2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
145 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
159 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173 s->version = s->method->version;
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
178 static int nid_list[] =
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
208 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
215 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
246 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
247 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
250 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
252 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
253 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
254 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
256 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
259 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
261 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
264 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
266 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
268 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
270 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
272 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
274 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
276 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
278 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
280 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
286 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
288 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
290 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
292 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
294 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
296 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
298 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
300 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
302 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
306 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
308 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
310 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
312 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
318 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
321 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
322 const unsigned char **pcurves,
327 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
328 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
331 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
332 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
334 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
335 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
336 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
339 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
340 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
344 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
345 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
349 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
350 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
354 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
355 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
358 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
359 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
361 const unsigned char *curves;
363 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
364 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
366 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
369 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
372 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
374 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
377 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
379 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
382 else /* Should never happen */
385 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
386 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
388 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
394 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
395 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
399 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
401 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
402 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
404 /* Can't do anything on client side */
411 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
412 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
415 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
416 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
418 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
419 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
420 /* Should never happen */
423 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
426 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
433 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
435 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
436 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
438 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
442 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
443 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
454 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
455 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
457 unsigned char *clist, *p;
459 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
460 * while curve ids < 32
462 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
463 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
466 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
468 unsigned long idmask;
470 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
472 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
483 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
487 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
492 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
495 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
497 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
501 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
503 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
505 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
507 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
508 if (nid == NID_undef)
509 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
510 if (nid == NID_undef)
511 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
512 if (nid == NID_undef)
514 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
515 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
517 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
520 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
521 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
526 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
528 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
530 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
531 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
537 const EC_METHOD *meth;
540 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
541 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
542 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
545 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
548 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
552 /* Determine curve ID */
553 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
554 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
555 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
559 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
571 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
574 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
576 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
579 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
583 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
584 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
585 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
587 const unsigned char *p;
590 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
591 * is supported (see RFC4492).
593 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
595 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
596 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
597 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
607 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
608 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
610 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
611 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
613 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
618 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
625 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
628 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
630 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
632 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
633 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
637 *pformats = ecformats_default;
638 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
640 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
642 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
646 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
647 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
649 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
651 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
654 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
657 /* If not EC nothing to do */
658 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
663 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
667 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
668 * supported curves extension.
670 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
673 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
674 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
676 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
683 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
684 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
685 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
686 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
687 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
689 return 0; /* Should never happen */
690 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
691 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
693 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
697 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
698 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
700 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
705 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
706 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
708 unsigned char curve_id[2];
709 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
710 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
711 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
712 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
715 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
716 * no other curves permitted.
720 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
721 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
722 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
723 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
724 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
728 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
729 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
731 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
732 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
734 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
737 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
740 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
742 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
748 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
750 /* Need a shared curve */
751 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
757 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
762 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
764 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
768 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
772 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
776 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
777 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
780 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
781 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
783 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
786 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
787 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
789 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
792 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
793 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
795 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
798 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
799 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
800 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
801 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
803 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
805 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
806 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
809 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
810 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
812 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
813 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
816 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
820 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
821 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
822 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
825 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
827 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
830 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
832 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
833 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
834 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
836 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
837 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
840 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
841 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
845 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
846 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
848 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
849 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
851 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
853 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
854 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
858 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
860 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
862 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
865 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
868 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
869 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
871 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
872 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
874 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
875 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
876 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
877 /* Should never happen */
880 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
881 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
886 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
888 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
889 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
890 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
892 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
894 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
897 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
902 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
904 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
906 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
907 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
911 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
913 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
916 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
924 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
927 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
928 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
929 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
931 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
934 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
935 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
940 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
946 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
949 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
950 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
953 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
954 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
955 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
956 * session and not global settings.
959 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
962 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
963 size_t i, sigalgslen;
964 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
967 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
968 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
969 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
972 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
973 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
976 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
977 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
982 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
987 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
992 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
998 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
999 * signature algorithms.
1003 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1004 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1008 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1009 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1013 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1014 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1017 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1019 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1020 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1023 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1024 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1025 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1027 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1028 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1030 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1034 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1035 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1037 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1038 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1047 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1050 unsigned char *ret = p;
1051 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1052 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1054 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1057 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1058 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1060 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1062 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1064 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1065 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1066 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1067 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1076 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1077 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1078 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1083 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1085 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1087 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1088 unsigned long size_str;
1091 /* check for enough space.
1092 4 for the servername type and entension length
1093 2 for servernamelist length
1094 1 for the hostname type
1095 2 for hostname length
1099 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1100 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1103 /* extension type and length */
1104 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1105 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1107 /* length of servername list */
1108 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1110 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1111 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1113 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1117 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1122 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1128 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1130 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1133 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1143 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1144 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1145 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1147 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1148 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 /* check for enough space.
1155 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1156 1 for the srp user identity
1157 + srp user identity length
1159 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1161 /* fill in the extension */
1162 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1163 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1164 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1165 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1173 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1175 const unsigned char *plist;
1178 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1180 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1181 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1188 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1189 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1190 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1191 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1194 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1195 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1196 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1198 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1199 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1200 if (plistlen > 65532)
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1206 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1207 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1209 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1210 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1211 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1212 * resolves this to two bytes.
1215 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1218 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1220 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1223 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1224 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1225 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1226 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1228 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1229 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1230 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1232 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1233 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1235 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1239 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1240 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1242 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1245 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1246 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1250 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1256 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1259 const unsigned char *salg;
1260 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1261 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1263 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1264 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1266 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1270 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1271 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1272 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1274 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1276 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1278 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1281 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1284 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1289 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1290 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1293 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1297 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1299 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1300 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1306 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1308 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1315 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1316 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1317 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1319 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1320 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1322 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1324 /* save position of id len */
1325 unsigned char *q = ret;
1326 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1327 /* skip over id len */
1329 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1335 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1339 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1343 * 1: peer may send requests
1344 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1346 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1347 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1349 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1353 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1355 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1356 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1357 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1364 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1368 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1370 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1372 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1375 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1383 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1384 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1385 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1386 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1387 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1388 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1390 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1391 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1393 if (limit < ret + 6)
1396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1397 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1399 *(ret++) = list_len;
1400 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1403 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1404 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1407 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1409 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1411 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1412 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1414 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1415 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1416 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1420 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1424 return NULL; /* error */
1425 if (cb_retval == -1)
1426 continue; /* skip this extension */
1428 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1430 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1432 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1437 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1444 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1447 unsigned char *ret = p;
1448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1449 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1451 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1452 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1453 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1454 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1456 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1457 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1461 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1463 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1465 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1467 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1471 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1475 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1481 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1483 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1486 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1496 if (using_ecc && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1498 const unsigned char *plist;
1500 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1503 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1505 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1506 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1513 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1514 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1515 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1516 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1520 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1521 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1523 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1524 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1526 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1527 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1531 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1533 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1534 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1538 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1539 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1540 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1542 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1544 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1546 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1549 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1552 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1561 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1563 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1565 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1568 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1576 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1577 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1578 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1579 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1580 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1581 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1582 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1583 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1584 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1585 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1586 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1592 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1593 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1595 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1598 * 1: peer may send requests
1599 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1601 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1602 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1604 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1610 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1611 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1612 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1614 const unsigned char *npa;
1615 unsigned int npalen;
1618 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1619 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1621 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1622 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1624 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1626 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1631 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1633 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1635 size_t authz_length;
1636 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1637 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1638 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1639 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1640 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1642 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1644 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1645 * uint8_t authz_type
1647 * uint8_t data[length]
1649 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1650 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1652 unsigned short length;
1656 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1658 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1662 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1670 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1671 * 2 bytes for extension type
1672 * 2 bytes for extension length
1673 * 1 byte for the list length
1674 * n bytes for the list */
1675 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1677 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1678 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1680 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1681 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1685 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1687 unsigned short length;
1692 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1694 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1697 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1704 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1705 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1709 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1712 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1714 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1716 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1717 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1719 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1720 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1723 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1726 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1730 return NULL; /* error */
1731 if (cb_retval == -1)
1732 break; /* skip this extension */
1733 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1735 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1737 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1745 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1752 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1754 unsigned short type;
1755 unsigned short size;
1757 unsigned char *data = *p;
1758 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1761 s->servername_done = 0;
1762 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1764 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1768 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1769 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1771 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1772 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1774 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1775 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1777 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1778 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1780 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1781 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1783 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1784 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1786 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1787 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1790 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1794 if (data > (d+n-len))
1797 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1802 if (data+size > (d+n))
1805 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1807 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1808 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1809 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1810 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1812 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1813 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1814 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1815 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1816 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1817 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1818 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1819 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1820 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1821 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1822 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1823 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1824 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1825 the value of the Host: field.
1826 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1827 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1828 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1829 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1833 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1835 unsigned char *sdata;
1841 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1848 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1855 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1861 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1864 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1865 switch (servname_type)
1867 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1870 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1872 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1875 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1877 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1880 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1882 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1885 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1886 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1887 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1888 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1889 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1890 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1893 s->servername_done = 1;
1897 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1898 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1899 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1911 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1917 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1919 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1921 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1924 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1926 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1929 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1931 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1932 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1934 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1936 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1943 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1944 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1946 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1947 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1949 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1950 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1952 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1957 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1959 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1960 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1962 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1963 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1965 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1968 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1969 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1972 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1973 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1974 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1975 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1976 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1979 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1980 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1982 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1983 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1984 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1986 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1987 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1989 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1994 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1996 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1999 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2000 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2002 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2005 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2006 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2009 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2010 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2011 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2012 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2013 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2016 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2017 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2018 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2019 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2021 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2025 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2028 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2029 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2031 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2035 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2036 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2037 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2038 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2040 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2041 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2043 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2048 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2050 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2051 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2053 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2057 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2059 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2061 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2063 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2066 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2068 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2073 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2075 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2078 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2080 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2083 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2086 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2089 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2090 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2094 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2095 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2100 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2104 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2106 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2108 const unsigned char *sdata;
2110 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2115 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2124 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2128 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2132 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2137 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2141 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2146 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2147 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2150 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2151 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2152 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2154 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2155 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2158 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2159 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2161 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2162 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2167 /* Read in request_extensions */
2170 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2177 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2183 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2185 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2186 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2189 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2190 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2192 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2193 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2195 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2200 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2204 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2207 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2211 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2212 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2214 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2215 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2216 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2218 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2224 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2225 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2227 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2230 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2231 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2232 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2233 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2234 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2235 * anything like that, but this might change).
2237 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2238 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2239 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2240 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2241 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2242 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2246 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2247 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2249 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2254 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2256 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2257 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2261 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2265 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2267 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2269 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2273 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2274 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2275 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2278 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2279 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2280 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2281 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2282 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2284 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2288 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2289 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2290 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2292 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2294 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2295 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2296 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2297 1 /* element size */,
2300 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2303 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2304 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2306 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2313 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2314 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2315 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2316 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2317 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2319 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2321 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2323 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2325 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2326 if (type == record->ext_type)
2330 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2331 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2333 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2335 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2340 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2341 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2344 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2345 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2346 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2347 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2348 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2349 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2351 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2352 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2355 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2356 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2368 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2370 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2371 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2373 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2375 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2378 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2379 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2380 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2385 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2388 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2390 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2394 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2403 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2404 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2405 * the length of the block. */
2406 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2408 unsigned int off = 0;
2422 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2424 unsigned short length;
2425 unsigned short type;
2426 unsigned short size;
2427 unsigned char *data = *p;
2428 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2429 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2432 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2436 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2437 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2440 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2444 if (data+length != d+n)
2446 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2450 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2455 if (data+size > (d+n))
2458 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2459 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2460 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2462 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2464 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2466 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2469 tlsext_servername = 1;
2472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2473 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2474 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2476 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2477 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2479 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2481 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2484 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2485 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2486 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2488 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2491 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2492 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2494 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2495 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2496 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2497 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2498 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2501 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2503 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2505 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2506 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2508 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2511 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2514 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2517 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2519 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2520 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2521 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2523 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2527 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2530 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2531 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2533 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2537 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2538 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2539 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2540 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2542 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2544 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2546 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2551 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2552 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2554 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2555 * a status request message.
2557 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2559 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2562 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2563 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2566 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2567 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2569 unsigned char *selected;
2570 unsigned char selected_len;
2572 /* We must have requested it. */
2573 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2575 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2578 /* The data must be valid */
2579 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2581 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2584 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2586 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2589 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2590 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2592 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2595 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2596 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2597 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2600 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2602 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2604 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2607 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2611 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2612 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2614 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2615 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2616 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2618 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2623 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2625 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2630 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2632 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2633 * an authz hello extension if the client
2634 * didn't request a proof. */
2635 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2636 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2638 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2640 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2646 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2650 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2651 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2653 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2657 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2658 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2659 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2660 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2662 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2666 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2669 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2670 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2672 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2675 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2677 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2679 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2680 if (record->ext_type == type)
2682 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2694 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2698 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2700 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2702 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2704 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2705 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2707 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2713 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2723 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2724 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2725 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2726 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2727 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2728 * absence on initial connect only.
2730 if (!renegotiate_seen
2731 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2732 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2734 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2736 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2744 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2747 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2751 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2753 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2758 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2760 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2761 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2763 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2764 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2766 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2767 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2772 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2776 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2777 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2784 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2789 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2791 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2792 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2794 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2795 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2796 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2798 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2799 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2803 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2804 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2805 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2806 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2808 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2810 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2811 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2812 * so this has to happen here in
2813 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2817 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2819 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2822 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2823 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2828 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2829 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2830 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2832 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2834 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2835 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2837 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2838 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2840 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2841 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2843 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2844 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2846 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2847 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2850 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2854 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2856 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2857 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2858 * abort the handshake.
2860 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2861 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2869 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2870 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2873 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2874 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2877 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2878 s->servername_done=0;
2884 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2886 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2889 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2890 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2891 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2892 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2894 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2897 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2898 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2899 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2900 if (certpkey == NULL)
2902 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2905 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2906 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2908 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2909 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2912 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2913 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2914 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2916 /* status request response should be sent */
2917 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2918 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2919 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2921 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2923 /* something bad happened */
2924 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2925 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2926 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2931 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2936 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2937 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2940 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2941 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2949 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2951 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2952 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2955 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2956 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2957 * it must contain uncompressed.
2959 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2960 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2961 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2962 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2963 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2965 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2967 unsigned char *list;
2968 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2969 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2970 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2972 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2974 found_uncompressed = 1;
2978 if (!found_uncompressed)
2980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2984 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2985 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2987 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2988 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2989 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2990 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2992 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2993 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2995 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2996 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2998 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3000 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3001 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3004 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3005 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3006 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3007 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3009 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3010 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3015 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3018 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3019 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3022 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3023 * there is no response.
3025 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3027 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3028 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3030 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3031 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3034 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3035 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3039 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3040 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3046 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3047 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3050 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3051 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3054 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3055 s->servername_done=0;
3061 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3064 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3066 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3068 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3072 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3080 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3081 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3082 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3084 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3085 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3086 * extension, if any.
3087 * len: the length of the session ID.
3088 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3089 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3090 * point to the resulting session.
3092 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3093 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3094 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3097 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3098 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3099 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3100 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3101 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3102 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3103 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3106 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3107 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3108 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3109 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3110 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3111 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3113 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3114 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3116 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3117 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3121 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3123 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3124 * to permit stateful resumption.
3126 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3128 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3132 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3133 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
3140 /* Skip past cipher list */
3145 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3150 /* Now at start of extensions */
3151 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3154 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3156 unsigned short type, size;
3159 if (p + size > limit)
3161 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3166 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3167 * currently have one. */
3168 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3171 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3173 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3174 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3175 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3176 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3177 * calculate the master secret later. */
3180 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3183 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3184 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3186 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3188 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3189 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3191 default: /* fatal error */
3200 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3202 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3203 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3204 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3205 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3206 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3207 * point to the resulting session.
3210 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3211 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3212 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3213 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3215 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3216 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3217 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3220 unsigned char *sdec;
3221 const unsigned char *p;
3222 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3223 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3226 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3227 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3230 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3231 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3232 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3233 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3235 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3236 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3247 /* Check key name matches */
3248 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3250 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3251 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3252 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3253 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3255 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3256 * integrity checks on ticket.
3258 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3261 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3265 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3266 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3267 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3268 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3269 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3271 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3272 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3273 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3274 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3275 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3278 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3281 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3282 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3285 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3288 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3292 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3293 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3294 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3295 * as required by standard.
3298 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3299 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3307 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3312 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3320 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3321 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3322 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3323 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3324 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3325 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3326 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3329 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3330 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3331 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3332 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3335 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3338 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3340 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3346 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3349 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3351 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3352 return table[i].nid;
3357 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3362 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3363 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3366 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3369 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3370 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3374 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3376 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3377 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3380 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3385 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3393 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3397 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3398 return EVP_sha224();
3400 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3401 return EVP_sha256();
3403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3404 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3405 return EVP_sha384();
3407 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3408 return EVP_sha512();
3416 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3421 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3422 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3425 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3426 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3429 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3430 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3436 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3437 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3438 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3440 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3441 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3443 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3445 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3446 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3448 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3450 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3452 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3453 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3455 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3459 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3460 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3461 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3463 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3466 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3467 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3468 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3469 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3471 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3472 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3473 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3475 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3476 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3478 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3480 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3482 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3487 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3488 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3489 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3491 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3502 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3503 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3505 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3506 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3508 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3510 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3511 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3512 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3514 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3515 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3517 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3519 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3520 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3523 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3524 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3528 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3529 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3535 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3536 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3538 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3541 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3544 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3545 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3546 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3551 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3553 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3559 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3560 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
3561 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3563 /* Should never happen */
3567 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3568 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3570 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3571 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3573 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3575 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3576 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3578 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3579 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3581 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3583 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3585 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3588 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3589 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3590 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3591 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3592 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3594 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3595 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3601 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3602 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3604 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3605 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3607 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3608 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3609 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3610 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3612 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3613 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3618 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3619 * use the certificate for signing.
3621 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3623 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3624 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3627 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3628 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3631 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3633 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3634 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3638 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3639 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3646 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3647 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3648 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3650 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3656 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3663 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3665 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3668 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3669 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3670 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3672 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3673 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3677 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3679 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3681 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3683 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3685 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3686 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3692 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3694 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3695 unsigned short hbtype;
3696 unsigned int payload;
3697 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3699 /* Read type and payload length first */
3704 if (s->msg_callback)
3705 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3706 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3707 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3709 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3711 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3714 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3715 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3716 * payload, plus padding
3718 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3721 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3722 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3724 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3726 /* Random padding */
3727 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3729 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3731 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3732 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3733 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3734 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3736 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3741 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3745 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3746 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3747 * sequence number */
3750 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3753 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3761 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3763 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3765 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3766 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3768 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3769 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3770 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3776 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3777 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3783 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3784 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3786 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3790 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3791 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3793 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3795 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3796 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3797 * some random stuff.
3798 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3799 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3800 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3801 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3804 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3807 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3808 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3810 /* Sequence number */
3811 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3812 /* 16 random bytes */
3813 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3815 /* Random padding */
3816 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3818 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3821 if (s->msg_callback)
3822 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3823 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3824 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3826 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3835 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3840 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3843 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3845 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3848 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3849 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3851 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3853 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3855 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3863 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3864 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3865 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3866 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3867 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3868 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3871 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3872 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3873 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3874 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3877 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3879 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3880 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3883 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3884 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3888 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3889 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3890 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3894 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3898 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3901 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3903 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3908 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3909 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3911 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3913 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3914 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3915 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3916 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3918 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3926 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3927 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3928 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3929 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3933 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3934 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3935 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3936 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3942 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3946 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3950 if (default_nid == -1)
3952 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3954 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3955 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3956 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3960 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3961 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3965 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3966 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3968 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3974 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3975 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3976 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3977 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
3980 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3982 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3983 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3984 /* Strict mode flags */
3985 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3986 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3987 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3989 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3994 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3995 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3997 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3998 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4001 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4005 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4008 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4010 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4012 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4013 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4016 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4017 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4018 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4020 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4021 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4030 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4033 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4034 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4035 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4037 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4045 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4046 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4047 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4050 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4056 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4057 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4060 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4063 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4064 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4066 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4071 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4072 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4073 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4074 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4075 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4078 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4079 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4080 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4081 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4085 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4086 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4094 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4095 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4098 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4101 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4102 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4104 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4107 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4115 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4116 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4118 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4121 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4122 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4123 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4125 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4130 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4138 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4139 else if(check_flags)
4140 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4142 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4143 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4144 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4145 else if (!check_flags)
4148 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4149 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4150 else if (strict_mode)
4152 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4153 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4155 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4156 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4160 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4168 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4170 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4175 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4178 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4181 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4186 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4187 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4188 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4189 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4190 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4195 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4200 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4204 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4205 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4207 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4209 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4211 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4215 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4219 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4222 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4224 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4225 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4227 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4229 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4230 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4232 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4234 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4236 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4237 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4239 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4244 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4248 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4250 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4251 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4255 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4257 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4258 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4259 else if (cpk->digest)
4260 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4263 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4265 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4266 * if the chain is invalid.
4270 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4271 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4274 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4275 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4282 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4283 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4285 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4286 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4287 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4288 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4289 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4290 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4292 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4293 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4295 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);