2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
37 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 tls1_export_keying_material,
42 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
43 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
57 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
58 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
60 tls1_export_keying_material,
61 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
62 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
63 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
64 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
65 tls_close_construct_packet,
69 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
73 tls1_generate_master_secret,
74 tls1_change_cipher_state,
75 tls1_final_finish_mac,
76 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
77 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
78 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
80 tls1_export_keying_material,
81 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
82 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
83 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
84 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
85 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
86 tls_close_construct_packet,
90 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
93 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
94 * http, the cache would over fill
103 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
107 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
109 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
113 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
116 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
117 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
119 s->version = s->method->version;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
125 int nid; /* Curve NID */
126 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
127 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
131 * Table of curve information.
132 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
133 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
135 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
136 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
137 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
138 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
139 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
140 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
141 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
142 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
143 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
144 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
145 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
146 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
147 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
148 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
149 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
150 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
151 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
152 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
153 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
154 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
155 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
156 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
157 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
158 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
159 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
160 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
161 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
162 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
164 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
167 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
168 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
169 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
170 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
173 /* The default curves */
174 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
175 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
176 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
177 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
178 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
181 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
182 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
183 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
184 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
185 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
186 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
187 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
188 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
191 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
192 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
194 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
195 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
196 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
197 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
198 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
199 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
200 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
201 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
202 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
203 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
204 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
205 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
206 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
207 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
208 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
209 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
210 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
211 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
212 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
213 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
214 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
215 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
218 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
219 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
220 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
223 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
225 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
226 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
227 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
229 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
231 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
235 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
238 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
239 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
246 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
248 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
249 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
250 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
251 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
252 * lists in the first place.
253 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
254 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
255 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
257 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
258 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
260 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
262 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
263 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
265 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
266 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
267 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
268 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
269 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
272 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
273 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
277 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
278 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
282 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
283 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
286 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
287 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
291 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
292 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
297 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
302 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
303 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
305 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
308 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
310 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
311 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
312 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
315 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
318 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
319 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
321 const unsigned char *curves;
322 size_t num_curves, i;
323 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
324 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
326 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
328 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
331 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
332 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
334 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
335 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
337 } else /* Should never happen */
340 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
342 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
343 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
344 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
350 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
351 * if there is no match.
352 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
353 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
354 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
356 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
358 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
359 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
361 /* Can't do anything on client side */
365 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
367 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
368 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
370 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
371 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
372 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
373 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
374 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
375 /* Should never happen */
378 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
382 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
383 * but s->options is a long...
385 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
386 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
388 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
389 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
390 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
391 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
392 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
395 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
398 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
400 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
401 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
402 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
404 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
408 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
409 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
410 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
411 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
412 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
415 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
416 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
424 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
428 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
429 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
431 unsigned char *clist, *p;
434 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
437 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
438 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
441 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
442 unsigned long idmask;
444 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
446 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
455 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
459 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
463 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
466 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
468 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
474 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
476 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
478 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
480 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
481 if (nid == NID_undef)
482 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
483 if (nid == NID_undef)
484 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
485 if (nid == NID_undef)
487 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
488 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
490 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
494 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
495 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
499 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
503 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
506 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
507 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
514 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
515 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
518 /* Determine curve ID */
519 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
520 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
521 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
525 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
527 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
529 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
530 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
532 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
533 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
535 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
541 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
542 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
543 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
545 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
546 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
549 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
550 * supported (see RFC4492).
552 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
553 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
554 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
555 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
556 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
559 if (i == num_formats)
564 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
565 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
566 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
568 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
570 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
571 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
572 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
573 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
574 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
578 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
579 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
584 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
591 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
595 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
597 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
598 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
599 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
601 *pformats = ecformats_default;
602 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
604 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
606 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
611 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
612 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
614 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
616 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
619 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
622 /* If not EC nothing to do */
623 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
625 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
629 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
632 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
636 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
637 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
639 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
645 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
646 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
647 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
648 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
649 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
651 return 0; /* Should never happen */
652 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
653 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
655 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
657 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
658 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
659 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
661 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
667 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
669 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
671 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
673 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
674 * is compatible with the client extensions.
676 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
678 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
681 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
684 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
685 unsigned char curve_id[2];
686 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
687 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
688 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
689 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
690 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
694 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
695 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
699 /* Need a shared curve */
700 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
704 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
708 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
713 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
716 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
717 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
720 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
721 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
723 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
726 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
727 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
729 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
735 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
738 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
739 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
740 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
741 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
743 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
744 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
745 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
746 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
747 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
748 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
750 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
751 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
752 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
757 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
758 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
759 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
762 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
765 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
768 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
769 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
770 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
771 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
772 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
774 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
775 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
778 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
779 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
783 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
784 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
785 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
786 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
787 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
788 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
789 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
791 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
792 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
797 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
798 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
800 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
801 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
803 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
804 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
805 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
806 /* Should never happen */
809 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
810 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
815 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
816 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
817 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
818 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
820 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
824 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
825 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
828 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
829 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
831 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
834 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
835 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
837 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
843 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
847 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
848 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
849 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
850 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
853 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
854 if (i == sent_sigslen
855 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
856 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
860 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
865 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
866 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
867 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
872 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
874 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
879 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
880 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
881 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
883 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
886 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
888 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
890 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
891 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
892 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
893 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
895 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
896 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
897 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
898 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
900 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
902 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
903 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
904 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
910 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
911 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
912 * @c: cipher to check
913 * @op: Security check that you want to do
915 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
917 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
919 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
920 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
922 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
924 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
925 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
927 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
928 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
931 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
934 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
936 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
938 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
941 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
943 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
944 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
954 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
955 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
956 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
957 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
958 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
961 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
963 PACKET extensions = *packet;
964 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
965 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
968 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
969 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
972 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
973 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
979 if (num_extensions <= 1)
982 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
983 if (extension_types == NULL) {
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
988 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
989 extensions = *packet;
990 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
992 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
993 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
994 /* This should not happen. */
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1000 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1004 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1005 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1006 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1007 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1012 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1016 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1019 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1021 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1023 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1024 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1026 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1027 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1029 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1030 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1031 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1032 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1040 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1041 if (s->renegotiate) {
1042 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1043 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1044 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1045 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1046 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1051 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1052 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1055 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1056 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1057 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1058 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1059 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1060 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1061 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1062 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1063 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1064 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1065 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1066 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1072 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1073 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1074 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1075 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1076 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1077 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1078 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1079 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1080 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1081 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1082 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1083 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1093 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1095 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1096 size_t num_curves, num_formats;
1099 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1101 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1102 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1103 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1104 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1105 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1111 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1113 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1114 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1119 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
1120 /* Sub-packet for curves extension */
1121 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1122 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1126 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1127 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1128 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1129 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[0])
1130 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[1])) {
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1132 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1137 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1142 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1144 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1146 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1147 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1148 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1149 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1150 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1151 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1152 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1156 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1157 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1158 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1161 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1162 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1165 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1166 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1174 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1176 const unsigned char *salg;
1178 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1180 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1181 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1182 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1183 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1184 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1185 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1186 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1187 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1193 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1196 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1197 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1198 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1199 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1200 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1201 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1205 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1206 unsigned char *idbytes;
1210 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1211 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1213 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1214 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1215 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1220 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1221 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1225 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1226 unsigned char *extbytes;
1227 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1234 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1240 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1247 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1252 * 1: peer may send requests
1253 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1255 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1256 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1258 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1260 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1261 /* Sub-packet for Hearbeat extension */
1262 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1263 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode)
1264 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1272 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1274 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1275 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1277 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1278 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1286 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1287 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1288 * (see longer comment below)
1290 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1291 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1292 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1293 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1294 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1295 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1296 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1297 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1301 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1304 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1305 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = 0;
1306 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1309 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1310 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1311 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1312 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1313 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1317 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1318 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1319 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1320 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1325 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1331 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1332 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1333 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1339 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1345 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1346 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1347 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1354 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1355 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1361 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1362 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1363 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1366 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1367 unsigned char *padbytes;
1370 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1375 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1376 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1382 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1383 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1387 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1395 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1396 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1399 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1400 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1402 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1405 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1406 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1407 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1408 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1413 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1415 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1418 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1423 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1426 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1429 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1437 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1438 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1441 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1442 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1443 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1446 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1449 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1451 const unsigned char *plist;
1454 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1458 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1460 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1462 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1464 if (plistlen > 255) {
1465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1469 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1470 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1471 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1472 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1477 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1480 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1482 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1483 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1485 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1489 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1492 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1495 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1496 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1498 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1502 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1505 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1506 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1510 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1513 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1516 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1524 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1525 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1526 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1527 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1528 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1529 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1530 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1531 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1532 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1533 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1535 if (limit - ret < 36)
1537 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1542 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1543 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1544 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1546 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1550 * 1: peer may send requests
1551 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1553 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1554 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1556 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1562 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1563 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1564 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1565 const unsigned char *npa;
1566 unsigned int npalen;
1569 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1571 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1572 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1573 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1575 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1577 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1579 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1583 if (!custom_ext_add_old(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1585 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1587 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1588 * for other cases too.
1590 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1591 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1592 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1593 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1594 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1596 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1600 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1601 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1605 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1606 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1607 unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1609 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1611 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1615 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1621 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1624 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1629 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1630 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1631 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1632 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1634 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1636 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1638 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1640 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1641 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1645 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1647 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1648 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1649 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1652 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1654 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1655 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1656 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1664 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1665 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1666 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1668 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1670 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1671 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1673 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1674 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1675 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1676 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1677 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1679 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1680 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1681 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1682 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1683 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1686 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1688 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1689 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1692 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1700 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1702 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1703 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1704 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1709 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1710 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1711 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1712 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1714 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1720 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1721 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1722 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1723 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1724 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1725 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1726 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1728 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1729 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1730 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1731 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1732 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1733 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1734 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1735 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1736 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1737 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1738 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1739 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1740 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1743 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1744 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1748 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1749 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1750 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1754 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1757 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1758 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1760 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1763 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1766 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1767 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1769 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1770 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1773 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1774 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1776 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1779 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1782 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1783 s->servername_done = 0;
1784 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1786 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1789 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1790 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1791 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1792 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1793 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1794 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1795 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1796 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1797 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1800 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1801 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1802 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1803 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1805 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1806 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1807 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1808 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1810 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1811 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1812 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1815 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1817 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1820 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1823 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1827 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1828 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1831 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1833 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1836 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1837 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1838 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1839 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1841 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1842 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1844 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1845 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1848 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1850 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1851 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1852 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1853 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1854 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1855 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1856 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1857 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1858 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1859 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1860 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1861 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1862 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1863 * the value of the Host: field.
1864 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1865 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1866 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1868 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1872 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1873 unsigned int servname_type;
1874 PACKET sni, hostname;
1876 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1877 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1878 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1883 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1884 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1885 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1887 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1888 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1889 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1891 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1892 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1894 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1895 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1896 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1901 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1902 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1906 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1907 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1911 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1912 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1916 s->servername_done = 1;
1919 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1920 * fall back to a full handshake.
1922 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1923 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1924 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1928 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1931 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
1934 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1938 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1939 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1941 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1942 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1948 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1949 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1950 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1952 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
1953 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1958 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1959 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1961 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1962 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1966 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1967 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
1969 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1970 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
1971 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
1972 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
1977 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
1978 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
1980 session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
1981 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1986 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1987 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1988 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1989 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
1990 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1991 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1993 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1996 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
1997 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
1999 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
2000 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2001 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2006 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2007 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2011 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2012 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2013 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2017 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2018 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2019 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2020 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2021 (&extension, &responder_id_list))
2025 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2026 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2028 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2030 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2031 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2032 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2033 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2037 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2040 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2042 PACKET responder_id;
2043 const unsigned char *id_data;
2045 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2047 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2051 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2052 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2053 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2057 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2058 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2062 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2063 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2064 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2069 /* Read in request_extensions */
2070 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2073 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2074 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2075 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2076 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2077 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2078 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2079 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2080 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2081 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2089 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2091 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2095 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2096 unsigned int hbtype;
2098 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2099 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2100 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2104 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2105 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2107 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2108 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2109 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2112 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2118 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2119 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2121 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2124 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2125 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2126 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2127 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2128 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2129 * anything like that, but this might change).
2131 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2132 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2133 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2134 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2135 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2137 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2141 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2142 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2143 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2147 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2149 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2150 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2151 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2155 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2156 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2158 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2159 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2163 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2164 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2165 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2166 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2167 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2170 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2171 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2176 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2178 * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
2180 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2186 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2188 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2189 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2190 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2192 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2197 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2198 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2199 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2200 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2205 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2208 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2209 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2210 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2213 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2222 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2223 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2224 * fill the length of the block.
2226 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2228 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2230 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2231 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2232 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2240 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2242 unsigned int length, type, size;
2243 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2244 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2247 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2249 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2251 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2252 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2254 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2255 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2258 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2260 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2262 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2265 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2266 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2270 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2271 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2275 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2276 const unsigned char *data;
2279 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2280 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2283 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2284 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2286 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2287 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2289 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2290 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2291 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2292 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2293 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2296 tlsext_servername = 1;
2298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2299 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2300 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2301 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2302 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2303 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2307 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2308 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2309 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2310 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2311 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2314 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2315 ecpointformatlist_length;
2316 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2317 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2318 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2319 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2325 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2327 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2328 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2329 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2330 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2332 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2335 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2336 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2339 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2340 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2342 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2345 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2346 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2349 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2350 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2354 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2355 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2356 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2358 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2359 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2360 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2361 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2362 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2363 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2365 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2367 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2368 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2369 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2372 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2377 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2378 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2379 unsigned char *selected;
2380 unsigned char selected_len;
2381 /* We must have requested it. */
2382 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2383 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2386 /* The data must be valid */
2387 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2388 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2391 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2394 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2395 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2396 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2400 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2401 * a single Serverhello
2403 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2404 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2405 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2406 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2409 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2410 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2411 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2415 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2417 /* We must have requested it. */
2418 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2419 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2423 * The extension data consists of:
2424 * uint16 list_length
2425 * uint8 proto_length;
2426 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2428 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2429 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2430 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2431 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2434 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2435 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2436 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2437 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2440 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2441 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2444 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2447 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2448 unsigned int hbtype;
2449 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2450 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2454 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2455 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2457 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2458 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2459 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2462 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2468 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2469 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2473 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2474 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2475 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2476 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2477 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2478 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2479 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2481 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2484 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2485 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2487 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2491 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2492 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2496 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2497 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2498 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2499 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2500 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2501 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2502 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2506 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2515 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2516 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2517 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2518 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2519 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2521 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2522 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2523 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2525 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2531 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2534 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2535 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2536 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2545 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2547 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2551 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2556 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2558 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2559 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2563 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2564 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2567 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2568 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2572 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2574 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2575 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2576 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2577 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2579 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2581 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2584 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2585 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2588 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2589 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2592 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2593 s->servername_done = 0;
2599 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2600 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2602 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2604 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2607 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2608 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2610 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2611 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2614 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2617 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2618 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2619 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2623 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2628 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2629 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2630 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2631 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2632 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2633 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2634 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2635 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2638 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2639 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2640 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2642 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2645 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2646 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2647 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2648 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2649 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2653 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2657 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2662 * Upon success, returns 1.
2663 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2665 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2667 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2670 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2671 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2672 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2673 * influence which certificate is sent
2675 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2677 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2678 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2679 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2680 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2682 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2683 * et al can pick it up.
2685 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2686 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2688 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2689 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2690 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2692 /* status request response should be sent */
2693 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2694 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2695 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2697 /* something bad happened */
2698 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2700 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2706 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2713 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2715 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2716 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2720 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2721 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2722 * must contain uncompressed.
2724 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2725 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2726 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2727 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2728 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2729 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2730 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2731 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2733 unsigned char *list;
2734 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2735 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2736 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2737 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2738 found_uncompressed = 1;
2742 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2744 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2748 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2749 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2751 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2753 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2754 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2755 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2756 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2758 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2760 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2763 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2764 * that we don't receive a status message
2766 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2767 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2768 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2771 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2772 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2775 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2776 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2779 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2780 s->servername_done = 0;
2786 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2789 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2791 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2792 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2796 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2804 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2805 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2806 * need to be handled at the same time.
2808 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2811 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2812 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2813 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2814 * point to the resulting session.
2816 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2817 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2818 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2821 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2822 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2823 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2824 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2825 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2826 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2827 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2830 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2831 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2832 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2833 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2834 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2835 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2837 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2840 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2841 const PACKET *session_id,
2845 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2848 int have_ticket = 0;
2849 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2852 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2853 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2856 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2859 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2862 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2866 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2867 unsigned int type, size;
2869 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2870 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2871 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2875 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2879 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2881 const unsigned char *etick;
2883 /* Duplicate extension */
2884 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2892 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2895 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2899 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2901 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2902 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2903 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2904 * calculate the master secret later.
2909 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2910 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2914 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2915 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2917 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2918 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2921 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2924 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2925 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2928 default: /* fatal error */
2934 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2935 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2936 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2942 if (have_ticket == 0)
2949 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2951 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2952 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2953 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2954 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2955 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2956 * point to the resulting session.
2959 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2960 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2961 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2962 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2963 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2965 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2966 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2967 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2970 unsigned char *sdec;
2971 const unsigned char *p;
2972 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2973 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2974 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2975 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2976 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2978 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2979 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2982 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2987 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2988 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2989 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3000 /* Check key name matches */
3001 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3002 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3006 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3007 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3008 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3009 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3010 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3011 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3017 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3020 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3024 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3026 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3031 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3032 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3033 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3036 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3037 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3038 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3041 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3042 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3043 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3044 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3045 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3046 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3047 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3051 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3052 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3057 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3061 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3065 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3066 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3067 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3071 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3072 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3081 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3085 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3086 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3090 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3097 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3098 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3099 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3100 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3101 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3102 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3103 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3104 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3105 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3106 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3109 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3110 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3111 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3112 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3113 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3114 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3115 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3118 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3121 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3122 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3128 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3131 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3132 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3133 return table[i].nid;
3138 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3144 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3147 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3150 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3157 * Old version of the tls12_get_sigandhash function used by code that has not
3158 * yet been converted to WPACKET yet. It will be deleted once WPACKET conversion
3162 int tls12_get_sigandhash_old(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3168 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3171 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3174 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3175 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3179 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3181 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3188 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3191 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3192 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3193 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3194 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3195 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3196 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3197 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3198 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3199 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3200 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3201 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3202 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3205 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3211 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3212 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3213 return tls12_md_info + i;
3219 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3221 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3222 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3224 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3227 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3230 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3234 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3235 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3238 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3239 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3242 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3243 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3246 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3247 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3249 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3250 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3252 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3253 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3259 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3260 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3261 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3263 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3264 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3266 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3267 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3269 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3271 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3272 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3274 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3276 if (psignhash_nid) {
3277 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3278 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3279 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3283 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3284 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3286 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3287 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3288 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3290 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3291 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3293 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3294 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3298 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3299 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3303 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3305 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3306 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3307 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3309 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3310 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3311 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3313 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3314 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3315 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3317 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3318 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3323 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3324 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3329 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3330 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3337 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3339 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3341 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3345 * Old version of the tls12_copy_sigalgs function used by code that has not
3346 * yet been converted to WPACKET yet. It will be deleted once WPACKET conversion
3350 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs_old(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3351 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3353 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3355 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3356 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3357 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3358 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3361 return tmpout - out;
3364 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3365 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3369 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3370 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3371 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3372 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3379 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3380 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3381 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3382 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3384 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3385 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3386 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3387 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3388 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3390 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3391 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3394 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3395 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3396 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3398 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3408 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3409 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3411 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3412 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3414 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3416 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3418 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3419 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3420 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3421 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3422 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3423 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3424 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3425 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3426 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3427 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3429 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3430 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3433 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3434 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3438 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3439 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3441 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3443 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3446 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3450 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3451 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3455 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3457 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3460 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3461 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3463 /* Should never happen */
3467 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3468 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3469 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3471 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3472 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3476 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3481 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3482 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3484 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3485 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3488 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3489 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3490 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3491 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3492 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3494 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3495 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3496 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3497 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3503 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3504 * the certificate for signing.
3506 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3508 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3509 * supported it stays as NULL.
3511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3512 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3513 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3515 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3516 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3517 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3518 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3522 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3523 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3526 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3527 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3528 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3529 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3530 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3531 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3532 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3533 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3539 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3540 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3541 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3543 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3548 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3555 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3557 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3560 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3561 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3562 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3564 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3565 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3569 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3571 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3573 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3575 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3577 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3578 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3581 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3585 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3588 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3590 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3591 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3592 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3593 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3594 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3595 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3597 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3598 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3599 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3603 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3605 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3608 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3611 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3613 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3615 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3617 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3625 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3626 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3628 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3631 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3632 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3635 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3636 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3641 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3642 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3644 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3648 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3652 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3655 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3657 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3662 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3663 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3665 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3666 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3667 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3669 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3676 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3677 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3678 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3680 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3681 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3682 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3688 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3692 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3696 if (default_nid == -1)
3698 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3700 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3701 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3702 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3707 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3708 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3712 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3713 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3714 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3721 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3722 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3723 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3724 * attempting to use them.
3727 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3729 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3730 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3731 /* Strict mode flags */
3732 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3733 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3734 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3736 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3741 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3742 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3745 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3746 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3748 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3751 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3753 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3754 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3756 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3758 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3759 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3765 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3768 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3770 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3771 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3773 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3780 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3781 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3782 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3783 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3784 else if (!check_flags)
3789 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3790 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3792 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3794 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3795 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3797 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3800 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3801 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3802 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3803 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3806 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3807 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3808 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3812 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3813 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3816 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3817 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3818 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3821 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3822 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3823 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3826 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3827 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3828 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3837 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3838 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3840 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3842 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3843 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3844 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3847 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3854 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3855 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3859 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3860 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3861 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3862 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3864 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3871 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3872 else if (check_flags)
3873 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3875 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3876 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3877 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3878 else if (!check_flags)
3881 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3882 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3883 else if (strict_mode) {
3884 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3885 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3886 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3887 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3889 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3896 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3897 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3899 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3901 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3904 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3907 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3911 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3915 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3917 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3918 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3920 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3921 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3922 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3926 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3929 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3931 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3933 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3934 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3936 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3937 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3938 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3940 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3941 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3942 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3943 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3944 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3949 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3952 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3954 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3955 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3959 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3960 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3961 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3962 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3963 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3965 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3968 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3972 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3975 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3976 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3983 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3984 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3986 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3987 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3988 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3989 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3990 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3991 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3992 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3995 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3996 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3998 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4001 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4002 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4004 int dh_secbits = 80;
4005 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4006 return DH_get_1024_160();
4007 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4008 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4013 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4014 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4017 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4025 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4026 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4028 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4029 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4037 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4038 return DH_get_2048_224();
4039 return DH_get_1024_160();
4043 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4046 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4049 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4050 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4051 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4052 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4054 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4057 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4059 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4062 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4064 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4065 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4066 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4067 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4069 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4070 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4072 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4073 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4076 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4078 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4081 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4084 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4086 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4087 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4089 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4090 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4092 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4093 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4098 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4099 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4100 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4103 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4105 int rv, start_idx, i;
4107 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4112 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4116 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4117 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4118 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);