2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
27 tls1_generate_master_secret,
28 tls1_change_cipher_state,
29 tls1_final_finish_mac,
30 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
31 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
33 tls1_export_keying_material,
35 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
36 tls_close_construct_packet,
40 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
44 tls1_generate_master_secret,
45 tls1_change_cipher_state,
46 tls1_final_finish_mac,
47 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
48 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
50 tls1_export_keying_material,
51 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
52 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
53 tls_close_construct_packet,
57 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
61 tls1_generate_master_secret,
62 tls1_change_cipher_state,
63 tls1_final_finish_mac,
64 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
65 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
67 tls1_export_keying_material,
68 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
69 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
70 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
71 tls_close_construct_packet,
75 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
78 tls13_setup_key_block,
79 tls13_generate_master_secret,
80 tls13_change_cipher_state,
81 tls13_final_finish_mac,
82 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
83 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
85 tls1_export_keying_material,
86 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
87 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
88 tls_close_construct_packet,
92 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
95 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
96 * http, the cache would over fill
105 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
109 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
111 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
115 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
118 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
119 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
121 s->version = s->method->version;
124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
127 int nid; /* Curve NID */
128 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
129 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
133 * Table of curve information.
134 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
135 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
137 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
138 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
139 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
140 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
141 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
142 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
143 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
144 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
145 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
146 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
147 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
148 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
149 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
150 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
151 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
152 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
153 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
154 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
155 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
156 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
157 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
158 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
159 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
160 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
161 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
162 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
165 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
166 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
169 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
170 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
171 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
172 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
175 /* The default curves */
176 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
177 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
178 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
179 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
180 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
183 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
184 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
185 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
188 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
190 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
191 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
192 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
194 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
196 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
200 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
203 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
204 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
211 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
213 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
214 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
215 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
216 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
217 * lists in the first place.
218 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
219 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
220 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
222 int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves,
225 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
228 *pcurves = s->session->ext.supportedgroups;
229 pcurveslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len;
231 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
232 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
233 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
234 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
235 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
238 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
239 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
243 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
244 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
248 *pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
249 pcurveslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
252 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
253 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
257 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
258 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
263 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
267 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
268 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
270 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
273 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
275 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
276 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
277 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
280 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
283 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
284 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
286 const unsigned char *curves;
287 size_t num_curves, i;
288 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
289 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
291 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
293 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
296 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
297 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
299 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
300 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
302 } else /* Should never happen */
305 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
307 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
308 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
309 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
315 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
316 * if there is no match.
317 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
318 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
319 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
321 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
323 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
324 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
327 /* Can't do anything on client side */
331 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
333 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
334 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
336 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
338 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
339 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
341 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
342 /* Should never happen */
345 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
349 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
350 * but s->options is a long...
352 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
353 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
355 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
356 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
357 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
358 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
360 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
362 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
363 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
365 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
366 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
367 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
370 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
372 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
380 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
384 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
385 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
387 unsigned char *glist, *p;
390 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
393 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
394 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
397 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
398 unsigned long idmask;
400 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
401 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
403 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
412 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
416 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
420 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
423 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
425 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
431 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
433 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
435 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
437 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
438 if (nid == NID_undef)
439 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
440 if (nid == NID_undef)
441 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
442 if (nid == NID_undef)
444 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
445 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
447 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
451 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
452 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
456 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
460 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
463 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
464 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
471 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
472 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
475 /* Determine curve ID */
476 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
477 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
478 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
482 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
484 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
486 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
487 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
489 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
490 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
492 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
498 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
499 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
500 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
502 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
503 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
506 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
507 * supported (see RFC4492).
509 if (comp_id && s->session->ext.ecpointformats) {
510 pformats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats;
511 num_formats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len;
512 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
513 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
516 if (i == num_formats)
521 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
522 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
523 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
525 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
527 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
528 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
529 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
530 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
531 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
535 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
536 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
541 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
548 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
552 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
554 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
555 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
556 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
558 *pformats = ecformats_default;
559 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
561 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
563 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
568 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
569 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
571 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
573 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
576 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
579 /* If not EC nothing to do */
580 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
582 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
586 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
589 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
593 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
594 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
596 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
602 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
603 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
604 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
605 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
606 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
608 return 0; /* Should never happen */
609 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
610 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
612 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
614 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
615 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
616 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
618 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
624 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
626 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
628 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
630 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
631 * is compatible with the client extensions.
633 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
635 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
638 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
641 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
642 unsigned char curve_id[2];
643 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
644 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
645 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
646 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
647 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
651 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
652 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
656 /* Need a shared curve */
657 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
661 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
665 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
670 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
672 /* Default sigalg schemes */
673 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
675 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
676 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
677 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
680 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
681 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
682 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
684 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
685 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
686 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
689 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
691 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
693 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
695 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
696 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
697 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
702 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
703 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
704 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
708 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
710 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
711 NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
712 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
713 NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
714 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
715 NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
716 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
717 NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
719 {"rsa_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
720 NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, NID_undef, NID_undef},
721 {"rsa_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
722 NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, NID_undef, NID_undef},
723 {"rsa_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
724 NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, NID_undef, NID_undef},
725 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
726 NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
727 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
728 NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
729 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
730 NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
731 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
732 NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
734 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
735 NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_DSA, NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
736 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
737 NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_DSA, NID_undef, NID_undef},
738 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
739 NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_DSA, NID_undef, NID_undef},
740 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
741 NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_DSA, NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
744 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
745 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, NID_undef,
747 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
748 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, NID_undef,
750 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
751 NID_id_GostR3411_94, NID_id_GostR3410_2001, NID_undef, NID_undef}
755 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
756 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
759 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
761 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
763 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
769 static int tls_sigalg_get_hash(uint16_t sigalg)
771 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *r = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigalg);
773 return r != NULL ? r->hash : 0;
776 static int tls_sigalg_get_sig(uint16_t sigalg)
778 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *r = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigalg);
780 return r != NULL ? r->sig : 0;
783 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
786 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
790 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
791 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
792 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
793 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
795 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
796 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
799 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
800 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
805 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
806 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
807 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
809 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
810 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
811 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
812 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
813 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
814 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
816 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
817 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
822 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
823 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
826 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
828 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
829 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
831 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
832 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
833 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
835 /* Should never happen */
838 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
839 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
840 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
841 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
843 * Check sigalgs is known and key type is consistent with signature:
844 * RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
846 if (lu == NULL || (pkeyid != lu->sig
847 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
848 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
851 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
852 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
853 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
854 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
855 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
857 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
861 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
862 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
865 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
866 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != NID_sha256) {
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
868 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
871 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
872 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != NID_sha384) {
873 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
874 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
880 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
884 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
885 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
886 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
887 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
890 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
891 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
892 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
896 md = tls12_get_hash(lu->hash);
898 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
902 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical reasons we
903 * have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
905 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
906 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
907 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
908 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
909 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
914 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
916 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = md;
917 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
921 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
923 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
925 *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
930 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
931 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
932 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
934 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
937 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
939 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
941 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
942 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
943 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
944 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
946 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
947 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
948 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
949 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
951 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
953 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
954 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
955 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
961 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
962 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
963 * @c: cipher to check
964 * @op: Security check that you want to do
966 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
968 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
970 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
971 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
973 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
975 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
976 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
978 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
979 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
982 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
985 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
987 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
989 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
992 /* Initialise digests to default values */
993 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
995 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
997 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1000 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1001 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
1003 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
1004 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
1006 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1007 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
1009 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1010 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
1011 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
1012 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
1016 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1021 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1022 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1023 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1024 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1025 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1026 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1027 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
1028 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1031 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
1032 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
1033 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1035 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1038 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
1039 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
1040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1041 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1042 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1046 ssl_set_default_md(s);
1050 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1055 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1057 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1058 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1059 * point to the resulting session.
1061 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1062 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1063 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1066 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1067 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1068 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1069 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1070 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1071 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1072 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1075 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1076 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1077 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1078 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1079 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1080 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1082 TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1087 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1090 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1093 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1094 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1097 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1100 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1101 if (!ticketext->present)
1104 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1107 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1110 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1111 return TICKET_EMPTY;
1113 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1115 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1116 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1117 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1118 * calculate the master secret later.
1120 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1123 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1124 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1126 case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1127 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1128 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1130 case TICKET_SUCCESS:
1131 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1133 case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1134 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1135 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1138 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1143 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1145 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1146 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1147 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1148 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1149 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1150 * point to the resulting session.
1152 TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1153 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1154 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1157 unsigned char *sdec;
1158 const unsigned char *p;
1159 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1160 TICKET_RETURN ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1162 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1163 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1164 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
1165 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
1167 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1168 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1170 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1171 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1173 ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1176 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1177 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1178 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1183 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1189 /* Check key name matches */
1190 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1191 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) {
1192 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1195 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
1196 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
1197 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1198 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1199 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
1201 + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
1206 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1209 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1213 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1215 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1216 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1220 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1221 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1222 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1225 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1226 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1227 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1228 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1230 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1231 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1232 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1233 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1234 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1235 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1236 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1237 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1239 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1241 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1242 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1244 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1247 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1251 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1255 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1256 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1257 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1261 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1262 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1265 return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1267 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1271 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1273 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1275 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1276 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1280 int tls12_get_sigandhash(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
1281 const EVP_MD *md, int *ispss)
1285 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1289 md_id = EVP_MD_type(md);
1290 sig_id = EVP_PKEY_id(pk);
1291 if (md_id == NID_undef)
1293 /* For TLS 1.3 only allow RSA-PSS */
1294 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sig_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1295 sig_id = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1297 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1298 /* Should never happen: we abort if no sigalgs extension and TLS 1.3 */
1299 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1301 /* For TLS 1.2 and no sigalgs lookup using complete table */
1302 for (i = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1304 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
1305 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curr->sigalg))
1307 *ispss = curr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1314 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1315 curr = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
1318 * Look for matching key and hash. If key type is RSA also match PSS
1321 if (curr->hash == md_id && (curr->sig == sig_id
1322 || (sig_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA && curr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS))){
1323 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curr->sigalg))
1325 *ispss = curr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1338 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
1339 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX},
1340 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX},
1341 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX},
1342 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX},
1343 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX},
1344 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX},
1345 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX},
1346 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX},
1347 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX},
1350 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(int hash_nid)
1353 if (hash_nid == NID_undef)
1356 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
1357 if (tls12_md_info[i].nid == hash_nid)
1358 return tls12_md_info + i;
1364 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(int hash_nid)
1366 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
1367 if (hash_nid == NID_md5 && FIPS_mode())
1369 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_nid);
1372 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
1375 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(int sig_nid)
1378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1380 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
1382 * For now return RSA key for PSS. When we support PSS only keys
1383 * this will need to be updated.
1385 case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
1386 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
1388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1390 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
1392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1394 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
1396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1397 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
1398 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1400 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
1401 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1403 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
1404 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
1410 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1411 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, unsigned int ptmp)
1413 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
1414 const tls12_hash_info *hinf
1415 = tls12_get_hash_info(tls_sigalg_get_hash(ptmp));
1416 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1418 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
1420 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1421 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(tls_sigalg_get_sig(ptmp)) == -1)
1423 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1424 sigalgstr[0] = (ptmp >> 8) & 0xff;
1425 sigalgstr[1] = ptmp & 0xff;
1426 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)sigalgstr);
1430 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1431 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1435 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1437 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1438 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1439 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1441 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1442 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
1443 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
1445 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1446 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i ++, sigalgs++) {
1447 switch (tls_sigalg_get_sig(*sigalgs)) {
1448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1449 /* Any RSA-PSS signature algorithms also mean we allow RSA */
1450 case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
1452 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1458 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1464 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1471 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1473 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1475 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1478 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1479 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1483 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1484 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, *psig)) {
1485 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1492 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1493 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1494 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1495 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1497 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1498 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1499 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1500 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1501 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, *ptmp))
1503 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1504 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1507 *shsig = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1517 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1518 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1520 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1521 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1523 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1525 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1527 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1528 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1529 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1530 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1531 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1532 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1533 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1534 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1535 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1536 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1538 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1539 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1542 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1543 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1547 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1548 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1550 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1552 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs));
1555 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1559 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1560 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1564 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1566 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1572 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1573 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1575 /* Should never happen */
1579 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1581 /* Invalid data length */
1582 if ((size & 1) != 0)
1587 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1588 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(size
1589 * sizeof(*s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs));
1590 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
1592 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = size;
1593 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1594 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs[i] = stmp;
1602 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1607 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
1608 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1611 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1614 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1615 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i];
1617 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1618 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1620 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->sig);
1621 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
1622 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->hash);
1624 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
1625 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
1626 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
1627 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
1633 * In strict mode or TLS1.3 leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
1634 * use the certificate for signing.
1636 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1637 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1639 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
1640 * supported it stays as NULL.
1642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1643 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
1644 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
1646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1647 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
1648 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
1649 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
1652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1653 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
1654 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
1656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1657 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
1658 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
1659 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
1660 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
1661 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
1662 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
1663 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
1664 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
1670 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1671 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1672 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1674 uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1675 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1676 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1679 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1681 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1685 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1687 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1688 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1690 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1692 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1693 if (psignhash != NULL)
1694 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1696 return (int)numsigalgs;
1699 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1700 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1701 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1703 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1704 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1705 || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1706 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1708 shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1710 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1712 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1713 if (psignhash != NULL)
1714 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1716 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1718 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1719 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1722 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1723 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1727 int sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1730 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1732 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1733 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1734 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1735 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1736 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1737 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1738 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1739 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1741 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1742 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1743 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1746 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1747 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1749 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1751 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1753 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
1754 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1757 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
1759 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1761 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1763 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1764 /* See if we have a match for TLS 1.3 names */
1766 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
1768 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1770 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
1781 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1782 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1785 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
1788 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
1789 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
1792 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
1793 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
1798 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1799 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1801 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1805 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
1809 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
1812 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
1814 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
1819 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs));
1820 if (sigalgs == NULL)
1822 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
1824 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1825 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
1826 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
1828 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1830 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
1831 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
1836 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1841 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
1842 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1843 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1845 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
1846 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1847 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1853 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
1857 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
1861 if (default_nid == -1)
1863 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
1865 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
1866 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
1867 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
1872 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1873 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
1877 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1878 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
1879 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
1886 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1887 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1888 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1889 * attempting to use them.
1892 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
1894 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1895 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1896 /* Strict mode flags */
1897 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1898 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1899 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1901 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
1906 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
1907 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
1910 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
1911 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1913 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1916 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
1918 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
1919 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1921 pk = cpk->privatekey;
1923 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
1924 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1930 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
1933 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1935 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1936 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
1938 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
1945 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1946 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
1947 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
1948 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1949 else if (!check_flags)
1954 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1955 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1957 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
1960 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
1962 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1965 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
1966 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
1967 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1968 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
1971 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1972 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1973 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
1977 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1978 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
1981 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1982 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
1983 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
1986 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1987 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
1988 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
1991 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1992 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
1993 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2002 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2003 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2005 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2007 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2008 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2009 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(*p) == NID_sha1
2010 && tls_sigalg_get_sig(*p) == rsign)
2013 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2020 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2021 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
2025 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2026 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2027 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2028 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2030 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2037 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2038 else if (check_flags)
2039 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2041 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2042 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
2043 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2044 else if (!check_flags)
2047 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2048 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2049 else if (strict_mode) {
2050 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2051 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2052 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2053 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2055 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2062 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2063 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2065 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2067 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2070 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2073 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2077 const unsigned char *ctypes;
2081 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
2083 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2084 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
2086 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
2087 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
2088 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2092 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2095 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2097 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
2099 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2100 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2102 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2103 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2104 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2106 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2107 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2108 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2109 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2110 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2115 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2118 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2120 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2121 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2125 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2126 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
2127 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2128 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
2129 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2131 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2134 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2138 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
2141 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2142 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2149 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2150 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2152 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
2153 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
2154 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2155 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2156 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2157 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2158 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2161 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
2162 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2164 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2168 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2170 int dh_secbits = 80;
2171 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2172 return DH_get_1024_160();
2173 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2174 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2179 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2180 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
2183 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2191 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2192 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2194 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2195 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2203 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2204 return DH_get_2048_224();
2205 return DH_get_1024_160();
2209 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2212 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2215 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2216 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2217 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2218 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2220 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2223 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2225 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2228 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2230 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2231 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
2232 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2233 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2235 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2236 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
2238 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
2239 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
2242 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
2244 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
2247 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2250 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2252 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2253 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2255 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2256 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2258 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2259 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2264 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
2265 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2266 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2269 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2271 int rv, start_idx, i;
2273 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2278 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2282 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2283 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2284 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);