2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
249 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
250 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
254 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
256 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
261 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
263 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
264 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
265 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
266 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
268 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
269 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
272 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
273 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
277 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
278 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
279 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
280 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
281 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
282 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
283 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
286 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
287 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
288 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
295 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
296 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
299 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
301 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
302 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
303 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
305 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
308 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
310 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
313 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
315 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
319 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
321 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
325 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
327 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
329 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
331 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
333 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
335 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
337 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
339 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
341 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
343 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
345 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
347 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
349 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
351 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
353 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
355 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
357 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
359 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
361 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
363 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
365 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
367 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
373 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
376 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
377 const unsigned char **pcurves,
382 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
383 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
386 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
387 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
389 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
390 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
391 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
394 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
395 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
399 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
400 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
404 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
405 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
409 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
410 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
413 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
414 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
416 const unsigned char *curves;
418 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
419 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
421 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
424 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
427 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
429 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
432 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
434 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
437 else /* Should never happen */
440 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
441 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
443 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
449 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
450 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
454 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
456 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
457 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
459 /* Can't do anything on client side */
466 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
467 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
470 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
472 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
473 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
474 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
475 /* Should never happen */
478 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
481 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
483 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
488 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
490 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
491 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
493 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
497 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
498 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
509 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
510 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
512 unsigned char *clist, *p;
514 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
515 * while curve ids < 32
517 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
518 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
521 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
523 unsigned long idmask;
525 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
527 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
538 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
542 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
547 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
550 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
552 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
556 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
558 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
560 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
562 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
563 if (nid == NID_undef)
564 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
565 if (nid == NID_undef)
566 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
567 if (nid == NID_undef)
569 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
570 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
572 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
575 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
576 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
581 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
585 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
587 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
588 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
593 const EC_METHOD *meth;
596 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
597 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
600 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
603 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
607 /* Determine curve ID */
608 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
610 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
614 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
626 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
628 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
631 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
633 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
636 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
640 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
641 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
642 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
644 const unsigned char *p;
647 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
648 * is supported (see RFC4492).
650 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
652 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
653 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
654 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
664 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
665 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
667 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
668 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
670 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
675 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
682 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
685 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
687 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
689 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
694 *pformats = ecformats_default;
695 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
697 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
699 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
703 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
704 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
706 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
708 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
711 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
714 /* If not EC nothing to do */
715 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
720 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
724 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
725 * supported curves extension.
727 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
730 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
731 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
733 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
740 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
741 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
742 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
743 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
744 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
746 return 0; /* Should never happen */
747 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
748 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
750 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
754 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
755 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
757 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
762 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
763 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
765 unsigned char curve_id[2];
766 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
767 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
768 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
769 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
772 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
773 * no other curves permitted.
777 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
778 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
779 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
780 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
781 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
785 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
786 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
788 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
789 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
791 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
794 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
797 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
799 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
805 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
807 /* Need a shared curve */
808 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
814 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
819 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
821 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
825 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
831 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
836 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
840 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
841 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
850 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
851 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
853 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
856 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
857 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
859 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
862 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
863 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
864 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
865 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
867 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
869 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
870 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
873 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
877 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
881 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
882 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
883 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
886 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
888 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
892 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
894 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
895 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
896 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
907 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
908 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
910 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
911 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
913 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
915 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
916 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
920 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
921 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
924 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
925 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
927 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
928 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
930 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
931 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
932 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
933 /* Should never happen */
936 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
937 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
943 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
945 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
946 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
947 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
949 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
954 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
959 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
961 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
964 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
968 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
970 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
973 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
981 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
985 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
986 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
987 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
989 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
992 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
993 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
998 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1004 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1007 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1008 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1011 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1012 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1013 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1014 * session and not global settings.
1017 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1020 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1021 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1022 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1025 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1026 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1027 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1030 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1031 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1034 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1040 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1045 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1050 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1056 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1057 * signature algorithms.
1061 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1066 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1067 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1071 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1075 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1077 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1078 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1082 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1083 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1085 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1086 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1088 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1092 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1095 unsigned char *ret = p;
1096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1097 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1099 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1102 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1103 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1105 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1107 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1109 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1110 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1111 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1112 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1121 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1122 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1123 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1128 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1130 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1132 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1133 unsigned long size_str;
1136 /* check for enough space.
1137 4 for the servername type and entension length
1138 2 for servernamelist length
1139 1 for the hostname type
1140 2 for hostname length
1144 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1145 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1148 /* extension type and length */
1149 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1150 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1152 /* length of servername list */
1153 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1155 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1156 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1158 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1162 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1167 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1173 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1175 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1178 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1188 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1189 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1190 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1192 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1193 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 /* check for enough space.
1200 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1201 1 for the srp user identity
1202 + srp user identity length
1204 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1206 /* fill in the extension */
1207 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1208 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1209 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1210 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1218 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1220 const unsigned char *plist;
1223 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1225 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1226 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1234 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1235 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1236 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1239 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1240 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1241 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1243 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1244 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1245 if (plistlen > 65532)
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1252 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1254 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1255 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1256 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1257 * resolves this to two bytes.
1260 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1263 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1265 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1268 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1269 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1270 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1271 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1273 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1274 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1275 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1277 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1278 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1280 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1284 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1285 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1287 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1290 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1291 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1295 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1301 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1304 const unsigned char *salg;
1305 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1306 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1308 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1309 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1311 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1315 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1316 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1318 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1320 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1322 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1325 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1328 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1333 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1336 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1340 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1342 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1343 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1349 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1351 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1358 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1360 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1362 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1363 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1365 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1367 /* save position of id len */
1368 unsigned char *q = ret;
1369 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1370 /* skip over id len */
1372 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1378 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1382 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1383 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1386 * 1: peer may send requests
1387 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1389 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1390 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1392 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1396 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1398 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1399 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1400 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1402 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1407 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1409 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1411 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1412 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1413 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1414 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1415 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1416 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1419 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1423 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1425 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1427 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1430 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1438 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1439 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1442 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1444 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1446 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1447 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1449 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1450 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1451 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1455 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1459 return NULL; /* error */
1460 if (cb_retval == -1)
1461 continue; /* skip this extension */
1463 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1465 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1467 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1471 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1472 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1475 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
1476 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1477 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02
1479 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1480 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1483 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1484 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1485 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
1487 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1489 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1491 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1497 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1499 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1505 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1512 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1515 unsigned char *ret = p;
1516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1517 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1520 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1521 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1522 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1523 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1525 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1526 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1530 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1532 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1534 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1536 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1540 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1544 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1550 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1552 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1555 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1567 const unsigned char *plist;
1569 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1572 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1574 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1575 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1582 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1583 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1584 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1585 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1589 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1590 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1592 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1593 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1595 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1596 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1600 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1602 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1603 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1607 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1608 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1610 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1612 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1614 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1617 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1620 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1629 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1631 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1633 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1636 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1644 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1645 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1646 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1647 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1648 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1649 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1650 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1651 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1652 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1653 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1654 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1660 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1661 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1663 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1666 * 1: peer may send requests
1667 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1669 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1670 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1672 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1678 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1679 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1680 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1682 const unsigned char *npa;
1683 unsigned int npalen;
1686 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1687 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1689 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1690 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1692 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1694 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1699 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1700 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1704 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1707 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1709 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1711 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1712 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1714 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1715 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1718 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1721 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1725 return NULL; /* error */
1726 if (cb_retval == -1)
1727 break; /* skip this extension */
1728 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1730 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1732 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1739 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1740 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1742 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1743 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1745 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1746 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1749 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1755 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1757 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1758 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1760 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1762 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1766 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1770 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1777 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1779 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1780 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1781 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1784 * returns: 0 on success. */
1785 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1786 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1790 const unsigned char *selected;
1791 unsigned char selected_len;
1794 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1800 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1801 * length-prefixed strings. */
1802 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1803 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1812 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1814 proto_len = data[i];
1820 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1826 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1827 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1828 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1829 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1830 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1831 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1832 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1834 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1837 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1838 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1843 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1847 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1848 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1849 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1850 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1855 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1856 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1857 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1858 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1860 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1861 unsigned short type, size;
1862 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1863 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1864 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1865 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1866 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1867 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1868 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1870 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1871 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1872 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1873 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1876 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1877 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1878 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1879 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1880 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1881 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1882 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1883 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1884 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1885 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1888 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1897 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1900 if (data+size > d+n)
1904 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1906 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1907 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1909 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1911 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1913 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1918 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1920 if (data + len != d+n)
1922 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1926 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1928 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1930 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1932 unsigned short type;
1933 unsigned short size;
1935 unsigned char *data = *p;
1936 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1939 s->servername_done = 0;
1940 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1941 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1942 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1945 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1947 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1948 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1951 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1952 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1953 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1955 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
1956 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1960 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1961 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1965 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1966 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1967 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1969 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1970 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1972 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1973 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1975 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1976 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1978 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1979 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1981 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1982 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1984 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1985 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1988 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1989 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1992 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1996 if (data > (d+n-len))
1999 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2004 if (data+size > (d+n))
2007 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2009 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2010 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2011 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2012 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2014 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2015 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2016 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2017 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2018 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2019 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2020 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2021 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2022 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2023 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2024 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2025 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2026 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2027 the value of the Host: field.
2028 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2029 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2030 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2031 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2035 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2037 unsigned char *sdata;
2043 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2050 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2057 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2063 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2066 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2067 switch (servname_type)
2069 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2072 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2074 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2077 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2079 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2082 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2084 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2087 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2088 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2089 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2090 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2091 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2092 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2095 s->servername_done = 1;
2099 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2100 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2101 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2113 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2119 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2121 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2123 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2126 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2128 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2131 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2133 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2134 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2136 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2138 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2145 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2147 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2148 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2150 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2151 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2153 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2158 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2160 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2161 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2163 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2164 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2166 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2169 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2170 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2173 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2174 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2175 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2176 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2177 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2180 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2182 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2183 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2184 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2186 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2187 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2189 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2194 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2196 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2199 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2200 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2202 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2205 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2206 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2209 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2210 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2211 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2212 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2213 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2216 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2217 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2218 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2220 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2224 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2227 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2228 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2230 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2234 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2235 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2236 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2237 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2239 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2240 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2242 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2247 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2249 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2250 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2252 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2256 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2258 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2260 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2262 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2265 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2267 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2272 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2274 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2277 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2279 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2282 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2285 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2288 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2289 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2293 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
2294 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2299 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2303 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2305 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2307 const unsigned char *sdata;
2309 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2314 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2323 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2327 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2331 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2336 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2340 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2345 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2346 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2349 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2350 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2351 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2353 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2354 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2357 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2358 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2360 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2361 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2366 /* Read in request_extensions */
2369 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2376 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2382 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2384 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2385 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2388 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2389 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2391 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2392 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2394 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2399 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2403 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2406 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2410 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2411 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2413 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2414 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2415 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2417 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2423 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2424 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2425 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2427 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2430 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2431 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2432 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2433 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2434 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2435 * anything like that, but this might change).
2437 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2438 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2439 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2440 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2441 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2442 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2446 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2447 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2448 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2450 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2453 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2454 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2458 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2459 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2461 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2465 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2466 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2467 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2468 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2469 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2471 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2473 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2475 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2477 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2478 if (type == record->ext_type)
2482 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2483 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2485 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2487 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2492 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2493 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2496 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2497 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2498 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2499 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2500 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2501 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2503 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2504 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2507 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2508 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2512 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2513 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2514 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2524 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2526 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2527 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2529 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2531 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2534 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2535 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2536 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2541 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2544 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2546 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2550 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2559 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2560 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2561 * the length of the block. */
2562 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2564 unsigned int off = 0;
2578 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2580 unsigned short length;
2581 unsigned short type;
2582 unsigned short size;
2583 unsigned char *data = *p;
2584 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2585 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2588 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2591 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2593 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2594 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2598 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2599 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2602 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2603 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2606 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2610 if (data+length != d+n)
2612 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2616 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2621 if (data+size > (d+n))
2624 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2625 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2626 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2628 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2630 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2632 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2635 tlsext_servername = 1;
2638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2639 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2641 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2642 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2644 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2646 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2649 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2650 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2651 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2653 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2656 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2657 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2659 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2660 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2661 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2662 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2663 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2666 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2668 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2670 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2671 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2673 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2676 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2679 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2682 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2684 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2685 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2687 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2691 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2694 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2695 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2697 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2701 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2702 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2703 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2704 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2706 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2708 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2710 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2715 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2717 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2718 * a status request message.
2720 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2722 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2725 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2726 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2728 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2729 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2730 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2732 unsigned char *selected;
2733 unsigned char selected_len;
2735 /* We must have requested it. */
2736 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2738 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2741 /* The data must be valid */
2742 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2744 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2747 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2749 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2752 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2753 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2755 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2758 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2759 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2760 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2764 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2768 /* We must have requested it. */
2769 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2771 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2776 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2779 /* The extension data consists of:
2780 * uint16 list_length
2781 * uint8 proto_length;
2782 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2786 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2788 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2792 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2794 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2797 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2798 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2799 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2800 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2802 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2805 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2806 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2809 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2811 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2813 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2816 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2820 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2821 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2823 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2824 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2825 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2827 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2832 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2834 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2838 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2839 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2841 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2844 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2846 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2848 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2849 if (record->ext_type == type)
2851 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2857 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2858 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2860 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2861 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2862 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2871 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2875 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2877 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2879 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2881 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2882 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2884 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2890 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2900 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2901 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2902 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2903 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2904 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2905 * absence on initial connect only.
2907 if (!renegotiate_seen
2908 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2909 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2911 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2913 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2921 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2924 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2928 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2930 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2935 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2937 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2938 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2940 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2941 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2943 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2944 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2949 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2953 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2954 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2961 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2966 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2968 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2969 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2971 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2972 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2973 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2975 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2976 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2980 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2981 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2982 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2983 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2985 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2987 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2988 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2989 * so this has to happen here in
2990 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2994 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2996 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2999 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3000 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3005 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3006 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3007 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3009 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3011 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3012 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3014 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3015 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3017 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3018 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3020 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3021 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3023 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3024 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3027 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3031 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3033 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3034 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3035 * abort the handshake.
3037 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3038 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3046 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3047 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3050 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3051 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3054 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3055 s->servername_done=0;
3061 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3063 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3066 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3067 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3068 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3069 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3071 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3074 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3075 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3076 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3077 if (certpkey == NULL)
3079 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3082 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3083 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3085 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3086 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3089 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3090 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3091 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3093 /* status request response should be sent */
3094 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3095 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3096 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3098 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3100 /* something bad happened */
3101 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3102 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3103 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3108 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3113 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3114 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3117 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3118 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3126 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3128 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3129 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3132 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3133 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3134 * it must contain uncompressed.
3136 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3137 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3138 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3139 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3140 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3142 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3144 unsigned char *list;
3145 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3146 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3147 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3149 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3151 found_uncompressed = 1;
3155 if (!found_uncompressed)
3157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3161 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3162 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3164 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3165 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3166 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3167 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3169 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3170 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3172 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3173 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3175 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3177 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3178 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3181 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3182 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3183 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3184 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3186 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3187 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3192 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3195 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3196 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3199 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3200 * there is no response.
3202 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3204 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3205 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3207 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3208 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3211 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3212 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3216 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3217 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3223 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3224 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3227 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3228 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3231 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3232 s->servername_done=0;
3238 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3241 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3243 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3245 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3249 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3257 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3258 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3259 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3261 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3262 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3263 * extension, if any.
3264 * len: the length of the session ID.
3265 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3266 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3267 * point to the resulting session.
3269 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3270 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3271 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3274 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3275 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3276 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3277 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3278 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3279 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3280 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3283 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3284 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3285 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3286 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3287 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3288 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3290 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3291 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3293 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3294 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3298 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3300 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3301 * to permit stateful resumption.
3303 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3305 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3309 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3317 /* Skip past cipher list */
3322 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3327 /* Now at start of extensions */
3328 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3331 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3333 unsigned short type, size;
3336 if (p + size > limit)
3338 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3343 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3344 * currently have one. */
3345 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3348 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3350 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3351 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3352 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3353 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3354 * calculate the master secret later. */
3357 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3360 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3361 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3363 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3365 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3366 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3368 default: /* fatal error */
3377 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3379 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3380 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3381 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3382 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3383 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3384 * point to the resulting session.
3387 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3388 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3389 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3390 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3392 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3393 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3394 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3397 unsigned char *sdec;
3398 const unsigned char *p;
3399 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3400 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3403 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3404 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3407 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3408 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3409 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3410 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3412 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3413 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3424 /* Check key name matches */
3425 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3427 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3428 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3429 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3430 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3432 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3433 * integrity checks on ticket.
3435 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3438 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3442 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3443 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3444 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3445 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3446 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3448 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3449 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3450 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3451 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3452 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3455 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3458 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3459 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3462 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3465 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3469 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3470 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3471 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3472 * as required by standard.
3475 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3476 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3484 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3489 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3497 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3498 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3499 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3500 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3501 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3502 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3503 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3506 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3507 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3508 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3509 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3512 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3515 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3517 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3523 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3526 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3528 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3529 return table[i].nid;
3534 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3539 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3540 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3543 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3546 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3547 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3551 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3553 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3554 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3557 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3562 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3569 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3570 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3573 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3574 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3575 return EVP_sha224();
3577 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3578 return EVP_sha256();
3580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3581 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3582 return EVP_sha384();
3584 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3585 return EVP_sha512();
3593 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3598 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3599 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3602 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3603 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3606 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3607 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3613 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3614 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3615 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3617 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3618 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3620 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3622 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3623 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3625 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3627 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3629 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3630 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3632 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3636 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3637 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3638 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3640 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3643 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3644 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3645 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3646 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3648 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3649 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3650 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3652 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3653 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3655 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3657 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3659 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3664 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3665 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3666 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3668 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3679 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3680 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3682 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3683 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3685 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3687 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3688 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3689 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3691 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3692 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3694 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3696 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3697 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3700 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3701 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3705 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3706 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3712 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3713 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3715 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3718 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3721 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3722 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3723 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3728 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3730 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3736 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3737 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3738 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3740 /* Should never happen */
3744 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3745 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3747 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3748 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3750 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3752 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3753 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3755 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3756 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3758 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3760 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3762 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3765 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3766 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3767 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3768 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3769 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3771 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3772 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3778 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3779 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3781 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3782 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3784 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3785 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3786 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3787 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3789 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3790 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3795 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3796 * use the certificate for signing.
3798 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3800 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3801 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3804 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3805 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3808 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3810 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3811 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3815 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3816 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3823 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3824 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3825 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3827 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3833 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3840 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3842 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3845 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3846 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3847 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3849 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3850 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3854 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3856 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3858 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3860 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3862 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3863 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3869 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3871 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3872 unsigned short hbtype;
3873 unsigned int payload;
3874 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3876 /* Read type and payload length first */
3881 if (s->msg_callback)
3882 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3883 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3884 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3886 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3888 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3891 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3892 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3893 * payload, plus padding
3895 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3898 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3899 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3901 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3903 /* Random padding */
3904 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3906 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3908 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3909 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3910 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3911 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3913 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3918 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3922 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3923 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3924 * sequence number */
3927 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3930 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3938 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3940 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3942 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3943 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3945 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3946 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3947 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3953 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3954 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3960 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3961 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3967 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3968 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3970 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3972 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3973 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3974 * some random stuff.
3975 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3976 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3977 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3978 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3981 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3984 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3985 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3987 /* Sequence number */
3988 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3989 /* 16 random bytes */
3990 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3992 /* Random padding */
3993 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3995 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3998 if (s->msg_callback)
3999 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4000 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4001 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4003 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4012 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4017 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4020 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4022 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4025 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4026 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4028 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4030 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4032 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4040 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4041 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4042 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4043 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4044 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4045 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4048 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4049 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4050 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4051 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4054 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4056 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4057 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4060 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4061 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4065 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4066 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4067 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4071 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4075 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4078 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4080 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4085 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4086 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4088 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4090 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4091 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4092 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4093 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4095 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4103 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4104 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4105 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4106 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4110 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4111 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4112 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4113 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4119 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4123 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4127 if (default_nid == -1)
4129 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4131 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4132 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4133 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4137 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4138 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4142 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4143 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4145 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4151 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4152 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4153 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4154 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4157 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4159 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4160 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4161 /* Strict mode flags */
4162 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4163 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4164 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4166 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4171 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4172 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4174 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4175 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4178 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4182 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4185 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4187 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4189 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4190 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4193 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4194 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4195 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4197 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4198 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4207 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4210 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4211 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4212 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4214 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4222 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4223 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4224 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4227 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4233 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4234 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4237 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4240 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4241 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4243 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4248 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4249 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4250 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4251 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4252 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4255 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4256 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4257 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4258 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4262 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4263 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4271 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4272 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4275 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4278 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4279 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4281 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4284 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4292 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4293 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4295 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4298 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4299 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4300 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4302 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4307 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4315 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4316 else if(check_flags)
4317 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4319 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4320 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4321 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4322 else if (!check_flags)
4325 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4326 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4327 else if (strict_mode)
4329 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4330 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4332 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4333 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4337 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4345 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4347 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4352 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4355 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4358 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4363 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4364 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4365 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4366 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4367 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4372 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4377 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4381 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4382 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4384 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4386 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4388 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4392 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4396 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4399 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4401 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4402 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4404 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4406 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4407 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4409 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4411 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4413 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4414 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4416 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4421 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4425 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4427 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4428 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4432 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4434 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4435 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4436 else if (cpk->digest)
4437 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4440 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4442 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4443 * if the chain is invalid.
4447 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4448 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4451 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4452 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4459 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4460 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4462 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4463 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4464 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4465 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4466 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4467 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4469 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4470 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4472 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);