2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
145 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
159 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173 s->version = s->method->version;
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
178 static int nid_list[] =
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
208 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
215 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
246 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
247 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
250 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
252 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
253 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
254 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
256 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
259 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
261 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
264 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
266 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
268 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
270 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
272 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
274 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
276 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
278 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
280 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
286 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
288 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
290 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
292 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
294 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
296 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
298 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
300 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
302 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
306 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
308 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
310 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
312 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
318 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
321 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
322 const unsigned char **pcurves,
327 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
328 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
331 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
332 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
334 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
335 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
336 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
339 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
340 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
344 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
345 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
349 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
350 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
354 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
355 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
358 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
359 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
361 const unsigned char *curves;
363 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
364 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
366 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
369 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
372 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
374 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
377 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
379 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
382 else /* Should never happen */
385 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
386 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
388 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
394 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
395 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
399 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
401 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
402 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
404 /* Can't do anything on client side */
411 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
412 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
415 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
416 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
418 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
419 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
420 /* Should never happen */
423 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
426 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
433 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
435 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
436 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
438 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
442 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
443 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
454 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
455 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
457 unsigned char *clist, *p;
459 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
460 * while curve ids < 32
462 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
463 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
466 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
468 unsigned long idmask;
470 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
472 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
483 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
487 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
492 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
495 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
497 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
501 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
503 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
505 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
507 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
508 if (nid == NID_undef)
509 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
510 if (nid == NID_undef)
511 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
512 if (nid == NID_undef)
514 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
515 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
517 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
520 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
521 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
526 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
528 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
530 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
531 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
537 const EC_METHOD *meth;
540 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
541 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
542 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
545 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
548 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
552 /* Determine curve ID */
553 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
554 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
555 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
559 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
571 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
574 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
576 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
579 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
583 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
584 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
585 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
587 const unsigned char *p;
590 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
591 * is supported (see RFC4492).
593 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
595 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
596 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
597 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
607 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
608 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
610 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
611 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
613 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
618 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
625 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
626 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
628 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
630 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
633 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
636 /* If not EC nothing to do */
637 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
642 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
646 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
647 * supported curves extension.
649 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
652 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
653 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
655 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
662 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
663 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
664 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
665 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
666 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
668 return 0; /* Should never happen */
669 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
670 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
672 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
676 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
677 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
679 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
684 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
685 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
687 unsigned char curve_id[2];
688 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
689 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
690 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
691 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTCOL)
694 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
695 * no other curves permitted.
699 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
700 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
701 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
702 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
703 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
707 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
708 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
710 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
711 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
713 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
716 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
719 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
721 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
727 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
729 /* Need a shared curve */
730 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
736 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
741 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
743 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
747 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
751 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
755 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
756 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
759 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
760 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
762 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
765 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
766 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
768 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
771 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
772 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
774 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
777 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
778 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
779 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
780 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
782 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
784 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
785 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
787 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
788 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
789 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
791 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
792 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
794 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
795 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
799 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
800 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
801 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
804 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
806 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
809 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
811 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
812 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
813 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
815 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
816 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
819 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
820 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
824 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
825 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
827 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
828 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
830 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
832 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
833 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
837 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
839 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
841 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
844 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
847 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
848 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
850 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
851 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
853 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
854 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
855 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
856 /* Should never happen */
859 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
860 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
865 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
867 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
868 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
869 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
871 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
873 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
876 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
881 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
883 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
885 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
886 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
890 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
892 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
894 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
895 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
903 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
906 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
907 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
908 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
910 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
913 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
914 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
916 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
919 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
925 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
928 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
929 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
932 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
933 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
934 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
935 * session and not global settings.
938 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
941 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
942 size_t i, sigalgslen;
943 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
946 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
947 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
948 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
951 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
952 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
955 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
956 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
961 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
966 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
971 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
977 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
978 * signature algorithms.
982 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
983 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
987 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
988 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
992 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
993 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
996 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
998 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
999 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1003 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1004 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1006 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1007 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1009 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1013 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1014 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1016 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1017 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1026 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1029 unsigned char *ret = p;
1030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1031 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1033 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1036 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1037 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1039 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1041 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1043 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1044 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1045 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1046 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1055 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1056 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1057 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1062 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1064 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1066 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1067 unsigned long size_str;
1070 /* check for enough space.
1071 4 for the servername type and entension length
1072 2 for servernamelist length
1073 1 for the hostname type
1074 2 for hostname length
1078 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1079 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1082 /* extension type and length */
1083 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1084 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1086 /* length of servername list */
1087 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1089 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1090 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1092 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1096 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1101 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1107 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1109 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1112 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1122 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1123 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1124 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1126 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1127 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1133 /* check for enough space.
1134 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1135 1 for the srp user identity
1136 + srp user identity length
1138 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1140 /* fill in the extension */
1141 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1142 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1143 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1144 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1152 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1154 const unsigned char *plist;
1156 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
1158 plist = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1160 plistlen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1163 plist = ecformats_default;
1164 plistlen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
1167 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1168 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1175 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1176 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1177 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1178 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1181 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1182 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1183 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1185 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1186 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1187 if (plistlen > 65532)
1189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1193 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1194 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1196 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1197 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1198 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1199 * resolves this to two bytes.
1202 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1205 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1207 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1210 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1211 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1212 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1213 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1215 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1216 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1217 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1219 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1220 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1222 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1226 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1227 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1229 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1232 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1233 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1237 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1243 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1246 const unsigned char *salg;
1247 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1248 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1250 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1251 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1253 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1257 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1258 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1259 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1261 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1263 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1265 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1268 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1271 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1276 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1277 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1280 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1284 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1286 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1287 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1293 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1295 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1302 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1303 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1304 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1306 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1307 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1309 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1311 /* save position of id len */
1312 unsigned char *q = ret;
1313 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1314 /* skip over id len */
1316 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1322 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1326 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1327 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1330 * 1: peer may send requests
1331 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1333 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1334 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1336 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1340 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1342 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1343 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1344 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1346 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1351 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1355 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1357 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1362 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1370 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1371 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1372 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1373 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1374 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1375 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1378 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1379 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1381 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1383 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1384 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1386 *(ret++) = list_len;
1387 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1390 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1397 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1400 unsigned char *ret = p;
1401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1402 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1405 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1406 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1410 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1412 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1414 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1416 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1420 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1424 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1430 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1432 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1435 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1445 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
1446 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1448 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1451 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1452 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
1453 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1459 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1460 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
1461 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1462 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1463 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1466 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1467 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1469 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1470 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1472 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1473 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1477 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1479 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1480 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1484 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1485 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1486 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1488 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1490 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1492 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1495 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1498 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1507 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1509 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1511 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1514 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1522 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1523 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1524 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1525 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1526 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1527 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1528 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1529 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1530 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1531 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1532 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1538 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1539 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1541 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1544 * 1: peer may send requests
1545 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1547 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1548 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1550 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1556 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1557 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1558 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1560 const unsigned char *npa;
1561 unsigned int npalen;
1564 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1565 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1567 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1568 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1570 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1572 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1577 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1579 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1581 size_t authz_length;
1582 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1583 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1584 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1585 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1586 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1588 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1590 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1591 * uint8_t authz_type
1593 * uint8_t data[length]
1595 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1596 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1598 unsigned short length;
1602 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1604 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1608 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1616 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1617 * 2 bytes for extension type
1618 * 2 bytes for extension length
1619 * 1 byte for the list length
1620 * n bytes for the list */
1621 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1623 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1624 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1626 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1627 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1631 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1633 unsigned short length;
1638 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1640 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1643 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1650 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1657 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1659 unsigned short type;
1660 unsigned short size;
1662 unsigned char *data = *p;
1663 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1666 s->servername_done = 0;
1667 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1669 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1673 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1674 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1676 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1677 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1679 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1680 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1682 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1683 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1685 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1686 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1688 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1689 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1691 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1692 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1695 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1699 if (data > (d+n-len))
1702 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1707 if (data+size > (d+n))
1710 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1712 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1713 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1714 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1715 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1717 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1718 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1719 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1720 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1721 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1722 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1723 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1724 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1725 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1726 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1727 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1728 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1729 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1730 the value of the Host: field.
1731 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1732 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1733 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1734 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1738 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1740 unsigned char *sdata;
1746 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1753 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1760 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1766 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1769 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1770 switch (servname_type)
1772 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1775 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1777 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1780 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1782 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1785 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1787 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1790 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1791 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1792 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1793 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1794 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1795 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1798 s->servername_done = 1;
1802 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1803 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1804 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1816 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1821 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1822 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1824 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1826 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1829 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1831 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1834 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1836 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1837 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1839 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1841 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1847 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1848 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1849 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1851 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1852 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1854 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1856 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1861 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1863 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1864 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1866 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1867 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1869 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1872 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1873 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1876 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1877 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1878 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1879 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1880 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1883 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1884 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1886 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1887 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1888 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1890 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
1892 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1897 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1899 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1902 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1903 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1905 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1908 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1909 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1912 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1913 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1914 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1915 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1916 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1919 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1920 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1921 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1922 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1924 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1928 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1931 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1932 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1934 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1938 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1939 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1940 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1941 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1943 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1944 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1946 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1951 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1953 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1954 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1956 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1960 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1962 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1964 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1966 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1969 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
1971 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1976 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
1978 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1981 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1983 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1986 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
1989 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1992 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1993 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1997 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1998 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2003 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2007 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2009 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2011 const unsigned char *sdata;
2013 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2018 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2027 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2031 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2035 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2040 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2044 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2049 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2050 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2053 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2054 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2055 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2057 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2058 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2061 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2062 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2064 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2065 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2070 /* Read in request_extensions */
2073 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2080 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2086 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2088 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2089 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2092 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2093 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2095 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2096 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2098 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2103 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2107 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2110 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2114 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2115 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2117 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2118 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2119 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2121 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2127 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2128 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2130 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2133 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2134 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2135 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2136 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2137 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2138 * anything like that, but this might change).
2140 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2141 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2142 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2143 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2144 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2145 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2149 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2150 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2152 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2157 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2159 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2160 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2164 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2168 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2170 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2172 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2176 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2177 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2178 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2181 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2182 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2183 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2184 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2185 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2187 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2191 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2192 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2193 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2195 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2197 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2198 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2199 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2200 1 /* element size */,
2203 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2206 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2207 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2209 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2223 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2225 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2226 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2228 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2230 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2233 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2234 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2235 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2240 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2243 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2245 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2249 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2258 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2259 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2260 * the length of the block. */
2261 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2263 unsigned int off = 0;
2277 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2279 unsigned short length;
2280 unsigned short type;
2281 unsigned short size;
2282 unsigned char *data = *p;
2283 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2284 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2286 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2287 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2291 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2292 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2295 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2299 if (data+length != d+n)
2301 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2305 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2310 if (data+size > (d+n))
2313 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2314 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2315 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2317 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2319 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2321 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2324 tlsext_servername = 1;
2327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2328 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2329 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2331 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2332 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2334 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2336 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2339 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2340 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2341 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2343 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2346 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2347 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2349 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2350 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2351 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2352 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2353 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2356 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2358 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2360 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2361 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2363 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2366 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2369 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2372 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2374 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2375 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2376 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2378 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2382 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2385 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2386 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2388 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2392 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2393 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2394 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2395 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2397 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2399 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2401 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2406 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2407 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2409 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2410 * a status request message.
2412 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2414 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2417 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2418 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2421 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2422 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2424 unsigned char *selected;
2425 unsigned char selected_len;
2427 /* We must have requested it. */
2428 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
2430 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2433 /* The data must be valid */
2434 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2436 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2439 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2441 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2444 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2445 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2447 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2450 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2451 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2452 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2455 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2457 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2459 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2462 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2466 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2467 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2469 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2470 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2471 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2473 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2478 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2480 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2485 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2487 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2488 * an authz hello extension if the client
2489 * didn't request a proof. */
2490 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2491 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2493 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2495 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2501 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2505 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2506 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2508 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2512 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2513 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2514 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2515 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2517 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2521 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2529 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2533 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2535 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2537 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2539 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2540 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2542 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2548 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2558 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2559 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2560 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2561 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2562 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2563 * absence on initial connect only.
2565 if (!renegotiate_seen
2566 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2567 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2569 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2571 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2579 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2582 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2586 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2588 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2593 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2595 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2596 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2598 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2599 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2601 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2602 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2607 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2611 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2612 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2619 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2622 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
2623 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
2624 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
2627 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2628 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2629 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
2630 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
2634 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2635 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
2637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2640 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
2641 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
2642 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
2643 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
2645 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2650 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2652 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2653 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2656 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2657 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2659 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2660 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2664 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2665 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2666 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2667 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2669 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2671 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2672 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2673 * so this has to happen here in
2674 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2678 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2680 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2683 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2684 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2689 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2690 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2691 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2693 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2695 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2696 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2698 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2699 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2701 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2702 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2704 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2705 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2707 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2708 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2711 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2715 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2717 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2718 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2719 * abort the handshake.
2721 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2722 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2730 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2731 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2734 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2735 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2738 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2739 s->servername_done=0;
2745 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2747 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2750 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2751 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2752 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2753 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2755 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2758 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2761 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2762 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2763 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2765 /* status request response should be sent */
2766 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2767 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2768 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2770 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2772 /* something bad happened */
2773 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2774 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2775 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2780 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2785 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2786 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2789 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2790 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2798 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2800 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2801 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2804 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2805 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2806 * it must contain uncompressed.
2808 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2809 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2810 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2811 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2812 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2814 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2816 unsigned char *list;
2817 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2818 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2819 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2821 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2823 found_uncompressed = 1;
2827 if (!found_uncompressed)
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2833 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2834 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2836 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2837 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2838 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2839 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2841 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2842 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2844 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2845 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2847 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2849 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2850 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2853 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2854 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2855 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2856 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2858 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2859 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2864 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2867 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2868 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2871 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2872 * there is no response.
2874 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2876 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2877 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2879 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2880 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2883 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2884 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2888 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2889 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2895 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2896 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2899 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2900 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2903 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2904 s->servername_done=0;
2910 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2913 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2915 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2917 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2921 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2929 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2930 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2931 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2933 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2934 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2935 * extension, if any.
2936 * len: the length of the session ID.
2937 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2938 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2939 * point to the resulting session.
2941 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2942 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2943 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2946 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2947 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2948 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2949 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2950 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2951 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2952 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2955 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2956 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2957 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2958 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2959 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2960 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2962 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2963 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2965 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2966 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2970 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2972 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2973 * to permit stateful resumption.
2975 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2977 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2981 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2982 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2989 /* Skip past cipher list */
2994 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2999 /* Now at start of extensions */
3000 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3003 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3005 unsigned short type, size;
3008 if (p + size > limit)
3010 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3015 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3016 * currently have one. */
3017 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3020 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3022 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3023 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3024 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3025 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3026 * calculate the master secret later. */
3029 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3032 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3033 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3035 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3037 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3038 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3040 default: /* fatal error */
3049 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3051 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3052 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3053 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3054 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3055 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3056 * point to the resulting session.
3059 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3060 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3061 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3062 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3064 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3065 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3066 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3069 unsigned char *sdec;
3070 const unsigned char *p;
3071 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3072 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3075 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3076 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3079 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3080 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3081 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3082 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3084 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3085 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3096 /* Check key name matches */
3097 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3099 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3100 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3101 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3102 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3104 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3105 * integrity checks on ticket.
3107 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3110 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3114 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3115 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3116 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3117 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3118 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3120 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3121 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3122 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3123 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3124 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3127 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3130 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3131 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3134 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3137 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3141 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3142 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3143 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3144 * as required by standard.
3147 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3148 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3156 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3161 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3169 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3170 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3171 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3172 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3173 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3174 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3175 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3178 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3179 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3180 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3181 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3184 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3187 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3189 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3195 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3198 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3200 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3201 return table[i].nid;
3206 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3211 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3212 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3215 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3218 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3219 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3223 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3225 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3226 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3229 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3234 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3242 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3246 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3247 return EVP_sha224();
3249 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3250 return EVP_sha256();
3252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3253 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3254 return EVP_sha384();
3256 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3257 return EVP_sha512();
3265 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3270 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3271 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3274 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3275 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3278 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3279 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3285 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3286 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3287 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3289 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3290 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3292 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3294 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3295 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3297 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3299 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3301 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3302 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3304 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3308 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3309 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3310 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3312 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3315 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3316 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3317 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3318 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3320 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3321 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3322 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3324 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3325 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3327 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3329 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3331 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3336 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3337 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3338 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3340 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3351 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3352 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3354 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3355 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3357 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3359 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3360 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3361 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3363 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3364 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3366 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3368 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3369 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3372 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3373 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3377 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3378 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3384 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3385 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3387 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3390 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3393 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3394 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3395 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3400 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3402 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3408 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3409 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
3410 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3412 /* Should never happen */
3416 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3417 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3419 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3420 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3422 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3424 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3425 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTCOL)
3427 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3428 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3430 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3432 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3434 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3437 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3438 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3439 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3440 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3441 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3443 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3444 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3450 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3451 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3453 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3454 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3456 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3457 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3458 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3459 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3461 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3462 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3467 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3468 * use the certificate for signing.
3470 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3472 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3473 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3476 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3477 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3480 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3482 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3483 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3487 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3488 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3495 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3496 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3497 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3499 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3505 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3512 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3514 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3517 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3518 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3519 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3521 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3522 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3526 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3528 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3530 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3532 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3534 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3535 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3541 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3543 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3544 unsigned short hbtype;
3545 unsigned int payload;
3546 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3548 /* Read type and payload length first */
3553 if (s->msg_callback)
3554 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3555 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3556 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3558 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3560 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3563 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3564 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3565 * payload, plus padding
3567 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3570 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3571 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3573 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3575 /* Random padding */
3576 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3578 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3580 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3581 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3582 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3583 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3585 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3590 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3594 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3595 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3596 * sequence number */
3599 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3602 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3610 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3612 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3614 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3615 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3617 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3618 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3619 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3625 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3626 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3632 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3633 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3639 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3640 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3642 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3644 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3645 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3646 * some random stuff.
3647 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3648 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3649 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3650 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3653 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3656 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3657 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3659 /* Sequence number */
3660 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3661 /* 16 random bytes */
3662 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3664 /* Random padding */
3665 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3667 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3670 if (s->msg_callback)
3671 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3672 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3673 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3675 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3684 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3689 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3692 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3694 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3697 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3698 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3700 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3702 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3704 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3712 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3713 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3714 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3715 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3716 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3717 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3720 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3721 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3722 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3723 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3726 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3728 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3729 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3732 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3733 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3737 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3738 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3739 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3743 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3745 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3748 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3750 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3755 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3756 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3758 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3760 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3761 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3762 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3763 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3765 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3773 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3774 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3775 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3776 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3780 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3781 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3782 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3783 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3789 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3793 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3797 if (default_nid == -1)
3799 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3801 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3802 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3803 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3807 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3808 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3812 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3813 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3815 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3821 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3822 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3823 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3824 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
3827 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3829 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3830 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3831 /* Strict mode flags */
3832 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3833 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3834 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3836 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3841 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3842 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3844 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3845 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3848 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3852 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3855 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3857 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3859 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3860 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3863 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3864 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3865 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTCOL)
3867 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3868 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3877 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3880 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3881 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3882 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3884 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3892 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3893 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3894 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
3897 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3903 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
3904 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
3907 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
3910 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3911 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3913 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3918 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3919 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3920 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3921 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3922 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3925 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3926 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3927 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3928 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3932 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3933 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3941 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
3942 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
3945 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
3948 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3949 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
3951 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3954 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
3962 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3963 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
3965 if (!check_flags) goto end;
3968 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3969 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3970 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3972 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
3977 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3985 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3986 else if(check_flags)
3987 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3989 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3990 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3991 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3992 else if (!check_flags)
3995 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3996 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3997 else if (strict_mode)
3999 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4000 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4002 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4003 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4007 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4015 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4017 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4022 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4025 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4028 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4033 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4034 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4035 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4036 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4037 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4042 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4047 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4051 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4052 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4054 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4056 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4058 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4062 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4066 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4069 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4071 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4072 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4074 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4076 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4077 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4079 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4081 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4083 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4084 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4086 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4091 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4095 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4097 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4098 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4102 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4104 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4105 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4106 else if (cpk->digest)
4107 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4110 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4112 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4113 * if the chain is invalid.
4117 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4118 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4121 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4122 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4129 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4130 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4132 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4133 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4134 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4135 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4136 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4137 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4139 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4140 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4142 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);