2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
249 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
250 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
254 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
256 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
261 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
263 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
264 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
265 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
266 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
268 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
269 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
272 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
273 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
277 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
278 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
279 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
280 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
281 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
282 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
283 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
286 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
287 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
288 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
295 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
296 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
299 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
301 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
302 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
303 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
305 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
308 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
310 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
313 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
315 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
319 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
321 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
325 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
327 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
329 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
331 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
333 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
335 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
337 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
339 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
341 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
343 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
345 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
347 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
349 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
351 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
353 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
355 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
357 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
359 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
361 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
363 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
365 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
367 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
373 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
376 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
377 const unsigned char **pcurves,
382 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
383 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
386 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
387 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
389 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
390 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
391 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
394 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
395 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
399 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
400 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
404 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
405 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
409 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
410 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
413 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
414 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
416 const unsigned char *curves;
418 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
419 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
421 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
424 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
427 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
429 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
432 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
434 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
437 else /* Should never happen */
440 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
441 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
443 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
449 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
450 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
454 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
456 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
457 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
459 /* Can't do anything on client side */
466 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
467 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
470 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
472 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
473 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
474 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
475 /* Should never happen */
478 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
481 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
483 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
488 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
490 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
491 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
493 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
497 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
498 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
509 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
510 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
512 unsigned char *clist, *p;
514 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
515 * while curve ids < 32
517 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
518 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
521 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
523 unsigned long idmask;
525 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
527 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
538 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
542 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
547 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
550 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
552 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
556 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
558 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
560 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
562 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
563 if (nid == NID_undef)
564 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
565 if (nid == NID_undef)
566 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
567 if (nid == NID_undef)
569 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
570 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
572 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
575 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
576 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
581 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
585 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
587 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
588 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
593 const EC_METHOD *meth;
596 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
597 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
600 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
603 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
607 /* Determine curve ID */
608 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
610 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
614 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
626 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
628 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
631 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
633 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
636 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
640 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
641 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
642 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
644 const unsigned char *p;
647 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
648 * is supported (see RFC4492).
650 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
652 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
653 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
654 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
664 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
665 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
667 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
668 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
670 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
675 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
682 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
685 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
687 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
689 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
694 *pformats = ecformats_default;
695 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
697 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
699 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
703 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
704 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
706 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
708 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
711 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
714 /* If not EC nothing to do */
715 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
720 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
724 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
725 * supported curves extension.
727 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
730 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
731 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
733 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
740 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
741 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
742 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
743 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
744 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
746 return 0; /* Should never happen */
747 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
748 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
750 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
754 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
755 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
757 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
762 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
763 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
765 unsigned char curve_id[2];
766 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
767 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
768 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
769 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
772 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
773 * no other curves permitted.
777 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
778 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
779 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
780 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
781 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
785 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
786 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
788 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
789 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
791 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
794 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
797 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
799 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
805 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
807 /* Need a shared curve */
808 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
814 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
819 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
821 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
825 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
831 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
836 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
840 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
841 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
850 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
851 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
853 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
856 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
857 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
859 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
862 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
863 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
864 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
865 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
867 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
869 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
870 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
873 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
877 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
881 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
882 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
883 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
886 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
888 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
892 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
894 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
895 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
896 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
907 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
908 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
910 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
911 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
913 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
915 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
916 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
920 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
921 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
924 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
925 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
927 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
928 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
930 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
931 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
932 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
933 /* Should never happen */
936 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
937 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
943 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
945 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
946 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
947 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
949 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
954 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
959 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
961 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
964 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
968 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
970 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
973 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
981 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
985 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
986 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
987 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
989 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
992 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
993 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
998 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1004 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1007 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1008 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1011 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1012 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1013 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1014 * session and not global settings.
1017 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1020 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1021 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1022 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1025 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1026 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1027 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1030 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1031 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1034 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1040 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1045 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1050 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1056 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1057 * signature algorithms.
1061 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1066 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1067 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1071 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1075 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1077 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1078 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1082 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1083 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1085 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1086 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1088 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1092 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1095 unsigned char *ret = p;
1096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1097 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1099 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1102 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1103 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1105 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1107 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1109 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1110 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1111 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1112 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1121 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1122 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1123 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1128 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1130 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1132 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1133 unsigned long size_str;
1136 /* check for enough space.
1137 4 for the servername type and entension length
1138 2 for servernamelist length
1139 1 for the hostname type
1140 2 for hostname length
1144 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1145 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1148 /* extension type and length */
1149 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1150 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1152 /* length of servername list */
1153 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1155 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1156 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1158 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1162 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1167 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1173 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1175 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1178 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1188 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1189 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1190 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1192 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1193 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 /* check for enough space.
1200 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1201 1 for the srp user identity
1202 + srp user identity length
1204 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1206 /* fill in the extension */
1207 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1208 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1209 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1210 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1218 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1220 const unsigned char *plist;
1223 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1225 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1226 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1234 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1235 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1236 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1239 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1240 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1241 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1243 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1244 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1245 if (plistlen > 65532)
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1252 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1254 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1255 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1256 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1257 * resolves this to two bytes.
1260 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1263 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1265 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1268 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1269 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1270 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1271 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1273 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1274 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1275 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1277 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1278 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1280 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1284 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1285 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1287 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1290 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1291 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1295 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1301 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1304 const unsigned char *salg;
1305 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1306 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1308 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1309 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1311 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1315 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1316 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1318 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1320 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1322 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1325 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1328 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1333 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1336 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1340 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1342 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1343 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1349 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1351 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1358 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1360 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1362 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1363 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1365 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1367 /* save position of id len */
1368 unsigned char *q = ret;
1369 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1370 /* skip over id len */
1372 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1378 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1382 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1383 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1386 * 1: peer may send requests
1387 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1389 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1390 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1392 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1396 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1398 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1399 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1400 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1402 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1407 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1409 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1411 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1412 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1413 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1414 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1415 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1416 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1419 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1423 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1425 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1427 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1430 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1438 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1439 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1442 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1444 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1446 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1447 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1449 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1450 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1451 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1455 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1459 return NULL; /* error */
1460 if (cb_retval == -1)
1461 continue; /* skip this extension */
1463 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1465 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1467 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1471 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1472 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1476 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1483 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1486 unsigned char *ret = p;
1487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1488 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1491 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1492 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1493 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1494 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1496 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1497 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1501 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1503 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1505 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1507 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1511 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1515 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1521 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1523 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1526 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1538 const unsigned char *plist;
1540 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1543 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1545 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1546 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1553 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1554 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1555 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1556 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1560 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1561 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1563 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1564 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1566 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1567 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1571 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1573 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1574 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1578 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1579 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1581 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1583 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1585 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1588 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1591 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1600 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1602 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1604 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1607 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1615 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1616 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1617 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1618 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1619 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1620 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1621 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1622 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1623 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1624 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1625 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1631 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1632 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1634 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1637 * 1: peer may send requests
1638 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1640 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1641 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1643 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1649 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1650 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1651 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1653 const unsigned char *npa;
1654 unsigned int npalen;
1657 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1658 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1660 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1661 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1663 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1665 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1670 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1671 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1675 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1678 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1680 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1682 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1683 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1685 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1686 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1689 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1692 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1696 return NULL; /* error */
1697 if (cb_retval == -1)
1698 break; /* skip this extension */
1699 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1701 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1703 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1710 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1711 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1713 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1714 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1716 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1717 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1720 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1726 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1728 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1729 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1731 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1733 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1737 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1741 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1748 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1750 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1751 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1752 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1755 * returns: 0 on success. */
1756 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1757 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1761 const unsigned char *selected;
1762 unsigned char selected_len;
1765 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1771 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1772 * length-prefixed strings. */
1773 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1774 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1783 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1785 proto_len = data[i];
1791 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1797 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1798 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1799 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1800 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1801 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1802 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1803 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1805 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1808 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1809 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1814 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1819 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1820 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1821 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1826 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1827 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1828 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1829 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1831 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1832 unsigned short type, size;
1833 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1834 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1835 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1836 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1837 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1838 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1839 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1841 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1842 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1843 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1844 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1847 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1848 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1849 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1850 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1851 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1852 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1853 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1854 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1855 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1856 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1859 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1868 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1871 if (data+size > d+n)
1875 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1877 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1878 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1880 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1882 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1884 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1889 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1891 if (data + len != d+n)
1893 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1897 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1899 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1901 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1903 unsigned short type;
1904 unsigned short size;
1906 unsigned char *data = *p;
1907 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1910 s->servername_done = 0;
1911 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1912 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1913 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1916 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1918 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1919 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1922 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1923 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1924 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1926 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
1927 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1931 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1932 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1935 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1936 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1937 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1938 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1940 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1941 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1943 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1944 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1946 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1947 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1949 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1950 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1952 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1953 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1955 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1956 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1959 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1960 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1963 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1967 if (data > (d+n-len))
1970 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1975 if (data+size > (d+n))
1978 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1980 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1981 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1982 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1983 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1985 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1986 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1987 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1988 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1989 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1990 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1991 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1992 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1993 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1994 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1995 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1996 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1997 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1998 the value of the Host: field.
1999 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2000 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2001 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2002 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2006 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2008 unsigned char *sdata;
2014 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2021 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2028 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2034 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2037 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2038 switch (servname_type)
2040 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2043 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2045 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2048 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2050 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2053 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2055 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2058 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2059 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2060 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2061 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2062 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2063 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2066 s->servername_done = 1;
2070 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2071 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2072 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2084 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2090 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2092 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2094 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2097 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2099 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2102 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2104 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2105 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2107 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2109 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2116 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2118 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2119 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2121 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2122 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2124 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2129 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2131 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2132 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2134 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2135 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2137 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2140 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2141 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2144 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2145 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2146 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2147 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2148 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2151 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2153 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2154 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2155 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2157 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2158 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2160 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2165 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2167 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2170 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2171 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2173 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2176 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2177 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2180 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2181 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2182 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2183 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2184 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2187 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2188 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2189 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2191 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2195 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2198 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2199 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2201 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2205 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2206 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2207 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2208 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2210 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2211 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2213 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2218 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2220 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2221 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2223 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2227 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2229 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2231 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2233 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2236 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2238 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2243 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2245 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2248 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2250 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2253 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2256 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2259 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2260 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2264 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
2265 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2270 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2274 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2276 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2278 const unsigned char *sdata;
2280 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2285 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2294 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2298 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2302 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2307 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2311 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2316 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2317 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2320 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2321 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2322 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2324 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2325 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2328 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2329 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2331 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2332 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2337 /* Read in request_extensions */
2340 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2347 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2353 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2355 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2356 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2359 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2360 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2362 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2363 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2365 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2370 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2374 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2377 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2381 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2382 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2384 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2385 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2386 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2388 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2394 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2395 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2396 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2398 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2401 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2402 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2403 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2404 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2405 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2406 * anything like that, but this might change).
2408 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2409 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2410 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2411 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2412 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2413 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2417 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2418 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2419 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2421 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2423 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2424 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2427 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2428 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2430 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2434 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2435 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2436 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2437 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2438 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2440 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2442 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2444 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2446 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2447 if (type == record->ext_type)
2451 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2452 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2454 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2456 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2461 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2462 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2465 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2466 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2467 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2468 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2469 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2470 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2472 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2473 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2476 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2477 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2481 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2482 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2483 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2493 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2495 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2496 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2498 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2500 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2503 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2504 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2505 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2510 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2513 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2515 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2519 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2528 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2529 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2530 * the length of the block. */
2531 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2533 unsigned int off = 0;
2547 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2549 unsigned short length;
2550 unsigned short type;
2551 unsigned short size;
2552 unsigned char *data = *p;
2553 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2554 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2557 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2560 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2562 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2563 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2567 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2568 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2571 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2572 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2575 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2579 if (data+length != d+n)
2581 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2585 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2590 if (data+size > (d+n))
2593 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2594 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2595 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2597 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2599 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2601 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2604 tlsext_servername = 1;
2607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2608 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2610 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2611 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2613 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2615 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2618 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2619 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2620 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2622 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2625 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2626 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2628 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2629 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2630 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2631 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2632 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2635 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2637 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2639 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2640 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2642 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2645 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2648 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2651 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2653 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2654 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2656 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2660 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2663 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2664 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2666 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2670 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2671 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2672 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2673 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2675 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2677 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2679 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2684 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2686 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2687 * a status request message.
2689 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2691 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2694 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2695 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2698 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2699 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2701 unsigned char *selected;
2702 unsigned char selected_len;
2704 /* We must have requested it. */
2705 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2707 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2710 /* The data must be valid */
2711 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2713 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2716 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2718 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2721 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2722 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2724 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2727 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2728 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2729 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2733 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2737 /* We must have requested it. */
2738 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2740 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2745 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2748 /* The extension data consists of:
2749 * uint16 list_length
2750 * uint8 proto_length;
2751 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2755 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2757 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2761 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2763 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2766 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2767 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2768 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2769 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2771 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2774 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2775 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2778 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2780 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2782 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2785 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2789 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2790 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2792 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2793 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2794 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2796 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2801 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2803 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2807 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2808 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2810 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2813 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2815 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2817 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2818 if (record->ext_type == type)
2820 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2826 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2827 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2829 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2830 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2831 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2840 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2844 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2846 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2848 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2850 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2851 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2853 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2859 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2869 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2870 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2871 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2872 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2873 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2874 * absence on initial connect only.
2876 if (!renegotiate_seen
2877 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2878 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2880 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2882 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2890 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2893 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2897 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2899 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2904 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2906 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2907 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2909 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2910 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2912 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2913 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2918 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2922 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2923 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2930 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2935 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2937 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2938 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2941 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2942 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2944 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2945 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2949 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2950 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2951 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2952 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2954 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2956 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2957 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2958 * so this has to happen here in
2959 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2963 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2965 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2968 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2969 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2974 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2975 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2976 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2978 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2980 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2981 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2983 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2984 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2986 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2987 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2989 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2990 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2992 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2993 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2996 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3000 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3002 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3003 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3004 * abort the handshake.
3006 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3007 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3015 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3016 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3019 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3020 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3023 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3024 s->servername_done=0;
3030 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3032 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3035 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3036 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3037 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3038 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3040 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3043 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3044 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3045 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3046 if (certpkey == NULL)
3048 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3051 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3052 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3054 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3055 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3058 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3059 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3060 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3062 /* status request response should be sent */
3063 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3064 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3065 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3067 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3069 /* something bad happened */
3070 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3071 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3072 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3077 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3082 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3083 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3086 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3087 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3095 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3097 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3098 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3101 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3102 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3103 * it must contain uncompressed.
3105 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3106 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3107 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3108 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3109 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3111 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3113 unsigned char *list;
3114 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3115 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3116 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3118 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3120 found_uncompressed = 1;
3124 if (!found_uncompressed)
3126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3130 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3131 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3133 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3134 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3135 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3136 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3138 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3139 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3141 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3142 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3144 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3146 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3147 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3150 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3151 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3152 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3153 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3155 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3156 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3161 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3164 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3165 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3168 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3169 * there is no response.
3171 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3173 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3174 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3176 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3177 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3180 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3181 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3185 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3186 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3192 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3193 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3196 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3197 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3200 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3201 s->servername_done=0;
3207 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3210 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3212 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3214 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3218 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3226 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3227 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3228 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3230 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3231 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3232 * extension, if any.
3233 * len: the length of the session ID.
3234 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3235 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3236 * point to the resulting session.
3238 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3239 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3240 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3243 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3244 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3245 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3246 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3247 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3248 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3249 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3252 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3253 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3254 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3255 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3256 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3257 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3259 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3260 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3262 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3263 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3267 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3269 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3270 * to permit stateful resumption.
3272 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3274 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3278 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3286 /* Skip past cipher list */
3291 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3296 /* Now at start of extensions */
3297 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3300 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3302 unsigned short type, size;
3305 if (p + size > limit)
3307 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3312 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3313 * currently have one. */
3314 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3317 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3319 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3320 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3321 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3322 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3323 * calculate the master secret later. */
3326 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3329 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3330 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3332 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3334 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3335 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3337 default: /* fatal error */
3346 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3348 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3349 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3350 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3351 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3352 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3353 * point to the resulting session.
3356 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3357 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3358 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3359 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3361 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3362 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3363 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3366 unsigned char *sdec;
3367 const unsigned char *p;
3368 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3369 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3372 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3373 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3376 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3377 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3378 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3379 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3381 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3382 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3393 /* Check key name matches */
3394 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3396 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3397 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3398 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3399 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3401 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3402 * integrity checks on ticket.
3404 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3407 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3411 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3412 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3413 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3414 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3415 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3417 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3418 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3419 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3420 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3421 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3424 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3427 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3428 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3431 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3434 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3438 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3439 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3440 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3441 * as required by standard.
3444 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3445 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3453 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3458 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3466 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3467 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3468 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3469 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3470 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3471 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3472 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3475 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3476 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3477 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3478 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3481 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3484 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3486 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3492 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3495 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3497 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3498 return table[i].nid;
3503 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3508 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3509 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3512 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3515 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3516 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3520 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3522 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3523 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3526 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3531 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3539 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3543 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3544 return EVP_sha224();
3546 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3547 return EVP_sha256();
3549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3550 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3551 return EVP_sha384();
3553 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3554 return EVP_sha512();
3562 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3567 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3568 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3571 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3572 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3575 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3576 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3582 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3583 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3584 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3586 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3587 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3589 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3591 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3592 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3594 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3596 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3598 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3599 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3601 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3605 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3606 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3607 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3609 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3612 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3613 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3614 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3615 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3617 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3618 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3619 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3621 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3622 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3624 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3626 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3628 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3633 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3634 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3635 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3637 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3648 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3649 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3651 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3652 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3654 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3656 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3657 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3658 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3660 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3661 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3663 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3665 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3666 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3669 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3670 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3674 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3675 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3681 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3682 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3684 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3687 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3690 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3691 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3692 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3697 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3699 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3705 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3706 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3707 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3709 /* Should never happen */
3713 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3714 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3716 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3717 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3719 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3721 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3722 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3724 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3725 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3727 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3729 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3731 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3734 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3735 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3736 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3737 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3738 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3740 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3741 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3747 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3748 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3750 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3751 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3753 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3754 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3755 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3756 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3758 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3759 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3764 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3765 * use the certificate for signing.
3767 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3769 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3770 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3773 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3774 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3777 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3779 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3780 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3784 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3792 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3793 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3794 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3796 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3802 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3809 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3811 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3814 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3815 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3816 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3818 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3819 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3823 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3825 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3827 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3829 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3831 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3832 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3838 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3840 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3841 unsigned short hbtype;
3842 unsigned int payload;
3843 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3845 /* Read type and payload length first */
3850 if (s->msg_callback)
3851 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3852 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3853 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3855 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3857 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3860 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3861 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3862 * payload, plus padding
3864 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3867 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3868 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3870 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3872 /* Random padding */
3873 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3875 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3877 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3878 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3879 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3880 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3882 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3887 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3891 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3892 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3893 * sequence number */
3896 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3899 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3907 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3909 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3911 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3912 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3914 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3915 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3916 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3918 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3922 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3923 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3925 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3929 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3930 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3936 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3937 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3939 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3941 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3942 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3943 * some random stuff.
3944 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3945 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3946 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3947 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3950 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3953 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3954 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3956 /* Sequence number */
3957 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3958 /* 16 random bytes */
3959 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3961 /* Random padding */
3962 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3964 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3967 if (s->msg_callback)
3968 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3969 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3970 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3972 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3981 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3986 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3989 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3991 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3994 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3995 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3997 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3999 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4001 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4009 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4010 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4011 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4012 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4013 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4014 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4017 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4018 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4019 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4020 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4023 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4025 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4026 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4029 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4030 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4034 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4035 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4036 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4040 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4044 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4047 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4049 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4054 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4055 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4057 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4059 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4060 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4061 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4062 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4064 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4072 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4073 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4074 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4075 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4079 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4080 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4081 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4082 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4088 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4092 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4096 if (default_nid == -1)
4098 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4100 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4101 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4102 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4106 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4107 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4111 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4112 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4114 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4120 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4121 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4122 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4123 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4126 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4128 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4129 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4130 /* Strict mode flags */
4131 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4132 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4133 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4135 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4140 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4141 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4143 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4144 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4147 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4151 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4154 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4156 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4158 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4159 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4162 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4163 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4164 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4166 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4167 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4176 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4179 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4180 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4181 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4183 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4191 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4192 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4193 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4196 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4202 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4203 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4206 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4209 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4210 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4212 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4217 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4218 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4219 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4220 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4221 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4224 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4225 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4226 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4227 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4231 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4232 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4240 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4241 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4244 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4247 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4248 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4250 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4253 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4261 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4262 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4264 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4267 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4268 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4269 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4271 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4276 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4284 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4285 else if(check_flags)
4286 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4288 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4289 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4290 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4291 else if (!check_flags)
4294 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4295 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4296 else if (strict_mode)
4298 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4299 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4301 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4302 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4306 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4314 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4316 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4321 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4324 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4327 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4332 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4333 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4334 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4335 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4336 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4341 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4346 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4350 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4351 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4353 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4355 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4357 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4361 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4365 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4368 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4370 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4371 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4373 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4375 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4376 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4378 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4380 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4382 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4383 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4385 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4390 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4394 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4396 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4397 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4401 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4403 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4404 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4405 else if (cpk->digest)
4406 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4409 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4411 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4412 * if the chain is invalid.
4416 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4417 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4420 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4421 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4428 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4429 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4431 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4432 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4433 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4434 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4435 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4436 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4438 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4439 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4441 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);