2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
235 static tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
315 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
324 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
387 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
390 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
391 const unsigned char **pcurves,
396 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
397 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
400 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
401 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
405 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
423 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
424 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
428 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
429 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
431 tls_curve_info *cinfo;
434 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
435 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
437 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
438 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
441 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
442 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
444 const unsigned char *curves;
446 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
447 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
449 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
452 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
455 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
457 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
460 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
465 else /* Should never happen */
468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
469 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
471 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
472 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
477 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
478 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
482 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
484 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
485 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
487 /* Can't do anything on client side */
494 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
495 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
498 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
499 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
500 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
501 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
502 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
503 /* Should never happen */
506 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
509 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
511 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
516 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
518 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
519 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
521 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
523 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
527 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
528 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
539 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
540 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
542 unsigned char *clist, *p;
544 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
545 * while curve ids < 32
547 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
548 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
551 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
553 unsigned long idmask;
555 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
557 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
568 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
572 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
577 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
580 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
582 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
586 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
588 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
590 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
592 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
593 if (nid == NID_undef)
594 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
595 if (nid == NID_undef)
596 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
597 if (nid == NID_undef)
599 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
600 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
602 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
605 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
606 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
611 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
615 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
617 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
618 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
623 const EC_METHOD *meth;
626 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
627 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
630 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
633 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
637 /* Determine curve ID */
638 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
639 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
640 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
644 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
656 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
658 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
661 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
663 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
666 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
670 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
671 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
672 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
674 const unsigned char *p;
677 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
678 * is supported (see RFC4492).
680 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
682 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
683 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
684 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
694 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
695 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
697 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
698 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
700 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
705 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
712 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
715 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
717 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
719 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
724 *pformats = ecformats_default;
725 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
727 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
729 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
733 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
734 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
736 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
738 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
741 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
744 /* If not EC nothing to do */
745 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
750 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
754 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
755 * supported curves extension.
757 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
760 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
761 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
763 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
770 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
771 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
772 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
773 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
774 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
776 return 0; /* Should never happen */
777 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
778 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
780 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
784 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
787 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
792 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
793 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
795 unsigned char curve_id[2];
796 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
797 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
798 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
799 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
802 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
803 * no other curves permitted.
807 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
808 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
809 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
810 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
811 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
815 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
816 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
818 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
819 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
821 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
824 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
829 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
835 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
837 /* Need a shared curve */
838 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
849 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
851 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
855 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
861 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
866 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
870 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
871 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
874 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
875 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
877 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
880 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
881 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
883 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
886 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
887 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
889 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
892 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
893 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
894 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
895 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
897 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
899 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
900 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
903 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
904 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
907 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
911 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
912 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
913 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
916 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
918 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
922 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
924 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
925 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
926 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
928 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
929 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
932 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
933 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
937 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
938 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
940 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
941 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
943 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
945 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
950 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
951 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
954 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
955 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
957 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
958 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
960 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
961 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
962 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
963 /* Should never happen */
966 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
967 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
973 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
975 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
976 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
977 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
979 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
989 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
991 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
994 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
998 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1000 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1003 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1011 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1015 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1016 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1017 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1019 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1022 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1023 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1028 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1034 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1035 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1036 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1042 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1045 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1046 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1050 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1051 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1052 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1053 * session and not global settings.
1056 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1061 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1062 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1063 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1066 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1067 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1068 * signature algorithms.
1070 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1071 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1072 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1074 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1077 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1079 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1080 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1084 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1085 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1087 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1088 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1090 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1094 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1097 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1099 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1102 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1104 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1106 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1109 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1112 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1113 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1115 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1117 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1120 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1121 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1123 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1125 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1127 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1128 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1129 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1130 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1139 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1140 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1141 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1146 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1148 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1150 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1151 unsigned long size_str;
1154 /* check for enough space.
1155 4 for the servername type and entension length
1156 2 for servernamelist length
1157 1 for the hostname type
1158 2 for hostname length
1162 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1163 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1166 /* extension type and length */
1167 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1168 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1170 /* length of servername list */
1171 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1173 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1174 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1176 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1180 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1185 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1191 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1193 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1196 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1206 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1207 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1208 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1210 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1211 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1217 /* check for enough space.
1218 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1219 1 for the srp user identity
1220 + srp user identity length
1222 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1224 /* fill in the extension */
1225 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1226 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1227 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1228 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1236 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1238 const unsigned char *plist;
1241 unsigned char *etmp;
1243 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1245 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1246 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1253 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1254 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1255 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1256 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1259 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1260 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1261 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1263 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1264 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1265 if (plistlen > 65532)
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1272 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1274 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1275 for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
1277 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1284 plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
1286 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1287 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1288 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1289 * resolves this to two bytes.
1291 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1295 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1297 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1300 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1301 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1302 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1303 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1305 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1306 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1307 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1309 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1310 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1312 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1316 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1317 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1319 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1322 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1323 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1327 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1333 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1336 const unsigned char *salg;
1337 unsigned char *etmp;
1338 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1339 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1341 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1343 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1345 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1346 /* Fill in lengths */
1347 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1352 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1353 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1355 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1357 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1359 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1362 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1365 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1370 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1373 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1377 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1379 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1380 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1386 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1388 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1395 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1397 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1399 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1400 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1402 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1404 /* save position of id len */
1405 unsigned char *q = ret;
1406 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1407 /* skip over id len */
1409 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1415 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1419 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1420 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1422 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1425 * 1: peer may send requests
1426 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1428 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1429 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1431 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1435 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1437 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1438 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1439 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1441 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1446 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1448 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1450 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1451 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1452 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1453 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1454 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1455 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1458 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1462 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1464 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1466 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1469 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1477 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1478 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1481 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1483 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1485 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1486 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1488 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1489 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1490 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1494 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1498 return NULL; /* error */
1499 if (cb_retval == -1)
1500 continue; /* skip this extension */
1502 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1504 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1506 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1510 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1511 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1515 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1516 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1518 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1519 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1521 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1523 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1524 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1525 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1526 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1528 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1530 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1532 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1538 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1540 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1545 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1548 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1552 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1555 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1556 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1558 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1560 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1563 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1564 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1565 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1566 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1568 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1569 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1573 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1575 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1577 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1579 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1583 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1587 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1593 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1595 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1598 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1610 const unsigned char *plist;
1612 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1615 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1617 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1618 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1625 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1626 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1627 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1628 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1632 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1633 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1635 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1637 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1638 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1642 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1644 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1645 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1649 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1650 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1652 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1654 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1656 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1659 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1662 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1671 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1673 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1675 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1678 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1686 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1687 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1688 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1689 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1690 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1691 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1692 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1693 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1694 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1695 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1696 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1702 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1703 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1705 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1707 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1710 * 1: peer may send requests
1711 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1713 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1714 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1716 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1722 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1723 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1724 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1726 const unsigned char *npa;
1727 unsigned int npalen;
1730 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1731 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1733 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1734 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1736 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1738 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1743 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
1745 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1746 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1749 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
1751 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1754 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1758 return NULL; /* error */
1759 if (cb_retval == -1)
1760 continue; /* skip this extension */
1761 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1763 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1765 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1768 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1769 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1771 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1772 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1774 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1775 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1778 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1784 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1786 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1787 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1789 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1791 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1795 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1799 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1802 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1806 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1808 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1809 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1810 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1813 * returns: 0 on success. */
1814 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1815 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1819 const unsigned char *selected;
1820 unsigned char selected_len;
1823 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1829 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1830 * length-prefixed strings. */
1831 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1832 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1841 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1843 proto_len = data[i];
1849 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1855 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1856 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1857 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1858 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1859 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1860 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1861 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1863 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1866 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1867 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1872 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1877 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1878 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1879 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1884 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1885 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1886 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1887 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1889 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1890 unsigned short type, size;
1891 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1892 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1893 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1894 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1895 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1896 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1897 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1899 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1900 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1901 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1902 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1905 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1906 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1907 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1908 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1909 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1910 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1911 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1912 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1913 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1914 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1917 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1926 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1929 if (data+size > d+n)
1933 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1935 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1936 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1938 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1940 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1942 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1947 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1949 if (data + len != d+n)
1951 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1955 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1957 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1959 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1961 unsigned short type;
1962 unsigned short size;
1964 unsigned char *data = *p;
1965 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1968 s->servername_done = 0;
1969 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1971 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1974 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1976 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1977 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1980 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1981 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1982 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1984 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1985 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1989 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1990 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1994 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1995 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1996 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1998 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1999 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2001 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2002 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2004 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2005 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2007 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2008 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2010 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2011 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2013 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2014 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2017 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2018 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2021 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2025 if (data > (d+n-len))
2028 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2033 if (data+size > (d+n))
2036 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2038 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2039 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2040 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2041 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2043 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2044 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2045 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2046 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2047 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2048 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2049 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2050 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2051 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2052 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2053 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2054 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2055 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2056 the value of the Host: field.
2057 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2058 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2059 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2060 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2064 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2066 unsigned char *sdata;
2072 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2079 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2086 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2092 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2095 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2096 switch (servname_type)
2098 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2101 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2103 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2106 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2108 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2111 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2113 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2116 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2117 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2118 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2119 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2120 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2121 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2124 s->servername_done = 1;
2128 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2129 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2130 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2142 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2148 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2150 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2152 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2155 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2157 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2160 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2162 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2163 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2165 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2167 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2174 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2176 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2177 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2179 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2180 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2182 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2187 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2189 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2190 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2192 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2193 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2195 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2198 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2199 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2202 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2203 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2204 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2205 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2206 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2209 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2211 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2212 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2213 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2215 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2216 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2218 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2223 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2225 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2228 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2229 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2231 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2234 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2235 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2238 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2239 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2240 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2241 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2242 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2245 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2246 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2247 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2249 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2253 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2256 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2257 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2259 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2263 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2264 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2265 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2266 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2268 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2269 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2271 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2276 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2278 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2279 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2281 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2285 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2287 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2289 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2291 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2294 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2296 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2301 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2303 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2306 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2308 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2311 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2314 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2317 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2318 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2322 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2327 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2331 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2333 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2335 const unsigned char *sdata;
2337 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2342 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2351 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2355 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2359 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2364 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2368 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2373 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2374 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2377 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2378 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2379 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2381 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2382 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2385 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2386 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2388 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2389 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2394 /* Read in request_extensions */
2397 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2404 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2410 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2412 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2413 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2416 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2417 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2419 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2420 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2422 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2427 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2431 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2434 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2438 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2439 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2441 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2442 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2443 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2445 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2451 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2452 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2453 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2455 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2458 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2459 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2460 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2461 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2462 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2463 * anything like that, but this might change).
2465 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2466 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2467 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2468 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2469 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2470 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2474 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2475 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2476 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2478 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2481 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2482 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2486 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2487 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2489 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2493 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2494 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2495 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2496 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2497 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2499 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2501 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2503 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2505 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2506 if (type == record->ext_type)
2508 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2513 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2514 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2515 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2525 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2527 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2528 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2530 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2532 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2535 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2536 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2537 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2542 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2545 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2547 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2551 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2560 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2561 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2562 * the length of the block. */
2563 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2565 unsigned int off = 0;
2579 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2581 unsigned short length;
2582 unsigned short type;
2583 unsigned short size;
2584 unsigned char *data = *p;
2585 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2586 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2589 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2592 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2594 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2595 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2599 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2600 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2603 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2604 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2607 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2611 if (data+length != d+n)
2613 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2617 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2622 if (data+size > (d+n))
2625 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2626 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2627 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2629 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2631 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2633 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2636 tlsext_servername = 1;
2639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2640 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2642 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2643 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2645 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2647 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2650 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2651 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2652 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2654 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2657 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2658 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2660 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2661 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2662 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2663 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2664 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2667 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2669 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2671 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2672 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2674 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2677 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2679 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2682 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2684 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2685 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2687 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2691 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2694 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2695 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2697 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2701 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2702 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2703 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2704 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2706 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2708 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2710 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2715 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2717 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2718 * a status request message.
2720 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2722 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2725 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2726 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2728 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2729 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2730 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2732 unsigned char *selected;
2733 unsigned char selected_len;
2735 /* We must have requested it. */
2736 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2738 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2741 /* The data must be valid */
2742 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2744 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2747 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2749 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2752 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2753 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2755 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2758 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2759 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2760 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2764 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2768 /* We must have requested it. */
2769 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2771 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2776 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2779 /* The extension data consists of:
2780 * uint16 list_length
2781 * uint8 proto_length;
2782 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2786 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2788 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2792 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2794 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2797 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2798 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2799 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2800 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2802 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2805 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2806 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2809 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2811 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2813 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2816 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2820 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2821 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2823 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2824 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2825 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2827 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2832 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2834 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2838 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2839 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2841 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2844 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2846 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2848 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2849 if (record->ext_type == type)
2851 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2857 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2858 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2860 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2861 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2862 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2871 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2875 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2877 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2879 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2881 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2882 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2884 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2890 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2900 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2901 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2902 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2903 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2904 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2905 * absence on initial connect only.
2907 if (!renegotiate_seen
2908 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2909 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2911 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2913 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2921 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2924 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2928 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2930 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2935 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2937 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2938 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2940 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2941 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2943 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2944 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2949 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2953 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2954 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2961 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2966 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2968 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2969 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2971 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2972 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2973 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2975 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2976 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2980 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2981 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2982 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2983 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2985 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2987 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2988 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2989 * so this has to happen here in
2990 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2994 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2996 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2999 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3000 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3005 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3006 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3007 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3009 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3011 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3012 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3014 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3015 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3017 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3018 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3020 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3021 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3023 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3024 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3027 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3031 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3033 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3034 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3035 * abort the handshake.
3037 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3038 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3046 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3047 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3050 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3051 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3054 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3055 s->servername_done=0;
3061 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3063 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3066 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3067 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3068 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3069 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3071 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3074 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3075 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3076 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3077 if (certpkey == NULL)
3079 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3082 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3083 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3085 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3086 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3089 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3090 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3091 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3093 /* status request response should be sent */
3094 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3095 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3096 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3098 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3100 /* something bad happened */
3101 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3102 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3103 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3108 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3113 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3114 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3117 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3118 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3126 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3128 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3129 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3132 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3133 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3134 * it must contain uncompressed.
3136 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3137 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3138 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3139 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3140 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3142 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3144 unsigned char *list;
3145 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3146 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3147 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3149 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3151 found_uncompressed = 1;
3155 if (!found_uncompressed)
3157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3161 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3162 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3164 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3165 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3166 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3167 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3169 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3170 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3172 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3173 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3175 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3177 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3178 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3181 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3182 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3183 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3184 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3186 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3187 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3192 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3195 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3196 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3199 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3200 * there is no response.
3202 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3204 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3205 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3207 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3208 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3211 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3212 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3216 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3217 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3223 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3224 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3227 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3228 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3231 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3232 s->servername_done=0;
3238 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3241 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3243 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3245 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3249 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3257 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3258 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3259 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3261 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3262 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3263 * extension, if any.
3264 * len: the length of the session ID.
3265 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3266 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3267 * point to the resulting session.
3269 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3270 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3271 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3274 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3275 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3276 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3277 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3278 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3279 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3280 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3283 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3284 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3285 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3286 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3287 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3288 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3290 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3291 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3293 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3294 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3298 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3300 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3301 * to permit stateful resumption.
3303 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3305 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3309 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3317 /* Skip past cipher list */
3322 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3327 /* Now at start of extensions */
3328 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3331 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3333 unsigned short type, size;
3336 if (p + size > limit)
3338 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3343 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3344 * currently have one. */
3345 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3348 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3350 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3351 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3352 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3353 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3354 * calculate the master secret later. */
3357 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3360 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3361 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3363 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3365 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3366 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3368 default: /* fatal error */
3377 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3379 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3380 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3381 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3382 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3383 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3384 * point to the resulting session.
3387 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3388 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3389 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3390 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3392 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3393 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3394 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3397 unsigned char *sdec;
3398 const unsigned char *p;
3399 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3400 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3403 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3404 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3407 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3408 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3409 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3410 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3412 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3413 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3424 /* Check key name matches */
3425 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3427 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3428 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3429 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3430 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3432 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3433 * integrity checks on ticket.
3435 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3438 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3442 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3443 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3444 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3445 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3446 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3448 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3449 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3450 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3451 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3452 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3455 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3458 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3459 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3461 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3466 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3469 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3473 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3474 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3475 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3476 * as required by standard.
3479 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3480 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3488 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3493 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3501 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3502 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3503 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3504 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3505 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3506 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3507 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3510 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3511 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3512 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3513 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3516 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3519 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3521 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3527 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3530 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3532 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3533 return table[i].nid;
3538 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3543 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3544 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3547 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3550 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3551 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3555 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3557 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3558 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3565 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3568 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3569 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3572 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3574 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3577 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3579 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3580 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3581 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3583 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3584 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3586 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3587 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3588 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3590 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3591 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3595 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3599 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3601 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3604 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3606 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3607 #ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
3608 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3611 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3612 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3614 return inf->mfunc();
3617 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3622 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3623 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3626 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3627 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3629 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3630 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3631 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3637 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3638 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3639 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3641 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3642 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3644 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3646 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3647 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3649 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3651 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3653 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3654 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3656 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3660 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3661 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3662 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3664 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3667 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3668 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3670 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3671 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3672 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3674 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3675 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3677 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3678 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3681 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3682 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3683 * then RSA is disabled.
3686 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3688 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3689 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3690 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3691 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3692 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3693 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3696 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3697 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3702 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3703 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3708 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3709 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3714 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3715 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3722 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3724 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3726 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3729 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3730 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3732 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3734 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3736 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3738 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3739 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3742 return tmpout - out;
3745 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3746 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3747 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3748 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3750 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3751 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3752 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3754 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3755 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3757 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3759 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3764 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3765 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3766 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3768 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3779 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3780 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3782 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3783 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3785 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3787 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3788 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3790 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3791 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3793 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3794 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3796 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3797 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3799 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3801 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3802 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3805 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3806 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3810 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3811 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3817 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3818 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3820 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3823 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3826 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3827 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3828 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3833 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3835 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3841 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3842 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3843 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3845 /* Should never happen */
3849 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3850 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3851 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3852 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3854 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3855 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3857 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3859 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3860 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3862 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3863 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3865 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3867 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3869 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3872 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3873 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3874 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3875 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3876 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3878 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3879 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3885 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3886 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3888 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3889 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3891 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3892 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3893 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3894 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3896 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3897 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3902 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3903 * use the certificate for signing.
3905 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3907 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3908 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3911 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3912 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3915 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3917 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3918 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3922 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3923 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3930 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3931 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3932 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3934 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3940 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3947 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3949 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3952 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3953 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3954 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3956 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3957 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3961 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3963 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3965 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3967 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3969 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3970 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3976 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3978 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3979 unsigned short hbtype;
3980 unsigned int payload;
3981 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3983 if (s->msg_callback)
3984 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3985 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3986 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3988 /* Read type and payload length first */
3989 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3990 return 0; /* silently discard */
3993 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3994 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3997 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3999 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
4002 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
4003 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
4004 * payload, plus padding
4006 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4009 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4010 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4012 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4014 /* Random padding */
4015 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4017 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4019 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4020 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4021 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4022 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4024 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4029 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4033 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4034 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4035 * sequence number */
4038 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4041 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4049 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4051 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4053 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4054 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4056 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4057 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4058 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4064 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4065 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4071 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4072 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4074 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4078 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4079 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4081 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4083 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4084 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4085 * some random stuff.
4086 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4087 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4088 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4089 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4092 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4095 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4096 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4098 /* Sequence number */
4099 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4100 /* 16 random bytes */
4101 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4103 /* Random padding */
4104 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4106 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4109 if (s->msg_callback)
4110 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4111 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4112 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4114 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4123 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4128 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4131 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4133 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4136 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4137 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4139 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4141 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4143 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4151 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4152 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4153 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4154 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4155 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4156 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4159 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4160 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4161 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4162 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4165 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4167 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4168 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4171 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4172 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4176 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4177 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4178 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4182 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4186 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4189 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4191 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4196 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4197 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4199 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4201 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4202 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4203 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4204 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4206 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4214 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4215 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4216 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4217 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4221 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4222 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4223 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4224 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4230 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4234 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4238 if (default_nid == -1)
4240 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4242 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4243 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4244 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4248 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4249 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4253 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4254 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4256 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4262 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4263 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4264 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4265 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4268 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4270 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4271 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4272 /* Strict mode flags */
4273 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4274 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4275 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4277 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4282 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4283 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4285 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4286 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4289 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4293 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4296 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4298 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4300 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4301 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4304 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4305 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4306 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4308 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4309 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4318 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4321 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4322 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4323 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4325 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4333 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4334 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4335 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4338 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4344 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4345 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4348 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4351 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4352 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4354 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4359 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4360 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4361 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4362 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4363 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4366 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4367 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4368 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4369 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4373 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4374 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4382 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4383 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4386 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4389 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4390 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4392 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4395 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4403 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4404 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4406 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4409 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4410 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4411 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4413 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4418 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4426 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4427 else if(check_flags)
4428 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4430 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4431 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4432 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4433 else if (!check_flags)
4436 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4437 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4438 else if (strict_mode)
4440 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4441 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4443 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4444 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4448 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4456 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4458 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4463 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4466 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4469 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4474 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4475 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4476 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4477 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4478 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4483 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4488 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4492 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4493 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4495 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4497 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4499 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4503 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4507 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4510 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4512 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4513 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4515 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4517 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4518 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4520 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4522 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4524 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4525 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4527 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4532 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4536 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4538 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4539 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4543 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4545 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4546 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4547 else if (cpk->digest)
4548 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4551 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4553 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4554 * if the chain is invalid.
4558 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4559 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4562 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4563 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4570 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4571 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4573 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4574 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4575 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4576 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4577 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4578 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4580 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4581 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4583 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4589 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4591 int dh_secbits = 80;
4592 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4593 return DH_get_1024_160();
4594 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4596 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4603 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4604 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4607 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4614 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4615 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4616 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4618 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4619 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4626 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4627 return DH_get_2048_224();
4628 return DH_get_1024_160();
4632 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4635 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4638 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4639 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4644 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4646 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4649 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4651 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4652 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4653 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4654 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4657 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4658 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4661 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4663 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4666 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4669 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4672 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4673 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4677 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4678 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4680 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4681 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4685 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4686 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4687 * not sending one to the peer.
4688 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4691 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4693 int rv, start_idx, i;
4696 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4702 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4706 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4708 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4709 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);