2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
37 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 tls1_export_keying_material,
42 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
43 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
57 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
58 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
60 tls1_export_keying_material,
61 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
62 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
63 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
64 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
65 tls_close_construct_packet,
69 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
73 tls1_generate_master_secret,
74 tls1_change_cipher_state,
75 tls1_final_finish_mac,
76 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
77 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
78 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
80 tls1_export_keying_material,
81 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
82 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
83 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
84 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
85 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
86 tls_close_construct_packet,
90 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
93 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
94 * http, the cache would over fill
103 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
107 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
109 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
113 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
116 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
117 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
119 s->version = s->method->version;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
125 int nid; /* Curve NID */
126 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
127 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
131 * Table of curve information.
132 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
133 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
135 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
136 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
137 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
138 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
139 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
140 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
141 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
142 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
143 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
144 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
145 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
146 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
147 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
148 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
149 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
150 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
151 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
152 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
153 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
154 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
155 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
156 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
157 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
158 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
159 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
160 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
161 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
162 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
164 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
167 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
168 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
169 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
170 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
173 /* The default curves */
174 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
175 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
176 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
177 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
178 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
181 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
182 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
183 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
184 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
185 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
186 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
187 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
188 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
191 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
192 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
194 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
195 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
196 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
197 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
198 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
199 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
200 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
201 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
202 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
203 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
204 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
205 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
206 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
207 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
208 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
209 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
210 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
211 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
212 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
213 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
214 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
215 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
218 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
219 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
220 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
223 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
225 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
226 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
227 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
229 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
231 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
235 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
238 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
239 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
246 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
248 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
249 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
250 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
251 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
252 * lists in the first place.
253 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
254 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
255 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
257 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
258 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
260 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
262 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
263 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
265 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
266 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
267 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
268 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
269 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
272 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
273 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
277 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
278 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
282 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
283 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
286 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
287 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
291 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
292 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
297 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
302 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
303 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
305 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
308 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
310 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
311 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
312 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
315 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
318 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
319 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
321 const unsigned char *curves;
322 size_t num_curves, i;
323 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
324 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
326 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
328 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
331 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
332 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
334 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
335 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
337 } else /* Should never happen */
340 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
342 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
343 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
344 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
350 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
351 * if there is no match.
352 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
353 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
354 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
356 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
358 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
359 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
361 /* Can't do anything on client side */
365 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
367 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
368 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
370 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
371 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
372 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
373 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
374 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
375 /* Should never happen */
378 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
382 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
383 * but s->options is a long...
385 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
386 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
388 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
389 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
390 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
391 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
392 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
395 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
398 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
400 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
401 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
402 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
404 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
408 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
409 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
410 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
411 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
412 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
415 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
416 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
424 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
428 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
429 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
431 unsigned char *clist, *p;
434 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
437 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
438 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
441 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
442 unsigned long idmask;
444 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
446 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
455 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
459 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
463 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
466 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
468 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
474 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
476 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
478 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
480 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
481 if (nid == NID_undef)
482 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
483 if (nid == NID_undef)
484 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
485 if (nid == NID_undef)
487 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
488 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
490 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
494 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
495 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
499 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
503 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
506 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
507 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
514 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
515 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
518 /* Determine curve ID */
519 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
520 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
521 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
525 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
527 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
529 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
530 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
532 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
533 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
535 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
541 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
542 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
543 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
545 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
546 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
549 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
550 * supported (see RFC4492).
552 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
553 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
554 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
555 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
556 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
559 if (i == num_formats)
564 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
565 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
566 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
568 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
570 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
571 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
572 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
573 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
574 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
578 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
579 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
584 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
591 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
595 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
597 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
598 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
599 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
601 *pformats = ecformats_default;
602 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
604 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
606 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
611 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
612 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
614 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
616 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
619 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
622 /* If not EC nothing to do */
623 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
625 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
629 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
632 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
636 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
637 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
639 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
645 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
646 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
647 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
648 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
649 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
651 return 0; /* Should never happen */
652 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
653 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
655 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
657 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
658 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
659 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
661 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
667 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
669 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
671 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
673 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
674 * is compatible with the client extensions.
676 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
678 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
681 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
684 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
685 unsigned char curve_id[2];
686 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
687 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
688 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
689 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
690 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
694 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
695 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
699 /* Need a shared curve */
700 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
704 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
708 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
713 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
716 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
717 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
720 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
721 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
723 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
726 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
727 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
729 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
735 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
738 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
739 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
740 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
741 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
743 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
744 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
745 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
746 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
747 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
748 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
750 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
751 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
752 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
757 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
758 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
759 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
762 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
765 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
768 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
769 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
770 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
771 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
772 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
774 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
775 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
778 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
779 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
783 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
784 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
785 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
786 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
787 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
788 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
789 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
791 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
792 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
797 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
798 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
800 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
801 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
803 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
804 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
805 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
806 /* Should never happen */
809 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
810 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
815 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
816 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
817 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
818 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
820 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
824 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
825 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
828 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
829 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
831 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
834 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
835 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
837 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
843 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
847 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
848 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
849 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
850 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
853 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
854 if (i == sent_sigslen
855 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
856 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
860 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
865 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
866 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
867 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
872 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
874 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
879 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
880 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
881 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
883 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
886 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
888 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
890 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
891 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
892 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
893 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
895 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
896 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
897 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
898 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
900 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
902 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
903 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
904 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
910 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
911 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
912 * @c: cipher to check
913 * @op: Security check that you want to do
915 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
917 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
919 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
920 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
922 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
924 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
925 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
927 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
928 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
931 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
934 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
936 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
938 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
941 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
943 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
944 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
954 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
955 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
956 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
957 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
958 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
961 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
963 PACKET extensions = *packet;
964 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
965 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
968 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
969 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
972 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
973 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
979 if (num_extensions <= 1)
982 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
983 if (extension_types == NULL) {
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
988 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
989 extensions = *packet;
990 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
992 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
993 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
994 /* This should not happen. */
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1000 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1004 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1005 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1006 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1007 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1012 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1016 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKETW *pkt, int *al)
1019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1020 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1022 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1024 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1025 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1027 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1028 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1030 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1031 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1032 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1033 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1041 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1042 if (s->renegotiate) {
1043 if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, 2)
1044 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(pkt, &spkt, 2)
1045 || !PACKETW_memcpy(&spkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1046 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1047 || !PACKETW_close(&spkt)) {
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1052 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1053 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1056 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1057 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1058 PACKETW slistpkt, hostpkt;
1060 if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, 2)
1061 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1062 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(pkt, &spkt, 2)
1063 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1064 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(&spkt, &slistpkt, 2)
1065 || !PACKETW_put_bytes(&slistpkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name, 1)
1066 /* Sub-packet for a single hostname host name */
1067 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(&slistpkt, &hostpkt, 2)
1068 || !PACKETW_memcpy(&hostpkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1069 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1070 || !PACKETW_close(&hostpkt)
1071 || !PACKETW_close(&slistpkt)
1072 || !PACKETW_close(&spkt)) {
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1077 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1078 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1079 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1082 if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, 2)
1083 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1084 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(pkt, &spkt, 2)
1085 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(&spkt, &loginpkt, 1)
1086 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1087 || !PACKETW_set_flags(&loginpkt,
1088 OPENSSL_PACKETW_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1089 || !PACKETW_memcpy(&loginpkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1090 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1091 || !PACKETW_close(&loginpkt)
1092 || !PACKETW_close(&spkt)) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1099 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1101 PACKETW formatspkt, curveslistpkt;
1104 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1106 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1107 size_t num_curves, num_formats;
1110 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1112 if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, 2)
1113 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1114 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(pkt, &spkt, 2)
1115 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(&spkt, &formatspkt, 1)
1116 || !PACKETW_memcpy(&formatspkt, pformats, num_formats)
1117 || !PACKETW_close(&formatspkt)
1118 || !PACKETW_close(&spkt)) {
1119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1124 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1126 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1127 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1132 if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, 2)
1133 /* Sub-packet for curves extension */
1134 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(pkt, &spkt, 2)
1135 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(&spkt, &curveslistpkt, 2)) {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1139 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1140 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1141 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1142 if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(&curveslistpkt, pcurves[0], 1)
1143 || !PACKETW_put_bytes(&curveslistpkt, pcurves[1], 1)) {
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1145 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1150 if (!PACKETW_close(&curveslistpkt) || !PACKETW_close(&spkt)) {
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1155 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1157 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1159 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1160 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1161 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1162 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1163 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1164 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1165 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1169 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1170 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1171 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1174 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1175 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1178 if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, 2)
1179 /* Sub-packet for ticket extension */
1180 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(pkt, &spkt, 2)
1181 || !PACKETW_memcpy(&spkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)
1182 || !PACKETW_close(&spkt)) {
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1189 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1191 const unsigned char *salg;
1192 PACKETW salgslistpkt;
1194 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1196 if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, 2)
1197 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1198 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(pkt, &spkt, 2)
1199 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1200 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(&spkt, &salgslistpkt, 2)
1201 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, &salgslistpkt, salg, salglen)
1202 || !PACKETW_close(&salgslistpkt)
1203 || !PACKETW_close(&spkt)) {
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1209 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1210 PACKETW idspkt, extpkt;
1213 if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, 2)
1214 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1215 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(pkt, &spkt, 2)
1216 || !PACKETW_put_bytes(&spkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp, 1)
1217 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1218 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(&spkt, &idspkt, 2)) {
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1222 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1223 unsigned char *idbytes;
1228 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1229 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1231 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1232 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(&idspkt, &idpkt, 1)
1233 || !PACKETW_allocate_bytes(&idpkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1234 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen
1235 || !PACKETW_close(&idpkt)) {
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1240 if (!PACKETW_close(&idspkt)
1241 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(&spkt, &extpkt, 2)) {
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1245 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1246 unsigned char *extbytes;
1247 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1253 if (!PACKETW_allocate_bytes(&extpkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1254 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1260 if (!PACKETW_close(&extpkt) || !PACKETW_close(&spkt)) {
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1267 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1272 * 1: peer may send requests
1273 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1275 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1276 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1278 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1280 if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, 2)
1281 /* Sub-packet for Hearbeat extension */
1282 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(pkt, &spkt, 2)
1283 || !PACKETW_put_bytes(&spkt, mode, 1)
1284 || !PACKETW_close(&spkt)) {
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1291 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1292 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1294 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1295 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1297 if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, 2)
1298 || !PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1306 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1307 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1308 * (see longer comment below)
1310 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1313 if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt,
1314 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, 2)
1315 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1316 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(pkt, &spkt, 2)
1317 /* Sub-packet for ALPN proto list */
1318 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(&spkt, &plistpkt, 2)
1319 || !PACKETW_memcpy(&plistpkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1320 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1321 || !PACKETW_close(&plistpkt)
1322 || !PACKETW_close(&spkt)) {
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1326 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1329 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1330 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = 0;
1331 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1335 if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, 2)
1336 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1337 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(pkt, &spkt, 2)
1338 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1339 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(&spkt, &plistpkt, 2)) {
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1343 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1344 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1345 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1346 if (prof == NULL || !PACKETW_put_bytes(&plistpkt, prof->id, 2)) {
1347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1351 if (!PACKETW_close(&plistpkt) || !PACKETW_close(&spkt)) {
1352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1357 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1358 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1359 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1364 if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, 2)
1365 || !PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1371 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1372 if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, 2)
1373 || !PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1380 if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, 2)
1381 || !PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, 0, 2)) {
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1387 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1388 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1389 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1392 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1393 unsigned char *padbytes;
1396 if (!PACKETW_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1401 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1402 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1408 if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, 2)
1409 || !PACKETW_get_sub_packet_len(pkt, &spkt, 2)
1410 || !PACKETW_allocate_bytes(&spkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1414 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1415 if (!PACKETW_close(&spkt)) {
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1426 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1427 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1430 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1431 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1433 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1436 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1437 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1438 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1439 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1444 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1446 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1449 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1454 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1457 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1460 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1468 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1469 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1472 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1473 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1474 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1477 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1482 const unsigned char *plist;
1485 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1489 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1491 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1493 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1495 if (plistlen > 255) {
1496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1500 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1501 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1502 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1503 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1508 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1511 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1513 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1514 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1516 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1520 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1523 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1526 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1527 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1533 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1536 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1537 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1541 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1544 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1547 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1555 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1556 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1557 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1558 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1559 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1560 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1561 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1562 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1563 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1564 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1566 if (limit - ret < 36)
1568 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1573 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1574 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1575 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1577 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1581 * 1: peer may send requests
1582 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1584 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1585 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1587 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1593 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1594 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1595 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1596 const unsigned char *npa;
1597 unsigned int npalen;
1600 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1602 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1603 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1604 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1606 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1608 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1610 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1614 if (!custom_ext_add_old(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1616 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1618 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1619 * for other cases too.
1621 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1622 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1623 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1624 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1625 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1627 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1631 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1632 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1636 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1637 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1638 unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1640 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1642 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1646 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1652 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1655 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1660 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1661 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1662 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1663 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1665 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1667 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1669 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1671 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1672 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1676 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1678 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1679 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1680 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1683 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1685 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1686 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1687 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1695 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1696 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1697 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1699 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1701 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1702 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1704 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1705 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1706 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1707 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1708 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1710 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1711 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1712 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1713 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1714 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1717 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1719 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1720 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1723 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1731 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1733 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1734 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1735 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1740 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1741 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1742 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1743 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1745 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1751 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1752 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1753 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1754 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1755 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1756 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1757 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1759 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1760 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1761 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1762 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1763 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1764 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1765 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1766 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1767 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1768 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1769 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1770 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1771 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1774 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1775 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1779 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1780 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1781 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1785 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1788 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1789 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1791 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1794 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1797 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1798 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1800 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1801 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1804 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1805 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1807 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1810 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1813 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1814 s->servername_done = 0;
1815 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1816 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1817 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1820 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1821 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1822 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1823 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1824 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1825 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1827 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1828 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1832 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1833 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1834 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1836 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1837 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1838 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1839 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1842 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1843 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1846 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1848 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1851 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1854 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1858 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1859 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1862 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1864 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1867 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1868 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1869 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1870 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1872 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1873 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1875 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1876 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1879 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1881 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1882 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1883 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1884 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1885 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1886 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1887 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1888 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1889 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1890 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1891 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1892 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1893 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1894 * the value of the Host: field.
1895 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1896 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1897 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1899 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1903 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1904 unsigned int servname_type;
1905 PACKET sni, hostname;
1907 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1908 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1909 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1914 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1915 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1916 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1918 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1919 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1920 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1922 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1923 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1925 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1926 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1927 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1932 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1933 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1937 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1938 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1942 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1943 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1947 s->servername_done = 1;
1950 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1951 * fall back to a full handshake.
1953 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1954 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1955 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1959 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1962 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
1965 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1969 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1970 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1972 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1973 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1979 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1980 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1981 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1983 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
1984 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1989 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1990 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1992 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1993 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1997 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1998 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
2000 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
2001 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
2002 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
2003 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
2008 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
2009 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2011 session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2012 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2017 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2018 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2019 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2020 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
2021 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
2022 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2024 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2027 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2028 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2030 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
2031 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2032 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2037 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2038 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2042 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2043 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2044 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2047 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2048 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2049 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2050 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2051 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2052 (&extension, &responder_id_list))
2055 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2057 PACKET responder_id;
2058 const unsigned char *id_data;
2060 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2062 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2066 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL
2067 && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2068 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) {
2069 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2073 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2074 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2075 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2079 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2080 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2084 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2085 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2086 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2091 /* Read in request_extensions */
2092 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2095 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2096 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2097 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2098 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2099 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2100 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2101 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2102 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2103 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2111 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2113 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2117 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2118 unsigned int hbtype;
2120 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2121 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2122 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2126 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2127 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2129 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2130 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2131 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2134 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2140 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2141 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2143 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2146 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2147 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2148 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2149 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2150 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2151 * anything like that, but this might change).
2153 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2154 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2155 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2156 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2157 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2159 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2163 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2164 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2165 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2169 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2171 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2172 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2173 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2177 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2178 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2180 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2181 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2185 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2186 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2187 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2188 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2189 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2192 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2193 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2198 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2200 * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
2202 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2208 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2210 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2211 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2212 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2214 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2219 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2220 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2221 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2222 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2227 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2230 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2231 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2232 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2235 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2244 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2245 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2246 * fill the length of the block.
2248 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2250 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2252 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2253 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2254 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2262 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2264 unsigned int length, type, size;
2265 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2266 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2268 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2269 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2271 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2273 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2274 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2276 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2277 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2280 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2282 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2284 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2287 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2288 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2292 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2293 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2297 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2298 const unsigned char *data;
2301 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2302 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2305 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2306 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2308 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2309 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2311 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2312 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2313 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2314 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2315 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2318 tlsext_servername = 1;
2320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2321 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2322 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2323 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2324 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2325 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2329 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2330 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2331 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2332 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2333 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2336 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2337 ecpointformatlist_length;
2338 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2339 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2340 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2341 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2347 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2349 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2350 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2351 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2352 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2354 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2357 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2358 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2361 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2362 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2364 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2367 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2368 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2371 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2372 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2376 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2377 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2378 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2380 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2381 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2382 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2383 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2384 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2385 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2387 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2389 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2390 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2391 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2394 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2399 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2400 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2401 unsigned char *selected;
2402 unsigned char selected_len;
2403 /* We must have requested it. */
2404 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2405 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2408 /* The data must be valid */
2409 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2410 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2413 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2416 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2417 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2418 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2421 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2422 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2423 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2426 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2427 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2428 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2432 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2434 /* We must have requested it. */
2435 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2436 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2440 * The extension data consists of:
2441 * uint16 list_length
2442 * uint8 proto_length;
2443 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2445 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2446 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2447 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2448 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2451 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2452 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2453 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2454 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2457 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2458 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2461 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2464 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2465 unsigned int hbtype;
2466 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2467 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2471 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2472 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2474 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2475 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2476 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2479 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2485 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2486 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2490 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2491 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2492 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2493 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2494 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2495 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2496 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2498 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2501 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2502 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2504 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2508 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2509 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2513 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2514 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2515 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2516 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2517 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2518 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2519 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2523 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2532 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2533 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2534 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2535 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2536 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2538 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2539 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2540 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2542 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2548 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2551 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2552 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2553 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2562 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2564 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2568 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2573 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2575 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2576 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2580 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2581 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2584 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2585 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2589 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2591 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2592 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2593 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2594 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2596 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2598 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2601 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2602 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2605 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2606 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2609 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2610 s->servername_done = 0;
2616 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2617 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2619 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2621 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2624 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2625 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2627 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2628 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2631 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2634 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2635 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2636 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2640 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2645 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2646 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2647 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2648 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2649 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2650 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2651 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2652 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2655 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2656 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2657 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2659 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2662 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2663 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2664 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2665 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2666 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2670 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2674 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2679 * Upon success, returns 1.
2680 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2682 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2684 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2687 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2688 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2689 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2690 * influence which certificate is sent
2692 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2694 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2695 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2696 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2697 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2699 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2700 * et al can pick it up.
2702 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2703 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2705 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2706 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2707 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2709 /* status request response should be sent */
2710 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2711 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2712 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2714 /* something bad happened */
2715 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2717 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2723 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2730 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2732 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2733 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2737 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2738 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2739 * must contain uncompressed.
2741 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2742 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2743 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2744 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2745 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2746 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2747 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2748 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2750 unsigned char *list;
2751 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2752 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2753 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2754 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2755 found_uncompressed = 1;
2759 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2761 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2765 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2766 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2768 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2770 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2771 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2772 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2773 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2775 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2777 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2780 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2781 * that we don't receive a status message
2783 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2784 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2785 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2788 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2789 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2792 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2793 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2796 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2797 s->servername_done = 0;
2803 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2806 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2808 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2809 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2813 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2821 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2822 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2823 * need to be handled at the same time.
2825 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2828 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2829 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2830 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2831 * point to the resulting session.
2833 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2834 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2835 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2838 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2839 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2840 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2841 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2842 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2843 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2844 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2847 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2848 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2849 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2850 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2851 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2852 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2854 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2857 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2858 const PACKET *session_id,
2862 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2865 int have_ticket = 0;
2866 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2869 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2870 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2873 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2876 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2879 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2883 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2884 unsigned int type, size;
2886 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2887 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2888 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2892 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2896 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2898 const unsigned char *etick;
2900 /* Duplicate extension */
2901 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2909 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2912 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2916 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2918 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2919 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2920 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2921 * calculate the master secret later.
2926 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2927 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2931 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2932 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2934 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2935 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2938 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2941 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2942 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2945 default: /* fatal error */
2951 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2952 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2953 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2959 if (have_ticket == 0)
2966 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2968 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2969 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2970 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2971 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2972 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2973 * point to the resulting session.
2976 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2977 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2978 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2979 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2980 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2982 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2983 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2984 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2987 unsigned char *sdec;
2988 const unsigned char *p;
2989 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2990 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2991 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2992 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2993 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2995 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2996 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2999 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3004 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3005 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3006 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3017 /* Check key name matches */
3018 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3019 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3023 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3024 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3025 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3026 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3027 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3028 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3034 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3037 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3041 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3043 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3048 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3049 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3050 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3053 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3054 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3055 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3058 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3059 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3060 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3061 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3062 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3063 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3064 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3068 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3069 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3074 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3078 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3082 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3083 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3084 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3088 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3089 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3098 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3102 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3103 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3107 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3114 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3115 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3116 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3117 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3118 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3119 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3120 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3121 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3122 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3123 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3126 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3127 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3128 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3129 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3130 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3131 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3132 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3135 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3138 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3139 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3145 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3148 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3149 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3150 return table[i].nid;
3155 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3160 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3163 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3166 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3167 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3171 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3173 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3180 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3183 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3184 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3185 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3186 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3187 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3188 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3189 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3190 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3191 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3192 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3193 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3194 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3197 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3203 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3204 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3205 return tls12_md_info + i;
3211 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3213 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3214 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3216 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3219 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3222 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3226 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3227 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3230 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3231 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3234 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3235 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3238 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3239 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3241 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3242 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3244 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3245 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3251 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3252 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3253 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3255 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3256 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3258 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3259 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3261 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3263 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3264 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3266 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3268 if (psignhash_nid) {
3269 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3270 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3271 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3275 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3276 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3278 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3279 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3280 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3282 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3283 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3285 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3286 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3290 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3291 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3295 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3297 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3298 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3299 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3301 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3302 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3303 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3305 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3306 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3307 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3308 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3309 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3310 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3315 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3316 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3321 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3322 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3329 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3331 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3333 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3337 * Old version of the tls12_copy_sigalgs function used by code that has not
3338 * yet been converted to PACKETW yet. It will be deleted once PACKETW conversion
3342 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs_old(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3343 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3345 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3347 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3348 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3349 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3350 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3353 return tmpout - out;
3356 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKETW *pkt,
3357 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3360 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3361 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3362 if (!PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, psig[0], 1)
3363 || !PACKETW_put_bytes(pkt, psig[1], 1))
3370 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3371 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3372 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3373 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3375 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3376 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3377 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3378 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3379 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3381 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3382 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3385 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3386 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3387 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3389 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3399 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3400 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3402 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3403 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3405 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3407 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3409 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3410 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3411 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3412 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3413 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3414 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3415 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3416 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3417 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3418 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3420 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3421 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3424 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3425 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3429 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3430 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3432 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3434 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3437 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3441 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3442 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3446 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3448 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3451 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3452 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3454 /* Should never happen */
3458 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3459 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3460 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3462 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3463 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3467 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3472 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3473 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3475 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3476 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3479 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3480 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3481 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3482 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3483 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3485 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3486 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3487 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3488 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3494 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3495 * the certificate for signing.
3497 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3499 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3500 * supported it stays as NULL.
3502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3503 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3504 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3507 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3508 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3509 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3513 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3514 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3517 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3518 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3519 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3520 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3521 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3522 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3523 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3524 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3530 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3531 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3532 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3534 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3539 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3546 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3548 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3551 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3552 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3553 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3555 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3556 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3560 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3562 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3564 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3566 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3568 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3569 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3572 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3576 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3579 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3581 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3582 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3583 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3584 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3585 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3586 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3588 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3589 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3590 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3594 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3596 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3599 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3602 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3604 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3606 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3608 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3616 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3617 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3619 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3622 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3623 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3626 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3627 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3632 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3633 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3635 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3639 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3643 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3646 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3648 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3653 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3654 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3656 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3657 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3658 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3660 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3667 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3668 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3669 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3671 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3672 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3673 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3679 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3683 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3687 if (default_nid == -1)
3689 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3691 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3692 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3693 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3698 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3699 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3703 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3704 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3705 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3712 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3713 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3714 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3715 * attempting to use them.
3718 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3720 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3721 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3722 /* Strict mode flags */
3723 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3724 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3725 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3727 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3732 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3733 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3736 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3737 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3739 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3742 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3744 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3745 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3747 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3749 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3750 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3756 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3759 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3761 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3762 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3764 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3771 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3772 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3773 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3774 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3775 else if (!check_flags)
3780 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3781 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3783 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3785 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3786 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3788 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3791 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3792 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3793 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3794 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3797 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3798 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3799 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3803 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3804 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3807 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3808 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3809 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3812 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3813 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3814 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3817 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3818 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3819 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3828 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3829 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3831 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3833 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3834 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3835 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3838 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3845 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3846 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3850 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3851 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3852 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3853 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3855 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3862 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3863 else if (check_flags)
3864 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3866 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3867 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3868 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3869 else if (!check_flags)
3872 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3873 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3874 else if (strict_mode) {
3875 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3876 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3877 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3878 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3880 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3887 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3888 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3890 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3892 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3895 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3898 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3902 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3906 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3908 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3909 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3911 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3912 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3913 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3917 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3920 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3922 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3924 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3925 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3927 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3928 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3929 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3931 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3932 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3933 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3934 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3935 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3940 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3943 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3945 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3946 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3950 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3951 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3952 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3953 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3954 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3956 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3959 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3963 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3966 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3967 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3974 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3975 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3977 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3978 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3979 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3980 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3981 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3982 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3983 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3986 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3987 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3989 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3993 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3995 int dh_secbits = 80;
3996 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3997 return DH_get_1024_160();
3998 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3999 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4004 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4005 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4008 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4016 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4017 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4019 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4020 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4028 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4029 return DH_get_2048_224();
4030 return DH_get_1024_160();
4034 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4037 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4040 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4041 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4042 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4043 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4045 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4048 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4050 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4053 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4055 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4056 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4057 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4058 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4060 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4061 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4063 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4064 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4067 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4069 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4072 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4075 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4077 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4078 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4080 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4081 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4083 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4084 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4089 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4090 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4091 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4094 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4096 int rv, start_idx, i;
4098 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4103 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4107 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4108 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4109 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);