2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
251 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
253 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
254 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
255 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
258 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
260 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
261 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
262 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
263 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
264 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
265 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
266 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
267 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
268 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
269 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
270 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
271 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
272 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
273 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
274 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
275 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
276 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
277 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
278 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
279 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
280 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
281 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
282 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
283 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
284 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
287 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
289 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
290 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
293 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
295 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
296 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
297 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
299 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
302 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
304 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
307 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
309 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
311 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
313 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
315 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
317 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
319 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
321 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
323 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
325 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
327 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
329 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
331 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
333 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
335 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
337 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
339 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
341 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
343 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
345 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
347 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
349 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
351 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
353 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
355 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
361 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
364 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
365 const unsigned char **pcurves,
370 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
371 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
374 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
375 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
377 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
378 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
379 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
382 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
383 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
387 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
388 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
392 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
393 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
397 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
398 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
401 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
402 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
404 const unsigned char *curves;
406 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
407 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
409 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
412 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
415 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
420 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
422 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
425 else /* Should never happen */
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
429 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
431 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
437 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
438 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
442 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
444 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
445 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
447 /* Can't do anything on client side */
454 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
455 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
458 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
459 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
460 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
461 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
463 /* Should never happen */
466 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
469 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
471 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
476 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
478 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
479 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
481 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
485 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
486 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
497 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
498 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
500 unsigned char *clist, *p;
502 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
503 * while curve ids < 32
505 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
506 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
509 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
511 unsigned long idmask;
513 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
515 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
526 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
530 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
535 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
538 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
540 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
544 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
546 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
548 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
550 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
551 if (nid == NID_undef)
552 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
553 if (nid == NID_undef)
554 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
555 if (nid == NID_undef)
557 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
558 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
560 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
563 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
564 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
569 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
573 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
575 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
576 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
582 const EC_METHOD *meth;
585 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
586 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
587 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
590 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
593 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
597 /* Determine curve ID */
598 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
599 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
600 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
604 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
616 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
619 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
621 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
624 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
628 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
629 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
630 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
632 const unsigned char *p;
635 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
636 * is supported (see RFC4492).
638 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
640 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
641 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
642 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
652 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
653 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
655 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
656 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
658 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
663 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
670 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
673 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
675 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
677 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
678 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
682 *pformats = ecformats_default;
683 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
685 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
687 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
691 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
692 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
694 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
696 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
699 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
702 /* If not EC nothing to do */
703 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
708 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
712 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
713 * supported curves extension.
715 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
718 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
719 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
721 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
728 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
729 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
730 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
731 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
732 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
734 return 0; /* Should never happen */
735 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
736 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
738 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
742 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
743 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
745 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
750 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
751 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
753 unsigned char curve_id[2];
754 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
755 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
756 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
757 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
760 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
761 * no other curves permitted.
765 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
766 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
767 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
768 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
769 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
773 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
774 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
776 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
777 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
779 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
782 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
785 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
787 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
793 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
795 /* Need a shared curve */
796 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
802 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
807 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
809 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
813 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
817 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
821 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
822 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
825 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
826 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
828 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
831 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
832 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
834 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
837 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
838 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
840 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
843 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
844 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
845 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
846 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
848 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
849 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
850 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
851 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
854 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
855 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
858 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
861 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
865 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
866 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
867 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
870 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
872 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
875 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
877 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
878 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
879 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
881 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
882 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
885 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
886 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
890 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
891 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
893 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
894 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
896 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
898 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
899 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
903 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
905 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
907 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
910 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
913 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
914 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
916 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
917 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
919 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
920 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
921 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
922 /* Should never happen */
925 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
926 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
931 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
933 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
934 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
935 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
937 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
942 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
947 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
949 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
952 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
956 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
958 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
961 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
969 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
972 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
973 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
974 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
976 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
979 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
980 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
985 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
991 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
994 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
995 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
998 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
999 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1000 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1001 * session and not global settings.
1004 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1007 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1008 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1009 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1012 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1013 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1014 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1017 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1018 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1021 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1022 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1026 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1027 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1031 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1032 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1037 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1043 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1044 * signature algorithms.
1048 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1049 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1053 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1054 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1058 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1059 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1062 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1064 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1065 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1069 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1070 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1072 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1075 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1079 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1080 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1082 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1083 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1092 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1095 unsigned char *ret = p;
1096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1097 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1099 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1102 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1103 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1105 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1107 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1109 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1110 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1111 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1112 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1121 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1122 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1123 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1128 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1130 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1132 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1133 unsigned long size_str;
1136 /* check for enough space.
1137 4 for the servername type and entension length
1138 2 for servernamelist length
1139 1 for the hostname type
1140 2 for hostname length
1144 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1145 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1148 /* extension type and length */
1149 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1150 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1152 /* length of servername list */
1153 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1155 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1156 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1158 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1162 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1167 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1173 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1175 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1178 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1188 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1189 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1190 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1192 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1193 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 /* check for enough space.
1200 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1201 1 for the srp user identity
1202 + srp user identity length
1204 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1206 /* fill in the extension */
1207 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1208 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1209 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1210 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1218 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1220 const unsigned char *plist;
1223 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1225 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1226 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1234 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1235 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1236 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1239 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1240 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1241 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1243 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1244 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1245 if (plistlen > 65532)
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1252 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1254 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1255 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1256 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1257 * resolves this to two bytes.
1260 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1263 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1265 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1268 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1269 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1270 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1271 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1273 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1274 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1275 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1277 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1278 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1280 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1284 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1285 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1287 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1290 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1291 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1295 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1301 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1304 const unsigned char *salg;
1305 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1306 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1308 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1309 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1311 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1315 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1316 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1318 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1320 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1322 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1325 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1328 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1333 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1336 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1340 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1342 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1343 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1349 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1351 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1358 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1360 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1362 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1363 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1365 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1367 /* save position of id len */
1368 unsigned char *q = ret;
1369 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1370 /* skip over id len */
1372 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1378 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1382 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1383 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1386 * 1: peer may send requests
1387 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1389 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1390 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1392 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1396 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1398 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1399 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1400 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1402 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1407 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1411 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1413 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1418 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1426 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1427 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1428 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1429 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1430 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1431 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1433 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1434 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1436 if (limit < ret + 6)
1439 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1440 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1442 *(ret++) = list_len;
1443 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1446 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1453 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1456 unsigned char *ret = p;
1457 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1458 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1460 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1461 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1462 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1463 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1465 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1466 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1470 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1472 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1474 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1476 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1480 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1484 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1490 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1492 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1495 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1507 const unsigned char *plist;
1509 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1512 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1514 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1515 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1522 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1523 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1524 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1525 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1529 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1530 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1532 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1533 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1535 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1536 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1540 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1542 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1543 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1547 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1548 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1550 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1552 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1554 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1557 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1560 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1569 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1571 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1573 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1576 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1584 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1585 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1586 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1587 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1588 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1589 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1590 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1591 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1592 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1593 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1594 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1600 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1601 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1603 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1606 * 1: peer may send requests
1607 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1609 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1610 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1612 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1618 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1619 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1620 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1622 const unsigned char *npa;
1623 unsigned int npalen;
1626 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1627 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1629 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1630 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1632 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1634 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1639 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1641 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1643 size_t authz_length;
1644 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1645 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1646 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1647 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1648 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1650 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1652 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1653 * uint8_t authz_type
1655 * uint8_t data[length]
1657 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1658 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1660 unsigned short length;
1664 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1666 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1670 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1678 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1679 * 2 bytes for extension type
1680 * 2 bytes for extension length
1681 * 1 byte for the list length
1682 * n bytes for the list */
1683 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1685 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1686 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1688 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1689 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1693 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1695 unsigned short length;
1700 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1702 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1705 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1712 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1719 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1721 unsigned short type;
1722 unsigned short size;
1724 unsigned char *data = *p;
1725 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1728 s->servername_done = 0;
1729 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1731 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1734 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1735 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1736 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1738 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1739 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1741 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1742 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1744 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1745 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1747 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1748 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1750 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1751 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1753 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1754 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1757 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1761 if (data > (d+n-len))
1764 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1769 if (data+size > (d+n))
1772 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1774 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1775 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1776 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1777 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1779 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1780 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1781 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1782 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1783 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1784 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1785 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1786 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1787 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1788 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1789 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1790 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1791 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1792 the value of the Host: field.
1793 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1794 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1795 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1796 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1800 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1802 unsigned char *sdata;
1808 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1815 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1822 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1828 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1831 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1832 switch (servname_type)
1834 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1837 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1839 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1842 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1844 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1847 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1849 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1852 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1853 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1854 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1855 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1856 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1857 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1860 s->servername_done = 1;
1864 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1865 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1866 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1878 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1884 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1886 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1888 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1891 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1893 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1896 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1898 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1899 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1901 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1903 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1910 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1912 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1913 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1915 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1916 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1918 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1923 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1925 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1926 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1928 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1929 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1931 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1934 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1935 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1938 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1939 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1940 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1941 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1942 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1945 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
1947 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1948 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1949 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1951 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1952 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1954 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1959 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1961 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1964 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1965 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1967 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1970 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1971 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1974 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1975 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1976 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1977 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1978 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1981 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1982 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1983 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
1985 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1989 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1992 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1993 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1995 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1999 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2000 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2001 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2002 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2004 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2005 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2007 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2012 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2014 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2015 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2017 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2021 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2023 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2025 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2027 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2030 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2032 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2037 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2039 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2042 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2044 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2047 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2050 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2053 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2054 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2058 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
2059 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2064 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2068 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2070 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2072 const unsigned char *sdata;
2074 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2079 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2088 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2092 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2096 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2101 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2105 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2110 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2111 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2114 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2115 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2116 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2118 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2119 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2122 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2123 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2125 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2126 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2131 /* Read in request_extensions */
2134 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2141 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2147 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2149 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2150 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2153 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2154 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2156 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2157 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2159 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2164 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2168 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2171 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2175 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2176 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2178 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2179 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2180 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2182 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2188 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2189 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2191 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2194 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2195 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2196 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2197 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2198 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2199 * anything like that, but this might change).
2201 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2202 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2203 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2204 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2205 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2206 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2210 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2211 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2213 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2218 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2220 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2221 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2225 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2229 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2231 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2233 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2237 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2238 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2239 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2242 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2243 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2244 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2245 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2246 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2248 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2252 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2253 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2254 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2256 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2258 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2259 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2260 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2261 1 /* element size */,
2264 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2267 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2268 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2270 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2284 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2286 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2287 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2289 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2291 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2294 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2295 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2296 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2301 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2304 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2306 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2310 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2319 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2320 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2321 * the length of the block. */
2322 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2324 unsigned int off = 0;
2338 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2340 unsigned short length;
2341 unsigned short type;
2342 unsigned short size;
2343 unsigned char *data = *p;
2344 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2345 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2348 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2351 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2352 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2353 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2356 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2360 if (data+length != d+n)
2362 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2366 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2371 if (data+size > (d+n))
2374 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2375 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2376 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2378 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2380 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2382 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2385 tlsext_servername = 1;
2388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2389 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2391 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2392 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2394 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2396 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2399 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2400 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2401 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2403 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2406 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2407 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2409 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2410 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2411 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2412 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2413 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2416 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2418 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2420 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2421 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2423 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2426 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2429 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2432 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2434 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2435 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2437 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2441 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2444 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2445 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2447 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2451 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2452 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2453 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2454 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2456 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2458 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2460 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2465 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2467 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2468 * a status request message.
2470 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2472 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2475 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2476 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2479 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2480 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2482 unsigned char *selected;
2483 unsigned char selected_len;
2485 /* We must have requested it. */
2486 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2488 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2491 /* The data must be valid */
2492 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2494 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2497 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2499 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2502 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2503 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2505 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2508 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2509 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2510 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2513 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2515 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2517 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2520 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2524 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2525 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2527 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2528 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2529 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2531 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2536 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2538 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2543 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2545 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2546 * an authz hello extension if the client
2547 * didn't request a proof. */
2548 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2549 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2551 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2553 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2559 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2563 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2564 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2566 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2570 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2571 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2572 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2573 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2575 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2579 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2587 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2591 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2593 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2595 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2597 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2598 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2600 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2606 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2616 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2617 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2618 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2619 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2620 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2621 * absence on initial connect only.
2623 if (!renegotiate_seen
2624 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2625 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2627 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2629 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2637 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2640 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2644 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2646 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2651 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2653 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2654 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2656 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2657 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2659 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2660 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2665 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2669 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2670 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2677 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2682 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2684 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2685 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2688 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2689 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2691 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2692 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2696 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2697 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2698 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2699 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2701 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2703 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2704 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2705 * so this has to happen here in
2706 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2710 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2712 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2715 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2716 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2721 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2722 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2723 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2725 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2727 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2728 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2730 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2731 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2733 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2734 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2736 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2737 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2739 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2740 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2743 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2747 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2749 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2750 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2751 * abort the handshake.
2753 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2754 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2762 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2763 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2766 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2767 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2770 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2771 s->servername_done=0;
2777 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2779 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2782 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2783 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2784 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2785 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2787 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2790 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2791 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2792 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2793 if (certpkey == NULL)
2795 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2798 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2799 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2801 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2802 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2805 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2806 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2807 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2809 /* status request response should be sent */
2810 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2811 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2812 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2814 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2816 /* something bad happened */
2817 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2818 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2819 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2824 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2829 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2830 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2833 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2834 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2842 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2844 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2845 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2847 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2848 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2849 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2850 * it must contain uncompressed.
2852 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2853 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2854 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2855 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2856 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2858 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2860 unsigned char *list;
2861 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2862 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2863 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2865 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2867 found_uncompressed = 1;
2871 if (!found_uncompressed)
2873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2877 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2878 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2880 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2881 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2882 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2883 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2885 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2886 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2888 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2889 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2891 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2893 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2894 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2897 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2898 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2899 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2900 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2902 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2903 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2908 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2911 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2912 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2915 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2916 * there is no response.
2918 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2920 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2921 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2923 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2924 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2927 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2928 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2932 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2933 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2939 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2940 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2943 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2944 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2947 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2948 s->servername_done=0;
2954 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2957 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2959 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2961 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2965 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2973 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2974 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2975 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2977 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2978 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2979 * extension, if any.
2980 * len: the length of the session ID.
2981 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2982 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2983 * point to the resulting session.
2985 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2986 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2987 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2990 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2991 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2992 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2993 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2994 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2995 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2996 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2999 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3000 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3001 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3002 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3003 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3004 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3006 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3007 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3009 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3010 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3014 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3016 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3017 * to permit stateful resumption.
3019 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3021 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3025 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3033 /* Skip past cipher list */
3038 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3043 /* Now at start of extensions */
3044 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3047 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3049 unsigned short type, size;
3052 if (p + size > limit)
3054 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3059 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3060 * currently have one. */
3061 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3064 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3066 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3067 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3068 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3069 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3070 * calculate the master secret later. */
3073 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3076 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3077 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3079 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3081 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3082 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3084 default: /* fatal error */
3093 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3095 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3096 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3097 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3098 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3099 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3100 * point to the resulting session.
3103 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3104 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3105 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3106 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3108 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3109 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3110 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3113 unsigned char *sdec;
3114 const unsigned char *p;
3115 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3116 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3119 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3120 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3123 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3124 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3125 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3126 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3128 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3129 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3140 /* Check key name matches */
3141 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3143 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3144 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3145 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3146 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3148 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3149 * integrity checks on ticket.
3151 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3154 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3158 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3159 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3160 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3161 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3162 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3164 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3165 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3166 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3167 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3168 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3171 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3174 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3175 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3178 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3181 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3185 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3186 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3187 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3188 * as required by standard.
3191 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3192 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3200 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3205 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3213 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3214 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3215 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3216 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3217 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3218 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3219 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3222 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3223 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3224 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3225 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3228 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3231 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3233 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3239 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3242 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3244 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3245 return table[i].nid;
3250 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3255 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3256 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3259 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3262 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3263 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3267 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3269 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3270 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3273 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3278 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3286 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3290 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3291 return EVP_sha224();
3293 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3294 return EVP_sha256();
3296 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3297 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3298 return EVP_sha384();
3300 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3301 return EVP_sha512();
3309 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3314 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3315 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3318 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3319 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3322 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3323 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3329 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3330 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3331 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3333 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3334 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3336 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3338 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3339 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3341 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3343 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3345 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3346 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3348 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3352 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3353 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3354 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3356 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3359 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3360 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3361 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3362 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3364 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3365 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3366 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3368 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3369 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3371 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3373 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3375 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3380 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3381 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3382 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3384 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3395 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3396 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3398 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3399 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3401 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3403 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3404 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3405 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3407 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3408 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3410 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3412 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3413 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3416 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3417 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3421 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3422 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3428 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3429 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3431 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3434 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3437 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3438 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3439 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3444 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3446 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3452 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3453 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3454 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3456 /* Should never happen */
3460 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3461 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3463 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3464 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3466 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3468 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3469 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3471 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3472 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3474 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3476 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3478 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3481 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3482 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3483 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3484 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3485 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3487 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3488 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3494 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3495 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3497 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3498 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3500 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3501 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3502 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3503 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3505 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3506 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3511 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3512 * use the certificate for signing.
3514 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3516 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3517 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3520 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3521 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3523 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3524 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3526 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3527 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3531 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3532 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3539 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3540 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3541 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3543 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3549 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3556 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3558 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3561 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3562 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3563 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3565 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3566 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3570 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3572 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3574 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3576 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3578 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3579 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3585 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3587 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3588 unsigned short hbtype;
3589 unsigned int payload;
3590 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3592 /* Read type and payload length first */
3597 if (s->msg_callback)
3598 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3599 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3600 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3602 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3604 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3607 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3608 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3609 * payload, plus padding
3611 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3614 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3615 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3617 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3619 /* Random padding */
3620 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3622 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3624 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3625 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3626 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3627 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3629 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3634 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3638 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3639 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3640 * sequence number */
3643 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3646 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3654 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3656 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3658 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3659 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3661 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3662 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3663 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3665 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3669 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3670 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3676 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3677 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3683 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3684 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3686 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3688 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3689 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3690 * some random stuff.
3691 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3692 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3693 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3694 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3697 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3700 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3701 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3703 /* Sequence number */
3704 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3705 /* 16 random bytes */
3706 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3708 /* Random padding */
3709 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3711 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3714 if (s->msg_callback)
3715 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3716 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3717 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3719 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3728 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3733 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3736 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3738 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3741 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3742 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3744 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3746 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3748 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3756 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3757 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3758 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3759 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3760 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3761 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3764 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3765 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3766 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3767 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3770 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3772 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3773 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3776 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3777 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3781 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3782 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3783 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3787 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3791 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3794 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3796 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3801 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3802 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3804 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3806 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3807 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3808 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3809 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3811 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3819 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3820 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3821 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3822 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3826 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3827 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3828 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3829 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3835 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3839 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3843 if (default_nid == -1)
3845 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3847 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3848 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3849 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3853 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3854 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3858 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3859 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3861 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3867 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3868 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3869 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3870 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
3873 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3875 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3876 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3877 /* Strict mode flags */
3878 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3879 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3880 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3882 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3887 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3888 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3890 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3891 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3894 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3898 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3901 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3903 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3905 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3906 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3909 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3910 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3911 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3913 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3914 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3923 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3926 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3927 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3928 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3930 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3938 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3939 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3940 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
3943 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3949 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
3950 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
3953 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
3956 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3957 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3959 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3964 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3965 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3966 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3967 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3968 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3971 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3972 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3973 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3974 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3978 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3979 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3987 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
3988 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
3991 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
3994 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3995 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
3997 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4000 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4008 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4009 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4011 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4014 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4015 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4016 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4018 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4023 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4031 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4032 else if(check_flags)
4033 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4035 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4036 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4037 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4038 else if (!check_flags)
4041 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4042 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4043 else if (strict_mode)
4045 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4046 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4048 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4049 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4053 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4061 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4063 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4068 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4071 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4074 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4079 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4080 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4081 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4082 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4083 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4088 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4093 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4097 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4098 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4100 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4102 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4104 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4108 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4112 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4115 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4117 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4118 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4120 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4122 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4123 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4125 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4127 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4129 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4130 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4132 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4137 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4141 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4143 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4144 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4148 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4150 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4151 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4152 else if (cpk->digest)
4153 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4156 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4158 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4159 * if the chain is invalid.
4163 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4164 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4167 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4168 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4175 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4176 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4178 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4179 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4180 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4181 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4182 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4183 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4185 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4186 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4188 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);