1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
124 # include <openssl/ct.h>
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
133 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
136 tls1_setup_key_block,
137 tls1_generate_master_secret,
138 tls1_change_cipher_state,
139 tls1_final_finish_mac,
140 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
141 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 tls1_export_keying_material,
146 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
147 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
151 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
154 tls1_setup_key_block,
155 tls1_generate_master_secret,
156 tls1_change_cipher_state,
157 tls1_final_finish_mac,
158 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
159 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
160 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
162 tls1_export_keying_material,
163 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
164 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
165 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
169 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
172 tls1_setup_key_block,
173 tls1_generate_master_secret,
174 tls1_change_cipher_state,
175 tls1_final_finish_mac,
176 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
191 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
192 * http, the cache would over fill
194 return (60 * 60 * 2);
201 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
205 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
211 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
214 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
215 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
217 s->version = s->method->version;
220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
223 int nid; /* Curve NID */
224 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
225 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
228 /* Mask for curve type */
229 # define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x3
230 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
231 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
232 # define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x2
235 * Table of curve information.
236 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
237 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
239 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
240 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
241 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
242 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
243 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
244 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
245 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
246 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
247 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
248 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
249 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
250 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
251 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
252 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
253 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
254 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
255 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
256 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
257 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
258 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
259 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
260 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
261 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
262 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
263 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
264 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
265 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
266 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
267 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
269 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM},
272 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
273 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
274 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
275 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
278 /* The default curves */
279 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
280 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
281 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
282 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
283 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
286 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
287 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
288 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
289 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
290 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
291 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
292 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
293 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
296 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
297 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
299 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
300 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
301 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
302 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
303 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
304 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
305 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
306 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
307 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
308 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
309 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
310 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
311 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
312 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
313 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
314 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
315 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
316 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
317 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
318 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
319 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
320 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
324 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
325 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
326 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
329 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
331 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
332 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
334 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
337 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
340 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
341 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
348 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
350 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
351 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
352 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
353 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
354 * lists in the first place.
355 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
356 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
357 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
359 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
360 const unsigned char **pcurves,
363 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
365 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
366 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
368 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
369 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
370 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
371 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
372 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
375 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
376 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
380 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
381 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
385 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
386 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
389 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
390 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
394 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
395 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
396 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
400 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
405 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
406 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
408 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
411 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
413 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
414 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
415 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
418 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
421 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
422 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
424 const unsigned char *curves;
425 size_t num_curves, i;
426 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
427 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
429 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
431 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
434 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
435 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
437 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
438 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
440 } else /* Should never happen */
443 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
445 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
446 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
447 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
453 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
454 * if there is no match.
455 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
456 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
457 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
459 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
461 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
462 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
464 /* Can't do anything on client side */
468 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
470 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
471 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
473 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
474 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
475 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
476 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
477 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
478 /* Should never happen */
481 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
485 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
486 * but s->options is a long...
488 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
489 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
491 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
492 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
493 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
494 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
496 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
499 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
502 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
504 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
505 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
506 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
508 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
512 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
513 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
514 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
515 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
516 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
519 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
520 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
528 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
532 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
533 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
535 unsigned char *clist, *p;
538 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
541 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
542 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
545 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
546 unsigned long idmask;
548 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
550 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
559 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
563 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
567 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
570 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
572 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
578 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
580 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
582 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
584 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
585 if (nid == NID_undef)
586 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
587 if (nid == NID_undef)
588 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
589 if (nid == NID_undef)
591 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
592 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
594 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
598 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
599 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
604 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
608 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
611 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
612 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
619 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
620 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
623 /* Determine curve ID */
624 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
625 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
626 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
630 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
632 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
634 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
635 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
637 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
638 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
640 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
646 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
647 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
648 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
650 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
651 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
654 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
655 * supported (see RFC4492).
657 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
658 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
659 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
660 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
661 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
664 if (i == num_formats)
669 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
670 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
671 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
673 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
675 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
676 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
677 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
678 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
679 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
683 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
684 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
689 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
696 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
700 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
702 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
703 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
704 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
706 *pformats = ecformats_default;
707 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
709 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
711 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
716 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
717 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
719 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
721 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
724 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
727 /* If not EC nothing to do */
728 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
730 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
734 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
737 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
741 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
742 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
744 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
750 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
751 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
752 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
753 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
754 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
756 return 0; /* Should never happen */
757 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
758 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
760 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
762 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
763 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
764 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
766 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
772 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
774 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
776 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
778 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
779 * is compatible with the client extensions.
781 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
783 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
786 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
789 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
790 unsigned char curve_id[2];
791 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
792 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
793 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
794 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
795 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
799 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
800 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
804 /* Need a shared curve */
805 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
809 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
813 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
818 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
821 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
822 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
825 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
826 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
828 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
831 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
832 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
834 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
838 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
840 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
843 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
844 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
845 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
846 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
848 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
849 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
850 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
851 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
852 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
853 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
855 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
856 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
857 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
862 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
863 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
864 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
867 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
870 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
873 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
874 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
875 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
876 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
877 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
879 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
880 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
883 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
884 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
888 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
889 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
890 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
891 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
892 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
893 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
894 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
896 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
897 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
902 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
903 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
905 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
906 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
908 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
909 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
910 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
911 /* Should never happen */
914 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
915 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
916 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
920 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
921 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
922 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
923 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
925 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
929 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
930 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
933 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
934 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
936 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
939 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
940 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
942 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
948 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
952 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
953 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
954 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
955 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
958 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
959 if (i == sent_sigslen
960 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
961 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
965 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
967 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
970 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
971 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
972 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
978 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
980 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
985 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
986 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
987 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
989 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
992 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
994 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
996 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
997 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
998 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
999 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
1000 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1001 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1002 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1003 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1004 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1006 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1008 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1009 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1010 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1016 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1017 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1018 * @c: cipher to check
1019 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1021 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1023 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1025 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1026 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1028 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
1030 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1031 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1033 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1034 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1037 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1040 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1042 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1044 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1047 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
1048 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
1049 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
1059 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
1060 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
1061 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
1062 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
1063 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
1066 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) {
1067 PACKET extensions = *packet;
1068 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
1069 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
1072 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
1073 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
1076 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
1077 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1083 if (num_extensions <= 1)
1086 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
1087 if (extension_types == NULL) {
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1092 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
1093 extensions = *packet;
1094 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1096 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1097 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1098 /* This should not happen. */
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1104 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1108 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1109 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1110 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1111 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1116 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1120 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1121 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1124 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1125 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1127 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1129 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1131 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1132 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1134 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1135 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1137 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1138 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1139 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1140 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1151 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1153 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1154 if (s->renegotiate) {
1157 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1162 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1165 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1168 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1175 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1176 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1179 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1180 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1181 unsigned long size_str;
1185 * check for enough space.
1186 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1187 * 2 for servernamelist length
1188 * 1 for the hostname type
1189 * 2 for hostname length
1193 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1195 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1198 /* extension type and length */
1199 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1200 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1202 /* length of servername list */
1203 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1205 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1206 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1208 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1212 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1213 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1214 * Client Hello message */
1216 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1217 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1223 * check for enough space.
1224 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1225 * 1 for the srp user identity
1226 * + srp user identity length
1228 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1231 /* fill in the extension */
1232 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1233 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1234 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1235 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1243 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1246 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1247 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1249 unsigned char *etmp;
1251 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1253 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1255 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1257 if (num_formats > 255) {
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1262 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1263 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1264 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1265 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1266 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1270 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1272 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1273 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1276 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1278 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1280 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1285 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1287 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1288 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1289 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1290 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1291 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1295 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1297 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1298 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1299 ret += curves_list_len;
1301 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1303 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1305 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1306 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1307 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1308 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1309 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1310 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1311 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1313 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1314 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1315 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1318 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1319 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1322 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1325 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1327 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1330 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1336 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1338 const unsigned char *salg;
1339 unsigned char *etmp;
1340 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1341 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1343 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1345 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1347 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1348 /* Fill in lengths */
1349 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1354 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1356 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1360 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1361 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1362 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1368 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1369 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1375 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1377 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1378 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1380 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1381 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1383 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1384 /* save position of id len */
1385 unsigned char *q = ret;
1386 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1387 /* skip over id len */
1389 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1395 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1398 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1399 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1400 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1402 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1406 * 1: peer may send requests
1407 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1409 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1410 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1412 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1417 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1419 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1420 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1422 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1424 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1430 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1431 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1432 * (see longer comment below)
1434 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1435 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1437 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1438 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1439 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1440 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1441 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1442 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1445 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1448 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1449 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1454 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1457 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1460 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1467 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1468 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1469 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1471 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1472 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1476 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1477 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret);
1481 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1485 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1486 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1487 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1490 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1491 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1493 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1494 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1500 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1502 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1509 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1512 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1516 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1517 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1520 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1521 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1523 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1526 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1527 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1528 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1529 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1534 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1536 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1539 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1544 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1547 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1550 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1558 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1559 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1562 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1563 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1564 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1567 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1572 const unsigned char *plist;
1575 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1579 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1581 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1583 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1585 if (plistlen > 255) {
1586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1590 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1591 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1592 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1593 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1598 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1601 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1603 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1604 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1606 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1610 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1611 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1613 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1618 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1621 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1622 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1626 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1629 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1632 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1640 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1641 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1642 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1643 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1644 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1645 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1646 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1647 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1648 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1649 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1651 if (limit - ret < 36)
1653 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1658 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1659 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1660 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1662 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1666 * 1: peer may send requests
1667 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1669 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1670 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1672 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1678 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1679 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1680 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1681 const unsigned char *npa;
1682 unsigned int npalen;
1685 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1687 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1688 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1689 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1691 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1693 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1695 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1699 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1701 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1702 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1704 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1705 * for other cases too.
1707 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1708 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1709 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1710 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1711 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1713 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1718 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1719 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1723 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1724 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1725 unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1727 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1729 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1733 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1739 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1742 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1747 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1748 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1749 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1750 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1752 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1754 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1756 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1758 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1759 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1763 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1765 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1766 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1767 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1770 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1772 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1773 &s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1774 &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1775 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1783 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1784 * ret: a pointer to the TLSEXT return value: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_*
1785 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1786 * returns 1 on success, 0
1788 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al)
1790 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1791 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1793 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1794 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1795 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1796 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1797 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1799 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1800 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1801 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1802 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1803 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1804 *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1807 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1809 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1810 *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1820 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1821 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1822 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1827 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1828 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1829 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1830 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1832 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1838 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1839 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1840 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1841 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1842 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1843 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1844 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1846 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1847 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1848 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1849 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1850 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1851 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1852 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1853 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1854 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1855 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1856 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1857 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1858 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1861 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1862 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1866 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1867 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1868 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1872 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1875 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1876 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1878 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1881 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1884 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1885 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1887 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1888 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1891 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1892 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1894 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1897 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1900 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1901 s->servername_done = 0;
1902 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1904 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1907 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1908 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1910 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1911 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1915 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1916 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1917 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1919 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1920 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1921 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1922 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1923 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1927 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1928 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1931 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1933 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1936 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1939 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1943 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1944 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1947 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1949 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1952 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1953 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1954 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1955 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1957 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1958 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1960 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1961 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1964 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1966 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1967 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1968 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1969 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1970 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1971 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1972 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1973 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1974 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1975 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1976 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1977 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1978 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1979 * the value of the Host: field.
1980 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1981 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1982 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1984 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1988 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1989 unsigned int servname_type;
1990 PACKET sni, hostname;
1992 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1993 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1994 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1999 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
2000 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
2001 * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
2003 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
2004 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
2005 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
2007 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
2008 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
2010 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
2011 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
2012 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2017 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2018 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2022 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2023 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2027 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2028 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2032 s->servername_done = 1;
2035 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2036 * fall back to a full handshake.
2038 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2039 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2040 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2044 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2047 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
2050 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2054 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2055 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2057 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2058 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2064 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2065 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2066 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
2068 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension,
2069 &ec_point_format_list)
2070 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2075 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2076 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2077 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2078 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2082 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2083 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
2085 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
2086 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension,
2087 &elliptic_curve_list)
2088 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
2089 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
2094 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
2095 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2096 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2097 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2102 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2103 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2104 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2105 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
2106 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
2107 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2108 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2111 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2112 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2114 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
2115 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2116 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2121 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2122 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2126 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2127 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2129 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2130 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2134 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2135 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2136 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &responder_id_list))
2139 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2141 PACKET responder_id;
2142 const unsigned char *id_data;
2144 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2146 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2150 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL
2151 && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2152 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) {
2153 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2157 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2158 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2159 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2163 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2164 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2168 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2169 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2170 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2175 /* Read in request_extensions */
2176 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2179 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2180 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2181 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2182 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2183 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2184 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2185 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2186 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2187 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2192 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2195 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2199 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2200 unsigned int hbtype;
2202 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2203 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2204 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2208 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2209 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2211 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2212 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2213 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2216 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2222 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2223 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2224 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2226 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2229 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2230 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2231 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2232 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2233 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2234 * anything like that, but this might change).
2236 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2237 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2238 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2239 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2240 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2242 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2246 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2247 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2248 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2251 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2252 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2256 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2258 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2259 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2260 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2264 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2265 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2266 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2269 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2270 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2274 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2275 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2276 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2277 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2278 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2281 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2282 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2287 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2288 /* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. */
2289 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2295 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2297 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2298 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2299 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2301 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2306 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2307 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2308 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2309 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2314 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2317 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2318 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2319 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2322 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2331 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2332 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2333 * fill the length of the block.
2335 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2339 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2340 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
2341 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
2349 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2351 unsigned int length, type, size;
2352 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2353 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2355 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2356 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2358 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2360 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2361 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2363 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2364 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2367 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2368 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2371 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2373 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2376 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2377 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2381 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2382 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2386 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2387 const unsigned char *data;
2390 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2391 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2394 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2395 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2397 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2398 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2400 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2401 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2402 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2403 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2404 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2407 tlsext_servername = 1;
2409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2410 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2411 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2412 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2413 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2414 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2418 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2419 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2420 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2421 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2422 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2425 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2426 ecpointformatlist_length;
2427 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2428 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2429 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2430 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2436 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2438 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2439 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2440 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2441 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2443 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2446 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2447 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2450 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2452 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2454 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2457 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2458 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2461 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2462 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2466 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2467 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2468 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2470 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2471 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2472 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2473 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2474 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2475 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2477 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2479 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2480 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2481 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2484 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2489 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2490 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2491 unsigned char *selected;
2492 unsigned char selected_len;
2493 /* We must have requested it. */
2494 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2495 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2498 /* The data must be valid */
2499 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2500 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2504 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2506 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2507 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2508 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2511 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2512 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2513 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2516 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2517 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2518 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2522 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2524 /* We must have requested it. */
2525 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2526 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2530 * The extension data consists of:
2531 * uint16 list_length
2532 * uint8 proto_length;
2533 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2535 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2536 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2537 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2538 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2539 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2542 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2543 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2544 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2545 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2548 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2549 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2552 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2555 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2556 unsigned int hbtype;
2557 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2558 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2562 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2563 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2565 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2566 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2567 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2570 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2576 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2577 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2581 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2582 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2583 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2584 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2585 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2586 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2589 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2590 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2592 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2595 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2596 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2598 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2602 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2603 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2607 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2608 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2609 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2610 s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2611 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2612 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2616 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2625 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2626 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2627 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2628 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2629 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2630 * initial connect only.
2632 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2633 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2634 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2636 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2642 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2645 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2646 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2647 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2656 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2658 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2662 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2667 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2669 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2670 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2674 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2675 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2678 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2679 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2683 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2685 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2686 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2687 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2688 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2690 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2692 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2695 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2696 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2699 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2700 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2703 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2704 s->servername_done = 0;
2709 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2710 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2712 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2714 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2717 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2718 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2720 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2721 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2724 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2726 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2727 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2728 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2729 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2733 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2737 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2738 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2739 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2740 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2741 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2742 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2743 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2744 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2747 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2748 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2749 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2751 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2754 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2755 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2757 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2758 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2762 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2766 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2770 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2772 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2773 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2776 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2777 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2778 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2779 * influence which certificate is sent
2781 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2783 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2784 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2785 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2786 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2787 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2791 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2792 * et al can pick it up.
2794 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2795 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2797 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2798 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2799 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2801 /* status request response should be sent */
2802 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2803 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2804 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2806 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2808 /* something bad happened */
2809 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2810 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2811 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2815 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2817 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, &ret, &al)) {
2823 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2824 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2827 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2828 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2836 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2838 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2839 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2843 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2844 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2845 * must contain uncompressed.
2847 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2848 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2849 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2850 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2851 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2852 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2853 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2854 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2856 unsigned char *list;
2857 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2858 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2859 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2860 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2861 found_uncompressed = 1;
2865 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2867 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2871 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2872 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2874 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2876 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2877 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2878 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2879 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2881 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2883 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2886 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2887 * that we don't receive a status message
2889 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2890 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2891 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2894 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2895 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2898 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2899 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2902 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2903 s->servername_done = 0;
2909 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2912 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2914 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2915 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2919 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2927 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2928 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2929 * need to be handled at the same time.
2931 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2934 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2935 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2936 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2937 * point to the resulting session.
2939 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2940 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2941 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2944 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2945 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2946 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2947 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2948 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2949 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2950 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2953 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2954 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2955 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2956 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2957 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2958 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2960 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2963 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2964 const PACKET *session_id,
2968 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2971 int have_ticket = 0;
2972 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2975 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2976 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2979 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2982 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2985 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2989 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2990 unsigned int type, size;
2992 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2993 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2994 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2998 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
3002 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
3004 const unsigned char *etick;
3006 /* Duplicate extension */
3007 if (have_ticket != 0) {
3015 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3018 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3022 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3024 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3025 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3026 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3027 * calculate the master secret later.
3032 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
3033 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3037 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
3038 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
3040 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3041 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3044 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3047 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3048 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3051 default: /* fatal error */
3057 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
3058 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3059 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3065 if (have_ticket == 0)
3072 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3074 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3075 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3076 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3077 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3078 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3079 * point to the resulting session.
3082 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3083 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3084 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3085 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3086 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3088 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3089 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3090 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3093 unsigned char *sdec;
3094 const unsigned char *p;
3095 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
3096 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3097 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3098 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3099 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3100 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3103 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3104 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3107 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3112 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3113 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3114 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3125 /* Check key name matches */
3126 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) {
3130 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3131 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3132 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3133 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3139 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3142 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3147 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3148 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3149 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3152 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3153 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3154 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3157 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3158 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3159 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3160 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3161 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3163 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3164 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3167 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3168 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3173 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3177 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3181 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3182 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3183 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3187 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3188 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3197 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3201 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3202 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3206 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3213 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3214 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3215 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3216 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3217 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3218 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3219 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3220 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3221 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3222 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3225 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3226 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3227 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3228 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3229 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3230 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3231 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3234 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3237 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3238 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3244 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3247 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3248 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3249 return table[i].nid;
3254 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3260 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3263 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3266 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3267 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3271 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3273 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3280 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3283 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3284 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3285 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3286 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3287 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3288 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3289 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3290 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3291 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3292 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3295 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3301 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3303 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3304 return tls12_md_info + i;
3310 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3312 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3313 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3315 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3318 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3321 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3325 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3326 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3329 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3330 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3332 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3333 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3334 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3336 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3337 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3338 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3340 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3341 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3343 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3344 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3350 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3351 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3352 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3354 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3355 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3357 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3358 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3360 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3362 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3363 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3365 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3367 if (psignhash_nid) {
3368 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3369 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3371 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3375 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3376 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3378 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3379 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3380 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3382 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3383 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3385 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3386 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3390 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3391 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3395 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3397 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3398 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3399 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3401 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3402 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3403 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3405 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3406 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3407 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3409 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3410 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3415 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3416 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3421 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3422 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3429 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3431 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3433 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3436 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3437 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3439 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3441 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3442 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3443 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3444 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3447 return tmpout - out;
3450 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3451 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3452 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3453 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3455 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3456 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3457 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3458 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3459 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3461 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3462 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3465 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3466 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3467 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3469 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3479 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3480 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3482 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3483 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3485 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3487 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3489 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3490 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3491 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3492 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3493 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3494 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3495 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3496 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3497 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3498 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3500 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3501 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3504 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3505 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3509 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3510 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3512 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3514 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3517 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3521 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3522 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3526 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3528 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3531 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3532 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3534 /* Should never happen */
3538 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3539 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3540 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3542 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3543 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3547 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3552 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3553 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3555 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3556 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3559 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3560 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3561 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3562 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3563 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3565 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3566 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3567 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3568 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3574 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3575 * the certificate for signing.
3577 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3579 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3580 * supported it stays as NULL.
3582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3583 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3584 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3587 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3588 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3589 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3593 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3594 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3596 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3597 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3598 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3599 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3600 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3601 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3602 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3608 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3609 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3610 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3612 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3617 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3624 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3626 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3629 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3630 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3631 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3633 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3634 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3638 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3640 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3642 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3644 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3646 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3647 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3650 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3654 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3657 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3659 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3660 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3661 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3662 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3663 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3664 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3666 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3667 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3668 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3672 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3674 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3677 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3680 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3682 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3684 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3686 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3694 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3695 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3697 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3700 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3701 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3704 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3705 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3710 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3711 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3713 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3717 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3721 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3724 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3727 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3732 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3733 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3735 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3736 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3737 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3739 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3746 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3747 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3748 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3750 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3751 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3752 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3758 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3762 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3766 if (default_nid == -1)
3768 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3770 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3771 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3772 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3777 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3778 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3782 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3783 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3784 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3791 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3792 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3793 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3794 * attempting to use them.
3797 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3799 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3800 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3801 /* Strict mode flags */
3802 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3803 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3804 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3806 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3811 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3812 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3815 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3816 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3818 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3821 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3823 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3824 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3826 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3828 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3829 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3835 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3838 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3840 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3841 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3843 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3850 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3851 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3852 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3853 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3854 else if (!check_flags)
3859 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3860 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3862 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3864 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3865 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3867 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3870 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3871 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3872 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3873 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3876 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3877 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3878 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3882 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3883 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3886 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3887 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3888 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3891 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3892 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3893 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3896 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3897 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3898 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3907 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3908 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3910 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3912 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3913 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3914 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3917 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3924 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3925 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3929 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3930 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3931 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3932 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3934 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3941 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3942 else if (check_flags)
3943 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3945 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3946 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3947 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3948 else if (!check_flags)
3951 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3952 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3953 else if (strict_mode) {
3954 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3955 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3956 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3957 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3959 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3966 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3967 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3969 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3971 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3974 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3977 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3981 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3985 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3987 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3988 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3990 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3991 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3992 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3996 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3999 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4001 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4003 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4004 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4006 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4007 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4008 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4010 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4011 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4012 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4013 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4014 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4019 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4022 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4024 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4025 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4029 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4030 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4031 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4032 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4033 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4035 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4038 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4042 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4045 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4046 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4053 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4054 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4056 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4057 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4058 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4059 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4060 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4061 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4062 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4065 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4066 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4068 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4072 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4073 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4075 int dh_secbits = 80;
4076 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4077 return DH_get_1024_160();
4078 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4079 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4084 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4085 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4088 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4094 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4095 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4096 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4098 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4099 if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) {
4105 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4106 return DH_get_2048_224();
4107 return DH_get_1024_160();
4111 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4114 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4117 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4118 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4119 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4120 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4122 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4125 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4127 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4130 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4132 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4133 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4134 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4135 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4137 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4138 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4140 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4141 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4144 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4146 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4149 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4152 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4154 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4155 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4157 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4158 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4160 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4161 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4166 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4167 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4168 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4171 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4173 int rv, start_idx, i;
4175 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4180 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4184 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4185 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4186 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);