2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
195 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
196 * http, the cache would over fill
198 return (60 * 60 * 2);
205 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
209 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
212 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
213 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
215 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
219 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
222 s->version = s->method->version;
225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
228 int nid; /* Curve NID */
229 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
230 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
233 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
234 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
236 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
269 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
273 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
274 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
276 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
277 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
278 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
279 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
280 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
281 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
282 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
283 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
285 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
286 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
287 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
288 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
289 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
290 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
291 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
292 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
293 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
294 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
295 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
296 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
297 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
298 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
299 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
300 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
301 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
304 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
305 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
306 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
309 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
311 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
312 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
313 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
315 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
318 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
320 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
322 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
324 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
326 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
328 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
330 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
332 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
334 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
336 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
338 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
340 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
342 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
344 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
346 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
348 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
350 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
352 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
354 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
356 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
358 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
360 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
362 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
364 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
366 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
368 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
370 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
372 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
374 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
376 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
384 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
386 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
387 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
388 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
389 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
390 * lists in the first place.
391 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
392 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
393 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
395 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
396 const unsigned char **pcurves,
399 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
401 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
402 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
404 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
405 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
406 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
407 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
408 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
411 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
412 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
416 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
417 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
421 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
422 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
425 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
426 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
430 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
431 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
436 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
441 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
442 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
444 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
447 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
448 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
450 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
451 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
452 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
455 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
458 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
459 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
461 const unsigned char *curves;
462 size_t num_curves, i;
463 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
464 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
466 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
468 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
472 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
474 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
475 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
477 } else /* Should never happen */
480 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
482 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
483 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
484 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
490 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
491 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
492 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
493 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
495 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
497 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
498 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
500 /* Can't do anything on client side */
504 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
506 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
507 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
509 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
510 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
511 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
512 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
513 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
514 /* Should never happen */
517 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
521 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
522 * but s->options is a long...
524 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
525 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
527 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
528 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
529 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
530 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
532 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
534 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
535 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
536 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
537 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
538 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
541 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
542 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
550 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
554 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
555 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
557 unsigned char *clist, *p;
560 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
563 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
564 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
567 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
568 unsigned long idmask;
570 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
572 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
582 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
586 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
590 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
593 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
595 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
601 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
603 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
605 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
607 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
608 if (nid == NID_undef)
609 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
610 if (nid == NID_undef)
611 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
612 if (nid == NID_undef)
614 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
615 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
617 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
621 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
622 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
627 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
631 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
634 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
635 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
640 const EC_METHOD *meth;
643 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
644 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
647 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
650 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
654 /* Determine curve ID */
655 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
656 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
657 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
660 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
669 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
671 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
673 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
675 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
677 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
682 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
683 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
684 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
686 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
687 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
690 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
691 * supported (see RFC4492).
693 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
694 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
695 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
696 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
697 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
700 if (i == num_formats)
705 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
706 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
707 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
709 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
710 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
715 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
722 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
726 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
728 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
729 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
730 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
732 *pformats = ecformats_default;
733 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
735 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
737 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
742 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
743 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
745 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
747 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
750 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
753 /* If not EC nothing to do */
754 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
758 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
763 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
766 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
770 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
771 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
773 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
779 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
780 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
781 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
782 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
783 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
785 return 0; /* Should never happen */
786 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
787 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
789 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
791 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
792 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
793 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
795 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
801 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
802 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
803 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
805 unsigned char curve_id[2];
806 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
807 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
808 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
809 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
813 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
816 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
817 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
818 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
819 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
820 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
821 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
825 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
826 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
828 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
829 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
831 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
833 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
836 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
838 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
845 /* Need a shared curve */
846 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
852 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
857 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
859 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
863 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
866 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
870 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
875 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
880 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
881 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
884 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
885 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
887 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
890 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
891 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
893 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
896 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
897 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
900 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
903 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
904 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
905 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
906 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
908 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
909 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
910 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
911 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
912 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
913 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
916 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
917 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
918 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
919 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
922 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
925 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
928 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
929 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
930 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
931 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
932 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
934 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
935 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
938 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
939 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
943 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
944 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
945 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
947 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
948 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
949 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
951 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
952 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
957 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
958 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
960 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
961 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
963 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
964 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
965 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
966 /* Should never happen */
969 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
970 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
974 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
975 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
976 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
977 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
978 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
980 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
985 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
988 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
989 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
991 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
994 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
995 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
997 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1003 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1007 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1008 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1009 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1010 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1013 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1014 if (i == sent_sigslen
1015 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1016 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1020 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1025 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1026 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1027 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1033 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1035 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1036 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1041 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1042 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1043 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1046 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1051 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1052 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1053 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1056 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1058 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1061 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1063 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1064 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1065 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1066 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1067 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1068 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1069 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1070 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1073 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1074 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1075 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1076 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1077 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1079 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1080 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1081 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1082 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1083 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1089 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1092 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k
1093 || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1095 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1098 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1100 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1102 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1105 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1106 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1109 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1110 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1111 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1112 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1114 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1116 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1117 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1119 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1120 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1122 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1123 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1124 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1125 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1136 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1138 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1139 if (s->renegotiate) {
1142 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1147 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1150 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1153 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1160 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1161 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1164 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1165 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1166 unsigned long size_str;
1170 * check for enough space.
1171 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1172 * 2 for servernamelist length
1173 * 1 for the hostname type
1174 * 2 for hostname length
1178 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1180 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1183 /* extension type and length */
1184 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1185 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1187 /* length of servername list */
1188 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1190 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1191 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1193 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1196 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1197 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1198 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1199 * Client Hello message */
1201 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1202 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1208 * check for enough space.
1209 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1210 * 1 for the srp user identity
1211 * + srp user identity length
1213 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1216 /* fill in the extension */
1217 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1218 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1219 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1220 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1225 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1228 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1231 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1232 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1234 unsigned char *etmp;
1236 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1238 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1240 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1242 if (num_formats > 255) {
1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1247 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1248 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1249 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1250 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1251 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1255 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1257 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1258 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1261 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1263 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1265 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1270 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1272 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1273 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1274 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1275 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1276 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1280 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1282 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1283 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1284 ret += curves_list_len;
1286 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1288 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1290 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1291 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1292 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1293 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1294 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1295 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1296 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1298 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1299 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1300 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1303 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1304 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1307 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1310 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1312 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1315 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1321 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1323 const unsigned char *salg;
1324 unsigned char *etmp;
1325 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1326 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1328 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1330 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1332 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1333 /* Fill in lengths */
1334 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1338 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1339 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1340 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1342 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1344 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1347 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1350 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1355 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1357 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1361 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1362 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1363 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1369 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1370 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1376 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1378 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1379 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1381 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1382 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1384 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1385 /* save position of id len */
1386 unsigned char *q = ret;
1387 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1388 /* skip over id len */
1390 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1396 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1398 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1399 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1400 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1402 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1406 * 1: peer may send requests
1407 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1409 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1410 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1412 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1415 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1416 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1418 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1419 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1421 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1423 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1428 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1429 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1431 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1432 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1433 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1434 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1435 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1437 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1438 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1441 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1443 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1446 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1449 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1456 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1457 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1458 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1460 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1461 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1466 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1467 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1468 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1471 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1472 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1474 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1475 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1478 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1480 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1481 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1487 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1489 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1496 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1499 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1503 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1504 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1507 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1508 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1509 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1510 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1512 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1513 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1514 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1515 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1516 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1517 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1522 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1524 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1527 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1532 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1535 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1538 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1546 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1547 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1550 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1551 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1552 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1555 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1558 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1560 const unsigned char *plist;
1563 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1567 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1569 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1571 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1573 if (plistlen > 255) {
1574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1578 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1579 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1580 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1581 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1586 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1589 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1591 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1592 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1594 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1598 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1599 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1601 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1604 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1605 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1606 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1608 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1610 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1613 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1616 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1621 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1622 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1625 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1627 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1630 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1633 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1641 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1642 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1643 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1644 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1645 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1646 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1647 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1648 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1649 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1650 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1652 if (limit - ret < 36)
1654 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1658 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1659 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1660 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1661 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1663 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1667 * 1: peer may send requests
1668 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1670 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1671 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1673 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1678 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1679 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1680 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1681 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1682 const unsigned char *npa;
1683 unsigned int npalen;
1686 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1688 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1689 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1690 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1692 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1694 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1696 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1700 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1702 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1703 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1705 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1706 * for other cases too.
1708 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1709 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1710 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1712 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1718 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1719 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1720 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1722 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1724 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1728 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1734 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1737 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1742 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1743 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1744 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1745 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1748 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1749 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1753 const unsigned char *selected;
1754 unsigned char selected_len;
1757 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1764 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1765 * length-prefixed strings.
1767 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1776 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1777 proto_len = data[i];
1783 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1789 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1790 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1791 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1792 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1793 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1794 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1795 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1796 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1799 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1800 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1805 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1809 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1811 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1812 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1813 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1818 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1819 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1820 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1821 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1823 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1824 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1826 unsigned short type, size;
1827 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1828 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1829 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1830 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1831 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1832 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1833 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1835 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1836 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1837 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1838 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1841 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1842 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1843 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1844 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1845 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1846 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1847 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1848 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1849 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1850 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1853 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1857 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1862 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1865 if (data + size > d + n)
1869 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1870 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1871 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1873 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1875 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1877 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1880 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1882 if (data + len != d + n)
1884 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1888 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1890 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1892 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1893 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1895 unsigned short type;
1896 unsigned short size;
1898 unsigned char *data = *p;
1899 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1901 s->servername_done = 0;
1902 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1903 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1904 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1907 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1908 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1909 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1911 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1912 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1913 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1916 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1917 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1918 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1919 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1921 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1922 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
1923 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1924 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1926 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1927 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1930 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1931 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1932 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1933 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1937 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1939 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1943 if (data > (d + n - len))
1946 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1950 if (data + size > (d + n))
1953 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
1955 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1956 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1957 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1958 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1960 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1961 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1964 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1966 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1967 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1968 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1969 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1970 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1971 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1972 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1973 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1974 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1975 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1976 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1977 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1978 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1979 * the value of the Host: field.
1980 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1981 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1982 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1984 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1988 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1989 unsigned char *sdata;
1994 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2000 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2006 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2011 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2014 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2015 switch (servname_type) {
2016 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2018 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2019 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2022 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2023 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2026 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2027 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2028 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2031 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2032 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2033 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2034 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2035 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2036 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2039 s->servername_done = 1;
2042 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2043 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2044 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2045 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2056 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2061 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2062 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2063 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2064 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2067 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2068 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2071 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2073 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2074 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2076 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2077 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2083 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2084 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2085 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2086 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2088 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2089 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2090 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2094 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2095 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2096 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2098 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2099 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2100 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2101 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2104 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2105 ecpointformatlist_length;
2106 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2107 ecpointformatlist_length);
2111 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
2112 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2113 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2114 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2115 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2116 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2118 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2119 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2120 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2121 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2123 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2124 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2125 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2126 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2127 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2131 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2132 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2135 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2136 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2137 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2138 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2141 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2142 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2143 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2144 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2148 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
2149 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2150 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2151 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2152 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2153 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2156 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2157 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2158 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2159 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2162 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2165 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2166 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2167 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2171 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2172 /* shouldn't really happen */
2173 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2176 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2177 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2178 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2180 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2181 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2182 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2183 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2188 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2189 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2190 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2191 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2193 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2196 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2198 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2199 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2204 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2205 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2208 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2209 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2212 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2215 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2219 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2221 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2222 const unsigned char *sdata;
2224 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2228 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2235 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2239 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2242 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2247 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2249 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2252 if (data != sdata) {
2253 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2254 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2257 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2258 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2259 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2260 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2261 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2264 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2265 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2266 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2271 /* Read in request_extensions */
2273 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2278 if (dsize != size) {
2279 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2284 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2285 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2286 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2289 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2290 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2291 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2292 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2298 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2301 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2303 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2304 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2306 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2307 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2309 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2310 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2311 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2314 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2319 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2320 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2321 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2322 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2324 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2327 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2328 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2329 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2330 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2331 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2332 * anything like that, but this might change).
2334 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2335 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2336 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2337 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2338 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2340 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2344 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2345 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2346 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2348 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2349 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2350 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2354 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2355 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2356 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2357 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2358 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2362 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2363 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2364 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2367 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2368 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2369 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2370 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2371 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2374 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2385 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2387 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2388 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2389 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2391 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2398 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2402 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2403 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2404 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2408 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2415 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2417 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2418 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2419 * fill the length of the block.
2421 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2423 unsigned int off = 0;
2436 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2437 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2439 unsigned short length;
2440 unsigned short type;
2441 unsigned short size;
2442 unsigned char *data = *p;
2443 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2444 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2446 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2447 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2449 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2451 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2452 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2453 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2455 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2456 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2457 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2460 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2461 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2464 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2468 if (data + length != d + n) {
2469 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2473 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2477 if (data + size > (d + n))
2480 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2481 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2483 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2484 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2486 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2487 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2488 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2489 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2490 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2493 tlsext_servername = 1;
2495 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2496 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2497 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2498 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2500 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2501 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2505 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2506 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2507 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2508 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2509 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2510 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2513 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2514 ecpointformatlist_length;
2515 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2516 ecpointformatlist_length);
2520 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2521 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2522 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2523 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2524 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2527 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2529 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2530 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2531 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2532 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2534 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2537 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2538 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2541 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2543 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2544 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) {
2545 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2548 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2551 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2552 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
2553 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2557 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2558 /* shouldn't really happen */
2559 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2561 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2562 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2563 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2565 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2566 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2569 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2570 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2575 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2577 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2580 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2581 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2584 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2585 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2587 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2588 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2589 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2590 unsigned char *selected;
2591 unsigned char selected_len;
2593 /* We must have requested it. */
2594 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2595 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2598 /* The data must be valid */
2599 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2600 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2604 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2606 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2607 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2608 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2611 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2612 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2613 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2616 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2617 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2618 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2622 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2625 /* We must have requested it. */
2626 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2627 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2631 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2635 * The extension data consists of:
2636 * uint16 list_length
2637 * uint8 proto_length;
2638 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2643 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2644 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2648 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2649 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2652 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2653 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2654 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2655 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2656 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2659 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2660 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2662 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2663 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2665 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2666 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2668 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2669 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2670 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2673 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2678 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2679 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2680 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2684 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2685 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2686 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2687 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2688 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2689 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2693 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2694 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2696 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2702 if (data != d + n) {
2703 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2707 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2708 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2709 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2710 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2711 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2712 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2716 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2727 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2728 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2729 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2730 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2731 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2732 * initial connect only.
2734 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2735 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2736 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2738 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2745 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2748 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2752 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2753 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2755 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2760 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2761 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2762 /* shouldn't really happen */
2763 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2766 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2767 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2768 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2770 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
2771 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2772 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2774 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2776 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2779 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len =
2780 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2785 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate
2786 * server opaque PRF input
2788 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
2789 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2796 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2801 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2803 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2804 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2806 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2808 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2809 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2812 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2813 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2817 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2819 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2820 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2821 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2822 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2824 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2826 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2828 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2831 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we
2832 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this
2833 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early().
2838 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
2839 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
2841 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2843 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2844 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2849 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2850 /* shouldn't really happen */
2851 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2853 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2855 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
2856 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2857 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
2858 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) {
2860 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF
2861 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input!
2864 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
2865 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2866 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
2868 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
2869 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
2870 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2872 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2873 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2874 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2877 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
2878 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2882 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2884 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we
2885 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the
2888 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2889 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2896 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2897 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2900 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2901 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2904 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2905 s->servername_done = 0;
2911 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2915 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2916 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2917 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2918 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2920 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2921 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2922 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2923 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2926 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2927 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2928 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2929 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2930 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2933 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2934 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2936 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2937 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2941 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2944 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2948 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2950 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2954 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2955 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2956 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2957 * influence which certificate is sent
2959 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2961 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2962 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2963 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2964 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2965 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2969 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2970 * et al can pick it up.
2972 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2973 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2975 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2976 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2977 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2979 /* status request response should be sent */
2980 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2981 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2982 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2984 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2986 /* something bad happened */
2987 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2988 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2989 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2993 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2997 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2998 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3001 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3002 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3010 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3012 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3013 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3015 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3017 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3018 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3019 * must contain uncompressed.
3021 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3022 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3023 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3024 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3025 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3026 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3027 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
3028 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3029 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3031 unsigned char *list;
3032 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3033 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3034 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3035 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3036 found_uncompressed = 1;
3040 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3042 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3046 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3047 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3049 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3051 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3052 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3053 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3054 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3056 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3058 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3060 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3061 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
3063 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on
3064 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a
3065 * value from the server too.
3068 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
3069 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3070 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3074 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to
3075 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size.
3077 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3078 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len !=
3079 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
3080 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3081 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3087 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
3090 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3091 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
3094 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
3097 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
3098 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3099 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3101 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3102 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3104 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3105 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3108 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3109 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3114 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3115 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3118 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3119 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3122 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3123 s->servername_done = 0;
3129 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
3133 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3135 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
3136 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3140 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3148 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3149 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3150 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3152 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3153 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3154 * extension, if any.
3155 * len: the length of the session ID.
3156 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3157 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3158 * point to the resulting session.
3160 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3161 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3162 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3165 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3166 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3167 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3168 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3169 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3170 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3171 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3174 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3175 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3176 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3177 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3178 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3179 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3181 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3182 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3184 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3185 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3189 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3192 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3195 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3197 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3201 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3202 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3208 /* Skip past cipher list */
3213 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3218 /* Now at start of extensions */
3219 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3222 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
3223 unsigned short type, size;
3226 if (p + size > limit)
3228 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3232 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3235 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3238 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3240 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3241 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3242 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3243 * calculate the master secret later.
3247 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3249 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3250 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3252 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3254 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3255 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3257 default: /* fatal error */
3267 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3269 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3270 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3271 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3272 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3273 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3274 * point to the resulting session.
3277 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3278 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3279 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3280 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3282 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3283 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3284 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3287 unsigned char *sdec;
3288 const unsigned char *p;
3289 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3290 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3293 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3294 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3297 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3298 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3299 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3300 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3301 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3302 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3311 /* Check key name matches */
3312 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3314 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3315 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3316 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3317 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3320 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3323 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3325 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3329 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3330 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3331 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3332 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3333 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3334 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3337 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3338 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3339 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3340 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3341 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3343 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3346 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3347 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3348 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3353 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3356 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3360 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3361 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3362 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3366 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3367 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3376 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3381 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3388 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3389 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3390 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3391 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3392 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3393 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3394 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3397 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3398 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3399 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3400 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3403 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3406 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3407 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3413 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3416 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3417 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3418 return table[i].nid;
3423 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3429 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3430 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3433 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3436 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3437 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3441 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3443 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3444 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3450 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3453 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3454 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3457 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3459 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3460 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3461 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3462 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3463 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3466 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3470 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info) / sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3472 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3475 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3477 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3478 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3480 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3481 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3483 return inf->mfunc();
3486 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3489 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3490 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3491 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3493 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3494 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3495 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3497 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3498 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3499 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3505 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3506 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3507 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3509 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3510 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3512 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3513 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3514 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3516 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3518 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3519 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3520 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3522 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3524 if (psignhash_nid) {
3525 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3526 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3528 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3532 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3533 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3535 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3536 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3537 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3539 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3540 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3542 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3543 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3547 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3548 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3552 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3554 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3555 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3556 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3558 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3559 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3560 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3562 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3563 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3564 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3565 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3566 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3567 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3571 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3572 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3573 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3577 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3578 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3579 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3586 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3588 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3590 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3593 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3594 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3596 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3598 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3599 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3600 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3601 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3604 return tmpout - out;
3607 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3608 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3609 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3610 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3612 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3613 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3614 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3615 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3616 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3618 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3619 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3622 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3623 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3624 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3626 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3636 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3637 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3639 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3640 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3642 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3644 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3645 if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3646 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3647 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3649 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3650 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3651 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3652 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3653 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3654 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3655 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3657 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3658 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3661 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3662 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3666 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3667 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3669 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3672 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3675 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3676 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3677 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3681 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3683 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3686 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3687 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3689 /* Should never happen */
3693 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3694 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3695 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3696 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3698 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3699 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3703 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3709 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3710 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3713 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3714 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3716 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3717 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3719 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3721 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3723 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3725 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3726 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3727 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3728 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3729 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3730 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3731 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3732 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3738 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3739 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3740 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3741 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3742 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3743 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3744 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3745 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3746 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3747 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3748 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3754 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3755 * the certificate for signing.
3757 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3759 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3760 * supported it stays as NULL.
3762 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3763 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3764 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3766 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3767 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3768 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3769 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3772 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3773 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3774 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3780 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3781 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3782 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3784 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3789 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3796 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3798 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3801 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3802 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3803 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3805 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3806 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3810 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3812 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3814 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3816 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3818 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3819 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3822 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3823 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3825 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3826 unsigned short hbtype;
3827 unsigned int payload;
3828 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3830 if (s->msg_callback)
3831 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3832 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3833 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3835 /* Read type and payload length first */
3836 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3837 return 0; /* silently discard */
3840 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3841 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3844 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3845 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3849 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3850 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3852 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3853 if (buffer == NULL) {
3854 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3859 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3860 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3862 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3864 /* Random padding */
3865 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3867 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3868 3 + payload + padding);
3870 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3871 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3872 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3873 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3875 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3879 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3883 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3884 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3888 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3890 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3897 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3899 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3901 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3902 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3904 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3905 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3906 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3907 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3911 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3912 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3917 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3918 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3919 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3924 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3925 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3927 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3930 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3931 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3932 * some random stuff.
3933 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3934 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3935 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3936 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3939 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3946 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3947 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3949 /* Sequence number */
3950 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3951 /* 16 random bytes */
3952 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3954 /* Random padding */
3955 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3957 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3959 if (s->msg_callback)
3960 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3961 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3962 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3964 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3973 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3977 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3980 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3982 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3985 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3988 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3990 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3992 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3994 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4002 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4003 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4004 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4005 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4006 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4007 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4011 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4012 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4013 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4014 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4017 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
4018 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4021 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4022 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4027 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
4028 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
4030 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4034 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4038 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4041 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
4044 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4049 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4050 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4052 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
4053 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4054 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4055 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4056 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4058 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4065 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4066 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4067 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4068 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4070 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4071 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4072 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4073 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4079 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4083 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4087 if (default_nid == -1)
4089 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4091 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4092 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4093 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4098 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4099 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4103 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4104 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
4105 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4112 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4113 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4114 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4115 * attempting to use them.
4118 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4120 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4121 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4122 /* Strict mode flags */
4123 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4124 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4125 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4127 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4132 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4133 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4135 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4136 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4138 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4141 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4143 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4145 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4147 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4148 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4151 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4152 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4153 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
4154 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
4155 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4156 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4163 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4166 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4167 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4168 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4170 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4177 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4178 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4179 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4180 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4181 else if (!check_flags)
4186 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4187 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4189 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4191 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4192 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4194 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4197 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4198 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4199 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4200 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4201 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4204 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4205 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4206 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4207 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4211 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4212 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4221 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4222 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4224 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4226 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4227 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4228 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4231 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4238 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4239 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4243 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4244 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4245 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4246 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4248 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4255 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4256 else if (check_flags)
4257 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4259 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4260 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4261 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4262 else if (!check_flags)
4265 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4266 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4267 else if (strict_mode) {
4268 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4269 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4270 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4271 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4273 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4280 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4281 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4285 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4288 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4291 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4296 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4297 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4298 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4299 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4300 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4304 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4308 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4310 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4311 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4313 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4314 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4315 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4319 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4322 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4324 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4326 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4327 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4329 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4330 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4331 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4333 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4334 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4335 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4336 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4337 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4342 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4345 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4347 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4348 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4352 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4353 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4354 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4355 else if (cpk->digest)
4356 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4358 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4361 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4365 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4366 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4368 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4369 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4376 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4377 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4379 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4380 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4381 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4382 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4383 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4384 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4387 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4388 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4390 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4396 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4398 int dh_secbits = 80;
4399 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4400 return DH_get_1024_160();
4401 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
4402 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4407 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4408 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4411 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4417 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4418 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4419 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4421 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4422 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4428 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4429 return DH_get_2048_224();
4430 return DH_get_1024_160();
4434 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4437 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4439 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4440 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4444 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4446 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4449 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4451 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4452 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4453 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4454 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4456 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4457 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4460 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4462 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4465 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4468 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4470 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4471 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4473 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4474 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4476 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4477 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4482 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4483 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4484 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4487 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4489 int rv, start_idx, i;
4491 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4496 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4500 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4501 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4502 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);