2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
145 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
159 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173 s->version = s->method->version;
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
178 static int nid_list[] =
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
208 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
215 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
246 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
247 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
250 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
252 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
253 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
254 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
256 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
259 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
261 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
264 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
266 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
268 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
270 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
272 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
274 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
276 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
278 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
280 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
286 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
288 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
290 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
292 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
294 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
296 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
298 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
300 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
302 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
306 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
308 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
310 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
312 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
318 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
321 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
322 const unsigned char **pcurves,
327 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
328 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
331 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
332 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
334 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
335 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
336 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
339 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
340 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
344 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
345 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
349 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
350 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
354 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
355 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
358 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
359 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
361 const unsigned char *curves;
363 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
364 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
366 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
369 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
372 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
374 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
377 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
379 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
382 else /* Should never happen */
385 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
386 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
388 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
394 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
395 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
399 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
401 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
402 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
404 /* Can't do anything on client side */
411 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
412 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
415 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
416 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
418 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
419 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
420 /* Should never happen */
423 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
426 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
433 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
435 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
436 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
438 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
442 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
443 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
454 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
455 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
457 unsigned char *clist, *p;
459 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
460 * while curve ids < 32
462 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
463 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
466 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
468 unsigned long idmask;
470 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
472 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
483 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
487 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
492 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
495 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
497 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
501 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
503 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
505 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
507 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
508 if (nid == NID_undef)
509 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
510 if (nid == NID_undef)
511 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
512 if (nid == NID_undef)
514 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
515 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
517 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
520 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
521 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
526 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
528 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
530 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
531 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
537 const EC_METHOD *meth;
540 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
541 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
542 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
545 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
548 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
552 /* Determine curve ID */
553 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
554 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
555 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
559 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
571 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
574 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
576 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
579 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
583 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
584 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
585 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
587 const unsigned char *p;
590 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
591 * is supported (see RFC4492).
593 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
595 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
596 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
597 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
607 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
608 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
610 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
611 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
613 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
618 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
625 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
628 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
630 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
632 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
633 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
637 *pformats = ecformats_default;
638 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
640 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
642 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
646 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
647 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
649 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
651 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
654 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
657 /* If not EC nothing to do */
658 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
663 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
667 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
668 * supported curves extension.
670 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
673 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
674 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
676 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
683 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
684 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
685 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
686 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
687 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
689 return 0; /* Should never happen */
690 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
691 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
693 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
697 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
698 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
700 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
705 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
706 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
708 unsigned char curve_id[2];
709 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
710 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
711 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
712 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
715 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
716 * no other curves permitted.
720 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
721 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
722 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
723 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
724 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
728 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
729 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
731 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
732 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
734 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
737 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
740 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
742 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
748 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
750 /* Need a shared curve */
751 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
757 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
762 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
764 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
768 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
772 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
776 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
777 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
780 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
781 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
783 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
786 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
787 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
789 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
792 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
793 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
795 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
798 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
799 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
800 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
801 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
803 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
805 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
806 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
809 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
810 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
812 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
813 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
816 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
820 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
821 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
822 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
825 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
827 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
830 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
832 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
833 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
834 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
836 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
837 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
840 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
841 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
845 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
846 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
848 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
849 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
851 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
853 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
854 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
858 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
860 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
862 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
865 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
868 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
869 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
871 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
872 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
874 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
875 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
876 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
877 /* Should never happen */
880 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
881 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
886 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
888 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
889 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
890 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
892 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
894 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
897 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
902 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
904 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
906 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
907 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
911 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
913 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
916 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
924 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
927 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
928 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
929 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
931 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
934 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
935 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
940 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
946 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
949 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
950 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
953 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
954 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
955 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
956 * session and not global settings.
959 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
962 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
963 size_t i, sigalgslen;
964 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
967 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
968 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
969 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
972 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
973 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
976 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
977 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
982 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
987 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
992 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
998 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
999 * signature algorithms.
1003 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1004 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1008 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1009 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1013 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1014 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1017 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1019 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1020 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1023 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1024 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1025 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1027 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1028 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1030 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1034 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1035 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1037 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1038 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1047 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1050 unsigned char *ret = p;
1051 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1052 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1054 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1057 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1058 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1060 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1062 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1064 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1065 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1066 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1067 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1076 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1077 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1078 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1083 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1085 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1087 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1088 unsigned long size_str;
1091 /* check for enough space.
1092 4 for the servername type and entension length
1093 2 for servernamelist length
1094 1 for the hostname type
1095 2 for hostname length
1099 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1100 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1103 /* extension type and length */
1104 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1105 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1107 /* length of servername list */
1108 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1110 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1111 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1113 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1117 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1122 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1128 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1130 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1133 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1143 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1144 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1145 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1147 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1148 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 /* check for enough space.
1155 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1156 1 for the srp user identity
1157 + srp user identity length
1159 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1161 /* fill in the extension */
1162 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1163 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1164 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1165 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1173 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1175 const unsigned char *plist;
1178 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1180 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1181 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1188 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1189 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1190 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1191 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1194 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1195 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1196 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1198 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1199 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1200 if (plistlen > 65532)
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1206 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1207 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1209 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1210 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1211 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1212 * resolves this to two bytes.
1215 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1218 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1220 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1223 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1224 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1225 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1226 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1228 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1229 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1230 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1232 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1233 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1235 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1239 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1240 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1242 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1245 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1246 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1250 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1256 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1259 const unsigned char *salg;
1260 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1261 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1263 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1264 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1266 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1270 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1271 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1272 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1274 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1276 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1278 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1281 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1284 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1289 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1290 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1293 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1297 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1299 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1300 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1306 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1308 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1315 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1316 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1317 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1319 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1320 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1322 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1324 /* save position of id len */
1325 unsigned char *q = ret;
1326 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1327 /* skip over id len */
1329 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1335 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1339 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1343 * 1: peer may send requests
1344 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1346 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1347 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1349 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1353 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1355 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1356 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1357 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1364 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1368 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1370 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1372 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1375 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1383 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1384 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1385 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1386 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1387 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1388 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1391 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1392 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1394 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1397 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1399 *(ret++) = list_len;
1400 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1403 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1410 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1413 unsigned char *ret = p;
1414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1415 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1417 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1418 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1419 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1420 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1422 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1423 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1427 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1429 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1431 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1433 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1437 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1441 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1447 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1449 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1452 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1462 if (using_ecc && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1464 const unsigned char *plist;
1466 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1469 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1471 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1472 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1479 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1480 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1481 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1482 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1486 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1487 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1489 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1490 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1492 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1493 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1497 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1499 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1500 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1504 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1505 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1506 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1508 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1510 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1512 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1515 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1518 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1527 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1529 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1531 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1534 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1542 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1543 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1544 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1545 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1546 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1547 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1548 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1549 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1550 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1551 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1552 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1558 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1559 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1561 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1564 * 1: peer may send requests
1565 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1567 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1568 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1570 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1576 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1577 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1578 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1580 const unsigned char *npa;
1581 unsigned int npalen;
1584 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1585 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1587 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1588 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1590 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1592 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1597 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1599 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1601 size_t authz_length;
1602 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1603 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1604 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1605 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1606 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1608 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1610 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1611 * uint8_t authz_type
1613 * uint8_t data[length]
1615 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1616 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1618 unsigned short length;
1622 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1624 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1628 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1636 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1637 * 2 bytes for extension type
1638 * 2 bytes for extension length
1639 * 1 byte for the list length
1640 * n bytes for the list */
1641 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1643 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1644 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1646 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1647 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1651 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1653 unsigned short length;
1658 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1660 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1663 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1670 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1677 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1679 unsigned short type;
1680 unsigned short size;
1682 unsigned char *data = *p;
1683 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1686 s->servername_done = 0;
1687 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1689 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1693 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1694 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1696 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1697 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1699 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1700 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1702 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1703 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1705 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1706 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1708 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1709 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1711 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1712 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1715 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1719 if (data > (d+n-len))
1722 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1727 if (data+size > (d+n))
1730 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1732 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1733 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1734 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1735 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1737 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1738 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1739 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1740 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1741 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1742 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1743 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1744 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1745 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1746 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1747 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1748 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1749 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1750 the value of the Host: field.
1751 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1752 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1753 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1754 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1758 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1760 unsigned char *sdata;
1766 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1773 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1780 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1786 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1789 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1790 switch (servname_type)
1792 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1795 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1797 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1800 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1802 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1805 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1807 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1810 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1811 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1812 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1813 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1814 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1815 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1818 s->servername_done = 1;
1822 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1823 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1824 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1836 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1842 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1844 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1846 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1849 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1851 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1854 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1856 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1857 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1859 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1861 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1868 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1869 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1871 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1872 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1874 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1875 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1877 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1882 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1884 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1885 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1887 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1888 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1890 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1893 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1894 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1897 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1898 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1899 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1900 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1901 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1904 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1905 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1907 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1908 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1909 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1911 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1912 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1914 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1919 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1921 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1924 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1925 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1927 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1930 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1931 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1934 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1935 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1936 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1937 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1938 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1941 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1942 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1943 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1944 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1946 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1950 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1953 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1954 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1956 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1960 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1961 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1962 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1963 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1965 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1966 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1968 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1973 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1975 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1976 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1978 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1982 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1984 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1986 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1988 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1991 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
1993 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1998 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2000 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2003 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2005 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2008 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2011 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2014 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2015 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2019 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2020 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2025 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2029 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2031 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2033 const unsigned char *sdata;
2035 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2040 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2049 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2053 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2057 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2062 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2066 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2071 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2072 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2075 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2076 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2077 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2079 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2080 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2083 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2084 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2086 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2087 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2092 /* Read in request_extensions */
2095 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2102 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2108 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2110 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2111 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2114 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2115 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2117 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2118 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2120 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2125 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2129 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2132 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2136 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2137 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2139 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2140 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2141 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2143 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2149 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2150 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2152 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2155 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2156 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2157 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2158 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2159 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2160 * anything like that, but this might change).
2162 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2163 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2164 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2165 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2166 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2167 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2171 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2172 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2174 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2179 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2181 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2182 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2186 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2190 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2192 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2194 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2198 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2199 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2200 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2203 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2204 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2205 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2206 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2207 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2209 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2213 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2214 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2215 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2217 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2219 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2220 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2221 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2222 1 /* element size */,
2225 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2228 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2229 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2231 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2245 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2247 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2248 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2250 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2252 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2255 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2256 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2257 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2262 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2265 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2267 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2271 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2280 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2281 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2282 * the length of the block. */
2283 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2285 unsigned int off = 0;
2299 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2301 unsigned short length;
2302 unsigned short type;
2303 unsigned short size;
2304 unsigned char *data = *p;
2305 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2306 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2308 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2309 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2313 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2314 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2317 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2321 if (data+length != d+n)
2323 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2327 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2332 if (data+size > (d+n))
2335 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2336 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2337 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2339 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2341 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2343 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2346 tlsext_servername = 1;
2349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2350 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2351 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2353 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2354 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2356 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2358 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2361 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2362 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2363 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2365 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2368 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2369 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2371 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2372 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2373 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2374 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2375 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2378 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2380 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2382 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2383 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2385 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2388 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2391 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2394 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2396 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2397 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2398 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2400 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2404 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2407 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2408 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2410 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2414 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2415 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2416 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2417 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2419 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2421 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2423 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2428 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2429 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2431 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2432 * a status request message.
2434 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2436 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2439 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2440 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2442 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2443 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2444 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2446 unsigned char *selected;
2447 unsigned char selected_len;
2449 /* We must have requested it. */
2450 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
2452 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2455 /* The data must be valid */
2456 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2458 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2461 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2463 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2466 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2467 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2469 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2472 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2473 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2474 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2477 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2479 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2481 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2484 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2488 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2489 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2491 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2492 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2493 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2495 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2500 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2502 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2507 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2509 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2510 * an authz hello extension if the client
2511 * didn't request a proof. */
2512 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2513 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2515 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2517 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2523 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2527 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2528 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2530 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2534 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2535 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2536 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2537 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2539 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2543 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2551 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2555 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2557 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2559 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2561 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2562 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2564 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2570 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2580 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2581 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2582 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2583 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2584 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2585 * absence on initial connect only.
2587 if (!renegotiate_seen
2588 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2589 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2591 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2593 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2601 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2604 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2608 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2610 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2615 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2617 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2618 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2620 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2621 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2623 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2624 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2629 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2633 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2634 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2641 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2646 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2648 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2649 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2652 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2653 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2655 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2656 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2660 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2661 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2662 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2663 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2665 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2667 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2668 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2669 * so this has to happen here in
2670 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2674 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2676 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2679 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2680 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2685 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2686 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2687 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2689 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2691 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2692 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2694 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2695 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2697 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2698 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2700 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2701 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2703 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2704 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2707 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2711 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2713 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2714 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2715 * abort the handshake.
2717 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2718 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2726 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2727 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2730 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2731 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2734 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2735 s->servername_done=0;
2741 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2743 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2746 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2747 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2748 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2749 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2751 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2754 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2755 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2756 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2757 if (certpkey == NULL)
2759 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2762 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2763 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2765 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2766 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2769 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2770 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2771 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2773 /* status request response should be sent */
2774 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2775 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2776 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2778 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2780 /* something bad happened */
2781 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2782 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2783 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2788 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2793 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2794 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2797 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2798 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2806 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2808 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2809 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2812 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2813 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2814 * it must contain uncompressed.
2816 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2817 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2818 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2819 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2820 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2822 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2824 unsigned char *list;
2825 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2826 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2827 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2829 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2831 found_uncompressed = 1;
2835 if (!found_uncompressed)
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2841 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2842 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2844 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2845 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2846 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2847 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2849 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2850 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2852 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2853 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2855 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2857 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2858 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2861 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2862 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2863 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2864 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2866 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2867 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2872 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2875 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2876 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2879 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2880 * there is no response.
2882 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2884 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2885 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2887 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2888 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2891 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2892 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2896 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2897 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2903 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2904 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2907 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2908 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2911 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2912 s->servername_done=0;
2918 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2921 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2923 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2925 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2929 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2937 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2938 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2939 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2941 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2942 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2943 * extension, if any.
2944 * len: the length of the session ID.
2945 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2946 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2947 * point to the resulting session.
2949 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2950 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2951 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2954 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2955 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2956 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2957 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2958 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2959 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2960 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2963 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2964 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2965 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2966 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2967 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2968 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2970 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2971 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2973 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2974 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2978 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2980 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2981 * to permit stateful resumption.
2983 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2985 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2989 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2990 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2997 /* Skip past cipher list */
3002 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3007 /* Now at start of extensions */
3008 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3011 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3013 unsigned short type, size;
3016 if (p + size > limit)
3018 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3023 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3024 * currently have one. */
3025 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3028 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3030 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3031 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3032 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3033 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3034 * calculate the master secret later. */
3037 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3040 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3041 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3043 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3045 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3046 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3048 default: /* fatal error */
3057 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3059 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3060 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3061 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3062 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3063 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3064 * point to the resulting session.
3067 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3068 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3069 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3070 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3072 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3073 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3074 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3077 unsigned char *sdec;
3078 const unsigned char *p;
3079 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3080 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3083 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3084 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3087 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3088 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3089 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3090 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3092 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3093 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3104 /* Check key name matches */
3105 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3107 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3108 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3109 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3110 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3112 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3113 * integrity checks on ticket.
3115 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3118 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3122 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3123 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3124 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3125 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3126 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3128 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3129 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3130 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3131 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3132 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3135 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3138 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3139 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3142 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3145 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3149 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3150 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3151 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3152 * as required by standard.
3155 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3156 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3164 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3169 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3177 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3178 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3179 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3180 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3181 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3182 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3183 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3186 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3187 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3188 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3189 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3192 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3195 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3197 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3203 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3206 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3208 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3209 return table[i].nid;
3214 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3219 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3220 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3223 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3226 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3227 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3231 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3233 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3234 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3237 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3242 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3250 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3254 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3255 return EVP_sha224();
3257 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3258 return EVP_sha256();
3260 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3261 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3262 return EVP_sha384();
3264 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3265 return EVP_sha512();
3273 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3278 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3279 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3282 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3283 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3286 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3287 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3293 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3294 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3295 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3297 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3298 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3300 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3302 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3303 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3305 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3307 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3309 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3310 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3312 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3316 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3317 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3318 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3320 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3323 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3324 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3325 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3326 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3328 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3329 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3330 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3332 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3333 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3335 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3337 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3339 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3344 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3345 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3346 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3348 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3359 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3360 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3362 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3363 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3365 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3367 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3368 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3369 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3371 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3372 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3374 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3376 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3377 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3380 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3381 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3385 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3386 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3392 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3393 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3395 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3398 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3401 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3402 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3403 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3408 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3410 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3416 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3417 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
3418 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3420 /* Should never happen */
3424 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3425 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3427 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3428 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3430 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3432 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3433 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3435 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3436 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3438 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3440 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3442 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3445 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3446 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3447 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3448 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3449 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3451 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3452 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3458 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3459 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3461 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3462 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3464 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3465 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3466 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3467 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3469 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3470 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3475 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3476 * use the certificate for signing.
3478 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3480 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3481 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3484 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3485 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3488 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3490 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3491 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3495 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3496 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3503 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3504 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3505 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3507 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3513 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3520 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3522 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3525 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3526 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3527 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3529 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3530 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3534 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3536 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3538 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3540 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3542 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3543 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3549 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3551 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3552 unsigned short hbtype;
3553 unsigned int payload;
3554 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3556 /* Read type and payload length first */
3561 if (s->msg_callback)
3562 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3563 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3564 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3566 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3568 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3571 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3572 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3573 * payload, plus padding
3575 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3578 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3579 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3581 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3583 /* Random padding */
3584 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3586 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3588 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3589 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3590 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3591 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3593 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3598 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3602 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3603 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3604 * sequence number */
3607 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3610 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3618 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3620 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3622 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3623 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3625 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3626 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3627 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3633 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3634 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3640 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3641 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3647 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3648 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3650 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3652 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3653 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3654 * some random stuff.
3655 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3656 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3657 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3658 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3661 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3664 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3665 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3667 /* Sequence number */
3668 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3669 /* 16 random bytes */
3670 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3672 /* Random padding */
3673 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3675 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3678 if (s->msg_callback)
3679 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3680 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3681 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3683 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3692 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3697 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3700 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3702 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3705 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3706 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3708 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3710 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3712 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3720 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3721 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3722 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3723 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3724 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3725 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3728 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3729 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3730 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3731 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3734 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3736 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3737 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3740 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3741 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3745 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3746 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3747 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3751 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3755 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3758 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3760 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3765 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3766 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3768 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3770 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3771 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3772 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3773 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3775 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3783 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3784 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3785 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3786 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3790 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3791 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3792 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3793 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3799 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3803 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3807 if (default_nid == -1)
3809 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3811 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3812 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3813 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3817 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3818 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3822 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3823 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3825 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3831 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3832 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3833 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3834 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
3837 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3839 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3840 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3841 /* Strict mode flags */
3842 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3843 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3844 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3846 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3851 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3852 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3854 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3855 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3858 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3862 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3865 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3867 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3869 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3870 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3873 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3874 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3875 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3877 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3878 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3887 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3890 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3891 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3892 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3894 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3902 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3903 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3904 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
3907 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3913 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
3914 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
3917 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
3920 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3921 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3923 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3928 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3929 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3930 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3931 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3932 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3935 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3936 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3937 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3938 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3942 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3943 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3951 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
3952 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
3955 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
3958 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3959 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
3961 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3964 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
3972 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3973 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
3975 if (!check_flags) goto end;
3978 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3979 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3980 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3982 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
3987 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3995 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3996 else if(check_flags)
3997 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3999 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4000 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4001 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4002 else if (!check_flags)
4005 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4006 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4007 else if (strict_mode)
4009 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4010 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4012 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4013 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4017 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4025 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4027 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4032 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4035 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4038 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4043 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4044 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4045 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4046 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4047 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4052 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4057 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4061 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4062 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4064 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4066 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4068 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4072 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4076 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4079 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4081 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4082 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4084 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4086 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4087 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4089 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4091 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4093 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4094 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4096 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4101 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4105 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4107 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4108 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4112 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4114 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4115 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4116 else if (cpk->digest)
4117 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4120 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4122 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4123 * if the chain is invalid.
4127 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4128 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4131 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4132 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4139 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4140 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4142 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4143 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4144 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4145 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4146 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4147 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4149 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4150 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4152 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);