2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
25 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
27 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
28 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
30 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
34 tls1_generate_master_secret,
35 tls1_change_cipher_state,
36 tls1_final_finish_mac,
37 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
38 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
39 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
41 tls1_export_keying_material,
43 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
48 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
52 tls1_generate_master_secret,
53 tls1_change_cipher_state,
54 tls1_final_finish_mac,
55 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
59 tls1_export_keying_material,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
61 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
62 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
66 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
70 tls1_generate_master_secret,
71 tls1_change_cipher_state,
72 tls1_final_finish_mac,
73 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
74 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
75 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
77 tls1_export_keying_material,
78 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
79 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
80 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
81 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
85 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
88 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
89 * http, the cache would over fill
98 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
102 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
104 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
108 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
111 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
112 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
114 s->version = s->method->version;
117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
120 int nid; /* Curve NID */
121 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
122 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
125 /* Mask for curve type */
126 # define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x3
127 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
128 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
129 # define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x2
132 * Table of curve information.
133 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
134 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
136 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
137 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
138 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
139 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
140 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
141 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
142 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
143 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
144 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
145 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
146 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
147 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
148 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
149 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
150 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
151 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
152 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
153 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
154 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
155 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
156 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
157 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
158 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
159 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
160 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
161 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
162 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
166 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM},
169 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
170 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
171 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
172 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
175 /* The default curves */
176 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
177 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
178 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
179 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
180 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
183 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
188 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
189 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
190 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
193 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
194 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
196 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
197 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
198 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
199 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
200 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
201 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
202 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
203 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
204 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
205 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
206 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
207 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
208 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
209 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
210 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
211 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
212 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
213 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
214 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
215 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
216 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
217 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
221 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
222 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
223 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
226 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
228 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
229 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
231 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
234 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
237 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
238 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
245 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
247 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
248 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
249 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
250 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
251 * lists in the first place.
252 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
253 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
254 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
256 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
257 const unsigned char **pcurves,
260 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
262 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
263 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
265 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
266 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
267 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
268 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
269 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
272 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
273 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
277 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
278 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
282 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
283 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
286 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
287 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
291 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
292 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
297 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
302 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
303 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
305 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
308 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
310 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
311 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
312 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
315 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
318 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
319 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
321 const unsigned char *curves;
322 size_t num_curves, i;
323 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
324 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
326 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
328 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
331 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
332 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
334 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
335 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
337 } else /* Should never happen */
340 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
342 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
343 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
344 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
350 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
351 * if there is no match.
352 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
353 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
354 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
356 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
358 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
359 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
361 /* Can't do anything on client side */
365 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
367 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
368 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
370 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
371 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
372 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
373 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
374 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
375 /* Should never happen */
378 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
382 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
383 * but s->options is a long...
385 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
386 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
388 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
389 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
390 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
391 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
393 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
396 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
399 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
401 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
402 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
403 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
405 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
409 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
410 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
411 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
412 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
413 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
416 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
417 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
425 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
429 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
430 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
432 unsigned char *clist, *p;
435 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
438 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
439 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
442 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
443 unsigned long idmask;
445 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
447 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
456 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
460 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
464 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
467 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
469 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
475 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
477 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
479 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
481 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
482 if (nid == NID_undef)
483 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
484 if (nid == NID_undef)
485 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
486 if (nid == NID_undef)
488 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
489 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
491 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
495 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
496 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
501 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
505 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
508 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
509 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
516 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
517 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
520 /* Determine curve ID */
521 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
522 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
523 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
527 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
529 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
531 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
532 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
534 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
535 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
537 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
543 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
544 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
545 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
547 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
548 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
551 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
552 * supported (see RFC4492).
554 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
555 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
556 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
557 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
558 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
561 if (i == num_formats)
566 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
567 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
568 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
570 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
572 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
573 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
574 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
575 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
576 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
580 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
581 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
586 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
593 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
597 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
599 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
600 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
601 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
603 *pformats = ecformats_default;
604 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
606 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
608 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
613 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
614 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
616 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
618 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
621 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
624 /* If not EC nothing to do */
625 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
627 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
631 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
634 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
638 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
639 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
641 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
647 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
648 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
649 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
650 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
651 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
653 return 0; /* Should never happen */
654 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
655 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
657 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
659 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
660 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
661 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
663 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
669 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
671 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
673 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
675 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
676 * is compatible with the client extensions.
678 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
680 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
683 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
686 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
687 unsigned char curve_id[2];
688 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
689 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
690 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
691 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
692 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
696 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
697 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
701 /* Need a shared curve */
702 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
706 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
710 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
715 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
718 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
719 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
722 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
723 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
725 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
728 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
729 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
731 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
735 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
737 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
740 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
741 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
742 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
743 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
745 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
746 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
747 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
748 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
749 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
750 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
752 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
753 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
754 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
759 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
760 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
761 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
764 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
767 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
770 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
771 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
772 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
773 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
774 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
776 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
777 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
780 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
781 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
785 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
786 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
787 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
788 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
789 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
790 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
791 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
793 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
794 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
799 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
800 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
802 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
803 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
805 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
806 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
807 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
808 /* Should never happen */
811 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
812 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
813 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
816 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
817 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
818 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
819 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
820 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
822 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
823 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
826 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
827 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
830 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
831 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
832 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
833 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
836 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
837 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
838 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
839 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
845 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
849 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
850 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
851 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
852 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
855 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
856 if (i == sent_sigslen
857 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
858 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
859 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
862 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
867 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
868 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
869 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
871 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
875 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
877 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
882 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
883 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
884 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
886 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
889 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
891 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
893 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
894 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
895 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
896 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
897 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
898 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
899 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
901 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
903 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
905 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
906 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
907 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
913 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
914 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
915 * @c: cipher to check
916 * @op: Security check that you want to do
918 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
920 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
922 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
923 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
925 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
927 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
928 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
930 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
931 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
934 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
937 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
939 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
941 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
944 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
945 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
946 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
956 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
957 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
958 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
959 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
960 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
963 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) {
964 PACKET extensions = *packet;
965 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
966 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
969 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
970 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
973 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
974 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
980 if (num_extensions <= 1)
983 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
984 if (extension_types == NULL) {
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
989 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
990 extensions = *packet;
991 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
993 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
994 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
995 /* This should not happen. */
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1001 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1005 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1006 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1007 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1008 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1013 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1017 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1018 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1021 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1022 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1023 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1024 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1026 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1028 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1029 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1031 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1032 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1034 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1035 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1036 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1037 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1048 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1050 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1051 if (s->renegotiate) {
1054 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1059 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1062 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1065 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1072 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1073 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1076 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1077 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1078 unsigned long size_str;
1082 * check for enough space.
1083 * 4 for the servername type and extension length
1084 * 2 for servernamelist length
1085 * 1 for the hostname type
1086 * 2 for hostname length
1090 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1092 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1095 /* extension type and length */
1096 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1097 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1099 /* length of servername list */
1100 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1102 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1103 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1105 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1108 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1109 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1110 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1111 * Client Hello message */
1113 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1114 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1120 * check for enough space.
1121 * 4 for the srp type type and extension length
1122 * 1 for the srp user identity
1123 * + srp user identity length
1125 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1128 /* fill in the extension */
1129 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1130 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1131 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1132 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1140 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1143 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1144 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1146 unsigned char *etmp;
1148 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1150 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1152 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1154 if (num_formats > 255) {
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1159 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1160 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1161 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1162 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1163 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1167 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1169 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1170 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1173 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1175 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1177 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1182 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1184 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1185 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1186 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1187 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1188 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1192 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1194 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1195 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1196 ret += curves_list_len;
1198 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1200 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1202 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1203 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1204 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1205 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1206 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1207 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1208 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1210 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1211 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1212 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1215 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1216 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1219 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1222 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1224 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1227 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1233 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1235 const unsigned char *salg;
1236 unsigned char *etmp;
1237 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1238 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1240 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1242 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1244 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1245 /* Fill in lengths */
1246 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1251 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1252 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1254 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1258 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1259 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1260 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1266 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1267 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1273 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1275 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1276 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1278 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1279 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1281 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1282 /* save position of id len */
1283 unsigned char *q = ret;
1284 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1285 /* skip over id len */
1287 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1293 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1296 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1297 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1298 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1299 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1301 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1305 * 1: peer may send requests
1306 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1308 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1309 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1311 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1316 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1318 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1319 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1321 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1323 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1329 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1330 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1331 * (see longer comment below)
1333 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1334 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1336 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1337 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1338 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1339 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1340 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1341 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1344 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1347 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1348 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1353 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1356 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1359 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1366 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1367 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1368 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1370 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1373 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1374 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret);
1378 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1382 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1383 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1384 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1387 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1388 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1390 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1391 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1397 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1399 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1406 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1409 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1413 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1414 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1417 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1418 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1420 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1423 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1424 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1425 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1426 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1431 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1433 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1436 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1441 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1444 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1447 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1455 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1456 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1459 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1460 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1461 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1464 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1469 const unsigned char *plist;
1472 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1476 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1478 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1480 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1482 if (plistlen > 255) {
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1487 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1488 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1489 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1490 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1495 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1498 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1500 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1501 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1503 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1506 /* if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket later */
1507 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1510 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1511 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1513 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1517 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1518 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1521 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1522 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1526 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1532 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1540 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1541 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1542 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1543 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1544 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1545 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1546 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1547 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1548 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1549 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1551 if (limit - ret < 36)
1553 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1558 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1559 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1560 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1562 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1566 * 1: peer may send requests
1567 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1569 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1570 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1572 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1578 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1579 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1580 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1581 const unsigned char *npa;
1582 unsigned int npalen;
1585 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1587 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1588 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1589 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1591 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1593 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1595 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1599 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1601 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1603 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1604 * for other cases too.
1606 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1607 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1608 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1609 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1610 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1612 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1616 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1617 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1621 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1622 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1623 unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1625 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1627 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1631 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1637 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1640 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1645 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1646 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1647 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1648 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1650 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1652 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1654 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1656 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1657 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1661 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1663 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1664 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1665 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1668 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1670 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1671 &s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1672 &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1673 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1681 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1682 * ret: a pointer to the TLSEXT return value: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_*
1683 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1684 * returns 1 on success, 0
1686 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al)
1688 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1689 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1691 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1692 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1693 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1694 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1695 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1697 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1698 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1699 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1700 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1701 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1702 *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1705 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1707 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1708 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1711 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1712 *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1722 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1723 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1724 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1729 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1730 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1731 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1732 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1734 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1740 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1741 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1742 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1743 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1744 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1745 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1746 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1748 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1749 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1750 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1751 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1752 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1753 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1754 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1755 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1756 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1757 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1758 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1759 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1760 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1763 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1764 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1768 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1769 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1770 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1774 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1777 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1778 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1780 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1783 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1786 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1787 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1789 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1790 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1793 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1794 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1796 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1799 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1802 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1803 s->servername_done = 0;
1804 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1806 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1809 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1810 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1811 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1812 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1813 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1814 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1816 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1817 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1820 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1821 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1822 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1823 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1825 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1826 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1827 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1828 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1831 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1832 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1835 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1837 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1840 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1843 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1847 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1848 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1851 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1853 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1856 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1857 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1858 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1859 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1861 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1862 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1864 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1865 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1868 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1870 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1871 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1872 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1873 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1874 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1875 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1876 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1877 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1878 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1879 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1880 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1881 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1882 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1883 * the value of the Host: field.
1884 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1885 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1886 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1888 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1892 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1893 unsigned int servname_type;
1894 PACKET sni, hostname;
1896 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1897 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1898 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1903 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1904 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1905 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1907 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1908 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1909 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1911 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1912 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1914 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1915 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1916 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1921 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1922 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1926 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1927 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1931 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1932 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1936 s->servername_done = 1;
1939 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1940 * fall back to a full handshake.
1942 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1943 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1944 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1948 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1951 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
1954 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1958 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1959 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1961 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1962 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1969 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1970 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1972 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension,
1973 &ec_point_format_list)
1974 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1979 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1980 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1981 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1982 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1986 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1987 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
1989 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1990 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension,
1991 &elliptic_curve_list)
1992 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
1993 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
1998 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
1999 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2000 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2001 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2006 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2007 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2008 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2009 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
2010 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
2011 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2012 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2015 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2016 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2018 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
2019 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2020 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2025 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2026 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2030 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2031 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2032 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2037 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2038 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2039 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2040 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &responder_id_list))
2043 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2045 PACKET responder_id;
2046 const unsigned char *id_data;
2048 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2050 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2054 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL
2055 && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2056 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) {
2057 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2061 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2062 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2063 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2067 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2068 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2072 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2073 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2074 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2079 /* Read in request_extensions */
2080 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2083 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2084 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2085 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2086 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2087 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2088 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2089 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2090 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2091 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2099 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2101 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2105 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2106 unsigned int hbtype;
2108 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2109 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2110 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2114 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2115 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2117 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2118 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2119 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2122 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2128 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2129 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2131 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2134 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2135 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2136 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2137 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2138 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2139 * anything like that, but this might change).
2141 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2142 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2143 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2144 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2145 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2147 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2151 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2152 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2153 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2157 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2158 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2159 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2160 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2161 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2165 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2166 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2168 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2169 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2173 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2174 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2175 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2176 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2177 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2180 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2181 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2186 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2187 /* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. */
2188 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2194 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2196 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2197 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2198 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2200 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2205 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2206 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2207 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2208 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2213 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2216 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2217 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2218 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2221 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2228 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2230 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2231 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2232 * fill the length of the block.
2234 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2236 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2238 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2239 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2240 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2248 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2250 unsigned int length, type, size;
2251 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2252 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2255 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2257 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2259 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2260 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2262 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2263 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2266 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2268 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2270 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2273 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2274 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2278 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2279 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2283 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2284 const unsigned char *data;
2287 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2288 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2291 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2292 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2294 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2295 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2297 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2298 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2299 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2300 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2301 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2304 tlsext_servername = 1;
2306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2307 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2308 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2309 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2310 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2311 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2315 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2316 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2317 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2318 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2319 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2322 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2323 ecpointformatlist_length;
2324 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2325 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2326 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2327 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2333 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2335 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2336 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2337 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2338 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2340 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2343 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2344 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2347 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2349 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2351 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2354 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2355 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2358 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2359 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2363 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2364 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2365 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2367 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2368 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2369 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2370 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2371 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2372 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2374 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2376 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2377 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2378 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2381 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2386 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2387 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2388 unsigned char *selected;
2389 unsigned char selected_len;
2390 /* We must have requested it. */
2391 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2392 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2395 /* The data must be valid */
2396 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2397 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2401 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2403 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2404 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2405 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2408 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2409 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2410 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2413 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2414 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2415 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2419 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2421 /* We must have requested it. */
2422 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2423 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2427 * The extension data consists of:
2428 * uint16 list_length
2429 * uint8 proto_length;
2430 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2432 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2433 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2434 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2435 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2436 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2439 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2440 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2441 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2442 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2445 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2446 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2449 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2451 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2452 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2453 unsigned int hbtype;
2454 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2455 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2459 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2460 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2462 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2463 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2464 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2467 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2473 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2474 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2478 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2479 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2480 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2481 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2482 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2484 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2485 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2487 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2490 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2491 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2493 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2497 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2498 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2502 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2503 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2504 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2505 s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2506 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2507 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2511 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2520 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2521 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2522 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2523 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2524 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2525 * initial connect only.
2527 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2528 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2529 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2531 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2537 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2540 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2541 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2542 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2551 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2553 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2557 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2562 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2564 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2565 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2569 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2570 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2573 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2574 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2578 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2580 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2581 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2582 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2583 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2585 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2587 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2590 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2591 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2594 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2595 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2598 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2599 s->servername_done = 0;
2604 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2605 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2607 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2609 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2611 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2612 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2613 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2615 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2616 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2619 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2622 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2623 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2624 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2628 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2633 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2634 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2635 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2636 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2637 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2638 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2639 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2640 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2643 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2644 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2645 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2647 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2650 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2651 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2653 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2654 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2658 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2662 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2666 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2668 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2669 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2672 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2673 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2674 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2675 * influence which certificate is sent
2677 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2679 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2680 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2681 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2682 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2683 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2687 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2688 * et al can pick it up.
2690 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2691 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2693 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2694 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2695 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2697 /* status request response should be sent */
2698 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2699 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2700 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2702 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2704 /* something bad happened */
2705 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2706 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2707 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2711 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2713 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, &ret, &al)) {
2719 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2720 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2723 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2724 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2732 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2734 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2735 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2739 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2740 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2741 * must contain uncompressed.
2743 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2744 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2745 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2746 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2747 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2748 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2749 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2750 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2752 unsigned char *list;
2753 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2754 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2755 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2756 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2757 found_uncompressed = 1;
2761 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2763 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2767 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2768 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2770 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2772 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2773 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2774 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2775 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2777 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2779 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2782 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2783 * that we don't receive a status message
2785 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2786 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2787 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2790 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2791 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2794 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2795 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2798 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2799 s->servername_done = 0;
2805 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2808 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2810 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2811 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2815 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2823 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2824 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2825 * need to be handled at the same time.
2827 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2830 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2831 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2832 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2833 * point to the resulting session.
2835 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2836 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2837 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2840 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2841 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2842 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2843 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2844 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2845 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2846 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2849 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2850 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2851 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2852 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2853 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2854 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2856 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2859 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2860 const PACKET *session_id,
2864 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2867 int have_ticket = 0;
2868 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2871 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2872 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2875 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2878 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2881 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2885 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2886 unsigned int type, size;
2888 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2889 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2890 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2894 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2898 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2900 const unsigned char *etick;
2902 /* Duplicate extension */
2903 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2911 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2914 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2918 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2920 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2921 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2922 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2923 * calculate the master secret later.
2928 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2929 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2933 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2934 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2936 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2937 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2940 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2943 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2944 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2947 default: /* fatal error */
2953 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2954 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2955 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2961 if (have_ticket == 0)
2968 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2970 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2971 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2972 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2973 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2974 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2975 * point to the resulting session.
2978 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2979 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2980 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2981 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2982 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2984 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2985 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2986 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2989 unsigned char *sdec;
2990 const unsigned char *p;
2991 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2992 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2993 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2994 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2995 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2996 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2999 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3000 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3003 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3008 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3009 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3010 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3021 /* Check key name matches */
3022 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3023 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3027 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3028 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3029 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3030 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3031 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3032 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
3037 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3040 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3045 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3046 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3047 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3050 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3051 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3052 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3055 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3056 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3057 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3058 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3059 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3061 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3062 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3066 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3067 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3072 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3076 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3080 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3081 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3082 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3086 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3087 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3096 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3100 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3101 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3105 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3112 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3113 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3114 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3115 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3116 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3117 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3118 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3119 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3120 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3121 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3124 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3125 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3126 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3127 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3128 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3129 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3130 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3133 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3136 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3137 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3143 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3146 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3147 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3148 return table[i].nid;
3153 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3159 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3162 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3165 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3166 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3170 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3172 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3179 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3182 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3183 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3184 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3185 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3186 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3187 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3188 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3189 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3190 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3191 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3194 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3200 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3202 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3203 return tls12_md_info + i;
3209 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3211 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3212 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3214 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3217 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3220 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3224 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3225 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3228 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3229 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3232 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3233 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3235 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3236 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3237 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3239 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3240 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3242 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3243 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3249 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3250 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3251 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3253 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3254 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3256 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3257 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3259 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3261 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3262 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3264 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3266 if (psignhash_nid) {
3267 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3268 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3270 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3274 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3275 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3277 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3278 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3279 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3281 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3282 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3284 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3285 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3289 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3290 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3294 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3296 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3297 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3298 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3300 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3301 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3302 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3304 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3305 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3306 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3308 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3309 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3314 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3315 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3319 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3320 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3321 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3328 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3330 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3332 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3335 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3336 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3338 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3340 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3341 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3342 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3343 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3346 return tmpout - out;
3349 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3350 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3351 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3352 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3354 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3355 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3356 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3357 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3358 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3360 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3361 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3364 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3365 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3366 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3368 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3378 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3379 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3381 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3382 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3384 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3386 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3388 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3389 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3390 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3391 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3392 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3393 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3394 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3395 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3396 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3397 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3399 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3400 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3403 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3404 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3408 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3409 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3411 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3413 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3416 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3420 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3421 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3425 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3427 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3430 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3431 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3433 /* Should never happen */
3437 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3438 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3439 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3441 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3442 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3446 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3451 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3452 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3454 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3455 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3458 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3459 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3460 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3461 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3462 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3464 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3465 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3466 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3467 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3473 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3474 * the certificate for signing.
3476 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3478 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3479 * supported it stays as NULL.
3481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3482 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3483 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3486 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3487 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3488 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3492 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3493 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3495 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3496 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3497 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3498 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3499 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3500 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3501 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3507 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3508 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3509 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3511 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3516 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3523 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3525 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3528 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3529 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3530 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3532 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3533 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3537 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3539 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3541 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3543 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3545 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3546 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3549 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3553 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3556 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3558 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3559 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3560 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3561 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3562 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3563 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3565 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3566 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3567 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3571 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3573 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3576 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3579 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3581 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3583 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3585 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3593 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3594 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3596 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3599 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3600 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3603 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3604 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3609 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3610 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3612 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3616 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3620 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3623 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3626 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3631 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3632 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3634 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3635 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3636 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3638 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3645 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3646 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3647 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3649 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3650 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3651 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3657 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3661 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3665 if (default_nid == -1)
3667 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3669 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3670 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3671 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3676 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3677 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3681 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3682 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3683 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3690 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3691 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3692 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3693 * attempting to use them.
3696 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3698 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3699 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3700 /* Strict mode flags */
3701 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3702 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3703 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3705 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3710 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3711 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3714 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3715 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3717 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3720 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3722 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3723 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3725 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3727 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3728 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3734 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3737 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3739 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3740 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3742 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3749 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3750 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3751 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3752 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3753 else if (!check_flags)
3758 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3759 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3761 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3763 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3764 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3766 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3769 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3770 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3771 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3772 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3775 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3776 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3777 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3781 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3782 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3785 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3786 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3787 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3790 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3791 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3792 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3795 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3796 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3797 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3806 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3807 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3809 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3811 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3812 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3813 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3816 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3823 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3824 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3828 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3829 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3830 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3831 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3833 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3840 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3841 else if (check_flags)
3842 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3844 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3845 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3846 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3847 else if (!check_flags)
3850 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3851 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3852 else if (strict_mode) {
3853 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3854 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3855 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3856 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3858 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3865 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3866 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3868 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3870 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3873 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3876 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3880 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3884 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3886 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3887 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3889 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3890 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3891 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3895 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3898 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3900 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3902 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3903 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3905 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3906 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3907 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3909 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3910 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3911 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3912 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3913 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3918 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3921 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3923 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3924 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3928 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3929 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3930 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3931 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3932 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3934 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3937 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3941 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3944 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3945 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3952 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3953 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3955 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3956 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3957 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3958 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3959 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3960 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3961 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3964 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3965 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3967 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3971 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3972 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3974 int dh_secbits = 80;
3975 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3976 return DH_get_1024_160();
3977 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3978 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3983 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3984 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3987 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
3995 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
3996 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
3998 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
3999 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4007 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4008 return DH_get_2048_224();
4009 return DH_get_1024_160();
4013 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4016 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4019 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4020 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4021 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4022 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4024 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4027 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4029 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4032 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4034 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4035 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4036 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4037 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4039 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4040 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4042 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4043 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4046 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4048 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4051 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4054 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4056 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4057 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4059 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4060 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4062 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4063 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4068 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4069 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4070 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4073 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4075 int rv, start_idx, i;
4077 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4082 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4086 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4087 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4088 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);