2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include "ssl_locl.h"
119 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
122 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
123 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
124 SSL_SESSION **psess);
127 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
130 tls1_setup_key_block,
131 tls1_generate_master_secret,
132 tls1_change_cipher_state,
133 tls1_final_finish_mac,
134 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
135 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
136 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
137 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
143 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
144 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
150 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
151 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
155 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
158 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
160 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
162 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
166 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
169 s->version = s->method->version;
172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
173 static int nid_list[] =
175 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
176 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
177 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
178 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
179 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
180 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
181 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
182 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
183 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
184 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
185 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
186 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
187 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
188 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
189 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
190 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
191 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
192 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
193 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
194 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
195 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
196 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
197 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
198 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
199 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
202 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
204 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
205 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
206 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
208 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
211 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
213 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
216 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
218 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
220 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
222 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
224 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
226 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
228 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
232 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
234 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
236 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
238 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
240 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
244 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
246 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
248 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
250 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
252 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
254 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
256 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
258 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
260 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
262 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
264 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
270 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
273 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
276 unsigned char *ret = p;
278 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
279 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
280 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
285 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
287 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
289 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
290 unsigned long size_str;
293 /* check for enough space.
294 4 for the servername type and entension length
295 2 for servernamelist length
296 1 for the hostname type
297 2 for hostname length
301 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
302 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
305 /* extension type and length */
306 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
309 /* length of servername list */
312 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
313 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
315 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
319 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
324 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
330 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
332 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
335 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
345 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
346 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
348 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
351 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
352 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
353 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
360 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
361 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
362 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
363 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
365 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
366 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
368 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
371 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
372 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
373 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
379 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
380 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
382 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
383 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
384 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
385 * resolves this to two bytes.
387 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
388 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
389 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
391 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
393 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
396 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
397 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
398 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
399 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
401 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
402 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
403 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
405 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
406 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
408 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
412 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
413 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
415 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
418 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
419 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
423 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
429 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
430 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
431 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
433 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
435 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
437 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
440 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
443 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
448 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
449 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
452 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
456 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
458 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
459 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
465 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
467 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
474 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
475 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
476 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
478 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
479 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
481 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
483 /* save position of id len */
484 unsigned char *q = ret;
485 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
486 /* skip over id len */
488 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
494 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
498 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
500 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
501 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
502 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
504 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
509 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
516 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
519 unsigned char *ret = p;
520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
521 int next_proto_neg_seen;
524 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
525 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
529 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
531 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
533 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
535 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
539 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
543 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
549 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
554 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
564 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
565 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
567 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
570 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
571 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
572 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
578 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
579 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
580 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
581 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
582 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
585 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
586 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
588 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
589 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
591 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
592 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
596 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
598 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
603 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
604 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
605 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
607 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
609 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
611 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
614 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
617 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
621 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
622 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
623 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
624 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
625 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
626 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
627 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
628 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
629 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
630 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
631 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
637 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
638 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
639 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
641 const unsigned char *npa;
645 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
646 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
648 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
649 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
651 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
653 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
658 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
665 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
670 unsigned char *data = *p;
671 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
673 s->servername_done = 0;
674 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
680 if (data > (d+n-len))
683 while (data <= (d+n-4))
688 if (data+size > (d+n))
691 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
693 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
694 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
695 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
696 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
698 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
699 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
700 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
701 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
702 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
703 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
704 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
705 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
706 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
707 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
708 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
709 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
710 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
711 the value of the Host: field.
712 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
713 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
714 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
715 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
719 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
721 unsigned char *sdata;
727 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
734 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
741 servname_type = *(sdata++);
747 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
750 if (s->servername_done == 0)
751 switch (servname_type)
753 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
756 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
758 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
761 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
763 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
766 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
768 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
771 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
772 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
773 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
774 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
775 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
776 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
779 s->servername_done = 1;
783 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
784 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
785 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
797 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
804 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
805 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
807 unsigned char *sdata = data;
808 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
810 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
812 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
817 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
819 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
820 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
822 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
823 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
825 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
828 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
829 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
832 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
833 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
834 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
835 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
836 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
839 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
840 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
842 unsigned char *sdata = data;
843 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
844 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
846 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
848 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
853 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
855 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
858 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
859 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
861 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
864 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
865 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
868 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
869 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
870 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
871 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
872 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
875 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
876 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
877 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
878 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
880 unsigned char *sdata = data;
884 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
887 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
888 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
890 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
894 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
895 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
896 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
897 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
899 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
900 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
902 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
907 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
909 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
910 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
912 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
916 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
918 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
920 renegotiate_seen = 1;
922 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
923 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
928 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
932 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
934 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
936 const unsigned char *sdata;
938 /* Read in responder_id_list */
943 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
952 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
959 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
964 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
968 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
973 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
974 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
977 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
978 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
979 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
981 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
982 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
985 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
986 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
988 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
989 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
994 /* Read in request_extensions */
999 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1005 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1006 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1008 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1009 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1011 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1016 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1020 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1023 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1024 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1026 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1029 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1030 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1031 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1032 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1033 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1034 * anything like that, but this might change).
1036 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1037 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1038 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1039 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1040 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1041 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1045 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1053 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1055 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1056 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1058 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1060 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1068 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1069 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1070 * the length of the block. */
1071 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1073 unsigned int off = 0;
1087 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1089 unsigned short length;
1090 unsigned short type;
1091 unsigned short size;
1092 unsigned char *data = *p;
1093 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1094 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1096 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1100 if (data+length != d+n)
1102 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1106 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1111 if (data+size > (d+n))
1114 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1115 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1116 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1118 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1120 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1122 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1125 tlsext_servername = 1;
1128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1129 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1130 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1132 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1133 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1135 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1137 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1140 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1141 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1142 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1144 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1147 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1148 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1150 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1151 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1152 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1153 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1154 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1157 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1159 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1161 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1162 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1164 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1167 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1170 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1173 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1175 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1176 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1177 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1179 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1183 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1186 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1187 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1189 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1193 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1194 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1195 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1196 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1198 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1200 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1202 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1207 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1208 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1210 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1211 * a status request message.
1213 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1215 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1218 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1219 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1222 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1224 unsigned char *selected;
1225 unsigned char selected_len;
1227 /* We must have requested it. */
1228 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
1230 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1233 /* The data must be valid */
1234 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1236 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1239 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1241 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1244 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1245 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1247 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1250 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1251 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1254 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1256 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1258 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1265 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1269 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1271 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1273 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1275 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1276 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1278 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1284 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1294 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1295 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1296 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1297 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1298 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1299 * absence on initial connect only.
1301 if (!renegotiate_seen
1302 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1303 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1305 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1307 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1315 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1318 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1319 * and elliptic curves we support.
1324 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1325 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1327 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1329 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1331 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1332 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1333 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1339 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1342 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1343 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1348 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1349 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1350 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1351 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1353 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1354 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1355 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2;
1356 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1358 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1362 for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <=
1363 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
1366 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1368 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1372 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1374 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1379 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1381 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1382 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1384 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1385 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1387 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1388 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1393 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1397 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1398 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1405 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1408 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1409 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1410 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1413 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1414 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1415 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1416 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1420 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1421 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1426 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1427 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1428 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1429 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1431 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1436 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1438 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1439 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1442 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1443 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1445 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1446 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1450 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1451 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1452 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1453 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1455 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1456 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1457 * the certificate has changed.
1459 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1462 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1465 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1466 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1467 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1469 /* status request response should be sent */
1470 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1471 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1472 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1474 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1476 /* something bad happened */
1477 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1478 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1479 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1484 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1486 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1488 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1489 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1490 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
1494 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1496 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1499 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1500 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1505 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1506 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1507 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1509 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1511 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1512 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1514 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1515 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1517 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1518 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1520 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1521 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1523 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1524 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1527 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1531 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1533 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1534 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1535 * abort the handshake.
1537 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1538 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1546 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1547 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1550 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1551 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1554 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1555 s->servername_done=0;
1561 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1563 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1564 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1567 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, then server
1568 * must return a an EC point formats lists containing uncompressed.
1570 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1571 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1572 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1573 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1575 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1577 unsigned char *list;
1578 int found_uncompressed = 0;
1579 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL) || (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length == 0))
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1584 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1585 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1587 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
1589 found_uncompressed = 1;
1593 if (!found_uncompressed)
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1599 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1600 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1602 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1603 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1604 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1605 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1607 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1608 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
1610 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
1611 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
1613 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1615 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1616 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1619 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
1620 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
1621 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
1622 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
1624 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1625 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1630 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
1633 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
1634 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1637 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
1638 * there is no response.
1640 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1642 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
1643 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
1645 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
1646 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1649 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
1650 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1654 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1655 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1661 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1662 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1665 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1666 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1669 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1670 s->servername_done=0;
1676 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
1677 * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
1678 * session ticket extension at the same time.
1681 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
1682 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
1684 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
1685 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
1688 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
1689 * to permit stateful resumption.
1691 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1694 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
1698 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
1699 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1706 /* Skip past cipher list */
1711 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
1716 /* Now at start of extensions */
1717 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
1720 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
1722 unsigned short type, size;
1725 if (p + size > limit)
1727 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1729 /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will
1730 * trigger a full handshake
1732 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1734 /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
1735 * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
1739 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1740 return 0; /* Cache miss */
1742 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1744 /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of
1745 * generating the session from ticket now,
1746 * trigger abbreviated handshake based on
1747 * external mechanism to calculate the master
1751 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
1759 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
1760 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
1761 SSL_SESSION **psess)
1764 unsigned char *sdec;
1765 const unsigned char *p;
1766 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
1767 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1770 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
1771 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
1774 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1775 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
1776 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
1777 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
1779 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1780 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1791 /* Check key name matches */
1792 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
1794 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
1795 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
1796 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
1797 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
1799 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
1800 * integrity checks on ticket.
1802 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
1805 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1809 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1810 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
1811 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
1812 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
1813 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
1815 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1816 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1817 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1818 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1819 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1822 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1825 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
1826 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
1829 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1832 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1836 /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
1837 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
1838 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
1839 * as required by standard.
1842 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1843 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1845 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
1848 /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
1852 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;