2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
153 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
157 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
168 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
171 s->version = s->method->version;
174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
176 static int nid_list[] =
178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
205 static int pref_list[] =
207 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
208 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
209 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
210 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
211 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
212 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
213 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
214 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
215 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
216 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
217 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
221 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
222 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
223 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
224 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
225 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
230 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
231 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
234 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
236 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
237 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
238 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
240 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
243 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
245 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
248 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
250 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
252 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
254 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
256 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
258 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
260 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
262 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
264 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
266 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
268 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
270 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
272 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
274 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
276 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
278 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
280 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
282 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
286 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
288 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
290 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
292 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
294 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
296 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
306 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
307 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
310 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
311 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
313 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
316 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
317 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
319 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
322 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
323 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
325 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
328 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
329 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
330 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
331 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
333 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
335 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
336 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
340 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
343 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
346 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
350 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
352 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
354 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
359 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
363 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
366 unsigned char *ret = p;
368 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
369 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
370 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
375 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
377 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
379 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
380 unsigned long size_str;
383 /* check for enough space.
384 4 for the servername type and entension length
385 2 for servernamelist length
386 1 for the hostname type
387 2 for hostname length
391 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
392 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
395 /* extension type and length */
396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
399 /* length of servername list */
402 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
403 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
405 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
409 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
414 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
420 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
422 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
425 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
435 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
436 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
437 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
439 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
440 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
446 /* check for enough space.
447 4 for the srp type type and entension length
448 1 for the srp user identity
449 + srp user identity length
451 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
453 /* fill in the extension */
454 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
455 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
456 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
457 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
463 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
464 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
466 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
469 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
470 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
471 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
477 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
478 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
479 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
480 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
481 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
483 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
484 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
486 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
489 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
490 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
491 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
497 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
498 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
500 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
501 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
502 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
503 * resolves this to two bytes.
505 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
506 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
507 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
509 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
511 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
514 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
515 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
516 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
517 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
519 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
520 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
521 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
523 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
524 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
526 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
530 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
531 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
533 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
536 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
541 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
547 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
549 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
552 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
553 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
554 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
555 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
558 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
559 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
560 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
562 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
564 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
566 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
569 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
572 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
577 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
578 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
581 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
585 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
587 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
588 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
594 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
596 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
603 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
604 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
605 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
607 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
608 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
610 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
612 /* save position of id len */
613 unsigned char *q = ret;
614 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
615 /* skip over id len */
617 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
623 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
627 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
628 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
631 * 1: peer may send requests
632 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
634 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
635 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
637 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
641 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
643 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
644 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
645 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
647 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
652 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
656 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
658 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
660 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
663 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
671 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
678 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
681 unsigned char *ret = p;
682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
683 int next_proto_neg_seen;
686 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
687 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
691 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
693 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
695 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
697 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
701 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
705 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
711 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
713 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
716 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
726 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
727 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
729 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
732 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
733 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
734 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
740 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
741 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
742 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
743 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
744 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
747 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
748 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
750 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
751 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
753 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
754 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
758 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
760 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
761 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
765 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
766 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
767 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
769 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
771 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
773 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
776 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
779 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
788 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
790 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
792 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
795 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
803 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
804 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
805 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
806 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
807 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
808 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
809 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
810 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
811 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
812 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
813 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
819 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
820 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
822 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
825 * 1: peer may send requests
826 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
828 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
829 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
831 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
837 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
838 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
839 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
841 const unsigned char *npa;
845 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
846 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
848 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
849 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
851 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
853 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
858 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
865 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
870 unsigned char *data = *p;
871 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
874 s->servername_done = 0;
875 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
877 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
881 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
882 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
889 if (data > (d+n-len))
892 while (data <= (d+n-4))
897 if (data+size > (d+n))
900 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
902 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
903 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
904 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
905 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
907 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
908 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
909 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
910 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
911 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
912 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
913 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
914 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
915 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
916 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
917 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
918 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
919 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
920 the value of the Host: field.
921 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
922 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
923 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
924 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
928 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
930 unsigned char *sdata;
936 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
943 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
950 servname_type = *(sdata++);
956 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
959 if (s->servername_done == 0)
960 switch (servname_type)
962 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
965 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
967 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
970 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
972 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
975 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
977 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
980 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
981 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
982 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
983 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
984 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
985 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
988 s->servername_done = 1;
992 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
993 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
994 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1006 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1011 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1012 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1014 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1016 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1019 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1021 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1024 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1026 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1027 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1029 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1031 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1037 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1038 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1039 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1041 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1042 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1044 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1046 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1051 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1053 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1054 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1056 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1057 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1059 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1062 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1063 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1066 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1067 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1068 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1069 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1070 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1073 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1074 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1076 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1077 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1078 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1080 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
1082 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1087 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1089 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1092 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1093 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1095 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1098 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1099 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1102 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1103 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1104 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1105 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1106 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1109 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1110 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1111 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1112 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1114 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1118 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1121 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1122 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1124 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1128 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1129 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1130 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1131 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1133 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1134 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1136 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1141 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1143 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1144 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1146 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1150 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1152 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1154 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1156 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1159 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1161 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1167 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1169 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1172 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1174 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1178 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1179 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1184 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1188 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1190 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1192 const unsigned char *sdata;
1194 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1199 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1208 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1212 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1216 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1221 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1225 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1230 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1231 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1234 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1235 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1236 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1238 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1239 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1242 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1243 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1245 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1246 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1251 /* Read in request_extensions */
1254 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1261 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1267 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1269 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1270 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1273 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1274 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1276 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1277 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1279 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1284 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1288 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1291 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1295 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1296 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1298 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1299 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1300 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1302 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1308 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1309 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1311 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1314 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1315 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1316 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1317 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1318 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1319 * anything like that, but this might change).
1321 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1322 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1323 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1324 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1325 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1326 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1330 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1331 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1333 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1345 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1347 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1348 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1350 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1352 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1360 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1361 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1362 * the length of the block. */
1363 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1365 unsigned int off = 0;
1379 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1381 unsigned short length;
1382 unsigned short type;
1383 unsigned short size;
1384 unsigned char *data = *p;
1385 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1386 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1389 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1393 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1394 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1397 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1401 if (data+length != d+n)
1403 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1407 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1412 if (data+size > (d+n))
1415 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1416 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1417 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1419 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1421 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1423 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1426 tlsext_servername = 1;
1429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1430 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1431 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1433 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1434 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1436 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1438 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1441 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1442 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1443 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1445 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1448 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1449 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1451 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1452 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1453 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1454 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1455 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1458 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1460 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1462 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1463 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1465 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1468 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1471 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1474 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1476 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1477 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1478 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1480 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1484 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1487 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1488 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1490 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1494 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1495 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1496 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1497 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1499 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1501 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1503 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1508 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1509 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1511 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1512 * a status request message.
1514 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1516 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1519 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1520 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1523 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1524 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1526 unsigned char *selected;
1527 unsigned char selected_len;
1529 /* We must have requested it. */
1530 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
1532 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1535 /* The data must be valid */
1536 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1538 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1541 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1543 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1546 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1547 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1549 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1552 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1553 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1554 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1557 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1559 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1561 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1564 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1568 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1569 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1571 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1572 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1573 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1575 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1580 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1582 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1592 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1596 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1598 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1600 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1602 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1603 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1605 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1611 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1621 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1622 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1623 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1624 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1625 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1626 * absence on initial connect only.
1628 if (!renegotiate_seen
1629 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1630 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1632 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1634 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1642 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1645 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1646 * and elliptic curves we support.
1651 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1652 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1654 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1656 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1658 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1659 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1660 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1666 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1669 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1670 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1675 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1676 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1677 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1678 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1680 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1681 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1682 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
1683 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1685 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1689 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
1690 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
1692 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1696 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1698 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1702 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1704 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1709 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1711 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1712 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1714 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1715 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1717 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1718 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1723 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1727 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1728 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1735 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1738 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1739 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1740 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1743 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1744 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1745 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1746 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1750 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1751 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1756 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1757 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1758 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1759 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1761 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1766 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
1768 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1769 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1771 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1772 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1773 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1775 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1776 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1780 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1781 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1782 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1783 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1785 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1787 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1788 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1789 * so this has to happen here in
1790 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
1794 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1796 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1799 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1800 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1805 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1806 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1807 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1809 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1811 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1812 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1814 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1815 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1817 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1818 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1820 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1821 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1823 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1824 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1827 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1831 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1833 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1834 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1835 * abort the handshake.
1837 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1838 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1846 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1847 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1850 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1851 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1854 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1855 s->servername_done=0;
1861 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
1863 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1866 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1867 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1868 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
1869 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
1871 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1874 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
1875 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
1876 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1877 if (certpkey == NULL)
1879 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1882 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
1883 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
1885 s->cert->key = certpkey;
1886 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1889 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1890 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1891 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1893 /* status request response should be sent */
1894 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1895 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1896 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1898 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1900 /* something bad happened */
1901 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1902 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1903 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1908 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1913 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1914 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1917 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1918 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1926 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1928 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1929 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1931 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1932 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
1933 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
1934 * it must contain uncompressed.
1936 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1937 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1938 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1939 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1940 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1942 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1944 unsigned char *list;
1945 int found_uncompressed = 0;
1946 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1947 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1949 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
1951 found_uncompressed = 1;
1955 if (!found_uncompressed)
1957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1961 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1962 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1964 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1965 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1966 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1967 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1969 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1970 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
1972 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
1973 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
1975 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1977 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1978 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1981 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
1982 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
1983 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
1984 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
1986 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1987 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1992 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
1995 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
1996 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1999 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2000 * there is no response.
2002 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2004 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2005 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2007 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2008 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2011 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2012 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2016 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2017 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2023 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2024 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2027 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2028 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2031 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2032 s->servername_done=0;
2038 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2039 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2040 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2042 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2043 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2044 * extension, if any.
2045 * len: the length of the session ID.
2046 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2047 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2048 * point to the resulting session.
2050 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2051 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2052 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2055 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2056 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2057 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2058 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2059 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2060 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2061 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2064 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2065 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2066 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2067 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2068 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2069 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2071 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2072 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2074 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2075 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2079 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2081 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2082 * to permit stateful resumption.
2084 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2086 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2090 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2091 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2098 /* Skip past cipher list */
2103 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2108 /* Now at start of extensions */
2109 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2112 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2114 unsigned short type, size;
2117 if (p + size > limit)
2119 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2124 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2125 * currently have one. */
2126 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2129 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2131 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2132 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2133 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2134 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2135 * calculate the master secret later. */
2138 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2141 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2142 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2144 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2146 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2147 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2149 default: /* fatal error */
2158 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2160 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2161 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2162 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2163 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2164 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2165 * point to the resulting session.
2168 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2169 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2170 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2171 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2173 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2174 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2175 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2178 unsigned char *sdec;
2179 const unsigned char *p;
2180 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2181 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2184 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2185 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2188 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2189 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2190 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2191 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2193 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2194 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2205 /* Check key name matches */
2206 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2208 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2209 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2210 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2211 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2213 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2214 * integrity checks on ticket.
2216 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2219 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2223 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2224 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2225 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2226 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2227 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2229 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2230 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2231 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2232 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2233 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2236 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2239 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2240 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2243 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2246 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2250 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2251 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2252 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2253 * as required by standard.
2256 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2257 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2265 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2270 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2278 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2280 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2283 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2286 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2287 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2290 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2291 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2295 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2296 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2297 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2300 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2303 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2307 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2310 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2312 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2318 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2321 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2323 if (table[i].id == id)
2324 return table[i].nid;
2330 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2335 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2336 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2339 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2342 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2343 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2347 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2349 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2350 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2353 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2358 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
2365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2366 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2370 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2371 return EVP_sha224();
2373 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2374 return EVP_sha256();
2376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2377 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2378 return EVP_sha384();
2380 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2381 return EVP_sha512();
2389 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2391 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2396 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2397 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2399 /* Should never happen */
2403 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2404 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2405 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2406 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2408 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2410 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2415 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2416 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2420 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2421 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2425 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2433 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2435 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2438 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2439 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2440 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2447 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2448 * supported it stays as NULL.
2450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2451 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2452 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2455 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2457 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2458 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2462 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2463 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2472 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2474 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2475 unsigned short hbtype;
2476 unsigned int payload;
2477 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2479 /* Read type and payload length first */
2484 if (s->msg_callback)
2485 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2486 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2487 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2489 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
2491 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2494 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
2495 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
2496 * payload, plus padding
2498 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2501 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2502 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2504 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2506 /* Random padding */
2507 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
2509 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
2511 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2512 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2513 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2514 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2516 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2521 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
2525 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
2526 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
2527 * sequence number */
2530 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
2533 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2541 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2543 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2545 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2546 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2548 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2549 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2550 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
2552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2556 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2557 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
2559 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2563 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2564 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2570 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
2571 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2573 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2575 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2576 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2577 * some random stuff.
2578 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2579 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2580 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2581 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2584 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2587 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2588 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2590 /* Sequence number */
2591 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2592 /* 16 random bytes */
2593 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2595 /* Random padding */
2596 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
2598 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2601 if (s->msg_callback)
2602 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2603 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2604 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2606 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;