 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1111 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1113 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1116 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1119 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1120 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1122 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1124 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1127 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1128 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1130 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1132 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1134 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1135 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1136 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1137 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1146 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1147 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1148 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1153 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1155 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1157 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1158 unsigned long size_str;
1161 /* check for enough space.
1162 4 for the servername type and entension length
1163 2 for servernamelist length
1164 1 for the hostname type
1165 2 for hostname length
1169 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1170 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1173 /* extension type and length */
1174 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1175 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1177 /* length of servername list */
1178 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1180 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1181 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1183 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1187 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1192 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1200 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1203 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1213 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1214 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1215 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1217 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1218 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1224 /* check for enough space.
1225 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1226 1 for the srp user identity
1227 + srp user identity length
1229 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1231 /* fill in the extension */
1232 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1233 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1234 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1235 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1243 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1245 const unsigned char *plist;
1248 unsigned char *etmp;
1250 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1252 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1253 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1260 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1261 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1262 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1263 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1266 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1267 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1268 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1270 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1271 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1272 if (plistlen > 65532)
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1279 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1281 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1282 for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
1284 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1291 plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
1293 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1294 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1295 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1296 * resolves this to two bytes.
1298 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1304 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1307 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1308 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1309 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1310 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1312 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1313 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1314 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1316 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1317 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1319 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1323 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1324 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1326 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1329 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1330 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1334 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1340 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1343 const unsigned char *salg;
1344 unsigned char *etmp;
1345 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1346 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1348 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1350 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1352 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1353 /* Fill in lengths */
1354 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1359 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1360 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1362 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1364 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1366 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1372 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1377 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1380 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1384 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1386 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1387 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1393 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1395 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1402 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1403 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1404 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1406 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1407 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1409 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1411 /* save position of id len */
1412 unsigned char *q = ret;
1413 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1414 /* skip over id len */
1416 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1422 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1426 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1427 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1432 * 1: peer may send requests
1433 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1435 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1436 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1438 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1442 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1444 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1445 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1446 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1448 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1453 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1455 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1457 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1458 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1459 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1460 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1461 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1462 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1465 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1469 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1471 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1473 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1476 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1484 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1485 if (s->cert->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1488 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1490 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1492 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1493 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1495 record = &s->cert->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1496 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1497 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1501 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1505 return NULL; /* error */
1506 if (cb_retval == -1)
1507 continue; /* skip this extension */
1509 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1511 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1513 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1517 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1518 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1522 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1523 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1525 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1526 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1528 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1530 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1531 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1532 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1533 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1535 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1537 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1539 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1545 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1547 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1552 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1555 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1559 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1562 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1563 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1565 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1567 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1569 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1570 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1571 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1572 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1573 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1575 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1576 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1580 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1582 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1584 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1586 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1590 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1594 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1600 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1602 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1605 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1617 const unsigned char *plist;
1619 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1622 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1624 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1625 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1632 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1633 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1634 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1635 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1639 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1640 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1642 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1644 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1645 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1649 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1651 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1652 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1656 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1657 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1659 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1661 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1663 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1666 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1669 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1678 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1680 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1682 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1685 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1693 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1694 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1695 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1696 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1697 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1698 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1699 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1700 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1701 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1702 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1703 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1709 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1710 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1712 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1714 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1717 * 1: peer may send requests
1718 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1720 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1721 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1723 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1728 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1729 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1730 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1731 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1733 const unsigned char *npa;
1734 unsigned int npalen;
1737 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1738 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1740 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1741 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1743 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1745 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1750 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
1752 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1753 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1756 record = &s->cert->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
1758 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1761 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1765 return NULL; /* error */
1766 if (cb_retval == -1)
1767 continue; /* skip this extension */
1768 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1770 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1772 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1775 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1776 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1778 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1779 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1781 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1782 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1785 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1791 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1793 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1794 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1796 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1798 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1802 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1806 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1809 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1813 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1815 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1816 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1817 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1820 * returns: 0 on success. */
1821 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1822 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1826 const unsigned char *selected;
1827 unsigned char selected_len;
1830 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1836 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1837 * length-prefixed strings. */
1838 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1839 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1848 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1850 proto_len = data[i];
1856 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1862 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1863 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1864 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1865 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1866 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1867 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1868 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1870 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1873 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1874 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1879 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1884 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1885 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1886 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1891 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1892 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1893 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1894 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1896 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1897 unsigned short type, size;
1898 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1899 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1900 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1901 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1902 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1903 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1904 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1906 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1907 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1908 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1909 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1912 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1913 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1914 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1915 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1916 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1917 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1918 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1919 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1920 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1921 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1924 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1933 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1936 if (data+size > d+n)
1940 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1942 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1943 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1945 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1947 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1949 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1954 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1956 if (data + len != d+n)
1958 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1962 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1964 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1966 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1968 unsigned short type;
1969 unsigned short size;
1971 unsigned char *data = *p;
1972 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1975 s->servername_done = 0;
1976 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1978 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1981 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1983 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1984 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1987 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1988 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1989 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1991 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1992 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1996 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1997 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2000 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2001 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2002 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
2003 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2005 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2006 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2008 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2009 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2011 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2012 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2014 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2015 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2017 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2018 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2020 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2021 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2024 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2025 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2028 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2032 if (data > (d+n-len))
2035 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2040 if (data+size > (d+n))
2043 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2045 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2046 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2047 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2048 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2050 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2051 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2052 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2053 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2054 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2055 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2056 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2057 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2058 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2059 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2060 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2061 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2062 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2063 the value of the Host: field.
2064 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2065 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2066 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2067 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2071 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2073 unsigned char *sdata;
2079 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2086 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2093 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2099 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2102 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2103 switch (servname_type)
2105 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2108 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2110 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2113 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2115 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2118 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2120 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2123 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2124 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2125 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2126 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2127 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2128 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2131 s->servername_done = 1;
2135 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2136 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2137 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2149 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2155 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2157 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2159 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2162 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2164 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2167 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2169 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2170 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2172 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2174 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2181 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2183 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2184 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2186 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2187 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2189 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2194 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2196 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2197 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2199 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2200 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2202 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2205 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2206 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2209 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2210 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2211 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2212 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2213 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2216 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2218 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2219 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2220 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2222 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2223 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2225 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2230 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2232 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2235 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2236 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2238 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2241 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2242 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2245 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2246 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2247 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2248 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2249 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2252 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2253 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2254 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2256 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2260 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2263 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2264 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2266 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2270 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2271 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2272 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2273 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2275 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2276 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2278 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2283 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2285 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2286 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2288 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2292 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2294 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2296 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2298 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2301 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2303 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2308 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2310 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2313 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2315 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2318 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2321 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2324 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2325 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2329 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2334 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2338 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2340 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2342 const unsigned char *sdata;
2344 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2349 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2358 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2362 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2366 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2371 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2375 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2380 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2381 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2384 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2385 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2386 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2388 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2389 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2392 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2393 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2395 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2396 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2401 /* Read in request_extensions */
2404 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2411 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2417 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2419 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2420 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2423 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2424 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2426 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2427 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2429 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2434 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2438 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2441 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2445 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2446 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2448 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2449 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2450 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2452 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2457 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2458 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2459 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2460 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2462 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2465 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2466 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2467 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2468 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2469 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2470 * anything like that, but this might change).
2472 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2473 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2474 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2475 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2476 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2477 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2481 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2482 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2483 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2485 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2488 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2489 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2493 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2494 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2496 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2500 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2501 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2502 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2503 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2504 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2506 else if (!s->hit && s->cert->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2508 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2510 for (i=0; i < s->cert->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2512 record = &s->cert->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2513 if (type == record->ext_type)
2515 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2520 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2521 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2522 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2532 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2534 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2535 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2537 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2539 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2542 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2543 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2544 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2549 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2552 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2554 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2558 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2567 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2568 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2569 * the length of the block. */
2570 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2572 unsigned int off = 0;
2586 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2588 unsigned short length;
2589 unsigned short type;
2590 unsigned short size;
2591 unsigned char *data = *p;
2592 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2593 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2596 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2599 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2601 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2602 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2606 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2607 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2610 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2611 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2614 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2618 if (data+length != d+n)
2620 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2624 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2629 if (data+size > (d+n))
2632 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2633 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2634 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2636 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2638 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2640 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2643 tlsext_servername = 1;
2646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2647 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2649 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2650 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2652 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2654 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2659 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2660 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2661 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2663 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2666 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2667 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2670 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2671 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2672 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2673 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2674 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2677 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2679 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2681 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2682 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2684 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2687 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2689 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2692 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2694 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2695 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2697 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2701 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2704 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2705 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2707 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2711 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2712 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2713 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2714 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2716 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2718 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2720 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2725 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2727 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2728 * a status request message.
2730 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2732 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2735 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2736 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2739 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2740 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2742 unsigned char *selected;
2743 unsigned char selected_len;
2745 /* We must have requested it. */
2746 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2748 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2751 /* The data must be valid */
2752 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2754 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2757 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2759 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2762 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2763 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2765 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2768 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2769 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2770 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2774 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2778 /* We must have requested it. */
2779 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2781 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2786 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2789 /* The extension data consists of:
2790 * uint16 list_length
2791 * uint8 proto_length;
2792 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2796 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2798 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2802 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2804 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2807 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2808 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2809 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2810 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2812 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2815 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2816 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2819 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2821 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2823 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2826 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2830 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2831 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2833 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2834 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2835 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2837 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2842 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2844 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2848 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2849 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2851 else if (s->cert->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2854 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2856 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2858 record = &s->cert->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2859 if (record->ext_type == type)
2861 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2867 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2868 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2870 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2871 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2872 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2881 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2885 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2887 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2889 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2891 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2892 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2894 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2900 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2910 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2911 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2912 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2913 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2914 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2915 * absence on initial connect only.
2917 if (!renegotiate_seen
2918 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2919 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2921 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2923 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2931 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2934 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2938 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2940 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2945 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2947 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2948 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2950 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2951 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2953 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2954 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2959 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2963 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2964 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2971 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2976 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2978 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2979 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2982 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2983 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2985 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2986 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2990 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2991 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2992 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2993 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2995 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2997 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2998 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2999 * so this has to happen here in
3000 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
3004 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
3006 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
3009 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3010 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3015 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3016 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3017 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3019 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3021 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3022 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3024 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3025 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3027 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3028 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3030 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3031 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3033 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3034 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3037 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3041 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3043 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3044 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3045 * abort the handshake.
3047 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3048 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3056 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3057 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3060 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3061 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3064 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3065 s->servername_done=0;
3071 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3073 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3076 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3077 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3078 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3079 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3081 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3084 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3085 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3086 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3087 if (certpkey == NULL)
3089 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3092 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3093 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3095 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3096 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3099 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3100 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3101 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3103 /* status request response should be sent */
3104 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3105 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3106 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3108 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3110 /* something bad happened */
3111 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3112 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3113 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3118 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3123 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3124 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3127 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3128 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3136 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3138 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3139 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3142 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3143 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3144 * it must contain uncompressed.
3146 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3147 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3148 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3149 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3150 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3152 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3154 unsigned char *list;
3155 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3156 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3157 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3159 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3161 found_uncompressed = 1;
3165 if (!found_uncompressed)
3167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3171 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3172 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3174 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3175 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3176 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3177 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3179 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3180 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3182 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3183 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3185 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3187 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3188 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3191 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3192 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3193 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3194 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3196 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3197 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3202 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3205 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3206 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3209 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3210 * there is no response.
3212 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3214 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3215 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3217 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3218 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3221 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3222 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3226 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3227 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3233 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3234 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3237 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3238 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3241 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3242 s->servername_done=0;
3248 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3251 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3253 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3255 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3259 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3267 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3268 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3269 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3271 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3272 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3273 * extension, if any.
3274 * len: the length of the session ID.
3275 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3276 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3277 * point to the resulting session.
3279 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3280 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3281 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3284 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3285 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3286 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3287 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3288 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3289 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3290 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3293 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3294 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3295 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3296 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3297 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3298 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3300 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3301 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3303 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3304 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3308 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3310 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3311 * to permit stateful resumption.
3313 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3315 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3319 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3327 /* Skip past cipher list */
3332 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3337 /* Now at start of extensions */
3338 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3341 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3343 unsigned short type, size;
3346 if (p + size > limit)
3348 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3353 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3354 * currently have one. */
3355 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3358 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3360 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3361 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3362 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3363 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3364 * calculate the master secret later. */
3367 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3370 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3371 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3373 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3375 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3376 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3378 default: /* fatal error */
3387 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3389 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3390 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3391 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3392 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3393 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3394 * point to the resulting session.
3397 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3398 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3399 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3400 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3402 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3403 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3404 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3407 unsigned char *sdec;
3408 const unsigned char *p;
3409 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3410 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3413 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3414 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3417 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3418 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3419 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3420 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3422 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3423 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3434 /* Check key name matches */
3435 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3437 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3438 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3439 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3440 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3442 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3443 * integrity checks on ticket.
3445 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3448 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3452 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3453 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3454 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3455 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3456 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3458 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3459 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3460 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3461 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3462 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3465 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3468 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3469 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3471 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3476 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3479 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3483 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3484 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3485 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3486 * as required by standard.
3489 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3490 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3498 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3503 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3511 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3512 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3513 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3514 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3515 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3516 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3517 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3520 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3521 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3522 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3523 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3526 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3529 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3531 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3537 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3540 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3542 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3543 return table[i].nid;
3548 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3553 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3554 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3557 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3560 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3561 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3565 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3567 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3568 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3575 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3578 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3579 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3582 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3584 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3587 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3589 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3590 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3591 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3593 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3594 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3596 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3597 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3598 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3600 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3601 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3605 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3609 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3611 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3614 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3616 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3617 #ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
3618 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3621 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3622 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3624 return inf->mfunc();
3627 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3632 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3633 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3635 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3636 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3637 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3640 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3641 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3647 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3648 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3649 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3651 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3652 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3654 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3656 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3657 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3659 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3661 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3663 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3664 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3666 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3670 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3671 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3672 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3674 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3677 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3678 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3680 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3681 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3682 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3684 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3685 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3687 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3688 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3691 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3692 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3693 * then RSA is disabled.
3696 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3698 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3699 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3700 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3701 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3702 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3703 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3706 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3707 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3712 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3713 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3718 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3719 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3724 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3725 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3732 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3734 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3736 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3739 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3740 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3742 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3744 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3746 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3748 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3749 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3752 return tmpout - out;
3755 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3756 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3757 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3758 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3760 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3761 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3762 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3764 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3765 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3767 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3769 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3774 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3775 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3776 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3778 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3789 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3790 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3792 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3793 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3795 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3797 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3798 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3800 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3801 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3803 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3804 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3806 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3807 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3809 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3811 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3812 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3815 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3816 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3820 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3821 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3827 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3828 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3830 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3833 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3836 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3837 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3838 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3843 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3845 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3851 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3852 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3853 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3855 /* Should never happen */
3859 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3860 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3861 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3862 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3864 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3865 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3867 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3869 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3870 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3872 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3873 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3875 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3877 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3879 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3882 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3883 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3884 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3885 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3886 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3888 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3889 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3895 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3896 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3898 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3899 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3901 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3902 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3903 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3904 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3906 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3907 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3912 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3913 * use the certificate for signing.
3915 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3917 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3918 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3921 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3922 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3925 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3927 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3928 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3932 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3933 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3940 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3941 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3942 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3944 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3950 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3957 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3959 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3962 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3963 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3964 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3966 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3967 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3971 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3973 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3975 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3977 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3979 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3980 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3986 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3988 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3989 unsigned short hbtype;
3990 unsigned int payload;
3991 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3993 if (s->msg_callback)
3994 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3995 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3996 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3998 /* Read type and payload length first */
3999 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
4000 return 0; /* silently discard */
4003 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
4004 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
4007 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
4009 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
4012 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
4013 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
4014 * payload, plus padding
4016 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4019 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4020 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4022 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4024 /* Random padding */
4025 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4027 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4029 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4030 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4031 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4032 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4034 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4039 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4043 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4044 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4045 * sequence number */
4048 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4051 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4059 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4061 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4063 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4064 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4066 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4067 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4068 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4070 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4074 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4075 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4077 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4081 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4082 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4088 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4089 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4091 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4093 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4094 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4095 * some random stuff.
4096 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4097 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4098 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4099 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4102 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4105 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4106 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4108 /* Sequence number */
4109 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4110 /* 16 random bytes */
4111 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4113 /* Random padding */
4114 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4116 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4119 if (s->msg_callback)
4120 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4121 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4122 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4124 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4133 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4138 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4141 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4143 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4146 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4147 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4149 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4151 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4153 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4161 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4162 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4163 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4164 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4165 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4166 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4169 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4170 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4171 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4172 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4175 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4177 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4178 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4181 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4182 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4186 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4187 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4188 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4192 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4196 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4199 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4201 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4206 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4207 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4209 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4211 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4212 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4213 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4214 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4216 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4224 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4225 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4226 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4227 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4231 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4232 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4233 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4234 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4240 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4244 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4248 if (default_nid == -1)
4250 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4252 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4253 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4254 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4258 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4259 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4263 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4264 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4266 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4272 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4273 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4274 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4275 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4278 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4280 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4281 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4282 /* Strict mode flags */
4283 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4284 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4285 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4287 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4292 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4293 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4295 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4296 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4299 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4303 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4306 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4308 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4310 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4311 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4314 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4315 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4316 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4318 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4319 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4328 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4331 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4332 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4333 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4335 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4343 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4344 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4345 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4348 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4354 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4355 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4358 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4361 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4362 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4364 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4369 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4370 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4371 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4372 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4373 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4376 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4377 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4378 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4379 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4383 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4384 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4392 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4393 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4396 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4399 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4400 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4402 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4405 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4413 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4414 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4416 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4419 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4420 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4421 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4423 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4428 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4436 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4437 else if(check_flags)
4438 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4440 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4441 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4442 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4443 else if (!check_flags)
4446 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4447 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4448 else if (strict_mode)
4450 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4451 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4453 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4454 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4458 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4466 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4468 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4473 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4476 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4479 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4484 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4485 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4486 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4487 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4488 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4493 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4498 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4502 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4503 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4505 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4507 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4509 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4513 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4517 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4520 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4522 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4523 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4525 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4527 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4528 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4530 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4532 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4534 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4535 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4537 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4542 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4546 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4548 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4549 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4553 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4555 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4556 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4557 else if (cpk->digest)
4558 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4561 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4563 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4564 * if the chain is invalid.
4568 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4569 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4572 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4573 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4580 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4581 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4583 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4584 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4585 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4586 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4587 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4588 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4590 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4591 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4593 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4599 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4601 int dh_secbits = 80;
4602 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4603 return DH_get_1024_160();
4604 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4606 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4613 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4614 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4617 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4624 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4625 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4626 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4628 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4629 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4636 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4637 return DH_get_2048_224();
4638 return DH_get_1024_160();
4642 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4645 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4648 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4649 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4654 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4656 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4659 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4661 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4662 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4663 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4664 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4667 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4668 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4671 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4673 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4676 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4679 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4682 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4683 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4687 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4688 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4690 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4691 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4695 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4696 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4697 * not sending one to the peer.
4698 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4701 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4703 int rv, start_idx, i;
4706 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4712 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4716 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4718 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4719 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);